TeamOnly
Deploy AI-built internal apps behind your company login, with a database, files and secrets.
Description from the maker (original English)
Scan MCP servers and agent tool manifests for poisoning, exfiltration, secrets and supply-chain risk
These three are never merged into one score: opinions, measurements and popularity are different things.
We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
Pick the AI app you use, then copy the settings.
You need
Which app do you use?
Pick your app above. We remember it, so next time the button says “Install in …”.
Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"palanit-core": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"palanit-core"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add palanit-core -- uvx palanit-corePaste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"palanit-core": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"palanit-core"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"palanit-core": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"palanit-core"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
This one runs on your computer, and ChatGPT can only connect to servers on the internet. Pick another app.
Your choice stays on this device in a cookie; no account needed.
These settings are generated from the maker’s registry entry. If the README says otherwise, follow the README.
Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 8, 2026
The registry name was verified with the GitHub account stasxr, which owns the repo
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
Compared with every active server in this category in the registry. Stars count only when the publisher owns the repo.
It passed 1 of 1 applicable basic checks. We have not read the code. Before adding a key or token, see what access the server asks for and use a key with only the permissions you need.
The registry does not list a required key, though some servers ask you to sign in on first use.
It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.1.3) reached the registry 18 days ago.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Python (uv) on your computer.
In the same category: TeamOnly, KillerSkills, InternetSecure
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:↓ Downloads per weeki★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
Deploy AI-built internal apps behind your company login, with a database, files and secrets.
Security verdicts for agent skills and MCP servers, from sandbox runs, before you install them.
Security grades, SSL/TLS, headers and uptime for your domains, plus a CI deploy gate.
Copied from the maker’s repo as written. PopNx MCP has not reviewed or endorsed it. HTML, images and scripts are removed. Links lead off this site.
Scan MCP servers and AI-agent tool manifests for hidden risk — before an attacker finds it.
Website · Docs · Palanit OS (hosted)
Your AI agent trusts tools, MCP servers and skills it didn't write. A tool's description is injected straight into the model's context — so a *poisoned* description can quietly tell your agent to leak a key, call an attacker's server, or run a shell command. Palanit Core reads every tool the way your agent will, and flags the ones that would betray it.
1 on HIGH+ findings, so a poisoned tool fails the build.pip install palanit-core
# Scan an MCP config or tool manifest
palanit scan mcp.config.json
palanit scan --sample
palanit scan mcp.config.json --json --fail-on HIGH
palanit pin mcp.config.json palanit scan mcp.config.json --baseline .palanit.lock.json
Example (trimmed):
CRITICAL Possible data exfiltration [PL-EXFIL-001]
Instructs the agent to send sensitive data to an external URL (collector.evil.example). ↳ mcp.config.json#/mcpServers/invoicing/tools/0/description fix: Remove external URLs and exfiltration verbs from tool text.
HIGH Hidden instructions in tool text [PL-POISON-001] HIGH Invisible or deceptive Unicode [PL-UNICODE-001] MEDIUM Unpinned package / runner [PL-SUPPLY-001] ... 9 finding(s) (1 critical · 5 high · 3 medium)
A scan at install time only sees the tool text you approved. A hostile server can swap a tool's description or input schema after that approval — and standard clients never re-check. palanit pin records a hash of each tool's declared definition; a later scan --baseline fails closed on any change, so a swap costs the attacker the tool instead of silently succeeding.
palanit pin mcp.config.json # approve current definitions
palanit scan mcp.config.json --baseline .palanit.lock.json # HIGH + exit 1 on any drift
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
PL-POISON-001 | HIGH | Hidden / injected instructions in tool & schema descriptions |
PL-EXFIL-001 | MED–CRIT | Tool text that steers the agent to send data to external URLs |
PL-SECRET-001 | HIGH | Hardcoded API keys, tokens and private keys |
PL-UNICODE-001 | MED–HIGH | Invisible / bidirectional Unicode used to hide instructions |
PL-SUPPLY-001 | MEDIUM | Unpinned / floating package versions (@latest, bare names) |
PL-SHELL-001 | MED–HIGH | Tools that launch a shell (bash -c, cmd /c, …) |
PL-TLS-001 | LOW–MED | Endpoints over http:// / ws:// without TLS |
PL-COLLIDE-001 | MEDIUM | Duplicate tool names that let one shadow another |
PL-ENV-001 | HIGH | Literal secrets in a server's env block |
PL-DRIFT-001 | HIGH | A tool's definition changed since you approved it — a post-install "rug pull" (only with --baseline) |
Run palanit rules to list them. Inputs understood: Claude-style mcpServers configs, servers configs, tools manifests, a bare list of tools, or a single tool object. Unknown JSON still gets string-level checks.
# .github/workflows/palanit.yml
name: palanit on: [push, pull_request] jobs: scan: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps:
Prefer plain steps? That works too:
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with: { python-version: "3.12" }
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
Palanit Core can itself run as an MCP server, so an agent or MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, …) can scan a config on demand:
pip install "palanit-core[mcp]"
palanit-mcp # stdio transport
Exposes the tools scan_mcp_config, list_rules and version. Example client entry:
{
"mcpServers": { "palanit": { "command": "palanit-mcp" } } }
Scanned your MCP server with Palanit Core? Show it:
[](https://github.com/stasxr/palanit-core)
Palanit Core only reads files you give it — but the broader PALANIT suite (botprobe) sends live test traffic. Only scan or test systems you own or are authorized to test. A clean scan reduces risk; it does not prove safety.
Apache-2.0 © Stanislav Miziyev. Contributions welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.
mcp-name: io.github.stasxr/palanit-core