Context7
Feeds AI the latest docs for libraries and frameworks before it answers, so code it writes does not use outdated, removed functions.
Description from the maker (original English)
Threat intel and DFIR: IOCs, CVEs, actors, SBOMs, domain scans, cases, memory, Kubernetes, Proxmox.
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
AuthorizationValues marked secret are keys to your account. Never share them or paste them into a chat.
You need
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This address needs a key in a request header, which the add-connector menu cannot set. Use Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code instead.
Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add --transport http mlab https://mlab.sh/mcp --header 'Authorization: your-value'Fill in the empty values before running it.
Paste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"mlab": {
"url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"mlab": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
This address needs a key in a request header, which the add-connector menu cannot set. Use Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code instead.
Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.
Authorization secret HTTP headerThese settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
The server asks you to sign in before it lists its tools.
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 7, 2026
The registry name was verified against the domain mlab.sh (the registry checks domain ownership)
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
Responded in 321 ms (HTTP 401)
Declares OAuth sign-in, so your AI app can take you to log in
Not checked yet; we read the tool list when we check the endpoint
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
It passed 3 of 3 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
You need to fill in: Authorization
It runs in the maker’s cloud. Connect over the internet with nothing to install, but what you send passes through the maker’s servers.
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (1.2.0) reached the registry yesterday.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. It connects by URL, so apps that accept remote MCP servers work too, such as ChatGPT in developer mode.
In the same category: Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
Feeds AI the latest docs for libraries and frameworks before it answers, so code it writes does not use outdated, removed functions.
Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.
Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
Public metadata and connection guide for the remote MCP server at https://mlab.sh/mcp, a threat intelligence server for SOC and DFIR work.
This repo is the registry listing and the documentation. It is not the server source: the server runs inside the mlab.sh backend and is closed source.
Endpoint: https://mlab.sh/mcp (Streamable HTTP via POST, SSE via GET).
Settings > Connectors > Add custom connector, then paste the URL. OAuth runs in the browser, no token to copy.
https://mlab.sh/mcp
claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mlab": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "mcp-remote", "https://mlab.sh/mcp", "--header", "Authorization: Bearer mcp_xxx" ] } } }
Drop the --header pair to use OAuth instead of a static token.
~/.cursor/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mlab": { "url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp", "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer mcp_xxx" } } } }
.vscode/mcp.json:
{
"servers": { "mlab": { "type": "http", "url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp", "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer mcp_xxx" } } } }
curl -sS -X POST https://mlab.sh/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer mcp_xxx" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"curl","version":"1.0.0"}}}'
Ready to paste versions of these four configs live in examples/.
Officially supported clients are Claude.ai and Claude Desktop. Other MCP clients (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf and friends) work but are best effort.
48 tools. tools/list only shows a token the tools its role and plan can use, so a client never sees a tool that would refuse every call. Every tool carries MCP annotations (read only, destructive, idempotent, open world), so a host can tell what it may run unattended. No tool deletes anything.
Parameters marked ? are optional.
| Group | Plan | Role |
|---|---|---|
IOC lookups, domain scans, scan_bash, scan_sbom | Any | Owner, admin, member (viewers cannot spend quota) |
| CVEs, actors, account, bookmarks, history | Any | Any, viewer included |
Cases: reading (list_cases, get_case) | Team, Enterprise | Any, viewer included |
Cases: writing (create_case, add_case_indicators, add_case_comment) | Team, Enterprise | Owner, admin, member |
| Workspaces | Team (1 workspace), Enterprise (up to 20) | Any; members only see the workspaces they were added to, owners and admins see all |
Quotas are counted per organization over a rolling 24 hour window. get_scan_limits reads what is left.
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
detect_ioc | value | Detects the type of an indicator (IPv4, IPv6, CIDR, domain, URL, MD5/SHA1/SHA256/SHA512 hash, email, MAC) and returns the relevant intel. A domain is typed, not scanned: use start_domain_scan for that. An IP spends IP quota |
scan_ip | ip | For an address: geolocation, ISP, ASN, datacenter / proxy / VPN / mobile network, TOR consensus status, forward confirmed reverse DNS, RDAP record with the abuse contact. For a CIDR range: network, broadcast, host window, netmask, size, reserved blocks. Addresses spend IP quota (cached 7 days); ranges are free |
scan_url | url, resolve? | Static analysis without visiting: scheme, host with its Unicode and punycode forms, IP literal hosts, credentials in the URL, dangerous extensions, shorteners, embedded redirect targets, and what a past domain scan recorded about the host. resolve follows the link to its real destination, the only part that visits anything. No quota |
scan_hash | hash | MD5, SHA1 or SHA256 against CIRCL hashlookup (NIST NSRL): known good, known malicious or unknown, each feed's own answer, malware family, product and file name, CIRCL trust score, and mlab_sample when mlab analysed the file itself. unknown is not the same as safe. No quota |
scan_crypto | address, chain? | Labels, sanctions, risk score and address type across 18 chains (Bitcoin, Ethereum and 12 other EVM chains, Tron, Solana, TON, Dogecoin), with a checksum check. EVM addresses do not reveal their chain: pass chain when you know it. Spends crypto quota |
scan_email | email | Mailbox type (disposable, role, consumer, standard), SPF / DKIM / DMARC spoofability of its domain, MX presence, domain age when scanned, and a 0 to 100 score with its weighted reasons. No quota |
scan_phone | number | E.164 number: validity, country, line type, allocated operator, formatting and scam shaped findings. Offline, no quota |
scan_mac | mac | OUI vendor, unicast or multicast, universal or local administration, randomized or virtual interface, EUI-64 IPv6, other formats. Offline, no quota |
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
start_domain_scan | domain | Returns a recent completed scan right away, or launches a new one and returns {"status": "started"}. A new scan contacts the target and spends domain scan quota |
get_domain_scan_results | domain | Results of a domain scan: DNS records, subdomains, SSL certificates, security.txt, robots.txt. Call again while the status is pending or scanning |
scan_bash | content, filename? | Static analysis of an inline shell script: sha256, every IOC it holds, and well known suspicious constructs (download piped to a shell, base64 decoding, /dev/tcp reverse shells, persistence, anti forensics, destructive deletes). Nothing runs or is stored. No quota |
scan_sbom | content, format? | Known vulnerabilities in a lockfile or SBOM (npm, yarn, pnpm, Cargo, pip, Poetry, uv, PDM, Pipfile, Composer, Gem, Go, Maven, Gradle, NuGet, pub, Hex, mise, CycloneDX, SPDX), one finding per package and CVE, worst first, with the fixed version and what the scan could not cover. Matched server side on vuln.mlab.sh (OSV, NVD for CPE only components). 2 MB at most; format defaults to auto |
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
cve_search | query, severity?, date_start?, date_end?, limit?, page? | CVEs by keyword, product, vendor or ID, filtered by severity (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) and publication date, with CVSS, EPSS and KEV status |
cve_detail | cve_id | The full record: CVSS vector breakdown, affected products, references, CWEs, EPSS, CISA KEV status |
search_actors | query, origin?, motivation?, sector?, limit? | Threat actors by name or alias from the MISP Galaxy cluster (CC0), narrowed by origin, incident type or targeted sector. Returns the slug for get_actor |
get_actor | slug | MISP Galaxy profile (origin, suspected sponsor, synonyms, targeted countries and sectors, references) with the MITRE ATT&CK tools and techniques attributed to it. Keep the sources block when quoting: it carries MITRE's notice |
Team and Enterprise. Each call goes through the same checks as the case pages.
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
list_cases | none | The organization's cases, open ones first, with indicator and comment counts |
get_case | uuid | Title, summary, status, every indicator with a link to its analysis, and the comment thread |
create_case | title, summary? | Opens a case and returns the uuid the other case tools take |
add_case_indicators | uuid, indicators | Files a paste of indicators (one per line, or comma or space separated, mixed types), typed automatically; anything mlab cannot look up comes back in skipped with the reason |
add_case_comment | uuid, body, indicator_uuid? | A note on the case, or on one of its indicators |
Team and Enterprise, and only in a workspace whose admin turned on AI agents (MCP): a workspace keeps its data on the organization's own hosts, and an answer goes to the LLM provider of whoever asked. workspace_list says which workspaces are open. Every tool except workspace_list takes workspace (the uuid from workspace_list). Each call is written to the workspace's audit log.
The tools read, and can start an index or a YARA scan. Creating, deleting, enrolling, members, policies, pushing a cluster config and binary downloads stay in the app. Answers carry data sent by the hosts, which may contain text planted by an attacker: the server says so before every answer.
Agents and memory forensics (engram)
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
workspace_list | none | The workspaces you can open, whether AI agents may read them, agents online and the tools they run |
workspace_agents | workspace | The workspace's agents: live state, version, the tools each one reports |
workspace_memory_dumps | workspace | Memory dumps on the engram agents, and which ones are indexed. Asks every agent: allow a few seconds |
workspace_memory_index | workspace, agent, dump | Starts indexing a dump on its host, in the background. Follow it with workspace_memory_dumps |
workspace_memory_overview | workspace, agent, dump | A dump's index: system, process tree, findings (injected code and other anomalies), registry hives |
workspace_memory_process | workspace, agent, dump, pid | One process in full: command line, environment, modules, memory regions, handles, findings |
workspace_memory_read | workspace, agent, dump, address, len?, space?, pid? | Up to 4 KiB read live from the dump, as hex and text. space is virtual (needs pid, the default) or physical |
workspace_memory_registry | workspace, agent, dump, hive, path? | One registry key: values, subkeys, last write time |
workspace_memory_yara | workspace, agent, dump, rules, pids? | Runs YARA rules over the dump's processes on the host. Usually returns a job, a new one each call |
workspace_memory_yara_status | workspace, agent, job | Progress of a YARA scan, and its matches once done |
Kubernetes clusters (k3sec)
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
workspace_cluster_list | workspace | Clusters reporting to the workspace: nodes online, images, vulnerabilities in packages really loaded, recent detections |
workspace_cluster_images | workspace, cluster | Running images with their vulnerabilities, loaded ones first |
workspace_cluster_image | workspace, cluster, digest | One image: findings and packages, with which are loaded in memory |
workspace_cluster_events | workspace, cluster, source?, kind?, namespace?, min_severity?, q?, before?, limit? | Runtime events, newest first: Kubernetes events, eBPF activity, YARA detections, with cached reputation of destinations and binaries. 200 at most per call; before pages back |
workspace_cluster_config | workspace, cluster | What k3sec collects on each node, and the ceiling the nodes' local policies allow |
Proxmox VE (virtsec)
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
workspace_virt_list | workspace | Proxmox clusters: nodes online, LXC and VM guests, guests with weakened isolation, vulnerabilities in loaded packages, critical events of the last 24 h |
workspace_virt_guests | workspace, cluster | Guests and nodes: status, isolation risks from their config (privileged, host bind mounts, passthrough), vulnerabilities |
| workspace_virt_guest | workspace, cluster, key, agent? | One guest by vmid, or a node (key = node with its agent): i
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