GitHub
by github
GitHub’s official server lets AI read and manage code, issues and pull requests in your account. Use GitHub’s hosted version or run it locally with Docker.
Computer or cloud★ 34,245MITUpdated 4 days ago
Install
cloud-audit
Overview
Description from the maker (original English)
AWS security scanner with attack chain detection, IAM privilege escalation, and fixes
PopNx MCP’s three pillars
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
- User voiceiNo reviews yetReviews open together with accounts in a later step
- Our basic checksi1 of 1 passedChecked from public information; code not scanned yet
- UsageiNot measured yet★ –
What you can do with it
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
- Connection: Runs on your computer
- Transport: stdio
- Category: Developer tools
Install
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
Before you install
- Basic checks: 1 of 1 passed
- Runs on your computer with your user’s permissions (files, network, apps).
- The registry lists no key to fill in.
You need
- PyPIPython’s uv installed (for the uvx command)
Which app do you use?
Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.
Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"cloud-audit": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"cloud-audit"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add cloud-audit -- uvx cloud-auditOr copy the settings yourself
Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"cloud-audit": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"cloud-audit"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Or copy the settings yourself
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"cloud-audit": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"cloud-audit"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.
Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.
These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
What it can do
Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
Basic checksi
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 7, 2026
- ✓ Pass
Maker matches the repo
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account gebalamariusz, which owns the repo
- … Not checked yet
Still maintained
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
- … Not checked yet
Has a licence
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
- – Not applicable
Endpoint responds
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
- – Not applicable
Sign-in with OAuth
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
- … Not checked yet
No hidden instructions in tool descriptions
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
Compared with others in Developer toolsi
- More stars than 0% of the other 1395 servers in this category
- Published to the registry more recently than 14% of the other 1395 servers in this category
- Basic checks equal to or better than 100% of the other 1395 servers in this category
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
Common questions
Is cloud-audit safe?
It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
What keys or codes does it need?
The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.
Does it run on my computer or in the cloud?
It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).
Is it still maintained?
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (2.0.1) reached the registry 7 months ago.
Which apps can use it?
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Python (uv) on your computer.
What can I use instead?
In the same category: GitHub, Desktop Commander, Cloudflare MCP
Alternatives
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
Desktop Commander
by wonderwhy-er
MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
Runs on your computer★ 10,225MITUpdated 16 days ago
Install
Cloudflare MCP
by cloudflare
Cloudflare MCP servers
Runs in the cloud★ 4,446Apache-2.0Updated 14 months ago
Install
README from the maker
Open the README
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
cloud-audit
English | 简体中文
What can a hijacked AI agent reach in your AWS account, and can you prove it?
Open-source, read-only AWS security scanner. 110 checks, 64 IAM privilege-escalation methods, 31 attack-chain rules, blast radius for any resource, and agent-blast for Bedrock Agents and AgentCore: what a prompt-injected or credential-stolen agent can reach, with the IAM policy simulator as the witness. Every finding ships an AWS CLI + Terraform fix . Nothing is written to your account.
30-second demo - agent-blast - Full scan - What's inside - Proof Mode - Installation - Documentation
Thirty seconds, no AWS account needed
pip install cloud-auditcloud-audit agent-blast --demo # a hijacked Bedrock Agent, two threat models, one screen cloud-audit demo --save demo.json # a full sample scan, then explore it offline: cloud-audit blast-radius --report demo.json --resource arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/support-bot-ticket-role cloud-audit simulate --report demo.json --fix aws-iam-018 cloud-audit exposure --report demo.json
The sample account is invented. Everything derived from it (attack chains, root causes, breach cost, security graph, agent reach) is produced by the same engines a real scan uses.
With credentials, the real thing is one command and read-only. The AWS-managed SecurityAudit policy covers every check (permissions):
cloud-audit scan # default profile and regioncloud-audit scan --verify # plus IAM policy-simulator proof for escalation paths cloud-audit agent-blast --verify # then: what your agents can reach, simulator-confirmed
agent-blast: what a hijacked AI agent can reach
An AI agent in AWS is a bundle of IAM identities: the role the agent runs as, the execution roles of the Lambda functions behind its tools, the roles of its knowledge bases, gateways and sandboxes. When the agent is hijacked, the attacker acts with *those* identities. agent-blast answers what that means, per agent, under two threat models:
| Threat model | What the attacker has | What is in reach |
|---|---|---|
| Identity takeover | the credentials of a role the agent runs as (sandbox escape, metadata-service read, leaked session) | the full role: privilege-escalation methods, AssumeRole hops, data |
| Behaviour takeover | nothing but a prompt (indirect prompt injection through a document, a ticket, a web page) | what the agent's tools can do, bounded by the tools' own execution roles |
Real output for the sample agent (cloud-audit agent-blast --demo -a support-bot):
support-bot (bedrock_agent, eu-central-1)├── A hijacked tool (tool: create-ticket) can escalate to account admin via PassRole+Lambda ├── status: PREPARED ├── Identity takeover (attacker holds the role's credentials) │ └── support-bot-agent-role arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/support-bot-agent-role │ └── no escalation path; 3 reach(es) from policy grants, 1 on named resources (see Reach) │ (risk 0/100, 1 nodes) ├── Behaviour takeover (prompt injection: the agent's tools, their roles) │ ├── search-docs action_group_lambda -> support-bot-search-role │ │ ├── 3 OpenAPI path(s) in apiSchema; state ENABLED │ │ └── no escalation path; 4 reach(es) from policy grants, 4 on named resources (see Reach) │ ├── create-ticket action_group_lambda -> support-bot-ticket-role │ │ ├── 2 function(s) in functionSchema; state ENABLED │ │ ├── reaches Account Takeover in 1 hop(s) via PassRole+Lambda (risk 72/100) │ │ └── escalation: PassRole+Lambda │ └── product-docs knowledge_base -> support-bot-kb-role │ ├── 1 S3 data source(s) │ └── no escalation path; 2 reach(es) from policy grants, 2 on named resources (see Reach) ├── Reach (13 action/resource pairs) │ ├── tool: search-docs secretsmanager:GetSecretValue on │ │ arn:aws:secretsmanager:eu-central-1:123456789012:secret:prod/db-credentials-Ab12Cd │ │ unverified read secret values │ ├── tool: create-ticket sts:AssumeRole on arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/ops-admin unverified │ │ assume IAM roles │ ├── tool: create-ticket lambda:InvokeFunction on * unverified invoke Lambda functions │ ├── tool: search-docs s3:PutObject on arn:aws:s3:::company-backups-2024/* unverified write S3 │ │ objects │ ├── support-bot-agent-role s3:GetObject on arn:aws:s3:::kb-product-docs/* unverified read the │ │ agent's knowledge base │ ├── tool: search-docs s3:GetObject on arn:aws:s3:::company-backups-2024/* unverified read S3 │ │ objects │ ... ├── Tags │ ├── OWASP Agentic: ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation, ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse, │ │ ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution │ └── MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0034 Cost Harvesting, AML.T0040 AI Model Inference API Access, AML.T0053 │ AI Agent Tool Invocation, AML.T0086 Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation └── Simulated, not executed: identity policies, the attached permissions boundary and SCPs are evaluated by the IAM policy simulator; resource-based policies of the targets, RCPs and VPC endpoint policies are not. Tool reach is an upper bound set by the tool's role; what the tool code does with its inputs is narrower.
The story the output tells: the support bot itself is harmless, but a document that tricks it into calling create-ticket runs code under a role that can pass an admin role to a new Lambda. The search-docs tool, meant to read product docs, can also read the production database secret and write into the backups bucket. Every line names the identity, the action and the resource, so the fix is a policy statement, not a debate.
The same engine covers AgentCore. For the sample gateway (--demo -a tools-gw) the headline is a cross-agent one:
tools-gw (agentcore_gateway, eu-central-1)├── tool: crm-sync can write into agent 'support-bot' knowledge base (RAG poisoning): arn:aws:s3:::kb-product-docs/* ├── inbound authorizer: NONE; policy engine: none ... │ ├── tool: crm-sync s3:PutObject on arn:aws:s3:::kb-product-docs/* unverified write into agent │ │ 'support-bot' knowledge base (RAG poisoning) ... ├── Coverage notes │ └── tool 'erp-mcp' (gateway_target_mcp_server): backend identity unknown, not assessed - remote │ MCP server; credential provider: OAUTH
What agent-blast reads (all list/get, no charge):
- Bedrock Agents: the agent resource role, every action group at the
DRAFTversion resolved to its Lambda and the Lambda's execution role, knowledge bases resolved to their S3 data-source buckets. - AgentCore: runtime role and network mode, gateway role with authorizer, policy engine and every target (Lambda, remote MCP server, API Gateway, OpenAPI, Smithy) with its credential provider, code interpreter and browser execution roles.
- IAM policies of exactly those identities (inline, attached, group), kept raw: action, resource, effect, whether a
Conditionis present. Conditions are flagged, never guessed. The simulator decides.
Then, per identity: the 64 privilege-escalation methods, AssumeRole hops through the trust graph, and every data, secret, lateral, code-execution and model-invocation grant matched against concrete resources. A knowledge-base bucket is always a concrete target, even behind s3:* on *, and write access to it is reported as RAG poisoning. Anything the scanner could not read (a denied region, a tool without an IAM identity) is a coverage note, never a silent pass.
--verify asks iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy about every concrete pair, with the context an attacker really has (no MFA on the session, TLS transport), and marks each reach PROVEN, DENIED (with the policy layer that denied: SCP, permissions boundary) or not asserted. Output formats: tree, json, markdown. The MCP server exposes the same report as get_agent_blast.
A full scan
cloud-audit scan runs 110 read-only checks across 25 AWS services, correlates the findings into attack chains, ranks the fixes by how many chains they break and prices the exposure. This is the sample account (cloud-audit demo), rendered by the same code as a real scan and trimmed for length:
┌─────── Health Score ───────┐│ 15 / 100 │ └────────────────────────────┘ Provider AWS Account 123456789012 Regions eu-central-1 Resources scanned 80 Checks passed 14 Checks failed 6 Attack chains 3 Risk exposure $572K - $12.5M (IBM/Verizon data) ┌───────────────────────── Attack Chains (3 detected) ─────────────────────────┐ │ CRITICAL PassRole Escalation to Admin (support-bot-ticket-role) │ │ Principal 'support-bot-ticket-role' has iam:PassRole and │ │ can create resources with privileged roles via: │ │ PassRole+Lambda. The attacker passes an admin role to a │ │ service, then uses that service to execute code with admin │ │ privileges. │ │ Fix: Scope iam:PassRole for 'support-bot-ticket-role' to │ │ specific role ARNs │ │ Risk: $250K - $5.0M │ │ │ │ CRITICAL Internet-Exposed Admin Instance │ │ i-0abc123def456789, sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f67890 │ │ Instance i-0abc123def456789 is reachable from the internet │ │ via open security group and has admin IAM role │ │ 'prod-admin-role'. An attacker can reach the instance, │ │ access IMDS credentials, and gain full admin access to the │ │ AWS account. │ │ Fix: Restrict security group sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f67890 to │ │ specific IPs (effort: LOW). │ │ Risk: $62K - $625K │ │
Only the beginning is shown; read the rest in the repo