Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Descripción del creador (original en inglés)
Scans code, IaC and AI-agent config for security problems. Read-only — nothing can be edited.
Estos tres nunca se combinan en una sola puntuación: las opiniones, las mediciones y la popularidad son cosas distintas.
Todavía no escribimos un resumen sencillo para este. Abajo están los datos que leímos del registro.
Elige la app de IA que usas y copia la configuración.
Necesitas
¿Qué app usas?
Elige tu app arriba. La recordamos, así que la próxima vez el botón dirá “Instalar en …”.
Abre Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config y pega esto en claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"valca": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valca"
]
}
}
}Ejecuta esto en tu terminal
claude mcp add valca -- uvx valcaPégalo en .cursor/mcp.json de tu proyecto, o en ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"valca": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valca"
]
}
}
}Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.
Pégalo en .vscode/mcp.json de tu proyecto
{
"servers": {
"valca": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valca"
]
}
}
}Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.
Este se ejecuta en tu computadora, y ChatGPT solo puede conectarse a servidores en internet. Elige otra app.
Tu elección se guarda en una cookie en este dispositivo; no necesitas cuenta.
Esta configuración se genera a partir de la ficha del creador en el registro. Si el README dice otra cosa, sigue el README.
Se ejecuta en tu computadora; la lista de herramientas aparece en tu app de IA después de instalarlo.
Revisamos información que cualquiera puede ver; no hemos leído el código. Las revisiones que no aplican no se cuentan. · Revisado el 6 nov 2026
El nombre en el registro se verificó con la cuenta de GitHub PranLabs, dueña del repo
Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub
Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub
Este se ejecuta en tu computadora; no hay endpoint en internet
Se ejecuta en tu computadora y usa ajustes locales en su lugar
Se ejecuta en tu computadora; solo podemos leer listas de herramientas de endpoints en internet
Comparado con todos los servidores activos de esta categoría en el registro. Las estrellas solo cuentan cuando quien lo publica es dueño del repo.
Superó 1 de 1 revisiones básicas aplicables. No hemos leído el código. Antes de agregar una clave o un token, revisa qué acceso pide el servidor y usa una clave que tenga solo los permisos que necesitas.
El registro no indica ninguna clave obligatoria, aunque algunos servidores te piden iniciar sesión la primera vez que los usas.
Se ejecuta en tu computadora. Tu app de IA lo inicia cuando hace falta, y los datos no pasan por los servidores del creador (a menos que el propio servidor llame a un servicio en línea).
El repo de GitHub cambió por última vez –, y la última versión (0.6.1) llegó al registro hace 30 días.
Las apps compatibles con MCP, como Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor y VS Code. También necesitas Python (uv) en tu computadora.
En la misma categoría: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, SSTracker free youth training
Servidores de la misma categoría hechos por otros creadores, ordenados por estrellas.
Cómo leer una tarjeta:★ Estrellas de GitHubiTres pilares: reseñas · revisiones · usoiActualizado = fecha en que se publicó la última versión en el registroi
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
Free youth sports drills, practice plans and age-group answers for parents and coaches.
Copiado tal cual del repo del creador. PopNx MCP no lo ha revisado ni lo respalda. Se quitaron HTML, imágenes y scripts. Los enlaces llevan fuera de este sitio.
AI coding security co-pilot — blocks insecure code at the moment of generation.
Formerly published as `vigilsec`. The package is now
valca. Both thevalcaandvigil
commands work, so existing hooks and scripts keep running unchanged.
Valca intercepts every file an AI coding assistant writes and blocks it if CRITICAL or HIGH security findings are detected — before the file hits disk. It's the only tool that operates at generation time rather than post-commit.
AI writes file → valca scan → exit 2 → Claude Code blocks the write
AI coding assistants reproduce the most common patterns in their training data. The most common patterns are insecure defaults.
The clearest example: every existing IaC scanner (Checkov, Trivy, Snyk, Semgrep) misses the docker-compose port binding that exposes your database to the internet:
ports:
The correct form is "127.0.0.1:5432:5432". Valca catches it. Nothing else does.
pip install valca
Wire the Claude Code hook (one time):
valca init --global # `valca init --global` also works
That's it. Every file Claude Code writes is now scanned before it saves. Reload Claude Code to activate.
Valca's core scanning is fully offline — the package has zero runtime dependencies and the engine never sends your code, file paths, or findings anywhere.
Three rules do reach the network, because checking whether a dependency is vulnerable or fabricated is impossible offline. When a manifest (requirements.txt, package.json, lockfiles) is scanned, these rules send package names and version strings only to:
| Host | Used by | What is sent |
|---|---|---|
api.osv.dev | VGL-PKG001 (known CVE in a pinned version) | package name + version |
pypi.org | VGL-PKG002/003/004 (hallucinated, stale, or suspicious package) | package name |
registry.npmjs.org | VGL-PKG002/003/004 | package name |
Your source code, file contents, file paths, and scan results are never transmitted. If your dependency inventory is itself sensitive, turn these rules off in .valcarc and Valca runs completely offline:
disabled_rules = ["VGL-PKG001", "VGL-PKG002", "VGL-PKG003", "VGL-PKG004"]
# Scan a single file
valca scan docker-compose.yml
valca scan ./my-project/
valca scan ./my-project/ --format json
valca scan ./my-project/ --format sarif > results.sarif
valca scan ./my-project/ --severity HIGH
valca feedback
Review what has been caught over time. Both commands read the local scan history — nothing leaves your machine.
# Findings log — what was caught, where, and when
valca log # 20 most recent findings valca log --severity CRITICAL # only criticals valca log --project api --since 2026-09-01 valca log --limit 100 --format json # for dashboards
valca stats valca stats --format json
valca stats reports how often each rule fires and how often you suppressed it, so rules with poor precision in *your* codebase are visible rather than guessed at.
Exit codes:
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 | No findings — write proceeds |
1 | Advisory findings only (MEDIUM / LOW / INFO) |
2 | CRITICAL or HIGH found — Claude Code blocks the write |
Blocking a vulnerable GitHub Actions workflow at write time:
In April 2026, researchers found that all three major AI coding agents (Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Copilot) could be hijacked to exfiltrate ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and GITHUB_TOKEN via a hidden HTML comment in a GitHub issue. CVSS 9.4. No special access required.
Valca catches the vulnerable workflow (issues: trigger + AI agent + API key in env) before it reaches git — the only tool that does.
→ Full writeup: The Attack That Steals Your API Keys Through a GitHub Issue Comment
116 rules across 27 categories. All built-in, stdlib-only, zero runtime dependencies.
This catalogue is generated from the rule registry — it cannot drift from the shipped engine.
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-I001 | CRITICAL | eval() or exec() — code injection risk |
| VGL-I002 | HIGH | subprocess with shell=True |
| VGL-I003 | HIGH | os.system() call |
| VGL-S001 | CRITICAL | AWS access key hardcoded |
| VGL-S002 | CRITICAL | Hardcoded password |
| VGL-S003 | CRITICAL | Hardcoded API key |
| VGL-S004 | CRITICAL | Hardcoded bearer token |
| VGL-S005 | CRITICAL | Hardcoded JWT secret |
| VGL-S006 | CRITICAL | PEM private key in source |
| VGL-S007 | CRITICAL | Database URL with embedded credentials |
| VGL-S008 | CRITICAL | Stripe live secret key |
| VGL-S009 | CRITICAL | Slack token hardcoded |
| VGL-S010 | CRITICAL | Provider API key hardcoded (OpenAI / GitHub / GitLab / Google) |
| VGL-S012 | HIGH | Insecure placeholder default for security-critical config |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-GHA001 | CRITICAL | Pwn Request — pull_request_target with attacker-controlled checkout ref |
| VGL-GHA002 | CRITICAL | Script injection — user-controlled context expression in run: step |
| VGL-GHA004 | HIGH | Secret directly interpolated in run: step (visible in process table) |
| VGL-GHA005 | MEDIUM | Workflow missing explicit permissions block (implicit GITHUB_TOKEN scope) |
| VGL-GHA006 | HIGH | Cache usage in pull_request workflow (cache poisoning attack vector) |
| VGL-GHA007 | HIGH | Self-hosted runner with pull_request trigger (persistent runner risk) |
| VGL-GHA008 | HIGH | workflow_run trigger without ref/repo validation |
| VGL-GHA009 | CRITICAL | AI agent wired to untrusted-input trigger (issues/pull_request_target) with API key in env |
| VGL-GHA010 | HIGH | AI agent on pull_request_target without fork origin guard |
| VGL-GHA011 | CRITICAL | Untrusted GitHub event data interpolated into AI agent prompt |
| VGL-GHA012 | HIGH | AI agent on untrusted trigger with no --allowedTools restriction |
| VGL-GHA013 | MEDIUM | AI agent on untrusted trigger with no --max-turns limit |
| VGL-GHA014 | HIGH | contents: write permission with AI agent on untrusted trigger |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-PI001 | CRITICAL | User input interpolated into the LLM system prompt |
| VGL-PI002 | HIGH | Raw HTTP request body used as LLM message content |
| VGL-PI003 | HIGH | String formatting used to build prompts with user data |
| VGL-PI004 | MEDIUM | Tool output appended to the conversation without sanitization |
| VGL-PI005 | CRITICAL | HTTP request data flows into an LLM prompt unsanitised |
| VGL-PI006 | CRITICAL | LLM response flows into subprocess, exec or eval |
| VGL-PI007 | HIGH | Webhook payload flows directly into an AI agent |
| VGL-PI008 | HIGH | Database content interpolated into a prompt — second-order injection |
| VGL-PI009 | HIGH | User input written into a vector store — memory poisoning |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VGL-DF001 | HIGH | Dockerfile runs as root — no USER directive | ||
| VGL-DF002 | MEDIUM | Dockerfile uses unpinned :latest base image | ||
| VGL-DF003 | HIGH | Dockerfile bakes secret into ENV or ARG layer | ||
| VGL-DF004 | HIGH | curl | bash or wget | sh pipe in Dockerfile RUN instruction |
| VGL-DF005 | HIGH | TLS verification disabled in Dockerfile RUN fetch | ||
| VGL-DF006 | MEDIUM | ADD used for local files — use COPY instead | ||
| VGL-DF007 | HIGH | COPY . without .dockerignore — risks leaking .git, .env, credentials | ||
| VGL-DF008 | MEDIUM | World-writable permissions set in Dockerfile (chmod 777) |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-D001 | CRITICAL | Docker public port binding — bypasses UFW, exposes service to internet |
| VGL-D002 | HIGH | docker-compose environment block contains hardcoded secret |
| VGL-D003 | CRITICAL | Docker container runs in privileged mode |
| VGL-D004 | HIGH | Docker container uses host network mode |
| VGL-D005 | CRITICAL | Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape vector |
| VGL-D006 | HIGH | Sensitive host path mounted into container |
| VGL-D007 | HIGH | AWS credentials directory (~/.aws) mounted into container — exposes all profiles |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-TF001 | CRITICAL | Terraform hardcoded secret value |
| VGL-TF002 | HIGH | Terraform resource with public access enabled |
| VGL-TF003 | HIGH | Terraform encryption explicitly disabled |
| VGL-TF004 | CRITICAL | IMDSv1 enabled on EC2 instance — vulnerable to SSRF metadata theft |
| VGL-TF005 | HIGH | Terraform S3 state backend stored without encryption |
| VGL-TF006 | MEDIUM | Deletion protection disabled on managed resource |
| VGL-TF007 | MEDIUM | Audit logging disabled on Terraform-managed resource |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-DESER001 | CRITICAL | Insecure deserialization — pickle.loads / pickle.load |
| VGL-DESER002 | HIGH | Insecure YAML deserialization — yaml.load() without SafeLoader |
| VGL-DESER003 | HIGH | Insecure deserialization — marshal.loads with untrusted data |
| VGL-PATH001 | HIGH | Path traversal — user input passed to file open or path join without validation |
| VGL-SSTI001 | CRITICAL | Server-Side Template Injection — user input rendered as Jinja2 template |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-MCP001 | CRITICAL | Prompt injection embedded in MCP tool description |
| VGL-MCP002 | HIGH | MCP tool description built from user-controlled data |
| VGL-MCP003 | HIGH | Shell execution in an MCP tool handler without a sandbox |
| VGL-MCP004 | HIGH | MCP server config uses an unpinned package or plaintext HTTP endpoint |
| VGL-MCP005 | HIGH | MCP fetch tool takes an agent-controlled URL with no allowlist |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-CORS001 | HIGH | CORS wildcard — allow_origins=['*'] |
| VGL-SQL001 | CRITICAL | SQL injection — query built with f-string or string concatenation |
| VGL-SQL002 | CRITICAL | SQL injection — ORM raw query with f-string |
| VGL-SSL001 | HIGH | SSL verification disabled |
| VGL-SSRF001 | CRITICAL | SSRF — HTTP call with user-controlled URL |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| VGL-A001 | CRITICAL | LLM output piped into shell execution |
| VGL-A002 | HIGH | Hardcoded auto-approval disables human-in-the-loop |
| VGL-A003 | HIGH | Unbounded agent loop with no iteration limit |
| VGL-A004 | HIGH | LLM response written to disk without validation |
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|
Solo se muestra el principio; lee el resto en el repo