Infrabroker

Name: Infrabroker
Author: luisgf

by luisgfversion 3.1.3i★ –iRuns on your computer

Registry nameio.github.luisgf/infrabroker

Install

Overview

Description from the maker (original English)

SSH & Kubernetes access broker for AI agents; the model never touches a credential.

PopNx MCP’s three pillars

These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.

User voiceiNo reviews yetReviews open together with accounts in a later step
Our basic checksi1 of 1 passedChecked from public information; code not scanned yet
UsageiNot measured yet★ –

What you can do with it

We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.

Connection: Runs on your computer
Transport: stdio
Category: Developer tools

Install

Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.

Before you install

Basic checks: 1 of 1 passed
Runs on your computer with your user’s permissions (files, network, apps).
The registry lists no key to fill in.

You need

DockerDocker installed

Which app do you use?

ClaudeClaude CodeCursorVS CodeChatGPT

Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.

Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "infrabroker": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": [
        "run",
        "-i",
        "--rm",
        "ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3",
        "-config",
        "your-value"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Run this in your terminal

claude mcp add infrabroker -- docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3 -config your-value

This one needs values on its command line, so copy the settings and fill them in.

Or copy the settings yourself

Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "infrabroker": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": [
        "run",
        "-i",
        "--rm",
        "ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3",
        "-config",
        "your-value"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.

This one needs values on its command line, so copy the settings and fill them in.

Or copy the settings yourself

Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project

{
  "servers": {
    "infrabroker": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "docker",
      "args": [
        "run",
        "-i",
        "--rm",
        "ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3",
        "-config",
        "your-value"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.

This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.

Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.

These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.

What it can do

Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.

Basic checksi

We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 7, 2026

✓ Pass
Maker matches the repo
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account luisgf, which owns the repo
… Not checked yet
Still maintained
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
… Not checked yet
Has a licence
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
– Not applicable
Endpoint responds
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
– Not applicable
Sign-in with OAuth
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
… Not checked yet
No hidden instructions in tool descriptions
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints

Compared with others in Developer toolsi

More stars than 0% of the other 4906 servers in this category
Published to the registry more recently than 41% of the other 4906 servers in this category
Basic checks equal to or better than 100% of the other 4906 servers in this category

Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.

Common questions

Is Infrabroker safe?

It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.

What keys or codes does it need?

The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.

Does it run on my computer or in the cloud?

It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).

Is it still maintained?

The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (3.1.3) reached the registry 2 months ago.

Which apps can use it?

Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Docker on your computer.

What can I use instead?

In the same category: GitHub, Desktop Commander, Cloudflare MCP

Alternatives

Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.

Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi

GitHub

by github

GitHub’s official server lets AI read and manage code, issues and pull requests in your account. Use GitHub’s hosted version or run it locally with Docker.

Computer or cloud★ 34,245MITUpdated 4 days ago

Install

Desktop Commander

by wonderwhy-er

MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management

Runs on your computer★ 10,225MITUpdated 16 days ago

Install

Cloudflare MCP

by cloudflare

Cloudflare MCP servers

Runs in the cloud★ 4,446Apache-2.0Updated 14 months ago

Install

README from the maker

Open the README

Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.

infrabroker

Infrastructure access broker for AI agents — SSH & Kubernetes. The model never touches a credential. *(formerly ssh-broker)*

The agent requests an *action* — run a command on a host, query or change a cluster. infrabroker checks it against policy, executes it with a credential minted for that single operation — an ephemeral, scope-limited SSH certificate from its own CA, or a short-lived bound ServiceAccount token — and returns only the output. Keys, certificates and tokens live in the broker's memory and are discarded after the call: nothing enters the model's context, so a prompt-injected agent has nothing to exfiltrate.

One binary — infrabroker — exposes the same engine (internal/broker) and tool surface (internal/mcpserver) over three transports, chosen by subcommand. (The legacy per-transport binaries broker / mcp-broker / mcp-broker-http remain as thin deprecated wrappers over these subcommands, so existing configs keep working.)

MCP stdio (local, recommended for personal use) — infrabroker serve-mcp. Tools: ssh_execute, ssh_session_open / ssh_session_exec / ssh_session_close, ssh_list_servers, ssh_put_file / ssh_get_file; with clusters configured, also k8s_get / k8s_list / k8s_logs / k8s_apply / k8s_delete / k8s_list_clusters. No transport auth — isolation comes from the process being launched by the user (as the MCP spec recommends for stdio).
MCP HTTP + OAuth2/OIDC (remote, multi-user) — infrabroker serve-mcp-http, Streamable HTTP. Same tools, but each client authenticates with an OIDC bearer token validated locally against the issuer's JWKS; the user identity (and groups, for per-user RBAC) is propagated to the signer.
HTTP + mTLS — infrabroker serve-http, POST /v1/ssh_run (one-shot), for network agents authenticated with a client certificate.

Documentation

This README is a landing page. The detail lives in focused, single-source docs:

Document	Contents
QUICKSTART.md	First `ssh_execute` in under 10 minutes — single-binary local mode, no signer/PKI
ARCHITECTURE.md	Diagram, request flow, design decisions, sudo elevation, sessions, multi-CA
THREAT_MODEL.md	Actors, trust boundaries, security controls, and explicit non-goals/gaps
OPERATIONS.md	Runbook: startup, adding hosts, hot-reload, `broker-ctl`, PKI rotation, configs
MESH.md	Running infrabroker over a NetBird / Tailscale mesh — the session layer on top of the overlay path
SANDBOX.md	infrabroker with a sandboxed agent (ASP): the agent's code in a microVM, the credential and the action behind the broker — what each layer enforces, the OIDC recipe, the honest limits
HA.md	Why it is single-instance today: state inventory, the blockers, and what degrades under replication
API.md	HTTP endpoint reference for all services
USAGE.md	Guide to the MCP tools (SSH + Kubernetes), dry-run, and audit review (for the model / operator)
SECURITY.md	Vulnerability disclosure policy
CONTRIBUTING.md · CODING_STYLE.md	Workflow, versioning, Go style

Why infrabroker

Anti-exfiltration (prompt injection): the ephemeral key/cert/token live only in the broker's memory; they never enter the model's context.
Kubernetes without kubeconfigs: the signer mints a short-lived bound ServiceAccount token (TokenRequest API) per operation; every cluster is default-deny with per-verb/resource/namespace policy and the same dry-run, approval and audit path as SSH.
Anti-reuse: each cert carries a TTL of minutes, source-address (broker or bastion IP), and — for one-shot — a force-command. Useless outside its host/time/IP.
Controlled escalation: allow_sudo / allowed_sudo_users live in the signer; a compromised broker cannot escalate where policy forbids it.
CA compromise bounded: one CA per host group (ca_keys), each key optionally in Azure Key Vault or ssh-agent (YubiKey PIV / SoftHSM / TPM) — the private key never leaves the HSM.
Audit / non-repudiation: append-only, Ed25519-chained log correlated by serial across signer, broker, and sshd.

The full threat model — including what the system deliberately does not defend — is in THREAT_MODEL.md.

How it works

AI model ──tool call──> broker ──mTLS──> [control-plane] ──mTLS──> signer

(no credential) (ephemeral key (approval + (CA key + in RAM, never guardrails, policy + RBAC, on disk) no CA key) signs the cert) │ └── SSH with the ephemeral cert ──> bastion ──> target host └─ stdout/stderr/exit_code ─> model

The broker sends an *intent* ({host, role, purpose, command?, sudo?, pty?, pubkey, …}); the signer derives every certificate constraint from policy and returns the signed cert. The ephemeral private key is generated in the broker and never leaves it. See ARCHITECTURE.md for the request flow, the design decisions, and the per-hop ProxyJump certificate diagrams.

Feature overview

Capability	One-liner	More
Ephemeral certificates	Ed25519 pair in RAM per operation; minutes-long, scoped cert. No reusable secret.	ARCHITECTURE
External signer	A separate `cmd/signer` holds the CA key and policy; the broker never does.	ARCHITECTURE
Multi-CA + HSM	One CA key per host group via `ca_keys`; local PEM, Azure Key Vault, or ssh-agent/HSM.	ARCHITECTURE
AI-action firewall	Per-host or composable-by-group command policy (allow/deny/`require_approval`), POSIX-sh AST parsing, dry-run. Authoritative for one-shot.	ARCHITECTURE · USAGE
Human-in-the-loop approval	Optional control plane gates `require_approval` commands behind out-of-band approval; the signer enforces it.	ARCHITECTURE · API
Action budgets (behaviour guardrails)	Budget how much an agent can do: per-CN sign-rate cap plus per-subject rate limit and novelty escalation (a subsequent new host / novel command → approval); observe or enforce. Network tools budget what an agent can reach or spend; this budgets the actions themselves.	OPERATIONS · ARCHITECTURE
Kill switch	Freeze a subject (caller CN, end user, session id or certificate serial): no new certificates, grants revoked, and live sessions are force-closed within `revocation_poll_seconds`.	OPERATIONS
Sealed exec	Opt-in per host (`sealed_exec`): every session command carries a signer-signed envelope that `infrabroker-shim` verifies on the target, so per-command authorization survives a compromised broker.	THREAT_MODEL gap 1 · deploy
Approval bridge	`approval-bridge` posts pending approvals to Slack (Socket Mode) with Allow / Deny buttons; outbound-only, so nothing with approval authority becomes internet-facing.	OPERATIONS
Secret redaction	On by default: credentials inline in commands are masked in audit logs, session recordings and approval notifications (best-effort pattern matching, not DLP).	THREAT_MODEL gap 8
RBAC	Broker-CN groups (mTLS) + per-end-user OIDC groups; fail-closed.	ARCHITECTURE
sudo / PTY	Policy-gated elevation (`sudo -n`) and PTY allocation, per host.	ARCHITECTURE
Kubernetes broker	`k8s_*` tools with per-operation bound SA tokens, default-deny verb/resource/namespace policy, dry-run.	USAGE §10
Session recording	`shell`/`pty` sessions to ASCIIcast v2 (`.cast`), indexed by `session_id`.	USAGE §8
Chained audit	Append-only, Ed25519-signed, SHA-256-chained; correlated by `serial`.	USAGE §7 · API
Hot reload	`signer.json` re-read (and validated) without restart, via `POST /v1/reload` or SIGHUP.	OPERATIONS §3

Comparison with existing solutions

Several tools address SSH access control or AI-agent credential security, but none cover the full combination that infrabroker targets in a lightweight, self-hosted package.

Feature	infrabroker	Teleport	Vault + SSH engine	StrongDM	ssh-mcp
Ephemeral cert in memory (no disk)	✅	✅	✅	❌	❌
Separate broker / signing service	✅	✅	Partial	❌	❌
MCP-native (AI agents)	✅	✅ (2025)	✅ (2025)	❌	✅
OAuth2/OIDC on MCP transport	✅	✅	✅	❌	❌
Per-command policy + dry-run (AI-action firewall)	✅	❌	❌	❌	❌
Human-in-the-loop approval for AI commands	✅	❌	❌	❌	❌
Per-agent behavioral guardrails (anomaly/rate)	✅	❌	❌	❌	❌
Session recording (ASCIIcast v2, stdin+stdout+stderr)	✅	✅	❌	Partial	❌
Cryptographically chained audit log	✅	❌	❌	Partial	❌
Single-binary / simple self-hosted	✅	❌	❌	❌	✅
HSM/KMS for CA key	✅ (AKV, ssh-agent/HSM)	✅	✅	—	—

[Teleport](https://goteleport.com/) is the closest commercial equivalent — short-lived SSH certs, RBAC, and since 2025 *Secure MCP*; its Jan-2026 *Agentic Identity Framework* targets the same threat model. The difference is operational weight: Teleport needs a dedicated control-plane cluster, recording proxy, and web UI — orders of magnitude heavier than a Go binary + signer.

[HashiCorp Vault SSH secrets engine](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/secrets/ssh) is an SSH CA with full HSM/KMS support and (2025) its own MCP server, but it provides only the *signing* piece — you still build the execution layer (engine.go, session.go, the MCP tools) yourself.

[StrongDM](https://www.strongdm.com/) hides credentials but stores long-lived secrets rather than generating ephemeral certs in memory, making it weaker against exfiltration. [Smallstep SSH CA](https://smallstep.com/) is a lightweight OIDC-integrated SSH CA (close to cmd/signer) with no execution broker or MCP layer. **[ssh-mcp](https://

Only the beginning is shown; read the rest in the repo

Infrabroker

Overview

PopNx MCP’s three pillars

What you can do with it

Install

Before you install

What it can do

Basic checksi

Maker matches the repo

Still maintained

Has a licence

Endpoint responds

Sign-in with OAuth

No hidden instructions in tool descriptions

Compared with others in Developer toolsi

Common questions

Alternatives

GitHub

Desktop Commander

Cloudflare MCP

README from the maker

infrabroker

Documentation

Why infrabroker

How it works

Feature overview

Comparison with existing solutions