Spec Driven Development
by formulahendry
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Runs on your computer★ 440MITUpdated 14 months ago
Install
Mcpvet
Overview
Description from the maker (original English)
Vetting for MCP servers and skills: capabilities, configs, mismatches, typosquats, probe parity.
PopNx MCP’s three pillars
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
- User voiceiNo reviews yetReviews open together with accounts in a later step
- Our basic checksi1 of 1 passedChecked from public information; code not scanned yet
- UsageiNot measured yet★ –
What you can do with it
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
- Connection: Runs on your computer
- Transport: stdio
- Category: Other
Install
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
Before you install
- Basic checks: 1 of 1 passed
- Runs on your computer with your user’s permissions (files, network, apps).
- The registry lists no key to fill in.
You need
- npmNode.js installed (for the npx command)
Which app do you use?
Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.
Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcpvet": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@reneturcios/mcpvet",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add mcpvet -- npx -y @reneturcios/mcpvet mcpOr copy the settings yourself
Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcpvet": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@reneturcios/mcpvet",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Or copy the settings yourself
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"mcpvet": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@reneturcios/mcpvet",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.
Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.
These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
What it can do
Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
Basic checksi
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 6, 2026
- ✓ Pass
Maker matches the repo
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account CloudCorpRecords, which owns the repo
- … Not checked yet
Still maintained
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
- … Not checked yet
Has a licence
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
- – Not applicable
Endpoint responds
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
- – Not applicable
Sign-in with OAuth
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
- … Not checked yet
No hidden instructions in tool descriptions
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
Compared with others in Otheri
- More stars than 0% of the other 32531 servers in this category
- Published to the registry more recently than 75% of the other 32531 servers in this category
- Basic checks equal to or better than 100% of the other 32531 servers in this category
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
Common questions
Is Mcpvet safe?
It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
What keys or codes does it need?
The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.
Does it run on my computer or in the cloud?
It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).
Is it still maintained?
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.2.1) reached the registry 12 days ago.
Which apps can use it?
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Node.js, Docker on your computer.
What can I use instead?
In the same category: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, Reelsaw
Alternatives
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
Remote Desktop Commander
by desktop-commander
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
Runs in the cloud★ 211Updated yesterday
Install
Reelsaw
by osbytes
Drive a self-hosted Reelsaw: turn long videos into vertical clips, edit, re-render and export them.
Runs on your computerUpdated today
Install
README from the maker
Open the README
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
mcpvet
Vet MCP servers and agent skills before you install them.
In early 2026 the ClawHavoc wave put 1,184 malicious skills on a public skill marketplace from just 12 accounts: credential stealers and reverse shells dressed up as helpful agent skills, inheriting whatever permissions the agent itself had. Only a small minority of organizations audit the MCP servers they install, and almost none audit skill packs. The install click is the trust decision, and it usually happens with no evidence at all.
mcpvet is the pre-install check. Point it at a local MCP server directory, a SKILL.md skill directory, a client config tree, or an npm package name, and it returns a deterministic verdict with evidence for every finding: VETTED, REVIEW, or DO-NOT-INSTALL. The scan is static only. Scanned code is read as text and never executed, imported, or installed.
Since 0.2.0 there is also a separate, clearly labeled live mode (mcpvet probe). It spawns a stdio server command twice and compares what it answers: probe parity, exact-hash fingerprint matching, and a server-level risk score derived from the recorded signals. Live mode executes the target, which is exactly why it is a separate command and not folded into the static scan.
Install
npx -y @reneturcios/mcpvet --versionnpm install -g @reneturcios/mcpvet docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/cloudcorprecords/mcpvet mcp
Quick start
mcpvet vet ~/src/some-mcp-servermcpvet vet ~/skills/some-skill --json mcpvet vet-package @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@2025.3.28 mcpvet probe -- node ~/src/some-mcp-server/dist/index.js mcpvet mcp
CLI exit codes: 0 when the verdict is VETTED, 1 for REVIEW or DO-NOT-INSTALL, 2 for a usage or setup error, 141 when the reader closed the output pipe before the report was delivered.
What it checks
| Check | What it catches |
|---|---|
| Tool inventory | Declared tools (server.json, package.json, tool manifests) against tools actually registered in source, plus resources and prompts |
| Capability combos | Filesystem read plus network egress, env access plus egress, credential store access plus egress, shell execution reachable from the tool surface |
| Config audit | Client configs (claude_desktop_config.json, .mcp.json, Cursor and VS Code mcp.json): autostart entries, npx -y on unpinned packages, curl pipe shell launchers, shell wrappers, wide env blocks sweeping in credential-shaped keys, whole-environment passthrough |
| Install scripts | preinstall, install, postinstall, and prepare scripts in package.json, with dropper shapes (remote download piped to a shell) graded critical |
| Manifest honesty | A package.json or server.json that is present but unparseable, unreadable, oversize and skipped, or not a regular file is reported as present but not audited, with a MANIFEST-UNPARSEABLE or MANIFEST-UNREADABLE finding, never as absent. A byte order mark prefix is stripped before parsing, so a BOM-prefixed manifest is audited normally |
| Bundled scripts | Reverse shell shapes (including a reverse shell composed from a socket connection, a spawned shell, and pipes joining them), one file that both reads a credential store and makes network requests, persistence touches (session hooks, scheduled tasks, autostart entries), download-and-execute droppers |
| Description language | Tool descriptions, package descriptions, and SKILL.md text carrying instruction or exfiltration language: override prior instructions, hide actions from the user, send credential material onward, run shell commands from prose |
| Documentation download-and-execute | A download-and-execute step declared as text anywhere in the package (SKILL.md prerequisites, READMEs, other docs, bundled scripts): a remote download piped or substituted into a shell or interpreter, or downloaded and run on the same line. Graded critical, like the same shape in autostart configs and install scripts. A download with no execution step does not draw this finding |
| Native binaries | Compiled native artifacts shipped in the package (.node, .dll, .so, .dylib files, or a prebuilds directory). Native code cannot be audited by static text scanning, so its presence is graded medium with a NATIVE-BINARY finding and the verdict floors at REVIEW: presence is not evidence of malice (many legitimate packages ship prebuilt addons), and it never escalates to DO-NOT-INSTALL on its own, but the binary should be reviewed, or the package built from source, before the server is trusted. The MALFEX imgdecode campaign hid its payload in exactly this shape: a native addon under prebuilds/ loaded at require time, with no install scripts at all |
| Mismatches | Declared tools missing from code, undeclared tools present in code, server.json and package.json disagreeing on name or version |
| Pinning | Missing version fields, moving tags such as latest or *, registry entries with no version, unpinned container references |
| Typosquat | Target and package names at edit distance 1 (or 2 for long names) from a bundled list of well-known MCP server names |
| Probe parity (live only) | The server is spawned twice and asked the same questions (initialize, tools/list). Any drift in identity, tool set, descriptions, or schemas between the two identical probes is recorded as a signal with the diff as evidence |
| Fingerprints (live only) | The presented tool set and tool descriptions are hashed (sha256 over canonical JSON) and compared against a bundled fingerprint file. Matches are exact only, never fuzzy, and each entry carries its provenance |
| Risk score | Every report carries a score from 0 to 100 derived from its recorded signals (static findings, or live signals in probe mode). The score is computed from the signal list on read, never kept as a counter, and it informs the verdict without replacing the verdict rules |
Verdict rules
- DO-NOT-INSTALL: at least one critical finding. Reverse shells, credential stealers, install droppers, curl pipe shell autostarts, and download-and-execute steps declared in skill documentation land here.
- REVIEW: at least one high or medium finding and no criticals. Dangerous capability combos, undeclared tools, typosquats, env harvesting configs, and unpinned autostarts land here. A partial scan also lands here at minimum: when a manifest is present but could not be parsed or read, the scan did not see the whole target, so VETTED is unreachable in that state.
- VETTED: no critical, high, or medium findings. Info and low findings (such as the autostart inventory itself) are still reported as evidence.
A verdict is a scan result, never a safety claim. VETTED means these checks found nothing at or above medium severity in the files scanned; it does not certify a server safe.
Scope floor (v0.1.2): DO-NOT-INSTALL is a claim about an installable MCP bundle. If the target is not an MCP target (kind unknown, meaning no server, config, or skill as its primary subject, or a mixed monorepo root whose critical findings all come from outside every identified MCP bundle), the verdict floors at REVIEW with an explicit "not an MCP target" note telling you to scope vetting to the server or skill directory. Findings are still reported as evidence; a critical inside an identified bundle still verdicts DO-NOT-INSTALL.
Live mode (probe) has its own verdict rules, deliberately capped: any scoring signal (a parity drift or a fingerprint match) makes the verdict REVIEW, a clean double probe verdicts VETTED, and no usable evidence verdicts REVIEW as inconclusive. Live evidence never yields DO-NOT-INSTALL: a fingerprint match is grounds for a human look, not a hard fail. Two negative controls are explicit: a probe refused for auth reasons is recorded as a pass on that probe (a server demanding credentials is doing the minimum right), and a timeout records no signal at all.
MCP
mcpvet mcp serves a stdio MCP server with three tools:
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
| vet_path | Vet a local MCP server directory, skill directory, or client config tree before install |
| vet_package | Vet an npm package by name using registry metadata only: the tarball is not downloaded and no code runs |
| probe_server | Live-probe a stdio server command (spawns it twice): probe parity, exact-hash fingerprints, and the derived risk score. This tool EXECUTES the command it is given |
Scope and limits
- Static analysis only, by design. mcpvet never executes, imports, or installs the target, and vet_package never downloads the tarball. Behavior that only appears at runtime is out of scope; vet the extracted directory for capability and inventory checks.
- Live mode is the one exception, and it is opt-in per invocation:
probe(or the probe_server MCP tool) spawns the given command twice on the machine running mcpvet. Run it only against commands you already trust enough to execute locally. - The fingerprint file shipped in 0.2.0 is seeded from mcpvet's own test fixtures (labeled test seeds, generated by probing the fixture server with scripts/gen-seeds.ts), not from observed real-world servers. Entries are added only from recorded evidence, each with its provenance.
- Tool inventory is pattern-based: tools registered through shapes the scanner does not recognize (dynamic registration, generated code) can be missed, which is why a declared manifest with no matching registrations is itself a finding.
- The walk caps at 2,000 files and 512 KiB per file. Anything skipped is counted and reported in the report's caps block, never silently dropped. When the skipped file is package.json or server.json, the verdict is also floored at REVIEW, because the manifest itself went unaudited.
- The vet target must be a directory. A regular file, a FIFO, a device, or a nonexistent path is a usage error and exits 2, never a verdict.
- Compiled native code is opaque to this scanner by construction. A tree shipping native artifacts (.node, .dll, .so, .dylib, or a prebuilds directory) draws a NATIVE-BINARY finding at medium and verdicts at least REVIEW; the finding reports presence only and claims nothing about what the binary does.
- The typosquat list is a bundled snapshot of well-known MCP server names, not the live registry.
- Pattern literals are indistinguishable from payloads in a static text scan: the source of a security scanner (or a test fixture corpus) contains the very shapes it detects, so vetting detector tooling flags its own pattern strings (observed on the Security Wave factory repos themselves, where every such critical was hand-verified as a pattern literal or a planted fixture). Treat verdicts on scanner source as REVIEW-grade evidence, not as a compromise claim.
Part of the Security Wave: hookcheck (persistence hooks), actionpin (Actions pinning), injectcheck (prompt injection in agent-read content), tracewatch (observability and root cause), mcpvet (pre-install vetting).
MIT.
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