Secure Telegram

Connect Claude, Cursor, or any MCP client to Telegram — without handing any of them your whole account.

*The demo runs against synthetic data — no real Telegram connection, no usable credential.*

❌ The usual Telegram MCP setup

• The AI client holds your full account session — every chat, every contact, every write.
• Access is all-or-nothing: your work agent can read your family group.
• The session credential sits in plaintext in a config file or .env.

✅ With secure-telegram-mcp

• Each AI client gets an endpoint: its own API key, scoped to the chats and folders you pick.
• Read/write verbs are re-checked on every call and fail closed — the tool menu is discovery, not authority.
• The Telegram session is encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, scrypt-wrapped keys), machine-bound by default or PIN-protected.

For example:

Every MCP connection authenticates with one endpoint key and receives a scope-bound Telegram adapter for that endpoint's account; without a key, a client can only list the tools. Endpoints can ride different logged-in accounts; endpoints on the same account share one background Telegram connection. Out-of-scope chats are not addressable at all.

Features

• 🔑 Per-endpoint API keys — each AI client gets its own key and scope, pinned to one of your logged-in accounts (one or many); only salted key hashes are stored.
• 📁 Folder-scoped access — bind an endpoint to Telegram folders, chats, or channels; write access is opt-in per endpoint.
• 🔒 Encrypted session at rest — AES-256-GCM envelopes for sessions and policy; PIN, recovery-keyfile, and machine-bound unlock slots.
• 🚦 Anti-ban pacing — per-account token buckets on messages, forwards, and search, plus a circuit breaker that backs the whole account off at the first sign of saturation. Pacing lowers the risk of flood limits; nothing can guarantee against a ban.
• 👤 Human-in-the-loop writes — optional per-endpoint confirmation; requires a client that supports MCP elicitation. On clients that don't, a confirm-writes endpoint fails closed: writes are blocked, never silent.
• ⛔ No raw MTProto surface — no invoke escape hatch, no model-accessible scope mutation; a CI architecture guard keeps it that way.

Quickstart

Prerequisites: Node.js ≥ 20.10 and Telegram api_id/api_hash from my.telegram.org/apps.

1. Run setup

npx -y secure-telegram-mcp setup

Setup walks you through, in order:

1. Telegram app credentials — the api_id / api_hash from the prerequisite link.
2. Login method — QR code (scan from a phone that's already logged in) or phone number + code. If your account has two-step verification, setup also asks for that password.
3. Session name — press Enter to accept the suggestion (your Telegram username, or main if you have none).
4. PIN or no PIN — default is no PIN (encryption keyed to this machine, nothing to unlock). With a PIN you re-enter it after each reboot; a forgotten PIN is unrecoverable.
5. Endpoint — name it, then pick chats/folders in the picker: r or Space grants read, w write, s saves, ? shows the full keymap.

At exit the endpoint's API key is printed once, inside a ready-to-paste client config — copy it before closing the terminal. Hit a snag? See Troubleshooting.

2. Add the endpoint to *one* MCP client

{

"mcpServers": { "telegram": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "secure-telegram-mcp", "connect"], "env": { "TELEGRAM_MCP_ENDPOINT_TOKEN": "tgmcp_..." } } } }

The token alone selects and authorizes the endpoint — no api_id, api_hash, or PIN material ever goes into client config. Setup prints one block per endpoint; each goes only into its own client — combining entries in one client intentionally grants it the union of the scopes.

Claude Code

claude mcp add telegram --env TELEGRAM_MCP_ENDPOINT_TOKEN=tgmcp_... -- npx -y secure-telegram-mcp connect

Claude Desktop

Add the JSON block above to claude_desktop_config.json (Settings → Developer → Edit Config).

Cursor

Run setup first, then click and replace the placeholder token — or add the JSON block above to ~/.cursor/mcp.json yourself.

VS Code

VS Code prompts for the endpoint token as a masked secret — it never lands in a settings file in plain sight of other extensions' recommendations.

Docker

See Usage and operations → Docker for the setup and stdio-connect containers.

3. Unlock (PIN posture only)

If you kept the default machine-bound protection, skip this — the service starts automatically when a client connects. With a PIN:

npx -y secure-telegram-mcp start

Enter the PIN interactively; clients never need it. Multi-client examples, unattended unlock, environment variables, and manual policy editing live in Usage and operations.

Tools

18 tools, gated by 8 permission verbs that are checked at execution time.

Forwarding is two-sided: read on the source chat *and* forward on the destination. Sending local media is a deliberate two-phase flow — prepare_media returns an opaque, expiring handle for a file inside the confined media root; send_media consumes it. The full catalogue and verb semantics are in Usage and operations.

Security model

• One local service owns the encrypted Telegram session and the sealed policy; MCP shims never open a second Telegram session.
• Every call re-verifies the endpoint token against the current sealed policy, so rotating a key revokes live connections.
• There is no raw MTProto tool and no way for the model to widen its own scope.
• Writes pass ACL → optional human confirmation → quota → audit, in that order, and fail closed at each gate.
• Telegram prose is Unicode-sanitized (control/format characters stripped, length-capped) before it reaches the model; writes, denials, and media egress land in an append-only NDJSON audit log.
• Known limits: the enforcement boundary is your local OS user; endpoint ACLs cannot shrink what the underlying full-account session could do if the process itself were compromised; sanitization cannot neutralize semantic prompt injection.

A read-only endpoint attempting send_message is stopped at the ACL gate and audited — one NDJSON line, no message content:

{"v":1,"timestampIso":"2026-07-17T09:41:22.310Z","endpointName":"work","verb":"send","outcome":"deny","targetChatId":"-1001234567890","reason":"VERB_NOT_GRANTED"}

The client sees only an ACL_DENIED error. An out-of-scope peer denies the same way, with PEER_OUT_OF_SCOPE.

Read the complete threat model — including non-objectives and residual risks — before pointing this at a Telegram account you care about. Component boundaries are in Architecture.

Documentation

• Usage and operations — clients, endpoints, commands, environment variables, Docker, media, tool catalogue.
• Security — threat model, guarantees, residual risks, hardened deployment.
• Architecture — process ownership, trust boundaries, policy lifecycle.
• Example configuration — schema-valid, deliberately unusable placeholders.

Development

npm run ci     # typecheck + lint + architecture guard + knip + tests

npm run build

The architecture guard rejects forbidden MCP surfaces and unreviewed MTProto request constructors; ESLint enforces dependency boundaries and confines GramJS to the infrastructure layer. See CONTRIBUTING.md before opening a PR.

License

MIT

*Unofficial project: not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Telegram FZ-LLC. "Telegram" is a trademark of Telegram FZ-LLC. This software connects to the Telegram API; each user supplies their own API credentials.*