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PopNx MCPServidores MCP para quienes usan IA · explicados con palabras sencillas

AI Guardian

de AIops-toolsversión 0.14.0i★ –iSe ejecuta en tu computadora
Nombre en el registroio.github.AIops-tools/ai-guardian

Instalar

Resumen

Descripción del creador (original en inglés)

Governed local-LLM observability: model policy, prompt scanner, capture proxy, 21 tools.

Los tres pilares de PopNx MCP

Estos tres nunca se combinan en una sola puntuación: las opiniones, las mediciones y la popularidad son cosas distintas.

Qué puedes hacer con él

Todavía no escribimos un resumen sencillo para este. Abajo están los datos que leímos del registro.

  • Conexión: Se ejecuta en tu computadora
  • Transporte: stdio
  • Categoría: Búsqueda y memoria de IA

Instalación

Elige la app de IA que usas y copia la configuración.

Antes de instalar

Necesitas

  • PyPIuv de Python instalado (para el comando uvx)

¿Qué app usas?

Elige tu app arriba. La recordamos, así que la próxima vez el botón dirá “Instalar en …”.

Abre Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config y pega esto en claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "ai-guardian": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "ai-guardian-aiops"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Ejecuta esto en tu terminal

claude mcp add ai-guardian -- uvx ai-guardian-aiops

Abrir en Cursor

O copia la configuración tú

Pégalo en .cursor/mcp.json de tu proyecto, o en ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "ai-guardian": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "ai-guardian-aiops"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.

Abrir en VS Code

O copia la configuración tú

Pégalo en .vscode/mcp.json de tu proyecto

{
  "servers": {
    "ai-guardian": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "ai-guardian-aiops"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.

Este se ejecuta en tu computadora, y ChatGPT solo puede conectarse a servidores en internet. Elige otra app.

Tu elección se guarda en una cookie en este dispositivo; no necesitas cuenta.

Esta configuración se genera a partir de la ficha del creador en el registro. Si el README dice otra cosa, sigue el README.

Qué puede hacer

Se ejecuta en tu computadora; la lista de herramientas aparece en tu app de IA después de instalarlo.

Revisiones básicasi

Revisamos información que cualquiera puede ver; no hemos leído el código. Las revisiones que no aplican no se cuentan. · Revisado el 7 nov 2026

  • ✓ Superada

    El creador coincide con el repo

    El nombre en el registro se verificó con la cuenta de GitHub AIops-tools, dueña del repo

  • … Aún sin revisar

    Sigue en mantenimiento

    Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub

  • … Aún sin revisar

    Tiene licencia

    Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub

  • – No aplica

    El endpoint responde

    Este se ejecuta en tu computadora; no hay endpoint en internet

  • – No aplica

    Inicio de sesión con OAuth

    Se ejecuta en tu computadora y usa ajustes locales en su lugar

  • … Aún sin revisar

    Sin instrucciones ocultas en las descripciones de herramientas

    Se ejecuta en tu computadora; solo podemos leer listas de herramientas de endpoints en internet

Comparado con otros en Búsqueda y memoria de IAi

  • Más estrellas que el 0% de los otros 5653 servidores de esta categoría
  • Publicado en el registro más recientemente que el 82% de los otros 5653 servidores de esta categoría
  • Revisiones básicas iguales o mejores que el 100% de los otros 5653 servidores de esta categoría

Comparado con todos los servidores activos de esta categoría en el registro. Las estrellas solo cuentan cuando quien lo publica es dueño del repo.

Preguntas frecuentes

¿Es seguro AI Guardian?

Superó 1 de 1 revisiones básicas aplicables. No hemos leído el código. Antes de agregar una clave o un token, revisa qué acceso pide el servidor y usa una clave que tenga solo los permisos que necesitas.

¿Qué claves o códigos necesita?

El registro no indica ninguna clave obligatoria, aunque algunos servidores te piden iniciar sesión la primera vez que los usas.

¿Se ejecuta en mi computadora o en la nube?

Se ejecuta en tu computadora. Tu app de IA lo inicia cuando hace falta, y los datos no pasan por los servidores del creador (a menos que el propio servidor llame a un servicio en línea).

¿Sigue en mantenimiento?

El repo de GitHub cambió por última vez –, y la última versión (0.14.0) llegó al registro hace 8 días.

¿Qué apps pueden usarlo?

Las apps compatibles con MCP, como Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor y VS Code. También necesitas Python (uv) en tu computadora.

¿Qué puedo usar en su lugar?

En la misma categoría: Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa

Alternativas

Servidores de la misma categoría hechos por otros creadores, ordenados por estrellas.

Cómo leer una tarjeta:★ Estrellas de GitHubiTres pilares: reseñas · revisiones · usoiActualizado = fecha en que se publicó la última versión en el registroi

Context7

de upstash

Up-to-date docs for AI agents

Computadora o nube★ 64.224MITActualizado ayer
Instalar

Codebase Memory

de DeusData

Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.

Se ejecuta en tu computadora★ 48.148MITActualizado hace 21 días
Instalar

Exa

de exa-labs

Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.

Se ejecuta en la nube★ 5213MITActualizado hace 2 meses
Instalar

README del creador

Abrir el README

Copiado tal cual del repo del creador. PopNx MCP no lo ha revisado ni lo respalda. Se quitaron HTML, imágenes y scripts. Los enlaces llevan fuera de este sitio.

AI Guardian

Audit availability: Real writes require a committed pending audit row and stop before contacting the platform if storage is unavailable. Reads and previews may continue with a warning; new audit rows store outcome summaries rather than full responses.

Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Ollama, IGEL, or any AI-security vendor. Product and trademark names belong to their owners. MIT licensed.

Governed observability + governance for on-endpoint local LLMs. It lets you observe + audit what your local models are actually fed, and gate what leaves in a prompt — the complement to IGEL AI Armor. AI Armor governs *whether* a local model may run on the endpoint; ai-guardian records *what it did* and gates *what goes into the prompt* (secrets, PII, source, jailbreaks) plus *which model* may serve it. Self-contained: it talks to each runtime's REST API and needs nothing beyond httpx and the MCP SDK. v0.1 provides opt-in route-through content governance, plus a transparent capture proxy for clients that did not opt in.

Supported runtimes

One tool, several local runtimes, selected per target by a runtime field in config.yaml (the init wizard asks). Ollama uses its native API; the other three share one OpenAI-compatible transport (/v1/models + /v1/chat/completions).

RuntimeruntimeDefault portList / policyScan + route-through guardProvenance
Ollamaollama11434✅✅digest (content hash — strong)
llama.cpp (llama-server)llamacpp8080✅✅props — /props model path/size → pinnable id
LM Studiolmstudio1234✅✅id only — weaker; pins report unverifiable
vLLM (local single-node)vllm8000✅✅id only — weaker; pins report unverifiable

The allow/deny model policy, the deterministic prompt scanner, the route-through guard (guarded_generate / observe_chat), provenance drift, and doctor work across all runtimes. Model lifecycle writes (pull / remove / unload) are Ollama-only — the OpenAI-compatible servers load a model at startup and expose no lifecycle endpoint, so those writes are refused with a clear message.

Provenance honesty: only Ollama (content digest) and llama.cpp (a /props-derived path/size identity) expose something to pin. LM Studio and vLLM expose only a model id, so a pinned digest is reported unverifiable rather than a false DRIFT.

vLLM here is a LOCAL endpoint-guarding use case. GPU inference-cluster

operations (autoscale, drain, Ray Serve/Jobs, model lifecycle at fleet scale)

belong to a different tool in the line — GPU cluster ops → inference-aiops.

What it does

Ollama persists no queryable prompt/response history — conversational context is client-supplied on every request. So ai-guardian observes on two fronts:

  • Passive inventory / state auditing — over /api/tags, /api/ps, /api/show, /api/version: what models are installed and running, their VRAM residency, license/params/capabilities, and their provenance digests. Every model is annotated with an allow/deny policy verdict, so shadow (unsanctioned) models show allowed: false.
  • Opt-in route-through content governance — callers send a prompt *through* ai-guardian (guarded_generate / observe_chat). It scans the text (secrets / PII / source / jailbreak), checks the model against policy, records the interaction to its own usage log (~/.ai-guardian/usage.db), and only then calls Ollama — blocking when the risk band is too high or the model is disallowed. The raw prompt is never stored (only its length + redacted findings).

Now available (ai-guardian proxy serve): a transparent capture proxy that

applies the same scan + model policy + recording to traffic from clients that

never opted in — point them at the proxy instead of the runtime. It inspects

requests and streams responses through untouched, and it is a

chokepoint, not an enforcement boundary: a client that can still reach the

runtime's real port bypasses it entirely. proxy_guidance returns the command

and that caveat; the CLI prints it on every start.

Key features

  • Deterministic, offline prompt scanner — no I/O, no network, so it is fully testable offline. Flags secrets (AWS AKIA, private-key blocks, GitHub / Slack / OpenAI / Google tokens, JWTs, assigned api_key=…, high-entropy fallback), PII (email, US SSN, credit card with a Luhn check), source/config-leak heuristics, and jailbreak / prompt-injection signatures — rolled up into a weighted risk band (low / medium / high / critical; any critical dominates). Findings are redacted — the scanner never re-emits the secret it caught.
  • Model allow/deny policy (shell-glob patterns) so shadow / unsanctioned models surface as allowed: false, plus provenance digest pinning to flag a model whose digest drifted (re-pulled / tampered).
  • Route-through guard — guarded_generate / observe_chat scan + policy-gate
  • record + run-if-allowed, blocking on risk-band >= block_threshold (default high) or a disallowed model.
  • Vendored governance harness — audit log, token/runaway budget guard, descriptive risk tiers, and undo-token recording, bundled in the package (no external dependency).
  • Highly self-testable — Ollama is free + local for the API parts; the scanner, policy, and risk-band are pure deterministic offline logic.

What this tool does, and does not, decide

It delivers local-LLM observability and operations — reads and writes — accurately, and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write to the model estate is allowed to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the host and account you run it under: point it at a runtime the account cannot administer — an Ollama daemon whose model store the user can't modify, or an endpoint the agent reaches read-only — and the writes fail at the runtime, the place that actually owns the permission. Simplest of all, hand the connecting agent only the scan/observe tools.

So the harness has no read-only switch, no deny-rules file, and no approval gate to configure. (Content governance is a separate, product-level thing that stays: the model allow/deny policy and the guarded_generate block threshold still scan and gate what a model is asked to do.) The one thing the harness guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.ai-guardian/audit.db, and destructive writes still capture their before-state and record an inverse where one exists.

Each tool declares a risk_level, kept in agreement with its [READ]/[WRITE]

documentation tag by a test, and carried into the audit row as a descriptive

tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was a high-risk delete. It

is a label, not a gate.

Running a smaller / local model? See agent-guardrails.md — it lists the guardrails this tool now enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.

Capability matrix (21 MCP tools)

Reads (11)
ToolRiskWhat it returns
list_modelslowinstalled models, each with the allow/deny verdict (shadow → allowed:false)
running_modelslowloaded models: VRAM footprint + residency expiry
model_detailslowlicense / parameters / capabilities for one model
server_statuslowOllama reachability + version
vram_usagelowtotal VRAM used by loaded models; flag over-budget
policy_viewlowcurrent allow/deny policy + provenance digest pins
model_provenanceloweach installed digest vs its pin; flag drift
scan_promptlowpure text scan → findings + weighted risk band (no model call)
usage_eventslowquery the observed-usage log
anomaly_reportlowrollup: shadow models, digest drift, high-risk + blocked prompts
proxy_guidancelowthe proxy serve command + the client change, and the explicit caveat that the proxy is a chokepoint, not an enforcement boundary; writes nothing, starts nothing
Writes (8)
ToolRiskUndo / safety
pull_modelmediumrefused if it violates policy
remove_modelhighdry-run + undo (re-pull)
unload_modelmediumevict from VRAM (keep_alive:0)
set_model_allowlistmediumundo → prior allowlist
set_model_denylistmediumundo → prior denylist
pin_model_digestmediumpin a model's expected provenance digest
guarded_generatemediumthe route-through guard: scan + policy-gate + record + run-if-allowed
observe_chatmediumsame, for /api/chat messages
Undo (2)
ToolRiskWhat it does
undo_listlowlist recorded undo tokens
undo_applymediumreplay a recorded inverse descriptor

Risk-band gating: guarded_generate / observe_chat block when the prompt's risk band >= block_threshold (default high) or the model is disallowed. Blocked calls never reach Ollama and are recorded as blocked in the usage log.

Quick start

As a Claude Code plugin

One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:

/plugin marketplace add AIops-tools/marketplace

/plugin install ai-guardian@aiops-tools

The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with ai-guardian init — see below.

As an OpenClaw plugin

The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:

openclaw plugins install clawhub:@zw008/ai-guardian

openclaw skills info ai-guardian # expect: Visible to model: yes

Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.

As a CLI or standalone MCP server
uv tool install ai-guardian-aiops          # or: pipx install ai-guardian-aiops

ai-guardian doctor # Ollama reachability + policy summary (works zero-config) ai-guardian overview # models installed/running, shadow count, usage stats ai-guardian model list # installed models with allow/deny verdicts ai-guardian guard scan "my key is [PopNx MCP ตัดค่าที่หน้าตาเหมือนกุญแจออก]" # deterministic scan → risk band

The command and the package have different names. The CLI, the skill and

this repo are all ai-guardian; the PyPI distribution is `ai-guardian-aiops`

because ai-guardian was already taken. Both spellings below are correct and

intentional — install ai-guardian-aiops, then run ai-guardian.

Route a prompt through the guard (scan + policy-gate + record + run-if-allowed) via MCP:

guarded_generate(model="llama3.2:3b", prompt="…", block_threshold="high")

Run as an MCP server (stdio) — the full 21-tool surface; the CLI is a convenience subset:

export AI_GUARDIAN_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD=...   # only if a target has a stored token

ai-guardian mcp # or: ai-guardian-mcp

**Where that pas

Solo se muestra el principio; lee el resto en el repo

Pregunta a PopNx