vulntel

Name: vulntel
Author: rozetyp

de rozetypversión 1.2.0i★ –iSe ejecuta en la nube

Nombre en el registrocom.vulntel/mcp

Instalar

Resumen

Descripción del creador (original en inglés)

Free hosted CVE intel for bug-bounty agents: CVE fact-check, attack approaches from paid H1 reports

Los tres pilares de PopNx MCP

Estos tres nunca se combinan en una sola puntuación: las opiniones, las mediciones y la popularidad son cosas distintas.

Opinión de usuariosiAún no hay reseñasLas reseñas se abrirán junto con las cuentas en una etapa posterior
Nuestras revisiones básicasi3 de 3 superadasRevisado con información pública; el código aún no se ha escaneado
UsoiAún sin medir★ –

Qué puedes hacer con él

Todavía no escribimos un resumen sencillo para este. Abajo están los datos que leímos del registro.

Conexión: Se ejecuta en la nube
Transporte: Streamable HTTP
Categoría: Otros
Debes completar: Authorization

Instalación

Elige la app de IA que usas y copia la configuración.

Antes de instalar

Revisiones básicas: 3 de 3 superadas
Se ejecuta en el servidor del creador: lo que le pidas pasa por su servidor.
Puede hacer 13 cosas (herramientas) enrich_cve, check_technology, hunt_plan, observe …
Debes completar tú: Authorization

Los valores marcados como secretos son llaves de tu cuenta. Nunca los compartas ni los pegues en un chat.

Necesitas

Se ejecuta en la nubeNo hay nada que instalar; se conecta por internet

¿Qué app usas?

ClaudeClaude CodeCursorVS CodeChatGPT

Elige tu app arriba. La recordamos, así que la próxima vez el botón dirá “Instalar en …”.

Esta dirección necesita una clave en un header de la solicitud, y el menú para agregar conectores no puede ponerla. Usa Claude Code, Cursor o VS Code.

Ejecuta esto en tu terminal

claude mcp add --transport http vulntel https://mcp.vulntel.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: your-value'

Completa los valores vacíos antes de ejecutarlo.

Abrir en Cursor

O copia la configuración tú

Pégalo en .cursor/mcp.json de tu proyecto, o en ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vulntel": {
      "url": "https://mcp.vulntel.com/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.

Abrir en VS Code

O copia la configuración tú

Pégalo en .vscode/mcp.json de tu proyecto

{
  "servers": {
    "vulntel": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.vulntel.com/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "your-value"
      }
    }
  }
}

Tu navegador te pide permiso para abrir la app; luego la app muestra la configuración y te pide confirmar. Los valores de las claves quedan vacíos para que los completes tú.

Esta dirección necesita una clave en un header de la solicitud, y el menú para agregar conectores no puede ponerla. Usa Claude Code, Cursor o VS Code.

Tu elección se guarda en una cookie en este dispositivo; no necesitas cuenta.

Valores que debes completar

Authorization secreto HTTP header
Optional bearer token. Without one, nine of the 13 tools run 25 times a day per network (the answers say how many calls are left). A free key from https://vulntel.com/signup lifts that to 60 calls a…

Esta configuración se genera a partir de la ficha del creador en el registro. Si el README dice otra cosa, sigue el README.

Qué puede hacer

Nombres y descripciones de las herramientas tal como los informó el servidor el 6 nov 2026. Los escribió el creador, no nosotros; los mostramos como texto sin formato.

enrich_cve
Full intelligence for a single CVE: CVSS, KEV status, EPSS, CISA SSVC (exploitation/automatable/technical_impact), P1-P4 priority with rationale, affected products/versions, Debian/Ubuntu/Alpine fixed builds per release (`distro_fixes`), and (live) public-exploit signal. Args: cv
check_technology
Find vulnerabilities affecting a product across NVD (CPE) and OSV (package ecosystems), de-duplicated and ranked by priority/EPSS/CVSS. Distinct products that share a name are kept distinct. If one name maps to several VENDORS' unrelated products (e.g. "Sentry" → sentry, mobileir
hunt_plan
Turn a recon'd stack into a ranked dig-order for authorized bug-hunting. For each discovered component, returns its top high-risk CVEs (KEV / CISA-SSVC- active / high-EPSS first) AND its `recurring_loci` — the bug classes (CWE) this product family repeatedly fails at, ranked by r
observe
Scan a host's exposed stack and join it to the CVE corpus — the recon workhorse. Fingerprints the homepage + JS bundles (recovering the backend identity and API endpoints homepage detection misses on SPAs), then ranks against live KEV / SSVC-active / high-EPSS into a dig-order. F
search_vulns
Search the CVE corpus — one entry point, three retrieval modes picked from your arguments: - query= a concept / technique / weakness (e.g. "SSO SAML assertion replay", "deserialization gadget chain", "server-side request forgery cloud metadata"). By default it FUSES full-text key
find_attack_approaches
Find how bugs *like this* were actually FOUND — retrieve real disclosed bug-bounty report mechanic-cards whose approach is closest (by mechanism) to your query or a seed CVE. The "what approach worked on a bug like this, on which program, and what did it pay" layer: grounded in r
find_continuations
When you're STUCK mid-hunt: describe your POSITION — the attacker state/capabilities you hold, stripped of product names — and get the CONTINUATIONS that worked from positions like it, matched against the full disclosed-report BODIES (the concrete step/payload/precondition), not
assist_submission
Submission & escalation co-pilot for a bug-bounty finding. Paste your DRAFT finding (and what you already tried / couldn't achieve) and get a grounded brief built from the closest REAL disclosed reports: (1) precedent & validity — is this an accepted class, with citable reports (
program_outcome_prior
At the START of an engagement on a bug-bounty PROGRAM, get a grounded prior over what bug classes have historically LANDED there — to decide what to look at first and what to skip. Built from real HackerOne disclosed reports: the class distribution for this program, each with LIF
new_in_scope
Find FRESH attack surface: bounty-eligible assets that entered a public bug-bounty program's scope in the last `days` (HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack, mirrored daily), the least-hunted surface there is. Raw scope additions are mostly not new (in one week 57 of 80 were
verify_cve_claim
Fact-check a claim about a CVE against the corpus — catch hallucinations before they ship. Verifies: does the CVE exist; does it affect the claimed product at the claimed version; is the severity right; is it actually KEV-exploited. Returns per-assertion verdicts (supported / ref
corpus_stats
Corpus size and data freshness (CVE / KEV / EPSS counts and latest timestamps).
search_public_code
Search public repositories for an exact code string; return WHERE it appears. Use it to hunt vendored / copy-pasted copies of known-vulnerable code: search a distinctive line or symbol from the vulnerable function, then FETCH AND READ the hits to judge which copies are still unpa

Revisiones básicasi

Revisamos información que cualquiera puede ver; no hemos leído el código. Las revisiones que no aplican no se cuentan. · Revisado el 7 nov 2026

✓ Superada
El creador coincide con el repo
El nombre en el registro se verificó con el dominio vulntel.com (el registro comprueba quién es dueño del dominio)
… Aún sin revisar
Sigue en mantenimiento
Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub
… Aún sin revisar
Tiene licencia
Todavía no hemos leído este repo en GitHub
✓ Superada
El endpoint responde
Respondió en 93 ms (HTTP 200)
– No aplica
Inicio de sesión con OAuth
No hace falta iniciar sesión
✓ Superada
Sin instrucciones ocultas en las descripciones de herramientas
Leímos 13 descripciones de herramientas y no encontramos instrucciones ocultas para la IA

Comparado con otros en Otrosi

Más estrellas que el 0% de los otros 32568 servidores de esta categoría
Publicado en el registro más recientemente que el 90% de los otros 32568 servidores de esta categoría
Revisiones básicas iguales o mejores que el 100% de los otros 32568 servidores de esta categoría

Comparado con todos los servidores activos de esta categoría en el registro. Las estrellas solo cuentan cuando quien lo publica es dueño del repo.

Preguntas frecuentes

¿Es seguro vulntel?

Superó 3 de 3 revisiones básicas aplicables. No hemos leído el código. Antes de agregar una clave o un token, revisa qué acceso pide el servidor y usa una clave que tenga solo los permisos que necesitas.

¿Qué claves o códigos necesita?

Debes completar: Authorization

¿Se ejecuta en mi computadora o en la nube?

Se ejecuta en la nube del creador. Te conectas por internet sin instalar nada, pero lo que envías pasa por los servidores del creador.

¿Sigue en mantenimiento?

El repo de GitHub cambió por última vez –, y la última versión (1.2.0) llegó al registro hace 3 días.

¿Qué apps pueden usarlo?

Las apps compatibles con MCP, como Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor y VS Code. Se conecta por URL, así que también funcionan las apps que aceptan servidores MCP remotos, como ChatGPT en modo desarrollador.

¿Qué puedo usar en su lugar?

En la misma categoría: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, FlyDocs

Alternativas

Servidores de la misma categoría hechos por otros creadores, ordenados por estrellas.

Cómo leer una tarjeta:★ Estrellas de GitHubiTres pilares: reseñas · revisiones · usoiActualizado = fecha en que se publicó la última versión en el registroi

Spec Driven Development

de formulahendry

MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.

Se ejecuta en tu computadora★ 440MITActualizado hace 14 meses

Instalar

Remote Desktop Commander

de desktop-commander

Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.

Se ejecuta en la nube★ 211Actualizado ayer

Instalar

FlyDocs

de flydocs.ai

Spec-driven development workflow: your agent works issues, sessions and the status lifecycle.

Se ejecuta en tu computadoraActualizado hoy

Instalar

README del creador

Abrir el README

Copiado tal cual del repo del creador. PopNx MCP no lo ha revisado ni lo respalda. Se quitaron HTML, imágenes y scripts. Los enlaces llevan fuera de este sitio.

vulntel

Most CVE tools hand your agent raw data. This one ranks it by what's actually being exploited, finds bugs by mechanism, catches the CVEs your agent invents — and transfers attack mechanics from ~14,000 disclosed bug-bounty reports.

A curated, hosted MCP corpus: ~422,000 CVEs, fused from NVD + CISA KEV + FIRST EPSS + OSV/GHSA + CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC), plus a mechanic layer distilled from ~14,000 disclosed, paid bug-bounty reports — refreshed daily. Not another live-API wrapper.

Free. Try it with no key (nine tools, 25 calls a day per IP address), then get a key: enter your email and your personal key is sent over. Tell me what you are hunting.

Why this, and not the next CVE wrapper

Most CVE MCP servers are thin wrappers: at query time they fan out to the same free public APIs and hand back whatever comes out. This is different in six concrete ways.

A curated, embedded corpus, not a live proxy. One record per vulnerability, fused across NVD, OSV/GHSA and KEV through an identity graph, with roughly 2,100 vendor-qualified product aliases and embeddings for semantic search. Queried locally, ranked consistently.
SSVC as priority, not just CVSS. Priority is exploitation-first: CISA SSVC (active / automatable / total impact), KEV and EPSS drive a P1 to P4 ranking. The wrapper MCPs do not carry SSVC at all.
Search by mechanism, not keywords. Semantic search finds the same bug *class* across different products. Keyword tools structurally cannot.
It fact-checks the agent. verify_cve_claim catches invented CVEs and wrong attributes. This is the one that matters most right now, with hallucinated AI bug reports flooding triage, and effectively no other CVE MCP does it.
Backport-aware. Paste a server banner (OpenSSH_8.9p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.10, Apache/2.4.62 (Debian)) and each CVE carries the Debian / Ubuntu / Alpine tracker's verdict for that exact build next to the upstream one. Upstream-only tools call a patched distro host vulnerable.
Right vendor, and no false zeros. "GitHub Enterprise" resolves to the right vendor, not every product that ships an "enterprise_server." A product it cannot resolve returns resolved: false with suggestions, never a silent 0 that reads as "not affected." A false zero is the worst answer a security tool can give.

The hard part of AI-assisted security is not *finding* CVEs. It is triage, prioritization, and false positives. That is what this targets.

Everything below is real output from the live server, trimmed only for length.

It fact-checks your agent

The differentiator that matters most. Your agent cites CVE-2025-99999:

verify_cve_claim("CVE-2025-99999")

-> exists: false "No record in NVD / OSV / GHSA. Likely hallucinated or not-yet-published."

Or it gets the details wrong. Claim: *"CVE-2021-44228 is a medium-severity Apache Struts bug, and it is not exploited."*

verify_cve_claim("CVE-2021-44228", product="Apache Struts", severity="medium", exploited=false)

refuted "not exploited" -> in CISA KEV (added 2021-12-10) refuted "severity medium" -> actual CVSS 10.0, P1 refuted "affects Apache Struts" -> no product matching "Apache Struts"

The other feeds hand your agent data. This one tells you when the agent is wrong, before it reaches a report.

Priority is exploitation-first (SSVC, KEV, EPSS), not CVSS

check_technology("GitLab") returns 792 CVEs for the product, de-duped and ranked so the exploited ones float to the top:

P1  KEV  EPSS 99.8   CVE-2023-7028   account-takeover: password-reset email sent to an attacker address (CVSS 10)

P2 KEV EPSS 98.5 CVE-2021-39935 unauthenticated SSRF via the CI Lint API P3 EPSS 99.7 CVE-2023-2825 unauthenticated path traversal, arbitrary file read (CVSS 10) P3 EPSS 99.7 CVE-2022-2992 authenticated RCE via the GitHub import API (CVSS 9.9)

Names that map to more than one vendor are flagged ambiguous (here, gitlab vs a jenkins plugin) and kept separate, never silently merged. enrich_cve then gives you the full SSVC picture for any one of them:

enrich_cve("CVE-2024-3400")   PAN-OS GlobalProtect

P1 KEV CVSS 10.0 EPSS 99.95 unauthenticated command injection -> root RCE SSVC exploitation=active automatable=yes technical_impact=total Metasploit exploit/linux/http/panos_telemetry_cmd_exec (rank: excellent) Public PoC 44 repos (h4x0r-dz 162 stars, W01fh4cker 90 stars, ...)

Turn recon into a dig-order

hunt_plan(["craftcms 4.4", "nginx", "keycloak"]) ranks your stack by its most-exploitable bug and names where each component historically bleeds:

#1  craftcms 4.4    97 CVEs, 12 high-risk

recurring_loci CWE-94 code injection x7 (2 exploited in the wild) -> probe template / eval surfaces first dig here P1 KEV EPSS 99.8 CVE-2025-32432 unauthenticated RCE (CVSS 10) your 4.4 is AFFECTED, fixed in 4.14.15 P1 KEV EPSS 99.9 CVE-2024-56145 RCE when register_argc_argv is on AFFECTED, fixed in 4.13.2

#2 nginx HTTP/2 Rapid Reset CVE-2023-44487 (KEV) #3 keycloak recurring_loci CWE-287 auth x12. OIDC request_uri SSRF CVE-2020-10770

It does not just list CVEs. It names the bug *class* a product family keeps failing at, ranked by real exploitation, and tells you whether *your version* is in range. Where to look, and what shape to expect.

Search by mechanism, across products

search_vulns(cve_id="CVE-2021-44228"), "what else works like Log4Shell":

sim 0.88   CVE-2021-44832   Log4j2 JDBC Appender, JNDI LDAP RCE

sim 0.82 CVE-2022-40145 Apache Karaf, code injection via an attacker-controlled JNDI URL sim 0.79 CVE-2022-34916 Apache Flume, JNDI LDAP RCE via a JMS source

The same JNDI-injection mechanism, surfaced across *different products*. A keyword search for "log4j" never finds Karaf or Flume. Or search a concept directly, search_vulns("SAML SSO authentication bypass"):

P3      CVSS 9.1  CVE-2024-9487   GitHub Enterprise: SAML SSO bypass via signature verification

P3 CVSS 9.8 CVE-2025-25291 ruby-saml: auth bypass via a ReXML / Nokogiri parser differential P1 KEV CVSS 9.8 CVE-2025-59718 Fortinet FortiOS / FortiProxy: signature-verification bypass

See what is being exploited right now

search_vulns(days=7), run live today:

P1 KEV CVSS 10.0  CVE-2026-10520  Ivanti Sentry: unauthenticated OS command injection -> root RCE

P1 KEV CVSS 9.3 CVE-2026-50751 Check Point: IKEv1 auth bypass, remote-access VPN without a password P2 KEV CVSS 8.8 CVE-2026-11645 Chrome V8: out-of-bounds read/write -> sandbox escape RCE

Median time from disclosure to in-the-wild exploitation is now days, not months. The Ivanti bug above carried a CISA remediation deadline in the same week it landed. corpus_stats on 2026-11-03: ~422,800 CVEs, ~1,770 KEV entries, data under a day old. These figures are point-in-time and drift daily, so call corpus_stats yourself for the live count rather than trusting the numbers on this page.

Transfer attack mechanics from disclosed bug-bounty reports

Beyond CVEs, the corpus distills ~14,000 disclosed, paid HackerOne reports into product-agnostic *attack mechanics* — each bug's source → sink → trigger → preconditions, de-anchored from the product it was filed against. The premise: a vulnerability is a transferable mechanism, not a property of one product — so a move that paid on one stack is a checklist item on the next.

find_attack_approaches(query="ssrf reaching cloud metadata") — the human moves that transferred, novelty-ranked, each tagged with live program-actionability:

Reddit         SSRF   preview_url fetches an unfiltered URL → returns metadata    program_active, pays

U.S. DoD SSRF /download-url?url= fetches AWS instance metadata program_active Concrete CMS SSRF DNS-rebind bypass → AWS IAM creds from the metadata svc program_active

find_continuations(position=...) — matches your *accumulated attacker position* mid-hunt to the next moves real reports played from a similar spot. Every move is status: UNVERIFIED with a decisive_check to run on the target — a legal move, never a confirmed bug.
assist_submission(finding=...) — a grounded submission brief from the closest paid precedents (validity, what's novel, an escalation playbook), with every cited report validated against the corpus (citations_grounded) so it can't smuggle a fabricated precedent.
program_outcome_prior("hackerone:gitlab") — the bug classes that historically *landed* on a program, with lift over base rate (GitLab: SSRF 3.4×, SQLi ~never).

Honest about what this is: it primes and grounds a human hunter — it surfaces the move and the precedent. It does not find the bug for you; the target decides whether the move survives, and that's a step you still run.

The whole point: a memory of mechanics to borrow and run — not a CVE lookup

The moat is three things a stateless model cannot self-generate, and this corpus holds all three:

Watched over time — priors, temporal drift (Log4Shell's affected set kept growing +1,200 days after publish), score stability. Your model has a training-cutoff snapshot; this has the *trajectory*.
Seen many — every disclosed mechanic and CVE mechanism, embedded, so the *same bug class* transfers across products a model would never connect: Log4Shell's JNDI lookup → Apache Karaf, Flume; an SSRF that paid on Reddit → the move to try on the next target.
Live-fused recon — observe recovers a host's real backend from its JS bundles and joins it to the corpus on the spot.

The cardinal sin is treating it as a severity-number checker. The job is to transfer a proven mechanic onto your target and run it — or read a fix to *falsify* an option before you spend a probe on it.

Force your agent to reach for it — it won't on its own

Left alone, an agent answers from training data: stale, and it *invents* CVE ids under pressure. Paste this operating loop into your agent's rules (CLAUDE.md, Cursor/Windsurf, a system prompt):

You have the vulntel MCP. Your own CVE knowledge is a guess to be verified — prefer the corpus.

Operating loop, in order:

Choosing / scoping a bounty program → new_in_scope (what just entered a program's scope, re-adds filtered) and program_outcome_prior (which bug classes have actually PAID here).
A live host → observe (a cache miss returns status="scanning"; call again with the same host until "ready"). Mine endpoints[], recurring_loci, the CVE join, not just two fields.
A product + version → check_technology / hunt_plan (dig-order + the recurring CWE loci).
Before asserting ANY CVE / "affects X" / "severity Y" / "exploited" → verify_cve_claim. Never cite from memory.
Feasibility of one CVE → enrich_cve; read the MECHANISM (POST vs GET, auth-required) to judge whether it chains. How it was fixed in the wild, or who vendored the vulnerable line → search_public_code (raw hits; read them).
Hunting a class → find_attack_approaches for the transferable move; RUN it on the target, don't cite it. Loop with a growing tried=.
Stuck / messy position → find_continuations(position) for the by-step move; then search_vulns that class to see whether it recurs in this stack.
Submitting → assist_submission; EXECUTE the techniques it transfers (referrer differential, key-reuse breadth), then file.
Before trusting a "nothing found" → corpus_stats (corpus size and

Solo se muestra el principio; lee el resto en el repo

vulntel

Resumen

Los tres pilares de PopNx MCP

Qué puedes hacer con él

Instalación

Antes de instalar

Valores que debes completar

Qué puede hacer

Revisiones básicasi

El creador coincide con el repo

Sigue en mantenimiento

Tiene licencia

El endpoint responde

Inicio de sesión con OAuth

Sin instrucciones ocultas en las descripciones de herramientas

Comparado con otros en Otrosi

Preguntas frecuentes

Alternativas

Spec Driven Development

Remote Desktop Commander

FlyDocs

README del creador

vulntel

Why this, and not the next CVE wrapper

It fact-checks your agent

Priority is exploitation-first (SSVC, KEV, EPSS), not CVSS

Turn recon into a dig-order

Search by mechanism, across products

See what is being exploited right now

Transfer attack mechanics from disclosed bug-bounty reports

The whole point: a memory of mechanics to borrow and run — not a CVE lookup

Force your agent to reach for it — it won't on its own