Context7
Feeds AI the latest docs for libraries and frameworks before it answers, so code it writes does not use outdated, removed functions.
Description from the maker (original English)
Fact-check LLM outputs with cited sources. API key: aihcc.cloud/keys.
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
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AuthorizationValues marked secret are keys to your account. Never share them or paste them into a chat.
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This address needs a key in a request header, which the add-connector menu cannot set. Use Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code instead.
Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add --transport http hallucc https://aihcc.cloud/mcp --header 'Authorization: your-value'Fill in the empty values before running it.
Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"hallucc": {
"url": "https://aihcc.cloud/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"hallucc": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://aihcc.cloud/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
This address needs a key in a request header, which the add-connector menu cannot set. Use Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code instead.
Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.
Authorization secret required HTTP headerThese settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
Tool names and descriptions exactly as the server reported them on Nov 6, 2026. The maker wrote them, not us; we show them as plain text.
verify_text逐声明幻觉核验。输入文本 → 提取声明 → 逐声明验证(supported/refuted/unverified)+ 来源引用。返回红/黄/绿汇总、每条声明的状态/置信度/理由/来源、citations、quota。耗 detect 额度(与 Web 端同源)。
verify_agentAgent 输出与轨迹自检。对最终回答跑逐声明幻觉核验,并对执行轨迹做六维结构化评估(事实性/来源/指令合规/工具声明一致/任务完成/反思)。返回 main.claims、steps[].checks、quota。耗 detect 额度。
check_cua_actionsComputer-Use Agent 动作风险分级。提交动作轨迹 → 逐步返回 L0(放行)/L1(放行+记录)/L2(需确认)/L3(阻断)/takeover(凭据场景挂起等用户亲手输入) 裁决、matched_rules、outcome,及 L0-L3 汇总计数;响应含 ruleset_version(规则库版本)与 disclaimer(本结果仅为分级参考,未执行实际拦截)。覆盖:敏感路径/破坏性命令/不可逆元素语义、域名分级(未知域导航 L2、黑名单域与敏感粘贴到未知域 L3、支付金额超阈值 L3)、凭据词表与支付/登录域 takeover、ta
check_cua_code_auditCUA 代码审计:静态分析 Agent 源码,检测危险导入(subprocess/os.system 等)、权限边界(eval/exec)、注入面(字符串拼接 shell)、危险默认值、沙箱缺失。纯规则扫描,不调 LLM、不耗额度。支持单文件或多文件扫描。
check_safetyAI 安全网关检测。对 prompt + output 跑 OWASP LLM Top 10 三层检测:40+ 特征规则引擎(注入/越狱/有害内容/敏感信息泄露/欺诈)+ 可选 LLM 深度分析 + 可选幻觉检测。返回 passed、risk_score、risk_level、threats[](category/severity/match_context/recommendation)、quota。fast=true 走纯规则 <10ms 模式。耗 detect 额度(fast 亦计入)。
check_agent_ice_wall智能体冰墙(童锁/保险丝):agent 每执行一步前调用一次,做单步幻觉护栏 + 会话级风险累积熔断。响应的 action 字段是唯一需要看的:allow/warn 放行、block 本步拦截、frozen=整场立即停机(风险累积超阈值或命中捏造工具等零容忍项,冻结期间任何动作都不应执行)。熔断条件:block=3分/warn=1分累积 ≥10、连续 3 次 block、或一次命中捏造工具/参数 Schema 违规;冷却 5 分钟自动解冻,或用户手动 reset。session_id 由你在整个 agent 任务内自定复用(状态在云端账号下,本地零安装零
reset_agent_ice_wall手动解冻被冰墙冻结的 agent 会话(用户确认安全后调用)。was_frozen=false 表示该会话本就没冻结(幂等)。解冻后风险分归零。
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 7, 2026
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account fredyee, which owns the repo
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
Responded in 413 ms (HTTP 200)
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Read 7 tool descriptions and found no hidden instructions to the AI
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
It passed 3 of 3 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
You need to fill in: Authorization
It runs in the maker’s cloud. Connect over the internet with nothing to install, but what you send passes through the maker’s servers.
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.1.11) reached the registry 2 days ago.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. It connects by URL, so apps that accept remote MCP servers work too, such as ChatGPT in developer mode.
In the same category: Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
Feeds AI the latest docs for libraries and frameworks before it answers, so code it writes does not use outdated, removed functions.
Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.
Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
[中文文档](./README_zh.md) | Live Demo | Official MCP Registry
Give your AI a fact-checker and a safety gateway: claim-by-claim hallucination detection, agent trajectory evaluation, L0-L3 risk gating for Computer-Use Agent (CUA) actions, Agent source code static audit, and a 40+ feature prompt-injection / jailbreak guard — one MCP server, five tools, works with Claude Code / Cursor / Claude Desktop.
| Tool | Backend endpoint | What it does | Quota |
|---|---|---|---|
verify_text | POST /detect | Claim-by-claim hallucination check: red/yellow/green summary + per-claim status/confidence/reason/sources + citations | ✅ detect |
verify_agent | POST /detect-agent | Text-level verification of an agent's final output + 6-dimension trajectory evaluation (factuality / sourcing / instruction compliance / tool-claim consistency / task completion / reflection) | ✅ detect |
check_cua_actions | POST /cua/classify | L0-L3 risk classification for Computer-Use Agent (CUA) actions + takeover (credential scenarios); covers sensitive paths/destructive commands, domain grading, payment-amount thresholds, task_scope intent deviation, and multi-agent delegation-chain taint analysis; response includes ruleset_version and disclaimer (pure rules, no LLM) | ❌ free |
check_cua_code_audit | POST /cua/audit-code | Static audit of Agent source code: dangerous imports / permission boundaries / injection surfaces / dangerous defaults / sandbox absence | ❌ free |
check_safety | POST /guard/check (fast=true → /guard/check-fast) | 40+ feature safety gateway: prompt injection / jailbreak / harmful content / PII leakage / fraud | ✅ detect |
check_agent_ice_wall | POST /icewall/check | Agent Ice Wall (child lock / fuse): per-step guard + session-level risk accumulation circuit breaker. Watch the action field: frozen = stop the whole session (score ≥10, 3 consecutive blocks, or zero-tolerance fabricated-tool/schema hits); 5-min cooldown auto-thaws | ✅ detect |
reset_agent_ice_wall | POST /icewall/reset | Manually thaw a frozen agent session after user confirmation (was_frozen=false = idempotent no-op) | ❌ free |
Auth model: each client sends
Authorization: Bearer→ the server forwards it as-is to the backend → the backend validates and deducts from the same account quota as the web app. Keys travel only in HTTP headers — never in tool arguments, never in model transcripts.
check_cua_actions| Field | Effect |
|---|---|
actions[].target_url / url | Target URL of a browser action — navigation to an unknown domain escalates to L2; pasting sensitive content to a non-allowlisted domain escalates to L3; blacklisted domains are L3 |
task_scope.task | Declares the intended task, used for deviation detection and audit traceability |
task_scope.allowed_apps / allowed_domains | Allowed apps / domains (domain suffix matching includes subdomains) |
task_scope.forbidden_elements | Forbidden element labels (highest precedence) |
actions[].chain_id | Multi-agent delegation chain id (uuid hex) — when given, the response gains a chain_trace cross-hop taint analysis |
actions[].agent_id / parent_agent_id | The agent owning this action / its delegating parent — pairs cross-agent-boundary propagation chains |
actions[].delegation_depth | Delegation depth (root agent = 0); a subagent exfiltrating content matching sensitive patterns gets an L2 |
An action that leaves task_scope is escalated one level (L0→L1, L1→L2, L2 stays L2 with an "outside task scope" reason appended, L3 unchanged). This mechanism only tightens and never loosens; omitting task_scope has no effect. Credential fields and payment/login domains yield a takeover verdict (suspend and wait for the user to type it themselves — the agent never types your password).
Multi-agent setups (Claude Code Task subagents, Codex agents, Kimi, …): a parent agent reading a credential file (L0 on its own) → a subagent posting it out (L2 on its own) is harmless per hop and dangerous as a chain. Attach the delegation-chain fields to each action and the backend appends a chain_trace: when cross-agent propagation exists the chain aggregate level is raised to L3 and risk_diluted is set (the laundering signal). Leave the chain fields empty and behaviour is bit-for-bit unchanged — existing callers need no change.
The response's ruleset_version lets you verify that online detection and the local Gate run the same rule version.
The MCP server is hosted at https://aihcc.cloud/mcp (remote, streamable-http). Point your client at it with your API key:
# Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http hallucc https://aihcc.cloud/mcp \ --header "Authorization: Bearer "
Cursor / Claude Desktop work the same way: URL https://aihcc.cloud/mcp, header Authorization: Bearer . Create your API key at https://aihcc.cloud (register → /keys). Free daily quota included.
{
"mcpServers": { "hallucc": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "hallucc-mcp"], "env": { "HALLUCC_API_KEY": " " } } } }
Same five tools over stdio transport; the key comes from the environment and requests default to the hosted backend https://aihcc.cloud/api.
The base URL must keep the `/api` prefix: nginx only proxies
/api/to the backend. A bare
https://aihcc.cloudreaches the frontend instead — the request returns 200 with an HTML body,
fails silently (nothing lands in audit or in a fallback file), and the audit replay stays empty.
# 1. Install dependencies
npm install
cp .env.example .env
npm run dev
The server listens on http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp; health check GET /health.
claude mcp add --transport http hallucc http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \
--header "Authorization: Bearer "
claude mcp list
Settings → MCP → Add MCP server:
httphttp://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp{"Authorization": "Bearer "}~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "hallucc": { "type": "http", "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp", "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer " } } } }
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector
tools/call (and any non-discovery method) requires a format-valid key — hc_ + 48 hex — else 401 JSON-RPC, before the backend is contacted. The format check is a local regex, no backend round-trip.initialize, tools/list, ping, notifications/initialized) stay open unauthenticated so registries and directory sites can index the server: they make no backend call and expose no user data. Set MCP_ALLOW_ANON_DISCOVERY=0 to gate those too.verify_api_key; the MCP-layer check only rejects tokens that can't possibly be real keys.quota object (backend quota_status), same source as the web dashboard, decremented per call.check_cua_actions and check_cua_code_audit are both pure rules — no LLM, no quota cost, safe for high-frequency use.src/
server.ts Express + StreamableHTTP transport (stateless) + auth middleware + tool registration context.ts config loading + API key extraction backend.ts BackendClient (key pass-through, unified 401/429/5xx mapping) + toMcpResult schemas.ts zod input schemas for the 5 tools (aligned with backend Pydantic Fields) tools/ verifyText.ts → /detect verifyAgent.ts → /detect-agent checkCuaActions.ts → /cua/classify checkCuaCodeAudit.ts → /cua/audit-code checkSafety.ts → /guard/check (fast → /guard/check-fast) index.ts registerAllTools
Streamable HTTP (the remote transport recommended by the current MCP spec, formerly "HTTP+SSE"), stateless mode: each POST spins up a fresh transport + McpServer and closes when done. Natively supported by Claude Code / Cursor / Claude Desktop. To support legacy SSE-only clients, add SSEServerTransport (dual endpoints /sse + /messages).
io.github.fredyee/hallucc v0.1.11 (active)MIT