Context7
Feeds AI the latest docs for libraries and frameworks before it answers, so code it writes does not use outdated, removed functions.
Description from the maker (original English)
Scans RAG content/scraped pages for indirect prompt injection
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We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
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Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"prompt-injection-scanner": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add prompt-injection-scanner -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scannerPaste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"prompt-injection-scanner": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"prompt-injection-scanner": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
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Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 7, 2026
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account GuardBee, which owns the repo
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This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
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The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (1.2.0) reached the registry 6 days ago.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Node.js on your computer.
In the same category: Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa
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Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
Feeds AI the latest docs for libraries and frameworks before it answers, so code it writes does not use outdated, removed functions.
Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.
Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.
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An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans content — a RAG chunk, a scraped web page, a document — for indirect prompt injection payloads.
ai-code-scanner and mcp-server-auditor scan code; this package scans data. In classic prompt injection, the attacker writes a malicious prompt themselves; in indirect prompt injection, the attacker never talks to the model at all — instead they embed instructions in a document, web page, or tool result the model will later read. The moment the model pulls this content into its context via a RAG retrieval or a web fetch, the embedded instruction appears to carry the same authority as the user's own instructions.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Web page/RAG document ──► prompt-injection-scanner ──► LLM context
│ ├─ Instruction override ("ignore all previous instructions", "önceki talimatları yok say") ├─ Role spoofing ("System:", <|im_start|>, [INST], ) ├─ Hidden text (zero-width, Unicode tag and bidi characters, display:none + instruction, HTML comment) ├─ Direct address ("Dear AI, ...") └─ Exfiltration (system prompt extraction request, data → URL instruction, templated img beacon)
@guardbee/guard-core, shared with @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy, so a phrase this scanner reports is the same phrase the proxy blocks at runtimerecommendation) — not just "found it"guardbee.ymldisplay:none modals are specifically tested{
"mcpServers": { "guardbee-prompt-injection-scanner": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"] } } }
npx @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner scan ./knowledge-base --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarif
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
scan_text | Scans a given text/document snippet |
scan_file | Scans a single file |
scan_directory | Recursively scans a directory (e.g. a RAG knowledge base) (node_modules, .git, dist skipped automatically) |
list_patterns | Lists all supported patterns by category |
| Category | Pattern | Severity | What it means | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| instruction-override | instruction_override_phrase | high | A classic override phrase like "ignore/disregard/forget previous instructions" | ||
| instruction-override | instruction_override_tr | high | The Turkish form: "önceki talimatları yok say / unut / görmezden gel" | ||
| instruction-override | dan_mode | high | Asks for the "DAN mode" jailbreak persona | ||
| instruction-override | bypass_safety | high | Tells the model to bypass or disable its safety measures / guardrails | ||
| role-spoofing | system_role_spoof | medium | A fake "System:" role label at the start of a line in the content | ||
| role-spoofing | chat_template_marker_injection | high | Raw chat-template control tokens (`<\ | im_start\ | >, [INST]`) in the content |
| role-spoofing | system_tag | high | A tag that tries to pass data off as a system message | ||
| hidden-text | hidden_zero_width_chars | medium | Zero-width space/word-joiner (U+200B/U+2060) — text hidden from a human reviewer | ||
| hidden-text | unicode_tag_smuggling | critical | Invisible Unicode tag characters (U+E0000–E007F) carrying hidden text; flag emoji such as 🏴 are excluded | ||
| hidden-text | bidi_control_chars | medium | Bidi override/isolate characters that make text display in a different order than it is read | ||
| hidden-text | css_hidden_text_with_instruction | high | A display:none/white-on-white element containing instruction-like language | ||
| hidden-text | html_comment_instruction | high | An HTML comment containing instruction-like language | ||
| direct-address | direct_address_to_ai | medium | The content directly addresses "the AI"/"the assistant" | ||
| exfiltration | exfiltration_url_template_in_image | high | A markdown image URL with a {{...}}/${...} template — a data-exfil beacon | ||
| exfiltration | reveal_system_prompt_request | high | A sentence asking the model to reveal its system prompt | ||
| exfiltration | reveal_system_prompt_tr | high | The Turkish form: "sistem istemini göster" | ||
| exfiltration | send_data_to_url_instruction | critical | An explicit instruction ordering the model to send data to an external URL |
These are heuristic findings — a static text-pattern scan, not a semantic/intent analysis. Designed for a low false-positive rate (e.g. emoji ZWJ sequences and ordinary display:none modals are specifically excluded), but every finding should still be reviewed manually.
The patterns know attack phrases; a paraphrased, indirect or translated instruction slips past them. --judge also has a model read each file, in chunks, and reports instructions aimed at an agent as judge_semantic_injection (high). The finding carries judge: { model, version, confidence }, also in SARIF properties. The judge only adds findings.
GUARDBEE_JUDGE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1 GUARDBEE_JUDGE_MODEL=qwen2.5:7b \
npx @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner scan ./docs --judge
It is off unless configured. Since the content goes to the endpoint, a non-local one needs --judge-allow-remote and https. On GuardBee's judge benchmark (50 English and Turkish samples), the patterns catch 16% of the attacks and qwen2.5:7b all of them, with no false positives.
guardbee.yml)prompt-injection-scanner:
fail-on: high # any | critical | high | medium | low | none max-files: 5000 exclude:
npm run build
npm test # 45 unit tests
MIT — GuardBee
Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.