Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Description from the maker (original English)
Scans MCP server tool definitions for excessive agency, injection sinks, hardcoded secrets
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
You need
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Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.
Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"auditor": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add auditor -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-server-auditorPaste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"auditor": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"auditor": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
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These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 7, 2026
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account GuardBee, which owns the repo
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.
It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.4.1) reached the registry 7 days ago.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Node.js on your computer.
In the same category: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, Rystic
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
Start, seed, clock, inspect and diff Rystic API simulators from your agent.
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An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans other MCP servers' tool definitions for insecure patterns.
While ai-code-scanner looks at general LLM/AI integration code, this package specifically looks at an MCP server itself: how privileged a tool defined via server.tool(...) is, how loose its parameters are, which dangerous sinks (shell/filesystem/HTTP/SQL) its handler passes tool input into directly. The MCP ecosystem is growing fast, but there's no common tool yet for auditing these servers' security.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Claude ──► mcp-server-auditor ──► An MCP server's source code
│ ├─ Excessive agency (execSync(input.command), a tool named "run_shell") ├─ Unsafe input (fetch(input.url) → SSRF, SQL string interpolation) ├─ Loose schema (a parameter typed z.any()/z.unknown()) ├─ Secrets exposure (a hardcoded API key in a schema default, the entire process.env) └─ Network exposure (wildcard CORS)
arguments, go-sdk typed args, mcp-go request.RequireString(...)) through plain assignments into shell, file write/delete, HTTP and SQL callsrecommendation) — not just "found it"guardbee.yml{
"mcpServers": { "guardbee-mcp-server-auditor": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor"] } } }
npx @guardbee/mcp-server-auditor scan ./src --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarif
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
scan_text | Scans a given text/code snippet |
scan_file | Scans a single file |
scan_directory | Recursively scans a directory (node_modules, .git, dist skipped automatically) |
list_patterns | Lists all supported patterns by category |
| Category | Pattern | Severity | OWASP | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| excessive-agency | shell_exec_from_tool_input | critical | MCP05:2025 | A tool handler passes tool input directly into a shell call like execSync/spawn |
| excessive-agency | eval_of_tool_input | critical | MCP05:2025 | Tool input is executed as code via eval()/new Function() |
| excessive-agency | unrestricted_shell_tool_name | high | MCP05:2025 | A tool name (run_shell, execute_sql, etc.) implies shell/SQL execution directly |
| unsafe-input | fs_write_from_raw_tool_input | high | A path from tool input flows into a file write/delete call with no validation (path traversal) | |
| unsafe-input | ssrf_fetch_from_tool_input | high | A URL from tool input flows directly into fetch/axios with no allowlist (SSRF) | |
| unsafe-input | sql_injection_via_tool_input | critical | MCP05:2025 | Tool input is interpolated into a SQL string via a template literal |
| loose-schema | overly_permissive_tool_schema | medium | A tool parameter is typed z.any()/z.unknown() — accepts anything | |
| secrets-exposure | hardcoded_secret_in_tool_schema | critical | A credential-shaped schema field's default value is a hardcoded literal | |
| secrets-exposure | full_env_exposed_to_tool_caller | critical | The entire process.env is spread/stringified/returned (not one named variable) | |
| network-exposure | permissive_cors_on_server | medium | Wildcard CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) or cors() with no options |
Python (.py) and Go (.go) files also get a tool-input flow check. The tool's input names come from its definition, are followed through plain assignments in the handler (command = f"du {directory}"), and a finding is reported when one reaches a sink call:
| Pattern | Severity | Sinks |
|---|---|---|
python_shell_from_tool_input | critical | subprocess.*, os.system, os.popen, asyncio.create_subprocess_* |
python_eval_of_tool_input | critical | eval, exec |
python_fs_write_from_tool_input | high | open(..., "w"/"a"/"x"), os.remove/rename/…, shutil.rmtree/move, Path(...).write_text/unlink |
python_ssrf_from_tool_input | high | requests.*, httpx.*, client.get(...), urlopen (URL argument) |
python_sql_injection_via_tool_input | critical | cursor.execute(f"...{x}..."), % / .format / + |
go_shell_from_tool_input | critical (sh -c), high (argument list) | exec.Command, exec.CommandContext |
go_fs_write_from_tool_input | high | os.WriteFile, os.Remove, os.RemoveAll, os.Rename, os.Create, os.OpenFile for writing |
go_ssrf_from_tool_input | high | http.Get/Post/NewRequest…, client.Get |
go_sql_injection_via_tool_input | critical | db.Query…/Exec… with fmt.Sprintf or + |
File findings are skipped when the handler checks the path against a base directory (is_relative_to, commonpath, .parents, filepath.IsLocal, filepath.Rel, strings.HasPrefix), and HTTP findings when it checks a host allowlist. Tools named run_shell, execute_sql etc. are reported for both languages. Rust, Java, Kotlin, C# and other languages get the language-neutral patterns only.
These are heuristic findings — a static text-pattern scan, not a full AST/type analysis. Designed for a low false-positive rate, but every finding should still be reviewed manually.
guardbee.yml)mcp-server-auditor:
fail-on: high # any | critical | high | medium | low | none max-files: 5000 exclude:
npm run build
npm test
MIT — GuardBee
Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.