Obsideo MCP

Obsideo MCP server

Give any MCP-capable agent (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, ...) durable storage that is encrypted on your machine before it is uploaded and that you can independently prove is still held. Zero setup: the first put/get/ls auto-creates a free no-email trial account (100 MB, proof-of-work instead of identity), so storage just works with nothing to configure. Want more? Self-serve signup from inside the conversation upgrades to 8 GB free, no card, no CAPTCHA, no expiry; 16 GB after the account holder answers eight questions in the Drive web app.

Obsideo is S3-compatible object storage where every stored object is replicated to 3 providers and challenged with chunk-level merkle proofs on a continuous cycle; providers are paid only for proofs they pass. 8 GB free with an email, no card; 16 GB after eight questions in the Drive web app. Paid plans are 200 GB blocks at $5/month each by card (Stripe), started from the upgrade tool and paid on Stripe's own page; the plan never changes size without the human's agreement.

Privacy posture (read this first)

• This server runs on YOUR machine. Obsideo never hosts it. Credentials, the account signing key, and the encryption key live in ~/.obsideo/ and are sent nowhere except the endpoints they authenticate against.
• The account signing key is generated locally; only the public half is ever sent. Keep ~/.obsideo/signing.pem private. Re-running signup rotates credentials and the keypair with no overlap, so do not re-run casually.
• Encrypted by default. put encrypts client-side (AES-256-GCM) with a locally generated, user-held key before anything leaves the machine, so the platform stores ciphertext it is architecturally incapable of reading. Pass encrypt: false only when another tool must read the stored bytes directly (S3 interop).

Back up your key

The encryption key is generated on your machine when the account is created and written to ~/.obsideo/mcp.json. Obsideo does not have a copy and cannot recover it. If that file is lost, every encrypted object is permanently unreadable, no matter how many providers still hold it and how many proofs it passes. Replication protects against providers losing your bytes; it does not protect against you losing your key. Call backup_keys with a destination right after signup and keep the archive somewhere you would still have after losing this machine. Encrypted objects are readable only with this key: there is no sharing of encrypted objects between people or machines today, so treat an account as one person's.

~/.obsideo/roots.json is written alongside it: the merkle root of each object as committed at upload time. It holds no secrets, and it is what lets verify prove providers hold *your* bytes without re-uploading them. Encryption uses a fresh IV per upload, so ciphertext cannot be recomputed from a plaintext file later; this record is what keeps the strong proof available for encrypted objects. Losing it costs you strength of proof, not data. If it is damaged, the server moves it aside unchanged and says so in the next result, rather than overwriting it.

Install

Claude Desktop, one click: download obsideo-mcp.mcpb from the latest release, then Settings -> Extensions and drag the file in. No Node or npm setup needed.

Everything else, via npx:

{

"mcpServers": { "obsideo": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "obsideo-mcp"] } } }

(Claude Desktop: claude_desktop_config.json. Claude Code: claude mcp add obsideo -- npx -y obsideo-mcp. Cursor/Cline: their MCP settings, same command.)

Hermes Agent: paste https://obsideo.io/agent-storage to your Hermes and say "set this up". That page is a runbook the agent executes: install, first store, first proof, then the free tier (8 GB) with your email. The install it runs is one command on any OS (Node 18 or newer is required for npx):

hermes mcp add obsideo --command npx --args -y obsideo-mcp

It writes the server into Hermes's own config, connects, lists the 13 tools and asks which to enable (leave out rm if you would rather the agent had no delete tool). Then /reload-mcp in a running session, or start a new one. The tools appear as mcp_obsideo_put, mcp_obsideo_get, mcp_obsideo_verify and so on. Manual alternative: the same mcpServers block as above, under the mcp_servers: key of Hermes's config.yaml. First thing to try: ask Hermes to store its own MEMORY.md on obsideo, then to verify it.

Tools

Paying, and what an agent is allowed to do

upgrade returns a link. That is all it does. The human opens it, sees the exact monthly amount, and pays or closes the tab; the quota rises after payment. An existing plan is never resized from this server: near the top of a tier Obsideo emails an agree link, and the human's click is the only thing that changes the bill. portal returns the Stripe portal link for cancelling, changing the card and downloading invoices. Cancelling keeps everything stored and readable; the account returns to its free quota at the end of the paid period.

verify

Challenges every provider holding the object directly, on one randomly chosen chunk each, and compares each answer on this machine against a merkle root. For objects this server uploaded, that is the root recorded locally at upload time, so a pass means the provider holds *your* bytes rather than agreeing with the others. Objects uploaded elsewhere can be checked against a file you pass as local_path. With neither, it falls back to the coordinator's root and says so.

The coordinator still chooses which providers to ask and where to reach them, issues the challenge tokens, and lists the public keys that providers' signatures are checked against. The result states which of these it relied on. When a provider fails the proof or cannot be challenged, the result says so first and speaks only for the providers that passed.

What it is good for

App file storage, automated backups (databases, snapshots, state), agent artifacts and memory that must survive sessions and machines, provable offsite copies. Not a CDN, not a queryable database, not sub-millisecond storage; Obsideo stores objects and backup artifacts.

Full integration contract (per-step postconditions, error table): obsideo.io/agents.md

Transport

From 0.7.0, put / get / ls / rm talk to the coordinator and to the storage providers it names, the same path verify has always used. There is no S3 gateway hop and no wait for freshly minted credentials to propagate: the account's coordinator API key is valid the moment signup returns, so the first put after signup works at once (measured 0.8 s on production). Configs that predate the coordinator key, or OBSIDEO_TRANSPORT=s3, keep using the S3 gateway with the SigV4 keypair; nothing about stored objects changes between the two, and the same S3 credentials still work with rclone, boto3 and any other S3 client.

Verified

Every tool in this server is exercised end to end against production before release: a freshly minted trial, then an encrypted put / byte-exact get / ls / rm over the direct transport (test/e2e_prod.mjs, which identifies itself so it is excluded from funnel measurement), plus labeled-error passthrough from the signup service. Unit tests run the transport against mock coordinator and provider servers (npm test).

License

PolyForm Shield 1.0.0 from version 0.6.2 (see LICENSE). In plain terms: you may use, read, audit, modify and redistribute this server for any purpose except building a product or service that competes with Obsideo. That keeps the client auditable, which the product depends on, without handing the work to a competitor. Versions 0.6.1 and earlier remain under MIT as published. The storage provider node (obsideo-provider) is and stays MIT.

Privacy Policy

This extension runs entirely on your machine. Credentials, your account signing key, and any client-side encryption key are stored locally in ~/.obsideo/mcp.json and are never sent to or hosted by Obsideo. Conversation content from your AI assistant is not collected; only the tool calls you make (for example an upload) reach the storage service.

Full policy: https://obsideo.io/privacy/