Browser Use
Browser agents and stealth cloud browsers for AI: run web tasks, fill forms, extract data.
Stealth browser automation for AI agents — real Chrome, N parallel persistent logged-in sessions.
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
通过 3/3 项检查 · 在你的电脑上运行
第一步:你用哪个 AI?
选择你用的应用,步骤会显示在下方。
可连接 Claude,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次) · 仅限电脑上的 Claude 应用(Windows 或 Mac),网页和手机不可用
SettingsDeveloperEdit Config
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
用 vibatchium 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Claude 说正在使用 vibatchium,或回答中出现 vibatchium 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
ChatGPT 暂时无法连接 vibatchium
vibatchium 需要安装在你的电脑上,而 ChatGPT 只能连接在网上运行的服务器
A · 使用能连接 vibatchium 的应用
B · 网页与浏览器 类中能连接 ChatGPT 的其他服务器
从同类中使用较多的里挑选,仅限用地址即可连接、无需密钥的
可连接 Claude Code,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)
Mac:按 Command+空格,输入 Terminal · Windows:打开 PowerShell
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
应能看到 vibatchium 在列表中并显示已连接
用 vibatchium 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Claude Code 说正在使用 vibatchium,或回答中出现 vibatchium 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
可连接 Cursor,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
用 vibatchium 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Cursor 说正在使用 vibatchium,或回答中出现 vibatchium 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Cursor 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
可连接 VS Code,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
用 vibatchium 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 VS Code 说正在使用 vibatchium,或回答中出现 vibatchium 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 VS Code 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
Claude Code
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json)
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
VS Code (mcp.json)
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
依据这个服务器的连接方式和各应用自己的文档,检查于 2026年11月10日。
在你的电脑上运行,适用于
ClaudeGooseLM StudioMsty StudioCherry StudioCursorVS Code + GitHub CopilotVisual StudioWindsurf (Devin Desktop)ZedKiroClineContinueJetBrains AI AssistantClaude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLIOpenCodenodecodeWarpLibreChatRaycast
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月13日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 trueoriginlabs 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
代码最后更新于7天前
使用 Apache-2.0
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
提问、分享技巧或报告无法使用。按“有帮助”数量排序。
还没有评价
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 3 项适用的基础检查中通过了 3 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于7天前,最新版本(0.21.0)于7天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。
同一分类中有:Browser Use, Scrapling MCP Server, Chrome DevTools MCP
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:↓ 每周下载量i★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Browser agents and stealth cloud browsers for AI: run web tasks, fill forms, extract data.
Web scraping with stealth HTTP, real browsers, and Cloudflare bypass. CSS selectors supported.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
The browser layer for an always-on box. Many logged-in identities, running unattended, all at once — on real Chrome, with stealth on by default, and with a security model for letting an AI near the credentials.
One daemon, N persistent Chrome sessions, a vb CLI and an MCP server. Self-hosted, free, Apache-2.0.
pipx install 'vibatchium[all]'
patchright install chrome vb setup # register the MCP server + agent skill (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor) vb explore https://example.com
| You want… | Use |
|---|---|
| An agent driving your signed-in browser while you watch | Claude in Chrome, Chrome Auto Browse — first-party, free, better integrated |
| The stealthiest single browser you can buy | CloakBrowser — fingerprints patched in Chromium's C++ (paid for concurrency) |
| The leanest driver for one agent | bladebro — five tools, one Rust binary |
| Browser automation without anti-bot pressure | playwright-mcp, agent-browser — bigger, older, better tested |
| Many accounts on one box, running unattended, against sites that fight automation | vibatchium |
That last row is the whole wedge. Supervised agents hand control back to you at every login wall and CAPTCHA; a library leaves the fleet — sessions, budgets, crash recovery, credentials — for you to build. vibatchium is that fleet layer.
As of 2026-10-06, from each project's own README, source and release notes (the MCP-cost row is our own measurement¹). Rows where we lose are included on purpose.
| vibatchium | CloakBrowser | bladebro | agent-browser | playwright-mcp | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N persistent logged-in sessions at once | yes, free, one daemon | 1 free (latest build) · more on Pro | one Chrome per agent session | yes, one daemon per session | one per profile dir |
| Unattended ops: crash self-heal, leases, budgets, idle freeze, goals | all of them | — | partial (crash relaunch, idle timeout) | partial (idle timeout, restore) | idle timeout |
| Agent can *use* a secret but not *read* it (origin-bound fill, read-back refused, TOTP) | yes | — | — | vault, origin check | --secrets redaction |
| Prompt-injection scanning of page content | yes | — | — | boundary markers (opt-in), no scanning | — |
| Browserless HTTP on the session's own cookies, Chrome TLS fingerprint · keyless web search | yes | — | — | — | — |
| Browser | stock Chrome | own Chromium build | stock Chromium | Chrome for Testing default | stock Chrome |
| Stealth layer | CDP-level (Patchright) | engine-level (87 C++ patches) | CDP-level ("6-layer"), no Runtime.enable | none in core; via cloud providers | none |
| Published stealth score | not yet | 30/30 on its own detector list | 68/80 Stealth Bench V1 (self-run) | — | — |
| MCP startup cost in Claude Code¹ | ~2.7k tokens (89 tools, 5 always loaded) | n/a | ~3.4k tokens (5 tools) | not measured | not measured |
| Platforms | Linux (macOS: CI probe, unsupported) | Linux · macOS · Windows | Linux · macOS · Windows | all | all |
¹ bytes/4 of tools/list plus server instructions, measured over stdio. Clients without tool search load every tool: vb mcp --caps min is 12 tools, ~3.8k tokens. bladebro's own README says ~1.9k.
Where the others are genuinely better: CloakBrowser's engine-level patches go deeper than any CDP-level layer can — and vb start --browser-binary will drive a Chromium build you bring. bladebro has a stealth benchmark number and we don't; until we do, read our stealth claims as measured on scoreboards, below, not on production walls. Both run on more operating systems.
1. A fleet of logged-in identities on one box. Each session is its own Chrome and profile, with its own proxy, timezone and GPU node, and — opt-in with vb persona set — its own screen and window, because by default every headless session on one machine reports the same 800×600 screen. vb fleet-check measures how alike your sessions still look. They run in parallel on one daemon that keeps them alive: a crashed renderer is relaunched on the same profile, parked sessions have their renderers stopped and thawed on the next call, leases stop two agents clobbering one session, and goals give a task a step/spend/time budget that survives a daemon restart.
vb --session alice start && vb --session alice go https://x.com # log in once, stays logged in
vb --session bob start && vb --session bob go https://x.com vb --session alice act "open notifications" & vb --session bob extract & wait vb fleet-check --sessions alice,bob # how twinned are they?
2. Credentials an agent can use but never see. The vault fills a password or a live TOTP code into the page without the value reaching the model's context, a screenshot or a log — and only into the site it belongs to. Over MCP, a prompt-injected agent can't type your GitHub password into a lookalike page, can't read it back with value or eval while it sits in the field, and can't edit the vault or pull a code. An agent with a *shell* is the operator — the CLI has deliberate escape hatches — so give agents MCP, not Bash, if that boundary matters to you.
printf %s "$GH_PASSWORD" | vb secret set github.com password --stdin
printf %s "$GH_TOTP_SEED" | vb secret set github.com totp-seed --stdin vb --session work fill @e7 --use-secret github.com:password vb --session work fill @e9 --use-secret github.com:totp vb wait-email-code github.com # operator CLI: polls IMAP and prints the code; refused over MCP
3. Page text is treated as untrusted. Every session scans the page text it returns for instructions aimed at the agent and flags them by default; wrap fences them off and redact removes them. Caller-supplied file paths are confined too, so an injected agent can't upload ~/.ssh or write into .git/hooks.
4. A browserless lane on the same identity. vb fetch reuses a session's cookies and proxy with Chrome's TLS fingerprint and client hints — JSON endpoints behind your login at curl speed, and it tells you when it can't match the browser. vb search finds URLs with no API key and no per-session budget.
vb --session work fetch https://api.example.com/v1/me
vb search "site reliability postmortem" -n 20 --urls
Status: alpha, active development. 2,331 tests green in CI (Linux, Python 3.11–3.14). Coding agents: read AGENTS.md first — the one-call recipes and the traps worth skipping.
Detector scores quoted below (bot.sannysoft, CreepJS, Cloudflare cold-launch) are manual observations, not CI-asserted — no test in the suite gates on them, and they are only as current as the last hand-run. The generated block under Measured scores is the one to trust.
pipx install vibatchium # core: browse / extract / screenshot / N parallel sessions
pipx install 'vibatchium[all]' # + fetch/search lanes, credential vault, VLM read, REST shim
patchright install chrome vb setup # register MCP + an auto-discoverable skill (idempotent) vb install # report which optional lanes are available
On a uv venv (no pip), add an extra with uv pip install --python /bin/python curl_cffi. Bleeding edge from master: pipx install 'git+https://github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium#egg=vibatchium[all]'.
vb setup wires up the agents on *this* machine. To pull just the agent skill into any agent skills.sh supports (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Copilot, …), or to install skill + MCP server as one Claude Code plugin:
npx skills add trueoriginlabs/vibatchium # skill only, any agent
/plugin marketplace add trueoriginlabs/vibatchium # Claude Code: skill + vb mcp /plugin install vibatchium@vibatchium
Both still need the vb CLI on PATH (pipx install 'vibatchium[all]') — the skill drives it and the plugin's MCP server *is* vb mcp. On Claude Code, pick the plugin or vb setup, not both, or you register the server twice. The skill file is generated from vibatchium/setup_cmd.py; edit there and run python scripts/sync_skill.py.
vb explore https://example.com # one call: text-first, auto-closes
vb research --target https://example.com \ # parallel fan-out, N intents --intent "pricing model" --intent "customers" --intent "tech stack"
A wave of "headless browser for AI agents" tools rebuild the browser from scratch (Rust + V8, no Blink/Skia) to hit tiny memory and sub-100ms page loads. The catch is structural: with no rendering engine, they can't produce a real device's fingerprint — they synthesize one. And synthetic fingerprints don't hold still.
vibatchium drives *real* Google Chrome, so its fingerprints are real — and, more to the point, stable. The single test that separates the two is fingerprint stability across navigations. Run the same canvas + WebGL probe on two pages in one session:
| vibatchium (real Chrome) | synthesized-fingerprint engines | |
|---|---|---|
| canvas hash, page A → page B | identical | reseeded per navigation |
WebGL readPixels | real, deterministic pixels | often Math.random() |
| WebGL renderer | a real ANGLE renderer¹ | stub / zeros |
¹ Chrome's own software renderer (SwiftShader) by default — still a coherent, deterministic Chrome value, not a stub. A hardware-GPU string (e.g. ANGLE (Intel …)) needs the opt-in --gpu flag.
A real device returns the same fingerprint every page load; a fingerprint keyed off Date.now() does not — and *that inconsistency* is exactly what lie-detection fingerprinters (CreepJS and friends) flag. Measured: vibatchium's canvas hash and WebGL readback are byte-identical across navigations, and CreepJS reported 0 % stealth-tampering (no synthetic-environment signatures) when last run by hand. That figure is not regression-tested — treat it as an observation, not a guarantee.
This is not a claim of invisibility. The moat is fingerprint *authenticity*, not hiding that a browser is automated — vibatchium still reads as headless on the headless-specific tells (see Honest limits), and real-GPU WebGL (--gpu) is opt-in. But real, consistent fingerprints pass the consistency tier that synthetic ones fail *by construction* — and that tier is what stands between you and a login wall.
vb session new work
vb --session work start vb --session work go https://github.com # log in by hand once vb session new banking vb --session banking start vb --session banking go https://bank.example.com vb --session work click @e3 & # truly parallel — vb --session banking fill @e5 hi & # separate Chromes, no cookie bleed wait vb session list
Active-session resolution: --session FLAG → $VIBATCHIUM_SESSION env → ~/.config/vibatchium/active-session → default. Cap via VIBATCHIUM_MAX_SESSIONS=8 (default 8).
On one s