Aep

Name: Aep
Author: Focus-GTS

by Focus-GTSversion 0.11.1i★ –iRuns on your computer

Registry namecom.focusgts/aep

Install

Overview

Description from the maker (original English)

Full-CRUD server for AEP, Journey Optimizer and CJA. 61 tools from one OAuth credential.

PopNx MCP’s three pillars

These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.

User voiceiNo reviews yetReviews open together with accounts in a later step
Our basic checksi1 of 1 passedChecked from public information; code not scanned yet
UsageiNot measured yet★ –

What you can do with it

We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.

Connection: Runs on your computer
Transport: stdio
Category: Other
You need to fill in: AEP_CLIENT_ID, AEP_CLIENT_SECRET, AEP_ORG_ID

Install

Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.

Before you install

Basic checks: 1 of 1 passed
Runs on your computer with your user’s permissions (files, network, apps).
You fill in yourself: AEP_CLIENT_ID, AEP_CLIENT_SECRET, AEP_ORG_ID, AEP_SANDBOX_NAME, AEP_MODE, LOG_LEVEL

Values marked secret are keys to your account. Never share them or paste them into a chat.

You need

npmNode.js installed (for the npx command)

Which app do you use?

ClaudeClaude CodeCursorVS CodeChatGPT

Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.

Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "aep": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@focusgts/aep-mcp-server"
      ],
      "env": {
        "AEP_CLIENT_ID": "your-value",
        "AEP_CLIENT_SECRET": "your-value",
        "AEP_ORG_ID": "your-value",
        "AEP_SANDBOX_NAME": "your-value",
        "AEP_MODE": "your-value",
        "LOG_LEVEL": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Run this in your terminal

claude mcp add aep --env AEP_CLIENT_ID=your-value --env AEP_CLIENT_SECRET=your-value --env AEP_ORG_ID=your-value --env AEP_SANDBOX_NAME=your-value --env AEP_MODE=your-value --env LOG_LEVEL=your-value -- npx -y @focusgts/aep-mcp-server

Fill in the empty values before running it.

Open in Cursor

Or copy the settings yourself

Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "aep": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@focusgts/aep-mcp-server"
      ],
      "env": {
        "AEP_CLIENT_ID": "your-value",
        "AEP_CLIENT_SECRET": "your-value",
        "AEP_ORG_ID": "your-value",
        "AEP_SANDBOX_NAME": "your-value",
        "AEP_MODE": "your-value",
        "LOG_LEVEL": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.

Open in VS Code

Or copy the settings yourself

Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project

{
  "servers": {
    "aep": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@focusgts/aep-mcp-server"
      ],
      "env": {
        "AEP_CLIENT_ID": "your-value",
        "AEP_CLIENT_SECRET": "your-value",
        "AEP_ORG_ID": "your-value",
        "AEP_SANDBOX_NAME": "your-value",
        "AEP_MODE": "your-value",
        "LOG_LEVEL": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.

This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.

Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.

Values you fill in

AEP_CLIENT_ID required env
Adobe I/O client ID from an OAuth Server-to-Server credential in the Adobe Developer Console.
AEP_CLIENT_SECRET secret required env
Adobe I/O client secret paired with AEP_CLIENT_ID.
AEP_ORG_ID required env
Adobe IMS organization ID, in the form xxxxxxxxx@AdobeOrg.
AEP_SANDBOX_NAME env
AEP sandbox to scope every call to. Defaults to 'prod'. Use a development sandbox to enable write operations.
AEP_MODE env
Write posture: 'read-only' (no mutation anywhere), 'safe' (default — writes only in sandboxes Adobe classifies as development), or 'production' (writes anywhere). Reads are never restricted.
LOG_LEVEL env
Pino log level. Logs go to stderr; stdout is reserved for the MCP JSON-RPC stream.

These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.

What it can do

Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.

Basic checksi

We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 6, 2026

✓ Pass
Maker matches the repo
The registry name was verified against the domain focusgts.com (the registry checks domain ownership)
… Not checked yet
Still maintained
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
… Not checked yet
Has a licence
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
– Not applicable
Endpoint responds
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
– Not applicable
Sign-in with OAuth
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
… Not checked yet
No hidden instructions in tool descriptions
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints

Compared with others in Otheri

More stars than 0% of the other 32466 servers in this category
Published to the registry more recently than 31% of the other 32466 servers in this category
Basic checks equal to or better than 100% of the other 32466 servers in this category

Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.

Common questions

Is Aep safe?

It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.

What keys or codes does it need?

You need to fill in: AEP_CLIENT_ID, AEP_CLIENT_SECRET, AEP_ORG_ID

Does it run on my computer or in the cloud?

It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).

Is it still maintained?

The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.11.1) reached the registry 2 months ago.

Which apps can use it?

Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Node.js on your computer.

What can I use instead?

In the same category: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, HotCodePush

Alternatives

Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.

Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi

Spec Driven Development

by formulahendry

MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.

Runs on your computer★ 440MITUpdated 14 months ago

Install

Remote Desktop Commander

by desktop-commander

Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.

Runs in the cloud★ 211Updated yesterday

Install

HotCodePush

by hotcodepush-team

Manage over-the-air (OTA) updates for React Native, Expo, Capacitor and Cordova apps.

Runs in the cloudUpdated today

Install

README from the maker

Open the README

Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.

Adobe's MCP lets your agent read Experience Platform. This one lets it work.

61 tools across 14 categories. Full read AND write. Self-hosted, Apache-2.0, no invitation required. Experience Platform, Journey Optimizer and Customer Journey Analytics — from one OAuth credential.

Ingest a batch → compose a schema → activate an audience → honour an erasure. Every mutation gated by a fail-closed write guard that asks Adobe what kind of sandbox it's in.

⚡ Do it in three lines

claude mcp add aep \

-e AEP_CLIENT_ID=... -e AEP_CLIENT_SECRET=... \ -e AEP_ORG_ID=...@AdobeOrg -e AEP_SANDBOX_NAME=your-dev-sandbox \ -- npx -y @focusgts/aep-mcp-server

Then just ask your agent:

*"Create a schema with the Demographic Details field group, then a dataset on it."*

*"Ingest this NDJSON file and tell me when the batch lands."*

*"Build an audience of customers who bought twice this quarter and activate it."*

*"Delete every record for this email address — dry run first."*

Writes are off until you ask for them, and safe mode only unlocks sandboxes Adobe classifies as development.

The loop that makes it different

flowchart LR

A["📐 Compose schema from field groups"] --> B["🗂️ Create dataset"] B --> C["📥 Ingest batch · upload · complete"] C --> D["🎯 Activate segment → destination"] D --> E["🧹 Govern erasure · expiration · quota"] E -. "re-audit the tenant" .-> A

Adobe's first-party gateway can *tell you* what's in your Experience Platform tenant. It cannot create a dataset, land a batch, activate an audience, or submit an erasure. This does — and does it behind a guard that fails closed.

🧠 How it works

flowchart LR

A["AI agent (Claude · Cursor · Copilot)"] -- MCP / stdio --> B["aep-mcp-server 61 tools"] B --> W{{"write guard fail-closed"}} W --> C["Schema Registry · Catalog Ingestion · Lifecycle · Privacy"] C --> F["Your AEP sandbox platform.adobe.io"] B --> J["Journey Optimizer read-only"] J --> K["ajo campaigns"] B --> Q["Customer Journey Analytics read-only, no sandbox"] Q --> L["cja.adobe.io"]

The agent calls tools; the server talks to live Adobe APIs over OAuth Server-to-Server. The write guard sits in the HTTP client, not in each tool, so all 61 inherit it and none can forget it. Blocked calls never reach Adobe.

🛡️ Safe by default

Three postures. Reads are never restricted in any mode.

`AEP_MODE`	Writes permitted	Use it when
`read-only`	Never, in any sandbox	Handing the server to someone to explore an environment you don't want touched
`safe` (default)	Only where Adobe classifies the sandbox `development`	Evaluating, or letting an agent work without risking production
`production`	Anywhere, including production	You run your own change control and don't want the server second-guessing you

How `safe` decides — and why it's not the sandbox name.

A production sandbox can be called anything, and a sandbox called prod might not be production. Only Adobe's type field from the Sandbox Management API decides.

It fails closed. If the type can't be determined — the credential can't read sandbox metadata, the API errors, startup hasn't finished — writes are blocked. A credential must not earn write access by being *less* capable. An unrecognised AEP_MODE falls back to safe, so a typo can never grant production writes.

A sandbox literally named `prod` is refused unconditionally, before mode resolution — so AEP_MODE=production does not lift it. Override with AEP_I_UNDERSTAND_THIS_WRITES_TO_PROD=true only if that really is your sandbox's name. The inference is deliberately asymmetric: trusting a name to *allow* a write is unsafe, trusting one to *deny* a write is safe, because the worst case is a refusal you can override on purpose.

Mutations are off entirely unless AEP_ALLOW_MUTATIONS=true. That is separate from AEP_MODE on purpose: choosing a write mode should not also mean "yes, you may change my data".

Startup always states the active posture:

SAFE MODE — sandbox is a development sandbox, so writes are ENABLED.

SAFE MODE — sandbox is PRODUCTION, so writes are BLOCKED. Reads work normally. SAFE MODE — sandbox type could not be confirmed, so writes are BLOCKED (fail-closed). READ-ONLY MODE — no write, update, or delete will be performed in any sandbox. PRODUCTION MODE — writes permitted against ANY sandbox, including production.

Per-tool confirmation gates

Writes are not *uniformly* gated — uniform gating makes an agent useless. Gates sit where an action is irreversible and wide-reaching, and every one is checked before any network call:

Tool	Gate
`aep_create_record_delete`	`dryRun` defaults true. Real submission needs `confirm: "DELETE RECORDS "` — bound to the dataset and a SHA-256 digest of the exact identity set, so a confirmation can't be reused for a different deletion. `ALL` and multi-dataset targets are refused.
`aep_delete_segment`	`confirm: "DELETE SEGMENT "` — segments were create-only until 0.9.1, so every one an agent made was permanent
`aep_delete_dataset`	`confirm: "DELETE DATASET "`, escalating to `"DELETE PROFILE-ENABLED DATASET "` when the dataset feeds Profile
`aep_complete_batch`	`confirm: "COMPLETE BATCH "` — the point of no return for ingestion
`aep_revert_batch`	`confirm: "REVERT BATCH "`
`aep_create_dataset_expiration`	`confirm: "CREATE DATASET EXPIRATION "` — unless `dryRun: true`
`aep_update_dataset_expiration`	`confirm: "UPDATE DATASET EXPIRATION "`
`aep_cancel_dataset_expiration`	`confirm: "CANCEL DATASET EXPIRATION "`
`aep_delete_profile`	`confirm: "I understand this is irreversible"` (deprecated — prefer Data Hygiene)

Confirmations name their target. A phrase carrying the dataset id — and for record delete, a hash of the identities too — cannot be copied from one call to another. A generic "I understand this is irreversible" approves *any* deletion once you've typed it once.

Identity values never leave the process. aep_create_record_delete returns a count, the namespace names, and a digest — never the email addresses or device IDs you passed it. A record-delete request is by nature a list of real people; a tool that echoes them copies them into every transcript and log sink it touches.

Batch creation and file upload are ungated on purpose: those writes are additive and recoverable. An unwanted batch can be left uncompleted, and data that did land can be removed with the Data Hygiene tools.

Tool annotations

Every tool ships MCP annotations — readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint — derived from the same metadata that builds its description, so the two cannot drift.

	Count
`readOnlyHint: true`	39
`destructiveHint: true`	8
Un-annotated	0

These are hints *for the client*, not enforcement — the guards above enforce. Their value is that a client like Claude Desktop uses destructiveHint to decide when to interrupt and ask a human. Without them aep_delete_profile looks identical to aep_list_schemas. A test asserts the destructive list exactly, so a ninth is a deliberate act rather than an oversight.

🛠️ The 61 tools

All prefixed aep_, verb_noun naming. 🔒 changes state · 🔥 destructive.

Data modelling & ingestion

Schemas (4)

list_schemas
get_schema
create_schema 🔒
update_schema 🔒

Datasets (4)

list_datasets
get_dataset
create_dataset 🔒
delete_dataset 🔥

Ingestion (7)

create_batch 🔒
upload_batch_file 🔒
complete_batch 🔥
get_batch_status
list_batches
abort_batch 🔥
revert_batch 🔥

Sources (2)

list_sources
list_dataflows

Query Service (3)

run_query 🔒
get_query_status
list_queries

Profiles, audiences & activation

Identities (2)

list_identity_namespaces
get_identity_graph

Profiles (4)

get_profile
get_profile_by_identity
preview_profile
delete_profile 🔥

Segments (5)

list_segments
get_segment
create_segment 🔒
estimate_segment_size
delete_segment 🔥

Destinations (3)

list_destinations
create_destination_connection 🔒
activate_segment 🔒

Governance — privacy, lifecycle & event routing

Privacy Service (6)

create_privacy_job 🔒
get_privacy_job
list_privacy_jobs
cancel_privacy_job 🔒
get_privacy_job_results
list_privacy_namespaces

Data Hygiene (9)

create_record_delete 🔥
get_work_order_status
list_work_orders
get_data_lifecycle_quota
create_dataset_expiration 🔥
get_dataset_expiration
list_dataset_expirations
update_dataset_expiration 🔥
cancel_dataset_expiration 🔥

Workflows these unlock

Ingest end to end — create_schema → create_dataset → create_batch → upload_batch_file → complete_batch → get_batch_status

Build and activate an audience — create_segment → estimate_segment_size → list_destinations → create_destination_connection → activate_segment

Honour an erasure request — get_profile_by_identity → create_record_delete → get_work_order_status

Retire data on a schedule — create_dataset_expiration → list_dataset_expirations → update_dataset_expiration → cancel_dataset_expiration

What's actually been run against a live tenant is recorded per tool in docs/VALIDATION-MATRIX.md — including the surfaces that are documented-and-mocked but deliberately never executed, and why.

Adobe Journey Optimizer (2)

AJO is a separate Adobe product, licensed separately — hence the ajo_ prefix, so an entitlement failure reads as one.

Campaigns

ajo_list_campaigns
ajo_get_campaign

Campaigns is the only AJO surface reachable on our tenant. Journeys, messages, channel surfaces, content templates, fragments, offers and decisions all return an HTML 404 — the gateway has no such route — so they are deliberately not implemented.

Writes are absent on purpose. The routes exist, but shipping an unva

Only the beginning is shown; read the rest in the repo

Aep

Overview

PopNx MCP’s three pillars

What you can do with it

Install

Before you install

Values you fill in

What it can do

Basic checksi

Maker matches the repo

Still maintained

Has a licence

Endpoint responds

Sign-in with OAuth

No hidden instructions in tool descriptions

Compared with others in Otheri

Common questions

Alternatives

Spec Driven Development

Remote Desktop Commander

HotCodePush

README from the maker

Adobe's MCP lets your agent *read* Experience Platform. This one lets it work.

⚡ Do it in three lines

The loop that makes it different

🧠 How it works

🛡️ Safe by default

Per-tool confirmation gates

Tool annotations

🛠️ The 61 tools

Data modelling & ingestion

Profiles, audiences & activation

Governance — privacy, lifecycle & event routing

Adobe Journey Optimizer (2)

Adobe's MCP lets your agent read Experience Platform. This one lets it work.