Attack Surface MCP Server

@cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server Passive external attack-surface mapping: CT subdomains, DNS, TLS, HTTP posture, RDAP/WHOIS, Shodan via MCP. STDIO or Streamable HTTP. 8 Tools • 1 Resource

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[!IMPORTANT]

Authorized, defensive use only. Point this server only at assets you own or are explicitly authorized to assess. It performs passive, non-intrusive reconnaissance — it reads public records (Certificate Transparency logs, DNS, RDAP/WHOIS) and each target's *own* published surface (TLS handshakes and HTTP GETs). It does not port-scan, exploit, brute-force, fuzz, or probe for vulnerabilities; that capability is excluded from the surface by design, not gated behind a flag. Output is descriptive — what exists and what the security posture is — never an exploitation plan. Connections to assessed targets check for private, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata addresses. DNS-only queries use validated resolvers.

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Overview

Passive external attack-surface mapping (EASM) over Certificate Transparency logs, DNS, TLS, HTTP, and RDAP/WHOIS registries, with optional Shodan host intelligence. Discover subdomains, resolve DNS records, and inspect TLS and HTTP security posture across a domain's live hosts.

The attack-surface guide covers assessment coverage and evidence-preserving triage. It ships with plugin, npm, MCPB and Docker distributions and is served through the MCP Skills extension for supporting clients.

Tools

Resources

All resource data is also reachable via tools — tool-only clients lose nothing, since attacksurface_map_domain covers the same ground.

Capability reference

attacksurface_map_domain tool

• depth: quick discovers subdomains and liveness; standard adds DNS records, TLS, and HTTP posture; thorough adds per-IP Shodan data when a key is present, otherwise a note.
• Returns a structured surface map and a defensive assessment of observable facts. Failed sources and unreachable hosts become notes, and subdomain resolution is capped by ATTACKSURFACE_MAX_SUBDOMAINS (default 200), with truncation disclosed.
• includeRegistration adds RDAP/WHOIS data for the apex at standard or thorough depth. Standard and thorough also return DNS records from the first configured resolver plus propagation mismatches for live hosts; null posture at quick depth means the work was skipped.
• coverage lists what was left unexamined or without host detail (unexamined, detailOmitted), and retrieval gives up to three ready-to-run follow-up calls (DNS/TLS batches of at most 50 hosts, one HTTP URL). nextToolSuggestions prefills an attacksurface_recon_guidance call for up to 50 hosts, with guidanceCoverage naming any omitted.

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attacksurface_enumerate_subdomains tool

• Discovers names through crt.sh → Certspotter → the apex TLS certificate SANs, then resolves DNS liveness. includeUnresolved: false keeps only live hosts; filteredAddressErrors retains DNS failures for excluded names.
• Returns each name's source provenance and per-source status. complete, pagesFetched, and incompleteReason disclose partial coverage, and addressError separates DNS failures from ENODATA/ENOTFOUND absence. A rate-limited source preserves its retry window when supplied; retries share the source deadline.
• offset and limit (default 50, larger requests clamped) page through candidates, bounded by min(50, ATTACKSURFACE_MAX_SUBDOMAINS). Use nextOffset or the prefilled continuation for the next page, and remainingCount to see what is left. CT logs are re-read per page, so changes can shift offsets.

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attacksurface_resolve_dns tool

• Accepts 1–1000 hosts and processes the first 50 in input order; processedCount and remainingHosts show what to resubmit. Queries A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, and CAA across public resolvers (default 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, 9.9.9.9); reverse DNS (PTR) is optional.
• Returns per-resolver answers to expose propagation gaps, with canonical records from the first configured resolver. Resolver failures (including SERVFAIL) appear in queryError and hostError next to any successful records. When neither A nor AAAA is requested, separate first-resolver address checks supply resolved and optional PTR without adding records to the requested maps. PTR uses the first resolver selected for the call.
• DNS-only queries report public DNS evidence, including private-range answers, without connecting to the queried host. Discovery liveness uses the first server-configured resolver.
• Private or loopback resolver IPs produce blocked_resolver; an individual host failure becomes a per-host error.

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attacksurface_inspect_tls tool

• Accepts 1–1000 hosts and processes the first 50 in input order; processedCount and remainingHosts show what to resubmit. Port defaults to 443 and handshake timeout to 8000ms (1000–30000ms).
• Returns negotiated protocol, cipher, leaf certificate and chain depth, SANs, issuer, validity window, days to expiry, and validation status. Invalid, expired, and self-signed certificates are reported; one host failure becomes a per-host error.
• Chain trust (validationAuthorized/validationError) and hostname match (identityAuthorized/identityError) are separate checks. daysUntilExpiry is null only when the expiry date cannot be parsed.

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attacksurface_probe_http tool

• Accepts one HTTP(S) URL; malformed URLs produce invalid_url. Timeout defaults to 10000ms (1000–30000ms) and covers the whole probe. Follows up to ten redirects with an SSRF check at every hop. A disallowed address or scheme produces blocked_target. DNS safety-check failures and redirect exhaustion return finalStatus: 0 with a transportError.
• Returns status, redirect chain, raw headers, security-header findings (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, cookie flags, CORS reflection), and technology detections with their triggering evidence. CSP analysis covers frame-ancestors only.
• bodyInspection reports complete, limited (64,000-byte prefix cap), failed, or not_read; a body failure keeps the status and headers.
• Without a final response, headers, cookies and CORS are unobserved and the audit has no findings. CORS findings retain the exact credentials header and distinguish exact true; a final plain-HTTP response is reported after redirects. These are observed configuration facts, not exploitability claims.

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attacksurface_lookup_registration tool

• Accepts a domain, IP, or CIDR (prefix IPv4 0–32, IPv6 0–128); type (auto / domain / ip) controls interpretation. Uses RDAP first, then WHOIS when needed.
• Domain results include registrar, EPP statuses, lifecycle events, nameservers, DNSSEC and a registrar abuse contact when published; IP/CIDR results include netblock, allocation CIDRs, ASN, country, allocation organization and abuse contact when attributable. Sparse, redacted or ambiguous fields stay unknown, and the raw WHOIS response is kept in rawWhois.
• An explicit WHOIS no-match returns no_match; a failed referral or an empty or unrecognized WHOIS response returns source_unavailable.

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attacksurface_lookup_host tool

• mode: "host" (default) looks up one bare IPv4/IPv6 address and returns invalid_target for anything else; `mode