Zeqqat
The safe MCP for Dokploy: agents deploy and fix apps without holding keys or seeing secrets.
Runs in the cloud
Ci Sentinel
Overview
Description from the maker (original English)
Multi-CI security scanner with a live threat-intel feed of compromised CI components
PopNx MCP’s three pillars
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
- User voiceiNo reviews yetReviews open together with accounts in a later step
- Our basic checksi1 of 1 passedChecked from public information; code not scanned yet
- UsageiVery new★ –
What you can do with it
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
- Connection: Runs in the cloud
- Transport: Streamable HTTP
- Category: Cybersecurity
Install
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
Before you install
- Basic checks: 1 of 1 passed
- Runs on the maker’s server: what you ask it goes through their server.
- The registry lists no key to fill in.
You need
- Runs in the cloudNothing to install; it connects over the internet
Which app do you use?
Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.
Works in Claude on the web, desktop and mobile:
- Open Settings → Connectors
- Press Add custom connector
- Paste the address below and press Add
- If it asks you to sign in, sign in with the maker
https://ci-sentinel.vercel.app/mcpRun this in your terminal
claude mcp add --transport http ci-sentinel https://ci-sentinel.vercel.app/mcpOr copy the settings yourself
Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"ci-sentinel": {
"url": "https://ci-sentinel.vercel.app/mcp"
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Or copy the settings yourself
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"ci-sentinel": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://ci-sentinel.vercel.app/mcp"
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
ChatGPT connects only to servers on the internet:
- Open ChatGPT on the web → Settings → Connectors (Apps)
- Press Create or Add (some plans need Developer mode under Advanced first)
- Paste the address below, give it a name and save
- If it asks you to sign in, sign in with the maker
https://ci-sentinel.vercel.app/mcpMenu names can differ slightly by plan and over time.
Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.
These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
What it can do
We have not read this server’s tool list yet; we check endpoints in rotation.
Basic checksi
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 9, 2026
- ✓ Pass
Maker matches the repo
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account Baneado98, which owns the repo
- … Not checked yet
Still maintained
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
- … Not checked yet
Has a licence
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
- … Not checked yet
Endpoint responds
Not checked yet; we check endpoints in rotation
- … Not checked yet
Sign-in with OAuth
Not checked yet; we check endpoints in rotation
- … Not checked yet
No hidden instructions in tool descriptions
Not checked yet; we read the tool list when we check the endpoint
Compared with others in Cybersecurityi
- More stars than 0% of the other 1005 servers in this category
- Published to the registry more recently than 23% of the other 1005 servers in this category
- Basic checks equal to or better than 100% of the other 1005 servers in this category
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
Common questions
Is Ci Sentinel safe?
It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
What keys or codes does it need?
The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.
Does it run on my computer or in the cloud?
It runs in the maker’s cloud. Connect over the internet with nothing to install, but what you send passes through the maker’s servers.
Is it still maintained?
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.1.0) reached the registry 5 months ago.
Which apps can use it?
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. It connects by URL, so apps that accept remote MCP servers work too, such as ChatGPT in developer mode.
What can I use instead?
In the same category: Zeqqat, Exepal, GitHits
Alternatives
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:↓ Downloads per weeki★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
README from the maker
Open the README
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
ci-sentinel 🛡️
Security auditor for SEVEN CI ecosystems — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI/CD, Jenkins, CircleCI, Azure Pipelines, Bitbucket Pipelines and Travis CI — finds the supply-chain and injection flaws a YAML linter can't see, *before* an attacker's pull/merge request runs code with your repository secrets.
Available as an MCP server (for Claude / Cursor / any agent) and a pay-per-call HTTP API (x402 USDC or a prepaid card key).
Give it your .github/workflows/*.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci/config.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml and/or .travis.yml (each file is auto-routed to the right analyzer) and get a CRITICAL / VULNERABLE / RISKY / HARDENED verdict with the exact flaws.
What it catches that a linter can't
| Class | What ci-sentinel does |
|---|---|
| 💉 Expression injection (inter-step / inter-job taint) | Taints untrusted ${{ github.event.* }} (issue/PR title, body, comment, review, branch name, commit message, label name, fork repo identity, edited-from values) to a run: shell or actions/github-script sink — and **follows it across steps. .outputs.*, needs. .outputs.*, env: vars, matrix values and reusable-workflow inputs.***. An attacker who hides the untrusted value behind an intermediate output is still caught; a per-file grep is not. |
| 🎭 Pwn requests | pull_request_target / workflow_run that check out untrusted fork code in the privileged, secret-bearing context = arbitrary code execution with your secrets. |
| 🔑 Token permissions | Excessive GITHUB_TOKEN scopes (write-all, contents:write, id-token:write), missing permissions: blocks, and secrets exposed to untrusted triggers. |
| 🔁 Reusable workflows | workflow_call callers passing untrusted data across the boundary as inputs.*, and `secrets: inherit` handing the full secret set to a reusable workflow on an untrusted trigger. |
| 📌 Action pinning | Third-party actions (and reusable-workflow `uses:`) on mutable tags/branches instead of a commit SHA (the tj-actions/changed-files-style hijack), resolved through the transitive action graph. |
| 🖥️ Self-hosted RCE | Self-hosted runners reachable from public-repo PRs (RCE on your own infra), and OIDC `id-token` trust misuse. |
…and the same depth for GitLab CI/CD (.gitlab-ci.yml)
| Class | What ci-sentinel does |
|---|---|
| 💉 CI-variable injection | Taints untrusted GitLab variables (CI_COMMIT_REF_NAME/BRANCH/TAG, CI_MERGE_REQUEST_TITLE/DESCRIPTION/SOURCE_BRANCH_NAME, commit message/author, triggering-user fields) interpolated into script: — following the taint through `variables:` and `extends:` templates. Knows the SAFE vars (CI_COMMIT_SHA, CI_MERGE_REQUEST_IID, CI_PROJECT_ID, …) so it doesn't flag every $CI_. |
| 🎭 Fork merge-request pwn | Jobs reachable from fork MR pipelines (merge_request_event, only: merge_requests) that carry secrets / a broad `CI_JOB_TOKEN` / `id_tokens` (OIDC), or that run privileged work (deploy/publish/`kubectl`/`terraform`) with no `when: manual` gate. |
| 📦 `include:` supply-chain | include: from a remote URL or another project/component on a moving (non-SHA) ref — foreign pipeline code merged into yours. |
| ☣️ Artifact / cache poisoning | An untrusted job writes an artifact/cache that a privileged downstream job consumes and executes (needs:/dependencies: or a shared cache path) — a cross-job and cross-pipeline escalation. |
…and five more CI systems, same taint model
| Ecosystem | What ci-sentinel catches |
|---|---|
🔧 Jenkins (Jenkinsfile) | Command injection from params.* / env.CHANGE_* / ghprb* / SCM data into sh/bat/powershell (through environment{} bindings); credential-leak (credentials()/withCredentials printed or baked into a GString); Groovy evaluate()/load RCE; missing input() approval gate; unsafe agent any. |
⭕ CircleCI (.circleci/config.yml) | Shell injection from << pipeline.git.branch/tag >> / pipeline parameters into run:; unpinned orbs (@volatile / bare major); fork-PR context secret exposure with no type: approval gate; privileged deploy with no approval. |
🟦 Azure Pipelines (azure-pipelines.yml) | Macro injection from $(Build.SourceBranch) / $(System.PullRequest.SourceBranch) / commit message into script:/bash:/pwsh:; untrusted templates from a foreign repo resource; fork variable-group secret exposure; unpinned repository resources. |
🪣 Bitbucket Pipelines (bitbucket-pipelines.yml) | Shell injection from $BITBUCKET_BRANCH / $BITBUCKET_TAG / $BITBUCKET_PR_DESTINATION_BRANCH / commit message expanded unquoted into script:; secured/deployment-variable exposure on externally-triggerable PR pipelines; unpinned pipes (:latest); deployments with no trigger: manual gate. |
🚦 Travis CI (.travis.yml) | Shell injection from $TRAVIS_BRANCH / $TRAVIS_PULL_REQUEST_BRANCH / $TRAVIS_COMMIT_MESSAGE expanded unquoted into a lifecycle hook; secure-env PR/fork secret exposure; deploy: stages with no on: branch/condition gate. |
…plus two deep cross-domain detectors a one-shot agent can't replicate
| Detector | What ci-sentinel catches |
|---|---|
| ☁️ OIDC cloud-trust misconfiguration (Terraform / CloudFormation / GCP workload-identity / Azure federated-credential) | Models the cloud half of CI OIDC: the trust policy of the IAM role / WIF pool / federated app. Flags a sub condition with a broad wildcard (repo:org/*, repo:*), no `sub` condition at all (any workflow on the issuer assumes the role), a repo pinned but ref/environment unpinned (any branch assumes), the bare pull_request subject (fork-reachable), or an unpinned aud. Then correlates the IaC trust with the CI side (a workflow that mints id-token reachable from an untrusted trigger) and escalates to critical when the chain is reachable end-to-end. No single-file linter catches this — it spans the CI claim and the cloud trust policy. |
🔧 Jenkins shared libraries (@Library → vars/*.groovy) | Taints an untrusted pipeline value (PR title / branch / build parameter) passed to a shared-library global-var step through the library's `call()` interior to an internal sh/bat sink — the Jenkins parity of orb/template/composite-action cross-file taint, invisible when reading only the `Jenkinsfile`. Also flags @Library imports on a mutable ref (a branch / default version) as supply-chain risk. |
Each analyzer knows the SAFE variables (SHAs, numeric ids, trusted slugs — BITBUCKET_COMMIT, TRAVIS_PULL_REQUEST, pipeline.git.revision, …) and the SAFE OIDC trusts (sub pinned to repo:org/repo:ref:refs/heads/main / :environment:prod with aud set) so it doesn't flag every $VAR or every trust. Zero false positives on hardened configs.
It is a real static analyzer: a line-aware workflow YAML parser → a model of triggers/jobs/steps/permissions/actions/outputs/needs → an inter-step/inter-job taint resolver + permission + supply-chain detectors → a scored verdict with per-finding file:line, the full taint path, concrete remediation, and a SARIF 2.1.0 report (with codeFlows) you can upload to GitHub code scanning.
…and it doesn't just flag — it FIXES, and it GRADES
| Premium | What you get |
|---|---|
| 🔧 Auto-remediation (the exact fix) | For each finding ci-sentinel produces the concrete change: the corrected YAML/Groovy snippet and a unified diff you can apply — pin the action/orb/pipe to an immutable SHA/version, env-bind + quote the injected expression, drop write-all to least privilege, insert the manual/approval gate, pin the OIDC sub/aud, move the hardcoded secret to the store (and rotate it). Not "you have a bug" but "change THIS to THIS", with a confidence label (exact / template / guided) so you know what's drop-in vs. what needs a value filled. Findings carry a stable fingerprint for de-duplication, and the SARIF results carry inline fixes. |
| 📋 Compliance scorecard (A–F) | A CIS-like CI security benchmark scored A–F with a PASS / FAIL / WARN / N/A breakdown per control (least privilege, component pinning, no secrets to forks, no self-hosted on public PRs, OIDC pinned, no hardcoded secrets, no pwn checkout, gated deploys, no injection, no cross-job poisoning). Each control lists the finding ids that drove its verdict — defensible to a security team. A directly-exploitable critical flaw caps the grade (one open RCE/secret-exfil path dominates the posture). |
| 🛰️ Live threat-intelligence feed (the data moat) | Every uses: / orb / pipe in your config is checked against a live, server-side feed of KNOWN-compromised CI components, ingested on a cron from public sources — [OSV.dev](https://osv.dev) and the [GitHub Security Advisory](https://github.com/advisories) database (`ecosystem=actions`) — and merged onto a curated seed of the flagship incidents (tj-actions/changed-files CVE-2025-30066, reviewdog/action-setup CVE-2025-30154 and its transitive dependents, the aquasecurity/trivy-action tag force-push, Ultralytics). It knows that tj-actions/changed-files@v45 is poison and that the same action SHA-pinned to a clean commit or upgraded to `@v46` is safe — a distinction a static YAML scan or a local linter cannot make, because it has no feed. The feed lives only on the hosted server (the thin client never carries it); GET /feed/status surfaces its freshness. A live reputation signal (stars / last-commit / archived / does-the-repo-still-resolve) additionally flags archived/abandoned components and dangling references that are takeover-bait. This is the access-moat that justifies the hosted, paid model: the value is the live DATA, not the compute. |
| 🪤 Tag-rewrite & imposter detection (live ref→commit) | Give ci-sentinel the commit SHA you *expected* a mutable ref to be (from your lockfile/SBOM) and it resolves what the tag currently points at upstream — flagging a tag-rewrite / force-push (@v2 now runs a *different* commit than you reviewed — the exact tj-actions attack), a deleted/dangling ref, or a suspiciously recent move. It also pairs typosquat detection with the live reputation signal to confirm impersonation — actons/checkout (a near-miss of actions) whose repo is a freshly-stood-up, low-star or dangling imposter — vs. a legitimately-named small fork (no false positive). And because the feed is keyed by component identity, a compromised action is caught no matter which CI system references it (cross-CI) — the piece a mono-CI scanner structurally can't have. |
MCP server (free)
{"mcpServers": { "ci-sentinel": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "ci-sentinel-mcp"] } } }
Tool: `audit_ci_security`. Pass files (a map of workflow filename → YAML) or source (one workflow). The free tier returns the verdict and how many issues of each kind were found.
Deep audit (deep: true) — two ways to pay
The deep audit returns every finding with file:line, the full inter-step/ inter-job injection taint path, the transitive action supply-chain graph, a concrete fix (corrected snippet + unified diff) per finding, an A–F compliance scorecard with a per-control breakdown, and a SARIF 2.1.0 document with inline `fixes` (uploadable to GitHub code scanning via github/codeql-action/upload-sarif).
- 💳 Card (Stripe) — buy a prepaid key at
https://ci-sentinel.vercel.app/pro/checkout, then set"env": { "CI_SENTINEL_KEY": " " }in your MCP config. - 🪙 x402 (USDC) — AI agents pay per call automatically (USDC on Base), no signup.
HTTP API
POST /audit Only the beginning is shown; read the rest in the repo