Memory Poisoning Scanner

@guardbee/mcp-memory-poisoning-scanner

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An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans agent code for memory poisoning — untrusted input written into an agent's *persistent, cross-session* memory that later gets recalled and fed back to the model as trusted context, potentially in a completely unrelated future session.

prompt-injection-scanner catches an injection payload sitting in content the model reads once (a document, a scraped page). This package catches something structurally different: the code pattern that lets an injection payload become part of what the model treats as its own long-term knowledge — the same gap between reflected and stored XSS, applied to an agent's memory instead of a browser's DOM.

Telemetry is off by default. With GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1 it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields like content, token or password are replaced with a placeholder. See @guardbee/mcp-telemetry.

Claude ──► memory-poisoning-scanner ──► Your agent's source

│ ├─ memory-write (untrusted input persisted into archival/core memory or a vector KB) └─ memory-readback (recalled memory fed into a system/assistant-role message or prompt)

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Why ordinary conversation memory is out of scope

A ConversationBufferMemory holding raw chat turns, or a plain chatHistory.push({role: "user", content: userInput}), is completely normal — that's just conversation history, not a vulnerability. This package deliberately does not flag that.

What it targets is narrower and higher-stakes: writes to *persistent* memory that outlives the current conversation — MemGPT-style archival memory (recalled across future, unrelated sessions) and core memory (re-injected into the system prompt on *every* turn by design), or a vector store used as a long-term knowledge base rather than per-conversation RAG context. If untrusted input lands there unsanitized, it doesn't just influence the current exchange — it becomes part of what the agent believes is true, for anyone, indefinitely, until someone happens to notice.

The second half of the risk is symmetric: a memory/vector retrieval result flowing directly into a system/assistant-role message or a prompt template is where a poisoned memory "cashes out" as an instruction the model obeys rather than data it merely reads.

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Features

• 5 memory-write patterns: MemGPT archival_memory_insert/core_memory_append/core_memory_replace fed raw input, vector store add_texts/add_documents/upsert fed raw input, and a generic catch-all for custom-named long-term-memory/knowledge-base stores
• 3 memory-readback patterns: archival/vector retrieval results flowing into a system/assistant-role message, or interpolated directly into a prompt template
• SARIF 2.1.0 output — CI/CD integration (GitHub Code Scanning, etc.)
• Config file support via guardbee.yml
• 17 unit tests — a positive and a negative (false-positive) scenario for every pattern, including an explicit check that ordinary conversation-buffer usage produces zero findings. End-to-end verified against a realistic planted-vulnerability fixture (caught both the write and the read-back) and the entire guardbee-mcp monorepo (386 files, zero false positives in production code)

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Quick Start

Claude Desktop / MCP Client

{

"mcpServers": { "guardbee-memory-poisoning-scanner": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-memory-poisoning-scanner"] } } }

CLI (CI/CD)

npx @guardbee/mcp-memory-poisoning-scanner scan ./src --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarif

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MCP Tools

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Detected Patterns

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Configuration (guardbee.yml)

memory-poisoning-scanner:

fail-on: high # any | critical | high | medium | none max-files: 5000 exclude:

• ".test.ts"

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Limitations (by design)

• Heuristic, not taint tracking. The write and read-back checks each look at one bounded location, not a proven data-flow path from a specific write to a specific later read. A finding means the *shape* of the risk is present in the code, not a mathematically confirmed exploit chain.
• Pattern coverage is MemGPT-terminology and generic-JS-naming based. A custom-built long-term memory system using entirely different function/variable names won't be recognized unless it happens to match the generic patterns (*memory*/*knowledge_base* naming, or a vectorstore-style API).
• This finds code patterns that enable memory poisoning, not an actual poisoned memory store at runtime — pair it with prompt-injection-scanner (for scanning what's actually stored) if you can inspect the memory contents directly.

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Development

npm run build

npm test # 17 unit tests

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License

MIT — GuardBee

Feedback

Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.