vulntel

Name: vulntel
Author: rozetyp

von rozetypVersion 1.2.0i★ –iLäuft in der Cloud

Name in der Registrycom.vulntel/mcp

Installieren

Überblick

Beschreibung vom Entwickler (englisches Original)

Free hosted CVE intel for bug-bounty agents: CVE fact-check, attack approaches from paid H1 reports

Die drei Säulen von PopNx MCP

Diese drei werden nie zu einer Punktzahl zusammengefasst: Meinungen, Messungen und Beliebtheit sind verschiedene Dinge.

Stimmen der NutzeriNoch keine BewertungenBewertungen starten in einem späteren Schritt zusammen mit Benutzerkonten
Unsere Basischecksi3 von 3 bestandenAnhand öffentlicher Informationen geprüft; Code noch nicht gescannt
NutzungiNoch nicht gemessen★ –

Was du damit machen kannst

Für diesen Server haben wir noch keine Zusammenfassung in einfacher Sprache geschrieben. Unten stehen die Fakten, die wir aus der Registry gelesen haben.

Verbindung: Läuft in der Cloud
Transport: Streamable HTTP
Kategorie: Sonstiges
Das musst du eintragen: Authorization

Installation

Wähle die KI-App, die du nutzt, und kopiere die Einstellungen.

Bevor du installierst

Basischecks: 3 von 3 bestanden
Läuft auf dem Server des Entwicklers: Was du fragst, läuft über dessen Server.
Kann 13 Dinge (Tools) enrich_cve, check_technology, hunt_plan, observe …
Das trägst du selbst ein: Authorization

Als geheim markierte Werte sind Schlüssel zu deinem Konto. Gib sie nie weiter und füge sie nie in einen Chat ein.

Du brauchst

Läuft in der CloudNichts zu installieren; die Verbindung läuft übers Internet

Welche App nutzt du?

ClaudeClaude CodeCursorVS CodeChatGPT

Wähle oben deine App. Wir merken sie uns, damit der Button beim nächsten Mal „In … installieren“ anzeigt.

Diese Adresse braucht einen Schlüssel in einem Header der Anfrage, und das Menü zum Hinzufügen von Connectors kann ihn nicht setzen. Nutze stattdessen Claude Code, Cursor oder VS Code.

Führe das in deinem Terminal aus

claude mcp add --transport http vulntel https://mcp.vulntel.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: your-value'

Trag die leeren Werte ein, bevor du ihn startest.

In Cursor öffnen

Oder kopier die Einstellungen selbst

In .cursor/mcp.json in deinem Projekt oder in ~/.cursor/mcp.json einfügen

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vulntel": {
      "url": "https://mcp.vulntel.com/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Dein Browser fragt, ob er die App öffnen darf, dann zeigt die App die Einstellungen und bittet dich um Bestätigung. Schlüsselwerte bleiben leer, damit du sie selbst einträgst.

In VS Code öffnen

Oder kopier die Einstellungen selbst

In .vscode/mcp.json in deinem Projekt einfügen

{
  "servers": {
    "vulntel": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.vulntel.com/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Dein Browser fragt, ob er die App öffnen darf, dann zeigt die App die Einstellungen und bittet dich um Bestätigung. Schlüsselwerte bleiben leer, damit du sie selbst einträgst.

Diese Adresse braucht einen Schlüssel in einem Header der Anfrage, und das Menü zum Hinzufügen von Connectors kann ihn nicht setzen. Nutze stattdessen Claude Code, Cursor oder VS Code.

Deine Auswahl bleibt in einem Cookie auf diesem Gerät; kein Konto nötig.

Werte, die du selbst einträgst

Authorization geheim HTTP header
Optional bearer token. Without one, nine of the 13 tools run 25 times a day per network (the answers say how many calls are left). A free key from https://vulntel.com/signup lifts that to 60 calls a…

Diese Einstellungen werden aus dem Registry-Eintrag des Entwicklers erzeugt. Wenn in der README etwas anderes steht, folge der README.

Was er kann

Tool-Namen und -Beschreibungen genau so, wie der Server sie am 6. Nov. 2026 gemeldet hat. Geschrieben hat sie der Entwickler, nicht wir; wir zeigen sie als reinen Text.

enrich_cve
Full intelligence for a single CVE: CVSS, KEV status, EPSS, CISA SSVC (exploitation/automatable/technical_impact), P1-P4 priority with rationale, affected products/versions, Debian/Ubuntu/Alpine fixed builds per release (`distro_fixes`), and (live) public-exploit signal. Args: cv
check_technology
Find vulnerabilities affecting a product across NVD (CPE) and OSV (package ecosystems), de-duplicated and ranked by priority/EPSS/CVSS. Distinct products that share a name are kept distinct. If one name maps to several VENDORS' unrelated products (e.g. "Sentry" → sentry, mobileir
hunt_plan
Turn a recon'd stack into a ranked dig-order for authorized bug-hunting. For each discovered component, returns its top high-risk CVEs (KEV / CISA-SSVC- active / high-EPSS first) AND its `recurring_loci` — the bug classes (CWE) this product family repeatedly fails at, ranked by r
observe
Scan a host's exposed stack and join it to the CVE corpus — the recon workhorse. Fingerprints the homepage + JS bundles (recovering the backend identity and API endpoints homepage detection misses on SPAs), then ranks against live KEV / SSVC-active / high-EPSS into a dig-order. F
search_vulns
Search the CVE corpus — one entry point, three retrieval modes picked from your arguments: - query= a concept / technique / weakness (e.g. "SSO SAML assertion replay", "deserialization gadget chain", "server-side request forgery cloud metadata"). By default it FUSES full-text key
find_attack_approaches
Find how bugs *like this* were actually FOUND — retrieve real disclosed bug-bounty report mechanic-cards whose approach is closest (by mechanism) to your query or a seed CVE. The "what approach worked on a bug like this, on which program, and what did it pay" layer: grounded in r
find_continuations
When you're STUCK mid-hunt: describe your POSITION — the attacker state/capabilities you hold, stripped of product names — and get the CONTINUATIONS that worked from positions like it, matched against the full disclosed-report BODIES (the concrete step/payload/precondition), not
assist_submission
Submission & escalation co-pilot for a bug-bounty finding. Paste your DRAFT finding (and what you already tried / couldn't achieve) and get a grounded brief built from the closest REAL disclosed reports: (1) precedent & validity — is this an accepted class, with citable reports (
program_outcome_prior
At the START of an engagement on a bug-bounty PROGRAM, get a grounded prior over what bug classes have historically LANDED there — to decide what to look at first and what to skip. Built from real HackerOne disclosed reports: the class distribution for this program, each with LIF
new_in_scope
Find FRESH attack surface: bounty-eligible assets that entered a public bug-bounty program's scope in the last `days` (HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack, mirrored daily), the least-hunted surface there is. Raw scope additions are mostly not new (in one week 57 of 80 were
verify_cve_claim
Fact-check a claim about a CVE against the corpus — catch hallucinations before they ship. Verifies: does the CVE exist; does it affect the claimed product at the claimed version; is the severity right; is it actually KEV-exploited. Returns per-assertion verdicts (supported / ref
corpus_stats
Corpus size and data freshness (CVE / KEV / EPSS counts and latest timestamps).
search_public_code
Search public repositories for an exact code string; return WHERE it appears. Use it to hunt vendored / copy-pasted copies of known-vulnerable code: search a distinctive line or symbol from the vulnerable function, then FETCH AND READ the hits to judge which copies are still unpa

Basischecksi

Wir prüfen Informationen, die jeder sehen kann; den Code haben wir nicht gelesen. Checks, die nicht zutreffen, werden nicht mitgezählt. · Geprüft am 7. Nov. 2026

✓ Bestanden
Entwickler passt zum Repo
Der Registry-Name wurde über die Domain vulntel.com bestätigt (die Registry prüft, wem die Domain gehört)
… Noch nicht geprüft
Wird noch gepflegt
Dieses Repo haben wir noch nicht von GitHub gelesen
… Noch nicht geprüft
Hat eine Lizenz
Dieses Repo haben wir noch nicht von GitHub gelesen
✓ Bestanden
Endpunkt antwortet
Antwort in 93 ms (HTTP 200)
– Nicht zutreffend
Anmeldung mit OAuth
Keine Anmeldung nötig
✓ Bestanden
Keine versteckten Anweisungen in Tool-Beschreibungen
Wir haben 13 Tool-Beschreibungen gelesen und keine versteckten Anweisungen an die KI gefunden

Im Vergleich mit anderen in Sonstigesi

Mehr Sterne als 0 % der anderen 32537 Server in dieser Kategorie
Neuer in der Registry veröffentlicht als 90 % der anderen 32537 Server in dieser Kategorie
Basischecks gleich gut wie oder besser als bei 100 % der anderen 32537 Server in dieser Kategorie

Verglichen mit allen aktiven Servern dieser Kategorie in der Registry. Sterne zählen nur, wenn dem Herausgeber das Repo gehört.

Häufige Fragen

Ist vulntel sicher?

Er hat 3 von 3 zutreffenden Basischecks bestanden. Den Code haben wir nicht gelesen. Bevor du einen Schlüssel oder Token hinzufügst, sieh nach, welche Zugriffe der Server verlangt, und nutze einen Schlüssel, der nur die Berechtigungen hat, die du brauchst.

Welche Schlüssel oder Codes braucht er?

Das musst du eintragen: Authorization

Läuft er auf meinem Computer oder in der Cloud?

Er läuft in der Cloud des Entwicklers. Du verbindest dich übers Internet, ohne etwas zu installieren, aber was du sendest, läuft über die Server des Entwicklers.

Wird er noch gepflegt?

Das GitHub-Repo wurde zuletzt – geändert, und die neueste Version (1.2.0) kam vor 3 Tagen in die Registry.

Welche Apps können ihn nutzen?

Apps, die MCP unterstützen, etwa Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor und VS Code. Er verbindet sich per URL, also funktionieren auch Apps, die Remote-MCP-Server akzeptieren, zum Beispiel ChatGPT im Entwicklermodus.

Was kann ich stattdessen nutzen?

In derselben Kategorie: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, TF Rooms

Alternativen

Server derselben Kategorie von anderen Entwicklern, sortiert nach Sternen.

So liest du eine Karte:★ GitHub-SterneiDrei Säulen: Bewertungen · Checks · NutzungiAktualisiert = neueste Version in der Registry veröffentlichti

Spec Driven Development

von formulahendry

MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.

Läuft auf deinem Computer★ 440MITAktualisiert vor 14 Monaten

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Remote Desktop Commander

von desktop-commander

Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.

Läuft in der Cloud★ 211Aktualisiert gestern

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TF Rooms

von tfrooms.com

Live room availability, rates and stay quotes for 12 New Leaf motels in Twin Falls, Idaho.

Läuft in der CloudAktualisiert heute

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README vom Entwickler

README öffnen

Unverändert aus dem Repo des Entwicklers übernommen. PopNx MCP hat den Inhalt weder geprüft noch empfiehlt es ihn. HTML, Bilder und Skripte wurden entfernt. Links führen von dieser Website weg.

vulntel

Most CVE tools hand your agent raw data. This one ranks it by what's actually being exploited, finds bugs by mechanism, catches the CVEs your agent invents — and transfers attack mechanics from ~14,000 disclosed bug-bounty reports.

A curated, hosted MCP corpus: ~422,000 CVEs, fused from NVD + CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS + OSV/GHSA + CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC), plus a mechanic layer distilled from ~14,000 disclosed, paid bug-bounty reports — refreshed daily. Not another live-API wrapper.

Free. Try it with no key (nine tools, 25 calls a day per IP address), then get a key: enter your email and your personal key is sent over. Tell me what you are hunting.

Why this, and not the next CVE wrapper

Most CVE MCP servers are thin wrappers: at query time they fan out to the same free public APIs and hand back whatever comes out. This is different in six concrete ways.

A curated, embedded corpus, not a live proxy. One record per vulnerability, fused across NVD, OSV/GHSA and KEV through an identity graph, with roughly 2,100 vendor-qualified product aliases and embeddings for semantic search. Queried locally, ranked consistently.
SSVC as priority, not just CVSS. Priority is exploitation-first: CISA SSVC (active / automatable / total impact), KEV and EPSS drive a P1 to P4 ranking. The wrapper MCPs do not carry SSVC at all.
Search by mechanism, not keywords. Semantic search finds the same bug *class* across different products. Keyword tools structurally cannot.
It fact-checks the agent. verify_cve_claim catches invented CVEs and wrong attributes. This is the one that matters most right now, with hallucinated AI bug reports flooding triage, and effectively no other CVE MCP does it.
Backport-aware. Paste a server banner (OpenSSH_8.9p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.10, Apache/2.4.62 (Debian)) and each CVE carries the Debian / Ubuntu / Alpine tracker's verdict for that exact build next to the upstream one. Upstream-only tools call a patched distro host vulnerable.
Right vendor, and no false zeros. "GitHub Enterprise" resolves to the right vendor, not every product that ships an "enterprise_server." A product it cannot resolve returns resolved: false with suggestions, never a silent 0 that reads as "not affected." A false zero is the worst answer a security tool can give.

The hard part of AI-assisted security is not *finding* CVEs. It is triage, prioritization, and false positives. That is what this targets.

Everything below is real output from the live server, trimmed only for length.

It fact-checks your agent

The differentiator that matters most. Your agent cites CVE-2025-99999:

verify_cve_claim("CVE-2025-99999")

-> exists: false "No record in NVD / OSV / GHSA. Likely hallucinated or not-yet-published."

Or it gets the details wrong. Claim: *"CVE-2021-44228 is a medium-severity Apache Struts bug, and it is not exploited."*

verify_cve_claim("CVE-2021-44228", product="Apache Struts", severity="medium", exploited=false)

refuted "not exploited" -> in CISA KEV (added 2021-12-10) refuted "severity medium" -> actual CVSS 10.0, P1 refuted "affects Apache Struts" -> no product matching "Apache Struts"

The other feeds hand your agent data. This one tells you when the agent is wrong, before it reaches a report.

Priority is exploitation-first (SSVC, KEV, EPSS), not CVSS

check_technology("GitLab") returns 792 CVEs for the product, de-duped and ranked so the exploited ones float to the top:

P1  KEV  EPSS 99.8   CVE-2023-7028   account-takeover: password-reset email sent to an attacker address (CVSS 10)

P2 KEV EPSS 98.5 CVE-2021-39935 unauthenticated SSRF via the CI Lint API P3 EPSS 99.7 CVE-2023-2825 unauthenticated path traversal, arbitrary file read (CVSS 10) P3 EPSS 99.7 CVE-2022-2992 authenticated RCE via the GitHub import API (CVSS 9.9)

Names that map to more than one vendor are flagged ambiguous (here, gitlab vs a jenkins plugin) and kept separate, never silently merged. enrich_cve then gives you the full SSVC picture for any one of them:

enrich_cve("CVE-2024-3400")   PAN-OS GlobalProtect

P1 KEV CVSS 10.0 EPSS 99.95 unauthenticated command injection -> root RCE SSVC exploitation=active automatable=yes technical_impact=total Metasploit exploit/linux/http/panos_telemetry_cmd_exec (rank: excellent) Public PoC 44 repos (h4x0r-dz 162 stars, W01fh4cker 90 stars, ...)

Turn recon into a dig-order

hunt_plan(["craftcms 4.4", "nginx", "keycloak"]) ranks your stack by its most-exploitable bug and names where each component historically bleeds:

#1  craftcms 4.4    97 CVEs, 12 high-risk

recurring_loci CWE-94 code injection x7 (2 exploited in the wild) -> probe template / eval surfaces first dig here P1 KEV EPSS 99.8 CVE-2025-32432 unauthenticated RCE (CVSS 10) your 4.4 is AFFECTED, fixed in 4.14.15 P1 KEV EPSS 99.9 CVE-2024-56145 RCE when register_argc_argv is on AFFECTED, fixed in 4.13.2

#2 nginx HTTP/2 Rapid Reset CVE-2023-44487 (KEV) #3 keycloak recurring_loci CWE-287 auth x12. OIDC request_uri SSRF CVE-2020-10770

It does not just list CVEs. It names the bug *class* a product family keeps failing at, ranked by real exploitation, and tells you whether *your version* is in range. Where to look, and what shape to expect.

Search by mechanism, across products

search_vulns(cve_id="CVE-2021-44228"), "what else works like Log4Shell":

sim 0.88   CVE-2021-44832   Log4j2 JDBC Appender, JNDI LDAP RCE

sim 0.82 CVE-2022-40145 Apache Karaf, code injection via an attacker-controlled JNDI URL sim 0.79 CVE-2022-34916 Apache Flume, JNDI LDAP RCE via a JMS source

The same JNDI-injection mechanism, surfaced across *different products*. A keyword search for "log4j" never finds Karaf or Flume. Or search a concept directly, search_vulns("SAML SSO authentication bypass"):

P3      CVSS 9.1  CVE-2024-9487   GitHub Enterprise: SAML SSO bypass via signature verification

P3 CVSS 9.8 CVE-2025-25291 ruby-saml: auth bypass via a ReXML / Nokogiri parser differential P1 KEV CVSS 9.8 CVE-2025-59718 Fortinet FortiOS / FortiProxy: signature-verification bypass

See what is being exploited right now

search_vulns(days=7), run live today:

P1 KEV CVSS 10.0  CVE-2026-10520  Ivanti Sentry: unauthenticated OS command injection -> root RCE

P1 KEV CVSS 9.3 CVE-2026-50751 Check Point: IKEv1 auth bypass, remote-access VPN without a password P2 KEV CVSS 8.8 CVE-2026-11645 Chrome V8: out-of-bounds read/write -> sandbox escape RCE

Median time from disclosure to in-the-wild exploitation is now days, not months. The Ivanti bug above carried a CISA remediation deadline in the same week it landed. corpus_stats on 2026-11-03: ~422,800 CVEs, ~1,770 KEV entries, data under a day old. These figures are point-in-time and drift daily, so call corpus_stats yourself for the live count rather than trusting the numbers on this page.

Transfer attack mechanics from disclosed bug-bounty reports

Beyond CVEs, the corpus distills ~14,000 disclosed, paid HackerOne reports into product-agnostic *attack mechanics* — each bug's source → sink → trigger → preconditions, de-anchored from the product it was filed against. The premise: a vulnerability is a transferable mechanism, not a property of one product — so a move that paid on one stack is a checklist item on the next.

find_attack_approaches(query="ssrf reaching cloud metadata") — the human moves that transferred, novelty-ranked, each tagged with live program-actionability:

Reddit         SSRF   preview_url fetches an unfiltered URL → returns metadata    program_active, pays

U.S. DoD SSRF /download-url?url= fetches AWS instance metadata program_active Concrete CMS SSRF DNS-rebind bypass → AWS IAM creds from the metadata svc program_active

find_continuations(position=...) — matches your *accumulated attacker position* mid-hunt to the next moves real reports played from a similar spot. Every move is status: UNVERIFIED with a decisive_check to run on the target — a legal move, never a confirmed bug.
assist_submission(finding=...) — a grounded submission brief from the closest paid precedents (validity, what's novel, an escalation playbook), with every cited report validated against the corpus (citations_grounded) so it can't smuggle a fabricated precedent.
program_outcome_prior("hackerone:gitlab") — the bug classes that historically *landed* on a program, with lift over base rate (GitLab: SSRF 3.4×, SQLi ~never).

Honest about what this is: it primes and grounds a human hunter — it surfaces the move and the precedent. It does not find the bug for you; the target decides whether the move survives, and that's a step you still run.

The whole point: a memory of mechanics to borrow and run — not a CVE lookup

The moat is three things a stateless model cannot self-generate, and this corpus holds all three:

Watched over time — priors, temporal drift (Log4Shell's affected set kept growing +1,200 days after publish), score stability. Your model has a training-cutoff snapshot; this has the *trajectory*.
Seen many — every disclosed mechanic and CVE mechanism, embedded, so the *same bug class* transfers across products a model would never connect: Log4Shell's JNDI lookup → Apache Karaf, Flume; an SSRF that paid on Reddit → the move to try on the next target.
Live-fused recon — observe recovers a host's real backend from its JS bundles and joins it to the corpus on the spot.

The cardinal sin is treating it as a severity-number checker. The job is to transfer a proven mechanic onto your target and run it — or read a fix to *falsify* an option before you spend a probe on it.

Force your agent to reach for it — it won't on its own

Left alone, an agent answers from training data: stale, and it *invents* CVE ids under pressure. Paste this operating loop into your agent's rules (CLAUDE.md, Cursor/Windsurf, a system prompt):

You have the vulntel MCP. Your own CVE knowledge is a guess to be verified — prefer the corpus.

Operating loop, in order:

Choosing / scoping a bounty program → new_in_scope (what just entered a program's scope, re-adds filtered) and program_outcome_prior (which bug classes have actually PAID here).
A live host → observe (a cache miss returns status="scanning"; call again with the same host until "ready"). Mine endpoints[], recurring_loci, the CVE join, not just two fields.
A product + version → check_technology / hunt_plan (dig-order + the recurring CWE loci).
Before asserting ANY CVE / "affects X" / "severity Y" / "exploited" → verify_cve_claim. Never cite from memory.
Feasibility of one CVE → enrich_cve; read the MECHANISM (POST vs GET, auth-required) to judge whether it chains. How it was fixed in the wild, or who vendored the vulnerable line → search_public_code (raw hits; read them).
Hunting a class → find_attack_approaches for the transferable move; RUN it on the target, don't cite it. Loop with a growing tried=.
Stuck / messy position → find_continuations(position) for the by-step move; then search_vulns that class to see whether it recurs in this stack.
Submitting → assist_submission; EXECUTE the techniques it transfers (referrer differential, key-reuse breadth), then file.
Before trusting a "nothing found" → corpus_stats (corpus size and

Nur der Anfang wird gezeigt; den Rest findest du im Repo

vulntel

Überblick

Die drei Säulen von PopNx MCP

Was du damit machen kannst

Installation

Bevor du installierst

Werte, die du selbst einträgst

Was er kann

Basischecksi

Entwickler passt zum Repo

Wird noch gepflegt

Hat eine Lizenz

Endpunkt antwortet

Anmeldung mit OAuth

Keine versteckten Anweisungen in Tool-Beschreibungen

Im Vergleich mit anderen in Sonstigesi

Häufige Fragen

Alternativen

Spec Driven Development

Remote Desktop Commander

TF Rooms

README vom Entwickler

vulntel

Why this, and not the next CVE wrapper

It fact-checks your agent

Priority is exploitation-first (SSVC, KEV, EPSS), not CVSS

Turn recon into a dig-order

Search by mechanism, across products

See what is being exploited right now

Transfer attack mechanics from disclosed bug-bounty reports

The whole point: a memory of mechanics to borrow and run — not a CVE lookup

Force your agent to reach for it — it won't on its own