ipdata MCP by usefulapi
Look up location, network, company and threat data for IP addresses and ASNs in ipdata.
Descripción del creador (original en inglés)
Audit MCP servers for tool poisoning, rug pulls and supply-chain risk (OWASP MCP Top 10).
Estos tres nunca se combinan en una sola puntuación: las opiniones, las mediciones y la popularidad son cosas distintas.
Todavía no escribimos un resumen sencillo para este. Abajo están los datos que leímos del registro.
Elige la app de IA que usas y copia la configuración.
Necesitas
¿Qué app usas?
Elige tu app arriba. La recordamos, así que la próxima vez el botón dirá “Instalar en …”.
Abre Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config y pega esto en claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"security-guard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-security-guard"
]
}
}
}Ejecuta esto en tu terminal
claude mcp add security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guardPégalo en .cursor/mcp.json de tu proyecto, o en ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"security-guard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-security-guard"
]
}
}
}Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.
Pégalo en .vscode/mcp.json de tu proyecto
{
"servers": {
"security-guard": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-security-guard"
]
}
}
}Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.
Este se ejecuta en tu computadora, y ChatGPT solo puede conectarse a servidores en internet. Elige otra app.
Tu elección se guarda en una cookie en este dispositivo; no necesitas cuenta.
Esta configuración se genera a partir de la ficha del creador en el registro. Si el README dice otra cosa, sigue el README.
Se ejecuta en tu computadora; la lista de herramientas aparece en tu app de IA después de instalarlo.
Revisamos información que cualquiera puede ver; no hemos leído el código. Las revisiones que no aplican no se cuentan. · Revisado el 7 nov 2026
El nombre en el registro se verificó con la cuenta de GitHub petrovicistefan, dueña del repo
Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub
Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub
Este se ejecuta en tu computadora; no hay endpoint en internet
Se ejecuta en tu computadora y usa ajustes locales en su lugar
Se ejecuta en tu computadora; solo podemos leer listas de herramientas de endpoints en internet
Comparado con todos los servidores activos de esta categoría en el registro. Las estrellas solo cuentan cuando quien lo publica es dueño del repo.
Superó 1 de 1 revisiones básicas aplicables. No hemos leído el código. Antes de agregar una clave o un token, revisa qué acceso pide el servidor y usa una clave que tenga solo los permisos que necesitas.
El registro no indica ninguna clave obligatoria, aunque algunos servidores te piden iniciar sesión la primera vez que los usas.
Se ejecuta en tu computadora. Tu app de IA lo inicia cuando hace falta, y los datos no pasan por los servidores del creador (a menos que el propio servidor llame a un servicio en línea).
El repo de GitHub cambió por última vez –, y la última versión (0.9.1) llegó al registro hace 19 días.
Las apps compatibles con MCP, como Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor y VS Code. También necesitas Node.js en tu computadora.
En la misma categoría: ipdata MCP by usefulapi, MaxMind minFraud MCP by usefulapi, Lambda Labs MCP by usefulapi
Servidores de la misma categoría hechos por otros creadores, ordenados por estrellas.
Cómo leer una tarjeta:★ Estrellas de GitHubiTres pilares: reseñas · revisiones · usoiActualizado = fecha en que se publicó la última versión en el registroi
Look up location, network, company and threat data for IP addresses and ASNs in ipdata.
MCP server for MaxMind minFraud — score transactions for fraud risk from your AI assistant.
Read GPU instances, types, images, filesystems and firewall rules; launch and terminate instances.
Copiado tal cual del repo del creador. PopNx MCP no lo ha revisado ni lo respalda. Se quitaron HTML, imágenes y scripts. Los enlaces llevan fuera de este sitio.
Find out if the MCP servers you installed are lying to your AI.
Local audit for tool poisoning, rug pulls, tool shadowing, hidden Unicode and leaked secrets, mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10. Nothing leaves your machine unless you opt in.
Click the button above, or use this deep link: cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=mcp-security-guard&config=eyJjb21tYW5kIjoibnB4IiwiYXJncyI6WyIteSIsIm1jcC1zZWN1cml0eS1ndWFyZCJdfQ==
Or manually add to .cursor/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }
/plugin marketplace add petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard
/plugin install mcp-security-guard@mcp-security-guard
Then run /mcp-audit or ask Claude *"are my MCP servers safe?"*
claude mcp add mcp-security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guard
Add to your Claude Desktop config (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows):
{
"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }
Click the button above, or manually add to .vscode/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }
npx -y mcp-security-guard audit --project-only
⭐ Star this repository to support the project and stay updated! → Give a star
Your code is covered by other tools. This one checks the MCP servers that inject text into your AI's context.
MCP Security Guard audits every MCP server Claude (and other AI clients) can reach: servers you configured, servers that plugins bring, and servers from Claude Desktop and other clients on your machine.
*As of October 2026. Corrections welcome.*
| Feature | MCP Security Guard | snyk/agent-scan | cisco-ai-defense/mcp-scanner | riseandignite/mcp-shield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Code native plugin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Runtime hooks (pre/post tool-use) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Rug-pull pinning (SHA-256) | ✅ Tools, skills, CLAUDE.md | Limited | ❌ | ❌ |
| OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping | ✅ Every finding | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| SARIF output | ✅ GitHub Action | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| CycloneDX BOM export | ✅ Agent inventory | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Fully local (zero network) | ✅ Default | Varies | Varies | Varies |
| Supply-chain checks | ✅ OSV, npm, PyPI | Varies | Varies | Varies |
| Tool poisoning detection | ✅ 26/27 attacks | Varies | Varies | Varies |
| License | MIT | Apache 2.0 | MIT | MIT |
Our differentiators:
/mcp-audit slash command and runtime protectionProtect your local AI setup.
# Scan before installing a new server
npx mcp-security-guard scan server-config.json --confirm-launch
npx mcp-security-guard pin
npx mcp-security-guard audit
Block risky MCP servers and poisoned skills in code review.
Fail PRs that add:
Findings appear in GitHub's code scanning interface with OWASP MCP Top 10 references.
- uses: petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard@main
with: fail-on: high
Central security policy for your organization.
With the Team plan:
MCP Security Guard discovers servers from every place AI clients load them: user, local and project scope, servers shipped inside installed plugins, claude_desktop_config.json, Claude Desktop extensions, organization-managed managed-mcp.json, other clients on the machine (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf), and claude.ai connectors you've used.
It scans everything a server puts into the AI's context: tools, server instructions, prompts, resources and resource templates.
| Check | What It Catches |
|---|---|
| Tool poisoning | Instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", tags, directives to read secrets (~/.ssh, .env), conversation harvesting, exfiltration via URLs/parameters/Markdown images, HTML comments, encoded payloads |
| Full-schema poisoning | Same checks on parameter names, descriptions, defaults, enums, required, plus non-schema text in type |
| Hidden text | Zero-width, bidi-control and Unicode-tag characters, ANSI terminal escapes, homoglyph tool names |
| Tool shadowing | Server descriptions referencing another server's tools, tool-name collisions between servers |
| Rug pulls | Tool definitions or launch commands that changed after you pinned them (SHA-256 per tool). Skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hooks of a plugin that changed after pinning (plugins changing files under the same version are flagged high). Re-checked automatically at every session start |
| Capabilities & score | Per-tool classification (execute, delete, write, egress), unauthenticated remote write access, 0–100 score and A–F grade per server, recommended permission rules |
| Supply chain | OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions, typosquats, missing or brand-new packages, install scripts, publisher changes (opt-in network check) |
| Runtime | Hooks on every MCP call: ask before credentials are sent, warn on injected instructions or credentials in outputs, content-free audit log |
| Policy | .mcp-security.json approved/blocked servers and hosts, enforced in audits, CI and at session start |
| Toxic flows | Servers holding all three legs of the "lethal trifecta" (untrusted input, private data, egress capability), on their own or together. A posture note (low or info), not a defect |
| Agent context | Skills and their scripts, slash commands, subagents, rules, CLAUDE.md and plugin hooks: instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", invisible text, HTML comments addressed to the model, directives to read credential files, commands that upload credentials, download-and-run, encoded execution, infostealer scripts, pre-approved unrestricted Bash |
| Configuration | Plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remotes, unpinned npx/uvx packages, privileged or unpinned Docker images, pipe-to-shell launches, duplicate names across scopes |
Everything runs locally. Nothing is sent anywhere unless you opt in.
Every finding is tagged with its OWASP MCP Top 10 id, in reports and in SARIF.
| ID | Risk | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| MCP01 | Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure | ✅ Plaintext secrets in env, headers, args and URLs. At runtime, asks before a credential is sent to an MCP server and warns when one comes back |
| MCP02 | Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep | ✅ Capability inventory (execute, delete, write, egress), ready-to-paste permissions.ask rules, privileged or broadly mounted containers |
| MCP03 | Tool Poisoning | ✅ 26/27 published techniques detected, including full-schema poisoning, shadowing and name collisions, plus rug-pull pinning |
| MCP04 | Supply Chain Attacks | ✅ Unpinned packages, images and git sources; OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions; typosquats; new packages; install scripts; publisher changes |
| MCP05 | Command Injection & Execution | ✅ Flags tools that can execute commands; adversarial_test finds injectable parameters in servers you own |
| MCP06 | Prompt Injection via Contextual Payloads | ✅ In tool metadata and, at runtime, in tool outputs (English patterns) |
| MCP07 | Insufficient AuthN/AuthZ | ✅ Plain-HTTP remotes; remote servers exposing write or exec tools without authentication; OAuth detection |
| MCP08 | Lack of Audit and Telemetry | ✅ Local, content-free audit log of every MCP call, with query_audit_log |
| MCP09 | Shadow MCP Servers | ✅ Discovery across user, project, local, plugin and Claude Desktop configs; approved-server policy enforced in audits, CI and at session st
Solo se muestra el principio; lee el resto en el repo