1Claw Vault

Name: 1Claw Vault
Author: 1clawAI

by 1clawAIversion 0.56.3i★ –iRuns on your computer

Registry nameio.github.1clawAI/1claw-mcp

Install

Overview

Description from the maker (original English)

HSM-backed vault secrets for AI agents (JIT fetch) plus prompt-injection and threat scanning.

PopNx MCP’s three pillars

These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.

User voiceiNo reviews yetReviews open together with accounts in a later step
Our basic checksi1 of 1 passedChecked from public information; code not scanned yet
UsageiEarly↓ 443/wk · ★ –

What you can do with it

We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.

Connection: Runs on your computer
Transport: stdio
Category: Cybersecurity
You need to fill in: ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY

Install

Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.

Before you install

Basic checks: 1 of 1 passed
Runs on your computer with your user’s permissions (files, network, apps).
You fill in yourself: ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY, ONECLAW_AGENT_ID, ONECLAW_VAULT_ID, ONECLAW_BASE_URL, ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY

Values marked secret are keys to your account. Never share them or paste them into a chat.

You need

npmNode.js installed (for the npx command)

Which app do you use?

ClaudeClaude CodeCursorVS CodeChatGPT

Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.

Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "1claw": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@1claw/mcp"
      ],
      "env": {
        "ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_AGENT_ID": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_VAULT_ID": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_BASE_URL": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Run this in your terminal

claude mcp add 1claw --env ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY=your-value --env ONECLAW_AGENT_ID=your-value --env ONECLAW_VAULT_ID=your-value --env ONECLAW_BASE_URL=your-value --env ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY=your-value -- npx -y @1claw/mcp

Fill in the empty values before running it.

Open in Cursor

Or copy the settings yourself

Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "1claw": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@1claw/mcp"
      ],
      "env": {
        "ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_AGENT_ID": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_VAULT_ID": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_BASE_URL": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.

Open in VS Code

Or copy the settings yourself

Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project

{
  "servers": {
    "1claw": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@1claw/mcp"
      ],
      "env": {
        "ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_AGENT_ID": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_VAULT_ID": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_BASE_URL": "your-value",
        "ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.

This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.

Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.

Values you fill in

ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY secret env
Agent API key (ocv_...). Exchanged for a short-lived JWT; auto-discovers agent ID and vault. Recommended for stdio.
ONECLAW_AGENT_ID env
Optional agent UUID when pinning identity (usually auto-discovered from the API key).
ONECLAW_VAULT_ID env
Optional vault UUID when the agent can access multiple vaults.
ONECLAW_BASE_URL env
Vault API base URL (default https://api.1claw.xyz).
ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY env
Set to true for security-only mode (inspect_content only; no vault credentials).

These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.

What it can do

Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.

Basic checksi

We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 9, 2026

✓ Pass
Maker matches the repo
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account 1clawAI, which owns the repo
… Not checked yet
Still maintained
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
… Not checked yet
Has a licence
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
– Not applicable
Endpoint responds
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
– Not applicable
Sign-in with OAuth
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
… Not checked yet
No hidden instructions in tool descriptions
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints

Compared with others in Cybersecurityi

More stars than 0% of the other 1003 servers in this category
Published to the registry more recently than 38% of the other 1003 servers in this category
Basic checks equal to or better than 100% of the other 1003 servers in this category

Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.

Common questions

Is 1Claw Vault safe?

It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.

What keys or codes does it need?

You need to fill in: ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY

Does it run on my computer or in the cloud?

It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).

Is it still maintained?

The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.56.3) reached the registry 3 months ago.

Which apps can use it?

Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Node.js on your computer.

What can I use instead?

In the same category: KillerSkills, Penthera, Draugr

Alternatives

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Reading a card:↓ Downloads per weeki★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi

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Offline, rule-based security checks for your repo, dependencies, AI agent config and local app.

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Draugr

Security scanning for AI agents: SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, DAST, ranked by real risk.

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Install

README from the maker

Open the README

Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.

@1claw/mcp

⭐ Star [1clawAI/agent-templates](https://github.com/1clawAI/agent-templates) — ready-to-run agent templates wired to 1Claw. It is our single starred repo.

Connect Cursor, Claude Desktop, VS Code, or any MCP client to your 1claw vault. The server exposes tools for secrets, signing, execution bindings, memory, automations, and more. Values are fetched at call time and are not cached in the model's context beyond the moment they are used.

Most teams use this instead of copying API keys into agent prompts or MCP config files. You register an agent, grant policy access to specific secret paths, and point the client at mcp.1claw.co or a local stdio process. The server handles JWT exchange and refresh from a single ocv_ key.

Local-only mode: Run without vault credentials for the security inspection tools only (e.g. inspect_content). Useful with Ollama or LM Studio when you want injection detection without a 1claw account.

Local daemon mode: Point at the local 1claw daemon (ONECLAW_LOCAL_VAULT=true) so secrets never leave your machine. The daemon injects credentials into outbound HTTP requests; the model never sees the raw value.

API contract: Vault tools use the REST API from @1claw/openapi-spec. LLM traffic through Shroud is separate: agents call https://shroud.1claw.co with X-Shroud-Agent-Key and `X-Shroud-Provider` (required; e.g. openai). When the MCP server exchanges an agent API key for a JWT, that token may carry `shroud_config` for Shroud's PolicyEngine; MCP itself does not proxy LLM requests.

Transport Modes

The server supports two transport modes:

Mode	Use case	Auth
stdio (default)	Local — Claude Desktop, Cursor	Env: `ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY` (recommended; auto-discovers agent + vault) or `ONECLAW_AGENT_ID` + key; or `ONECLAW_AGENT_TOKEN` + `ONECLAW_VAULT_ID`
httpStream	Hosted at `mcp.1claw.co`	Per-request headers: `Authorization: Bearer` , `X-Vault-ID`

Set MCP_TRANSPORT=httpStream and PORT=8080 to run in hosted mode.

stdio and environment: The server does not cache a single vault client for the whole process. Each tool invocation builds a OneClawClient from the current process.env (ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY, ONECLAW_VAULT_ID, etc.), so changing env vars (or vault binding) takes effect on the next call without restarting the MCP process.

Agent environment auto-resolve (v0.52): When an agent is tagged with environment and env_auto_resolve: true, the resolve_env tool can omit environment and the Vault API uses the agent's tag from the JWT. Org setting env.enforce_agent_environment_scope blocks agents from resolving vars outside their tagged environment.

Policy engine v0.53: Access policies support policy_schema_version: 2 with expression-based tx_conditions.expression (mini DSL), expanded control-plane action_kind_in consensus triggers, and multi-chain deep decode (Solana, Bitcoin, Tron) for signing-time policy evaluation. TEE attestation is available at GET https://shroud.1claw.co/v1/shroud/attestation (returns attestation_level: none | identity | confidential | sev_snp plus confidential_claims); audit chain verification at GET /v1/audit/verify.

Graduated HITL (v0.54–0.55): Agent guardrail fields include tx_approval_policy (graduated tx thresholds → 202 awaiting_approval), typed_data_policy, simulation_failure_policy, and raw_signing_policy (deny or route to HITL via approve). Extended v0.55 fields: tx_block_unlimited_approvals, per-recipient limits, USD caps, allow_erc4337, allow_eip7702. Humans approve via dashboard or API; org freeze at POST /v1/org/freeze.

Guardrail governance & Safe (v0.56–0.57): Convention 6 execution shadow/enforce; shadow report, revisions, replay; address screening; guardrail widening approvals (202); agent Safe accounts + module registry MCP tools (list_agent_accounts, migrate_agent_to_safe, get_guardrail_shadow_report, etc.). See package README tool table.

Installation (local / stdio)

Homebrew (macOS / Linux)

brew install 1clawAI/tap/1claw-mcp

From source

cd packages/mcp

pnpm install pnpm run build

Environment Variables

Variable	Required	Default	Description
`ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY`	stdio*	—	Recommended. Agent API key (`ocv_...`). Server exchanges it for a JWT, auto-discovers agent ID and vault, and refreshes the token automatically.
`ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY`	No	`false`	Set to `true` for security-only mode (no vault credentials needed).
`ONECLAW_LOCAL_VAULT`	No	`false`	Set to `true` to use the local daemon instead of the cloud API.
`ONECLAW_DAEMON_SOCKET`	No	`~/.config/1claw/daemon.sock`	Path to the local daemon Unix socket (local daemon mode only).
`ONECLAW_AGENT_ID`	No	—	Agent UUID. Optional with `ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY` (auto-discovered from key).
`ONECLAW_AGENT_TOKEN`	stdio*	—	Legacy. Static Bearer JWT (expires in ~1 h, no auto-refresh).
`ONECLAW_VAULT_ID`	No	—	UUID of the vault. Auto-discovered when using `ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY`.
`ONECLAW_DPOP`	No	`false`	Set to `true` to enable DPoP (RFC 9449) proof-of-possession. Binds agent tokens to the MCP client's ephemeral P-256 keypair so stolen tokens are unusable without the matching private key.
`ONECLAW_BASE_URL`	No	`https://api.1claw.co`	Vault API base URL. Agents with `intents_require_tee` / `execution_require_tee` need no special value here: the vault forwards their intents to Shroud itself (vault ≥ 0.61.19). Set it to Shroud (`https://shroud.1claw.co`) only for a DPoP-bound token or a self-hosted deployment that routes signing there.
`ONECLAW_MCP_TOOLSETS`	No	entitlement defaults	Comma list of toolsets to expose (or `all`). Narrows or opts in; never widens past the agent's entitlements. See Toolsets. Hosted: send `X-1Claw-Toolsets` instead.
`MCP_TRANSPORT`	No	`stdio`	Transport mode: `stdio` or `httpStream`.
`PORT`	No	`8080`	HTTP port (httpStream mode only).

\* For stdio, set `ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY` (recommended — auto-discovers agent ID and vault, handles token refresh). Alternatively, set ONECLAW_AGENT_TOKEN + ONECLAW_VAULT_ID for static JWT auth. Not needed when ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY=true or ONECLAW_LOCAL_VAULT=true.

Tools

The server ships 160 tools (add proxy_request in local daemon mode) but a session only ever sees the toolsets it is entitled to — a vault-only agent is offered ~24 tools, not 160. `inspect_content` also runs in `ONECLAW_LOCAL_ONLY=true` mode without vault credentials. Also includes the vault://secrets resource.

Split packages

Two narrower builds of this same tree are published in lockstep, for stdio deployments where the claim has to be true of the code on disk:

Package	Contains	Claim
`@1claw/mcp-vault`	`vault` + `approvals` toolsets, `inspect_content`, `vault://secrets` (24 tools)	no signing, execute, cards, memory, platform or admin code in the package
`@1claw/mcp-guard`	`inspect_content` only	no account, no credentials, no vault client in the package

Same env vars and behaviour; see packages/vault/README.md and packages/guard/README.md. The hosted server at mcp.1claw.co is always the umbrella.

Toolsets

Every tool belongs to one toolset (src/toolsets.ts). Which toolsets a session gets is decided from the agent's own flags, once at admission, and re-checked every 15 minutes and after any 403 from the vault (hosted sessions then receive notifications/tools/list_changed).

Toolset	On when	Tools
`inspect`	always	`inspect_content`
`vault`	any agent	secrets, versions, rotation, env bundles, vaults, sharing, connected accounts, child agents (~19)
`approvals`	any agent	`request_approval`, `get_approval_status`, `get_approval`, `list_approvals`, `cancel_approval`, `list_pending_approvals`
`intents`	`intents_api_enabled`	signing, simulation, submission, signing keys, portfolio, Safe accounts, Bankr lease (~18)
`execute`	`execution_intents_enabled`	bindings, `execute_http`, `execute_intent`, executions, connectors, event subscriptions (8)
`cards`	`cards_enabled`	cards and gift cards (5)
`memory`	`memory_enabled`	memory + `get_peer_context` (6)
`channels`	`shroud_enabled`	Telegram / WhatsApp / Discord channels (3)
`directory`	`discoverable`	agent directory + job board (4)
`treasury`, `delegation`, `chat`, `automations`, `runtimes`, `notification`	opt-in only	the vault has no per-agent flag for these; ask for them explicitly
`admin`	never on an agent	human-only endpoints (policies, sub-orgs, approval votes, Safe migration…) — only a user JWT over stdio sees them
`platform`	never	`plt_` endpoints; the server rejects platform keys

Choosing toolsets explicitly. Set ONECLAW_MCP_TOOLSETS (stdio) or send X-1Claw-Toolsets (hosted) with a comma list, e.g. vault,intents,automations, or all. A selection can narrow the defaults or opt into the opt-in sets; it can never add a toolset the agent is not entitled to, and all still excludes admin and platform. inspect is always included.

When `execution_require_tee` is set the vault refuses to hand this agent secret *values* outside a TEE, so get_secret, get_env_bundle and resolve_env are hidden; put_secret, rotate_*, describe_secret, list_secrets and list_versions stay.

Degraded lookups. The server logs one line per session: toolsets=… lookup=full|jwt_only|failed. jwt_only means the agent profile could not be read and only the flags carried in the signed JWT (intents, execute, shroud) were honoured — cards, memory and directory are withheld until the next refresh. failed means not even a token was obtained; the session falls back to the agent defaults. Neither state ever widens a toolset.

stdio. The toolset is fixed when the process starts; restart the MCP server after changing an agent's flags.

Tool	Description
`list_secrets`	List all secrets (metadata only — never values)
`get_secret`	Fetch the decrypted value of a secret by path. Accepts optional `client_share` for MPC vaults.
`put_secret`	Create or update a secret (creates a new version). Response includes `client_share` when the vault has MPC enabled.

| delete_secret | Soft-delete a secret at a path

Only the beginning is shown; read the rest in the repo

1Claw Vault

Overview

PopNx MCP’s three pillars

What you can do with it

Install

Before you install

Values you fill in

What it can do

Basic checksi

Maker matches the repo

Still maintained

Has a licence

Endpoint responds

Sign-in with OAuth

No hidden instructions in tool descriptions

Compared with others in Cybersecurityi

Common questions

Alternatives

KillerSkills

Penthera

Draugr

README from the maker

@1claw/mcp

Transport Modes

Installation (local / stdio)

Homebrew (macOS / Linux)

From source

Environment Variables

Tools

Split packages

Toolsets