Action1 MCP by usefulapi
Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.
Description from the maker (original English)
Offline security scanning for AI-generated code: seven open-source scanners in one MCP server.
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
You need
Which app do you use?
Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.
Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"valvur": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valvur",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add valvur -- uvx valvur mcpPaste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"valvur": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valvur",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"valvur": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valvur",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.
Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.
These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 8, 2026
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account MaverickHQ, which owns the repo
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.
It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (1.6.1) reached the registry 7 days ago.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Python (uv) on your computer.
In the same category: Action1 MCP by usefulapi, QNSQY, EchelonGraph CVE & Exposure
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.
Linux only, local: post-quantum CBOM scan, encrypt to public keys, verify. Takes no secrets
CVE, KEV, EPSS, SBOM and advisory lookups; per-CVE exposure from Shodan data (© Shodan). Keyless.
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
Offline security scanning for AI-generated code.
Seven open-source scanners and AI-specific checks, in one command and one ranked report.
Scorecard's Code-Review, Branch-Protection and Contributors checks need a second maintainer; valvur has one (MAINTAINERS.md).
Status: `1.6.1`, the version this tree declares; the PyPI badge above shows what
pip install valvurserves, and the CHANGELOG what each version changed.
In Claude Code: /plugin marketplace add MaverickHQ/valvur, then /plugin install valvur@valvur, and ask it to scan the project.
From a terminal, with Docker or Podman running: uvx valvur scan.
run.json, beside what left the machine: nothing. One command checks it.| area | what valvur reports | found by |
|---|---|---|
| Hallucinated packages | dependencies that do not exist, or sit one edit from a popular name, checked offline against every name on PyPI, npm, RubyGems, Packagist and crates.io | valvur's dependency-reality Check |
| Malicious packages | dependencies published as malicious, from OpenSSF's malicious-packages | OSV-Scanner, and the same Check |
| Agent configuration | injected directives, hidden Unicode, unpinned MCP servers, blanket approval, hooks that run a command, settings that would leak | valvur's ai-artifact Check |
| Vulnerable dependencies | known CVEs from lockfiles, ranked by exploitation, with the direct package to bump | Trivy, OSV-Scanner |
| Secrets | credentials in the files and in git history | Gitleaks |
| Code | injection, path traversal, SSRF, open redirects, XXE and insecure cookies, and model output reaching eval, a shell, a query or the DOM | Opengrep, with valvur's rules |
| Infrastructure | Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes and Dockerfile misconfiguration | Checkov |
| CI workflows | unpinned actions, write permissions, template injection | zizmor |
| Licences and SBOM | a missing or contradictory project licence; a CycloneDX SBOM when asked for | valvur's licence-file Check, Syft |
What it checks, rule by rule, and what it cannot see: how valvur works.
.env* files and agent configuration), fetches the public data it needs, and records each fetch..security-scan/ ← ignores itself in git, so it is never committed
├── SUMMARY.md ← start here: the verdict, anything that failed, the top groups ├── REMEDIATION.md ← a ranked proposal: you choose what to apply ├── findings.json ← every finding, normalised, secrets redacted ├── results.sarif ← SARIF 2.1.0, for code scanning and IDEs └── run.json ← what ran, what was fetched, and what left the machine: nothing
A scan ends findings, clean or inconclusive. It never says clean when stale data, an uninspected ecosystem or a Scanner that did not finish cannot support it, and it says why.
How much of what valvur claims it finds is measured as the Score: nine tracks scored by the OWASP Benchmark's formula, with a ratchet that no change may fall more than two points under. It is 74.1 out of 100, the same on Linux and on macOS.
| track | what it holds | score |
|---|---|---|
| sast-python | the OWASP Benchmark for Python | 40.9 |
| sast-js | valvur's JavaScript twins: ten weaknesses, vulnerable and fixed | 55.0 |
| secrets | ten formats, in files and in history | 100.0 |
| dependencies | lockfiles pinned to vulnerable versions; known-malicious packages | 100.0 |
| package-reality | nonexistent, near-miss and malicious names | 100.0 |
| agent-configuration | planted directives and hidden Unicode, against real files | 94.3 |
| infrastructure | Terraform, Kubernetes, Dockerfile and Actions faults | 95.0 |
| real-code-precision | 48 maintained projects, every finding labelled by hand | 2.3 |
| llm-output | model output reaching code, a shell, a query or the DOM: generated twins and five published advisories | 79.0 |
Track 8 is precision on maintained code, where almost nothing is a vulnerability: 3 of its 171 findings are real. Track 9 measures the rules for model output reaching a sink: they catch 30 of 34 generated flows with no false alarm, and none of five published advisories in LangChain, LlamaIndex and Vanna, whose flows each cross a function. Each rule's precision is in docs/RULES.md, and the method, the gates and what valvur does not claim are in docs/EVALUATING.md. Read that one sceptically.
The Claude Code plugin brings the MCP server, a skill that runs the workflow, and a hook that asks you before the agent installs a package valvur flags. Kiro takes it as a power. Any MCP client runs the server with uvx --from valvur valvur-mcp. The agents' guide has the configuration for eleven clients, the seven tools, and the permissions a *don't ask* mode needs.
The Scanners run in a container, so the machine needs Docker or Podman; valvur doctor says what is missing.
pip install valvur # or: uv tool install valvur
valvur scan # offline by default; --profile full adds the registries' answers valvur check npm left-pad # before an install: real, a near-miss, or malicious? valvur gate . --fail-on high --no-inconclusive
The command-line guide has every command, what a first scan fetches, the Results Folder, and the settings files.
- uses: MaverickHQ/valvur-action@16b19e275f843419887873ed536a71f872607e24 # v0.2
with: { fail-on: high, no-inconclusive: "true" }
The action scans, uploads results.sarif to code scanning and gates the job. The CI guide covers the gate, the image as a step of its own, and GitLab.
valvur builds no detection engine. Seven open-source Scanners do that and deserve the credit; valvur adds one File Set, one findings model, exploit-aware ranking, and three Checks of its own. All of them run in one container, fed a copy of the files. run.json records the version of each that ran, and raw/ keeps what each said.
| Scanner | Licence | Reads | Runs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gitleaks | MIT | Secrets in the files scanned and in git history, the newest 5,000 commits or 200 MB | always |
| Trivy | Apache-2.0 | Known vulnerabilities in dependencies, from lockfiles, against its database in the host cache | always |
| OSV-Scanner | Apache-2.0 | Lockfiles against OSV's data, which carries the known-malicious MAL- packages nothing else here reports. On offline, OSV's offline database for each ecosystem present, fetched into the host cache; on full, OSV.dev's API, which receives lockfile names and versions | always |
| Opengrep | LGPL-2.1 | Static analysis: pinning rules, a sink inventory at INFO, taint rules from a model call to a sink, and taint rules from request data | always |
| Checkov | Apache-2.0 | Infrastructure misconfiguration: Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Dockerfiles, other CI systems | where there is infrastructure other than GitHub workflows |
| zizmor | MIT | GitHub Actions workflows: unpinned actions, write permissions, template injection | where there are workflows |
| Syft | Apache-2.0 | The SBOM, and the dependency licences read from it | when asked for: scan --sbom, or sbom = true under [scan] |
| Check | Reads |
|---|---|
ai-artifact | Agent configuration: injected directives, hidden Unicode, unpinned MCP servers, blanket approval, hooks that run a command, and local settings that would leak |
dependency-reality | Every declared dependency against the Name Index: does it exist, and on full, how old and how adopted is it. Every declared or locked one against the known-malicious list, built daily from OpenSSF's malicious-packages |
licence-file | The project's own licence: missing, or contradicting what the manifest declares |
Exploit intelligence comes from CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS: public primary sources, auditable and mirrorable. No proprietary database, and nothing to lock you in.
| platform | support |
|---|---|
| Linux, Docker and Podman | Supported. Every commit runs the e2e suite against Docker and Podman on amd64, and against Docker on arm64, and a scan with the published image on both; the acceptance set runs nightly on GitHub's Linux runner |
| macOS, Docker Desktop or Podman | Supported, and tested by hand on
Only the beginning is shown; read the rest in the repo