Safe4

Safe4 — the payment firewall for AI agents, as an MCP server

Safe4 decides whether an AI agent's proposed payment should be allowed, by testing the purchase against the task the agent was actually given.

The case it exists for is the one budget limits miss: a payment that is inside every budget, in an allowed category, and to an approved counterparty — and is still the wrong purchase, because it does not serve the task.

This repository is the public manifest and client example for the hosted MCP server. The service itself runs at api.safe4.ai; there is no server to install.

Connect

Streamable HTTP, no installation:

{

"mcpServers": { "safe4": { "type": "http", "url": "https://api.safe4.ai/mcp/" } } }

Connecting and listing tools are free. Only safe4_authorize is paid.

Tools

safe4_price — free

Returns the current price and the payment networks the endpoint accepts, so an agent can see the cost before committing to a paid call.

safe4_authorize — paid, settled per call in USDC over x402

Returns an ALLOW or DENY decision for a proposed payment, with a reason code, the concepts it matched, and a hash-chained audit entry.

Called without a payment it returns the x402 challenge instead of a decision. An x402-aware client pays and calls again with the resulting payload in the payment argument.

Arguments:

The task and the two allow-lists are the principal's constraints, not the agent's — they are what the purchase is tested against, so an agent that writes its own task is grading its own homework. Safe4 records every field it was given and marks the task context as request-supplied, so a substituted constraint is visible in the audit entry afterwards.

Try it without paying

The example runs the entire free surface — connect, list tools, read the price, fetch the challenge — and stops before signing anything. It needs only httpx: no key, no funded wallet.

python examples/mcp_buyer_demo.py https://api.safe4.ai --dry-run

Drop --dry-run and set SAFE4_BUYER_PRIVATE_KEY to buy a real decision. That signs an EIP-3009 authorisation for exactly the amount and payee the server advertised, and nothing else; the script holds no custody and Safe4 never sees the key.

What a decision rests on

Four checks, in order, and a purchase must clear all of them:

1. Budget and caps — per-transaction, daily, and agent-scoped limits.
2. Service category — the purchase's category must be one the principal permitted.
3. Counterparty — when the task declares allowed_counterparties, payment to anyone else is refused. This is the only check that sees a swapped payee; task text and category are identical in that attack.
4. Task-to-purchase match — the task must account for what the purchase says it is buying, not merely share a word or two with it.

Every decision is appended to a hash-chained audit log. Each entry carries the previous entry's hash, so the record is tamper-evident and continuous across restarts and redeploys.

Payment

Priced per call in USDC over x402. The endpoint advertises its terms in the 402 challenge; buyers pay on whichever advertised network suits them. Safe4 holds no wallet key and takes no custody of buyer funds.

Links

• API documentation — https://api.safe4.ai/docs
• OpenAPI schema — https://api.safe4.ai/openapi.json
• x402 discovery — https://api.safe4.ai/.well-known/x402
• Site — https://safe4.ai

Security

Reporting instructions are in SECURITY.md. Please do not open a public issue containing exploit details.

License

The manifest and client examples in this repository are MIT licensed. The hosted service they describe is a separate commercial product.