Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Description from the maker (original English)
Passive security scanner: audits MCP servers against the OWASP MCP Top 10, graded A-F.
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
You need
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Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"scan": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"owasp-mcp-scan",
"--serve"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add scan -- npx -y owasp-mcp-scan --servePaste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"scan": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"owasp-mcp-scan",
"--serve"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"scan": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"owasp-mcp-scan",
"--serve"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.
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These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 6, 2026
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account CodingSelim, which owns the repo
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.
It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.2.1) reached the registry 4 months ago.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Node.js on your computer.
In the same category: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, dotnet-mcp
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
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MCP server for .NET symbols, XAML, source generators, and restricted workspace edit
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
Passive security scanner for Model Context Protocol servers. Point it at any running MCP server; it audits the live server against the OWASP MCP Top 10 and grades it A–F. Read-only, so it is safe to run against production.
npx owasp-mcp-scan --stdio "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp"
I ran it against the 12 most-installed MCP servers. [9 of them failed.](#real-findings-on-real-servers) No install, no config, no exploiting anything.
MCP tool descriptions are fed straight into your model's context, and most public servers were never security-reviewed. A bad one can hide instructions in a description, expose a raw-shell tool, or leak a key; and your agent acts on it. Endor Labs found 82% of servers prone to path traversal, 34% to command injection.
mcp-scan is the gut-check before you wire a server in. It's passive: it reads advertised capabilities and analyzes them statically, never invoking tools, so it's safe against production servers.
toxic-flow reasons across the whole toolset for the lethal trifecta (reads private data + ingests untrusted content + can exfiltrate), the shape single-tool scanners miss.It never calls a tool, never fuzzes, and never sends an exploit. The worst it does is read what the server already tells everyone.
12 popular npm servers, actual output (snapshot 2026-07-11, full benchmark):
| Server | Tools | Grade | 🔴 | 🟠 | 🟡 | Notable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
firecrawl-mcp | 26 | F | 2 | 11 | 1 | lethal trifecta (MCP10) + code exec (MCP05) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem | 14 | F | 0 | 1 | 11 | unconstrained path params (MCP01) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-puppeteer | 7 | F | 1 | 2 | 0 | script param executes JS (MCP05) |
tavily-mcp | 5 | F | 0 | 3 | 1 | untrusted-input + exfiltration (MCP10) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-memory | 9 | F | 0 | 3 | 0 | delete_* tools, no confirmation (MCP02) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-github | 26 | D | 0 | 0 | 2 | state-changing tools (MCP02) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-slack | 8 | C | 0 | 1 | 0 | reads + posts = data + exfil (MCP10) |
@modelcontextprotocol/server-everything | 13 | A | 0 | 0 | 0 | clean ✓ |
@kazuph/mcp-fetch | 1 | A | 0 | 0 | 0 | clean ✓ |
9 of 12 flagged, 3 clean, every row audited finding-by-finding, false positives stripped rather than padded. Reproduce any row yourself:
npx owasp-mcp-scan --stdio "npx -y firecrawl-mcp" # F: lethal trifecta + code exec
npx owasp-mcp-scan --stdio "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-everything" # A: clean
CLI
npx owasp-mcp-scan --stdio "<command>" # local stdio server
npx owasp-mcp-scan --url https://host/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" npx owasp-mcp-scan --config ~/.cursor/mcp.json --format sarif --output mcp.sarif
As an MCP server, let your agent scan servers on demand (*"scan this MCP server before I add it"*). Add to any client; this mcpServers shape works in Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code, and Gemini CLI:
{ "mcpServers": { "mcp-scan": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "owasp-mcp-scan", "--serve"] } } }
OpenAI Codex (~/.codex/config.toml):
[mcp_servers.mcp-scan]
command = "npx" args = ["-y", "owasp-mcp-scan", "--serve"]
Exposes two tools: `scan_mcp_server` (audit a stdio/HTTP target) and `list_checks`.
Claude Code plugin
/plugin marketplace add CodingSelim/mcp-scan
/plugin install mcp-scan@mcp-scan
Also on the official MCP registry as io.github.CodingSelim/mcp-scan. Publishing steps: PUBLISHING.md.
Full OWASP MCP Top 10 (2025) coverage, 12 checks:
| Check | OWASP | Catches |
|---|---|---|
secret-exposure | MCP01 | AWS / OpenAI / Anthropic / GitHub / GitLab / Stripe / SendGrid / npm / HF / DB URIs / JWT / private keys in advertised text |
transport | MCP01 | Plaintext http:// to a non-loopback host |
path-traversal | MCP01 | file:///{path} templates and unconstrained path params |
excessive-scope | MCP02 | Destructive tools (delete, drop, transfer) with no confirmation |
tool-poisoning | MCP03 | Instruction overrides, hidden exfiltration directives, zero-width / Unicode-tag smuggling |
tool-shadowing | MCP03 / MCP09 | Duplicate tool-name collisions and "call me first" precedence injection |
supply-chain | MCP04 / MCP09 | Unpinned/placeholder versions and homoglyph server names |
command-injection | MCP05 | Unconstrained command / shell / code params, raw SQL, advertised execution |
ssrf | MCP05 | Arbitrary url / host params with no allowlist |
tool-poisoning (dynamic) | MCP06 | Injection in resource contents and server instructions |
authn | MCP07 | HTTP servers that complete an unauthenticated handshake |
telemetry | MCP08 | High-impact tools with no audit trail (advisory, unscored) |
toxic-flow | MCP10 | Lethal trifecta: one server that reads private data, ingests untrusted content, and can exfiltrate |
toxic-flow is the standout, it reasons across the whole toolset, catching the GitHub-MCP / email-agent injection shape that per-tool checks miss.
console (default) · json · sarif (GitHub Code Scanning). Exit code is non-zero at/above --fail-on (default high), so it gates CI:
- run: npx owasp-mcp-scan --url ${{ secrets.MCP_URL }} --format sarif --output mcp.sarif
npm install && npm run build && npm test # 48 tests, incl. live end-to-end fixture scans
Checks are pure and isolated (src/checks/), reusing detectors in src/detectors/. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
OWASP MCP Top 10 · MCP Security Cheat Sheet · Vulnerable MCP Project · MCPTox
MIT © CodingSelim