Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Description from the maker (original English)
Defense-in-depth for MCP stdio servers: shell-injection guard, AST audit CLI, RCE blocking.
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We have not written a plain-language summary for this one yet. Below are the facts we read from the registry.
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Open Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config, and paste this into claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"stdio-shellguard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-stdio-shellguard"
]
}
}
}Run this in your terminal
claude mcp add stdio-shellguard -- npx -y mcp-stdio-shellguardPaste into .cursor/mcp.json in your project, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"stdio-shellguard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-stdio-shellguard"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
Paste into .vscode/mcp.json in your project
{
"servers": {
"stdio-shellguard": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-stdio-shellguard"
]
}
}
}Your browser asks to open the app, then the app shows the settings and asks you to confirm. Key values are left empty for you to fill in.
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Runs on your computer; the tool list appears in your AI app after you install it.
We check information anyone can see; we have not read the code. Checks that do not apply are left out of the count. · Checked Nov 6, 2026
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We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
We have not read this repo from GitHub yet
This one runs on your computer; there is no internet endpoint
Runs on your computer and uses local settings instead
Runs on your computer; we can only read tool lists from internet endpoints
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It runs on your computer. Your AI app starts it when needed, and data does not pass through the maker’s servers (unless it calls an online service itself).
The GitHub repo last changed –, and the latest version (0.1.3) reached the registry 4 days ago.
Apps that support MCP, such as Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and VS Code. You also need Node.js on your computer.
In the same category: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, Symantec Cloud DLP AIops
Servers in the same category from other makers, sorted by stars.
Reading a card:★ GitHub starsiThree pillars: reviews · checks · usageiUpdated = latest version published to the registryi
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
Governed Symantec Cloud DLP — 14 MCP tools, read-only with audit.
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Part of the [StudioMeyer MCP Stack](https://studiomeyer.io) — Built in Mallorca 🌴 · ⭐ if you use it
Defense-in-depth bundle for MCP stdio servers. Wraps child_process.exec/spawn with allowlist + sandbox + replay-detection, plus an AST audit CLI (mcp-shellguard-audit) that scans MCP server sources for unsanitized shell calls. Closes the Ox-Security MCP stdio-RCE class (200k vulnerable servers, May 2026 disclosure).
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0npm install mcp-stdio-shellguard
Or run the audit CLI directly without installing:
npx -y -p mcp-stdio-shellguard mcp-shellguard-audit scan ./src
Version 0.1.3 includes the dependency bundle described below.
The package ships @typescript-eslint/typescript-estree plus TypeScript and the required parser dependency closure through bundledDependencies. A root-only npm override does not constrain an installed package's dependency tree; the included closure carries the checked versions to consumers. The bundle preparation checks @typescript-eslint/typescript-estree 8.72.1 and minimatch 11.0.3, then changes only the parser manifest dependency range from minimatch ^10.2.2 to ^11.0.3. Third-party source files and package version numbers are unchanged. The AST audit calls typescript-estree.parse directly, with TypeScript included explicitly to satisfy the parser dependency tree; no ESLint runtime is required.
The measured archive is approximately 4.92 MB compressed and 26.04 MB unpacked (decimal MB). Bundling increases download and disk use; a security update to an included dependency requires an updated package archive.
For maintenance, run npm ci and npm run test:consumer from the repository checkout. npm pack runs prepack automatically: it builds the package and prepares the declared bundle. The consumer check packs twice, verifies identical bytes, installs the actual archive in a fresh project, checks npm ls and both dependency audits, and exercises the installed CLI or runtime. Review dependency updates together with the locked bundle and license proofs before distributing a new archive. The archive's dist/bundled-dependencies.json records the bundle and manifest adjustments.
Three layers, opt-in piecewise:
guardExec / guardSpawn you call from your own MCP server. Default-deny allowlist, sandbox profiles, replay window.mcp-shellguard-audit scan walks the AST, reports 12 anti-patterns from LOW (no timeout) to CRITICAL (exec(\...${userInput}...\)).mcp-stdio-shellguard-demo exposes 8 tools so the MCP Inspector / Claude Desktop can drive the bundle directly.| Tool | Type | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
guard_exec | destructive | Defended child_process.exec. Forces args[] vector, allowlist + sandbox + replay. Returns stdout, stderr, exitCode, canonicalHash, isReplay, trustTier. |
guard_spawn | destructive | Defended child_process.spawn. Returns SHA-256 hashes of stdout/stderr instead of full bodies. Hard-rejects shell:true. |
register_allowlist | mutating | Register a tool name with executable + args regex. Without registration the default-deny applies. |
audit_source | read-only | Scan a TS/JS path for shell-injection anti-patterns. Returns AuditFinding[] + summary. |
audit_report | read-only | Format an audit result as markdown / json / SARIF 2.1.0. |
replay_check | read-only | Compute canonical SHA-256 hash for an invocation and report whether it's already in the replay window. |
sandbox_status | read-only | Report active sandbox profile + concrete limits + cgroup-v2 active flag. |
trust_tier | read-only | Derive LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL tier for a registered tool plus improvement hints. |
| Profile | Timeout | Max stdout | Max stderr | FD budget | cgroup-v2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
strict | 5 s | 1 MB | 256 KB | 32 | yes (cpu/memory) |
standard (default) | 30 s | 10 MB | 1 MB | 256 | yes |
permissive | 5 min | 100 MB | 10 MB | 1024 | no |
Caller can tighten via timeoutMs / fdBudget per call. Caller cannot widen beyond the profile.
| Tier | Condition |
|---|---|
| LOW | tool not registered (default-deny) |
| MEDIUM | registered but argsPatterns empty (any args allowed) |
| HIGH | argsPatterns set but sandbox or replay tracker inactive |
| CRITICAL | argsPatterns + sandbox + replay all active |
Lift LOW → CRITICAL by registering the tool + setting argsPatterns + running through guardExec/guardSpawn (which always activate sandbox + replay).
import {
AllowlistRegistry, ReplayWindow, guardExec, } from "mcp-stdio-shellguard";
const registry = new AllowlistRegistry(); const replay = new ReplayWindow();
registry.register({ toolName: "git-log", executable: "/usr/bin/git", argsPatterns: ["^log$", "^--oneline$", "^-n$", "^\\d+$"], sandboxProfile: "strict", });
const result = await guardExec( { toolName: "git-log", command: "/usr/bin/git", args: ["log", "--oneline", "-n", "10"], }, { registry, replay }, );
console.log(result.stdout); // → commit lines console.log(result.trustTier); // → "CRITICAL" console.log(result.canonicalHash); // → 64-char SHA-256
mcp-shellguard-audit scan ./src
mcp-shellguard-audit scan ./src --format sarif --output audit.sarif mcp-shellguard-audit scan ./src --severity-floor HIGH # CI gate
Exit codes:
0 clean (no findings at-or-above floor)1 findings present2 parse / IO errorsCustom ignoreGlobs passed to scanPath or the audit_source MCP tool accept at most 128 strings. Each string is limited to 1024 UTF-16 code units and 16 unescaped opening grouping characters ((, {, [). Inputs above these budgets raise a controlled error before matching.
| ID | Severity | Triggers on |
|---|---|---|
exec_template_literal_with_input | CRITICAL | child_process.exec(\ls ${x}\) |
exec_dynamic_string | CRITICAL | child_process.exec(cmd) |
exec_sync_dynamic_string | CRITICAL | child_process.execSync(cmd) |
eval_near_child_process | CRITICAL | eval(...) |
function_constructor_near_child_process | CRITICAL | new Function(...) |
spawn_dynamic_file_args | HIGH | spawn(bin, userArgs) |
exec_file_dynamic | HIGH | execFile(bin, ...) |
shell_true_option | HIGH | { shell: true } |
os_system_equivalent | HIGH | Deno.run / Bun.spawn |
spawn_literal_dynamic_args | MEDIUM | spawn('git', userArgs) |
unbounded_buffer | LOW | exec without maxBuffer |
missing_timeout | LOW | exec/spawn without timeout |
The scanner resolves *renamed* child_process bindings before matching, so the dangerous shapes below are caught even when the call goes through an alias rather than a literal child_process.exec:
const execAsync = promisify(exec); execAsync(...${x})import cp from "node:child_process"; cp.exec(...${x})const { exec: sh } = require("child_process"); sh(...${x})import { exec as run } from "node:child_process"; run(...)Synchronous variants (spawnSync, execFileSync) share their async rules, and shell_true_option also fires on a string shell ({ shell: "/bin/sh" }) or a dynamic shell value — not just the literal { shell: true }. A promisify of a non-child_process function, a destructure off another module, and { shell: false } stay clean (no false positives).
// shellguard:ignore-next-line — suppress one finding// shellguard:ignore-file — suppress whole file (rare; prefer per-line)Ox-Security disclosed (2026-05) that 200k+ MCP stdio servers wrap child_process.exec with template literals carrying user input straight from LLM tool args. LiteLLM v1.83.6 was the canonical example (CVE patched in 1.83.7). This bundle is the defensive-security counterpart: a drop-in guard + scanner that closes the class. Inspired by AWS Linux seccomp + Chromium sandbox tiers.
HOOK_RECIPES.md — Claude Code hook recipes that auto-block dangerous tool callsCHANGELOG.md — release historyMIT — Copyright (c) 2026 Matthias Meyer (StudioMeyer)
Bundled dependencies retain their complete upstream license texts in the archive. The package license applies to this project's own code; bundled third-party packages retain their respective terms. The consumer check verifies each approved package version's full license file, or its complete README license section, against pinned content hashes from integrity-verified official npm artifacts. Whitespace and line-ending differences are accepted; missing, empty or partial legal text is rejected.