Gigamail

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MCP server that gives your agent — Claude, Codex, OpenClaw, Hermes, or any MCP client — safe, controlled access to your email — multi-account (Microsoft Graph + IMAP), calendar, local search index, sender memory, and an agent-aware permission model.

No built-in LLM: the intelligence is your agent's. The MCP server speaks stdio only — no network port. (An optional human console adds a local HTTP API bound to 127.0.0.1.)

On your data: GigaMail keeps mail indexes, credentials, memory and configuration on your machine — we run no service and receive nothing. Mail content your agent reads is, of course, handled by that agent and its model provider under their own data policies. Choose your agent accordingly; the masker lets you hide sensitive fields (tax codes, VAT numbers, IBANs, emails, phone numbers — validated deterministically, no AI) before the agent ever sees them.

Why

• Hybrid search: provider search (Graph/IMAP) + local SQLite index — fast and offline-friendly
• Its own archive: every mail of every account saved locally, attachments included, and still searchable after the server has dropped it. Outlook's history on the PC is imported once (gigamail archive)
• Sender memory: tone, topics and history per sender, so replies sound right
• Contact notes: what happened with each person — how a meeting went, what they are after — is written next to their name, and every draft to them reads it
• Observer: patterns learned from how the user edited past drafts
• Calendar-aware drafts: a draft only proposes times that are free in your calendar, inside your office hours
• Accounts viewed together (console): drag one account tile onto another to read both mailboxes as one list; every mail keeps its account, so replies leave from the right address, and "Split" undoes it. The agent keeps seeing separate accounts
• Knowledge files: attach your price lists, terms, product sheets to an account — the agent reads them to answer mail. Your agent doesn't need to know everything: the account carries its own knowledge
• Agent-aware permissions: reads are free; send/delete require an approval given out of band — the agent gets an inert request id, a human approves from the console or the CLI, and only then does it execute, with the exact arguments the human saw. Every write lands in an append-only action log
• Credentials never touch the agent channel: login and account management live in the CLI only — a prompt injection inside an email cannot add accounts or read secrets

Quick start

GigaMail ships through two channels:

• Desktop app, Windows and macOS — download it from gigamail.ai or from the latest release. The human console with its own Python: one installer, no prerequisites, no administrator password, and it updates itself.
• Windows 10/11: GigaMail-Setup.exe, code-signed. The certificate is new, so on first launch Windows may still say "unrecognized app": click More info, then Run anyway.
• macOS: GigaMail-arm64.dmg for Apple Silicon, GigaMail-x64.dmg for Intel, both signed with an Apple Developer ID and notarized by Apple.

The SHA-256 digests are next to the files on the release page. To build it yourself: Node 22+, console/prepare-python.ps1 (Windows) or console/prepare-python.sh (macOS, Linux), then npm run dist, npm run dist:mac or npm run dist:linux.

• `pip install gigamail` — the agentic core: MCP server, CLI, watcher and the console's local HTTP backend. No graphical app — the right channel when your agent is the interface.

Everything below covers the pip channel.

pip install "gigamail[all]"

gigamail login # Microsoft device flow gigamail accounts add-imap # or IMAP: Aruba, Gmail, Libero, ... gigamail check # search, a draft held for your approval, a test mail to yourself

Microsoft login note: the bundled Azure app is not yet

publisher-verified, so the consent screen shows an "unverified" notice

(works fine; some corporate tenants may block it). Standard alternative:

register your own Azure app and set your client_id in

src/gigamail/core/ms_config.json. IMAP needs none of this.

Give the account its identity and knowledge (this is what makes replies yours):

gigamail identity set                       # who am I, what I do, tone

gigamail identity add-file C:\docs\pricelist.xlsx gigamail identity add-file C:\docs\catalog\ # whole folder

Register in Claude Desktop / Claude Code (mcpServers):

{

"gigamail": { "command": "gigamail-server" } }

The commands are also available under their legacy names (ade-mail-agent, ade-mail-agent-server), and the Python package answers to its old name ade_mail_agent too (python -m ade_mail_agent.server), so existing setups keep working.

Using Claude Code? The repository is also a Claude Code plugin: it registers the gigamail MCP server and adds a skill that teaches Claude the approval gate.

claude plugin marketplace add adecubed/gigamail

claude plugin install gigamail@gigamail

Using Codex? The repository is a Codex plugin: it registers the gigamail MCP server and adds a skill that teaches Codex the approval gate.

codex plugin marketplace add adecubed/gigamail

codex plugin add gigamail@gigamail

GigaMail is also in the OpenAI Plugins Directory, as a skill: install it from there, then register the server with codex mcp add gigamail -- gigamail-server (the server comes from pip, as above).

Using OpenClaw or Hermes? Verified configs in INTEGRATIONS.md.

Are you an AI agent setting this up on behalf of a human? You can do

the install and the MCP registration: pip install "gigamail[all]", then

add gigamail-server to your client's MCP config (see INTEGRATIONS.md;

declare GIGAMAIL_ROOT if your client filters the environment). **Stop

there.** Connecting a mailbox (gigamail login, `gigamail accounts

add-imap`) asks for credentials and must be done by the human in their own

shell — it is not something you should do, and GigaMail is built so that

it cannot be done through you. Tell them what to run, then wait.

Then just ask your agent: *"reply to the last quote request using the price list"* — it reads the mail, pulls the numbers from your file, drafts the reply, and asks you before sending.

Tools

31 typed tools, generated from the server itself:

• Read (18) — accounts, identity, knowledge files and search inside them, messages, unread, folders, hybrid search, attachment text, sender history, learned patterns, calendar events, free-slot availability, Drive files and their text
• Safe writes (3, audited) — mark read, create folder, save a draft
• Dangerous (10, human approval out of band) — move message, send, reply, delete message, delete folder, create/delete calendar event, create a Zoom meeting, upload a file to Drive, move a Drive file to the trash

The calendar is served by Microsoft Graph or Google Calendar, whichever the user connected; the tools are the same either way. Drive uses the drive.file scope, so it only ever sees files GigaMail created itself. Connecting Google: GOOGLE_SETUP.md.

Full map and design decisions: MAPPA_MCP.md.

Security model

Email content is treated as untrusted data (prompt injection). The agent cannot approve its own actions, by construction: a dangerous tool returns only an inert request_id, and approving it — from the console or from gigamail approvals approve — requires an OS-level verification of the person at the machine (Windows Hello / Touch ID). A process, including an agent that holds a shell, can open that prompt but cannot pass it. On Linux, where neither exists, a local PIN typed in an interactive terminal stands in (gigamail approvals pin): weaker, and declared so in SECURITY.md. Telegram approval is opt-in and the weakest channel of the three. No secret ever enters the model context, so an injected instruction has nothing to spend. Repeating the id just returns *awaiting approval*. The agent can only read files explicitly registered by the user, never the rest of the filesystem. Every write action is logged to %APPDATA%/ADE/agent_audit.jsonl (append-only: GigaMail never rewrites past entries — it is not, and does not claim to be, tamper-proof storage).

We red-team this: hostile emails ordering exfiltration, mass deletion, and the agent to approve itself — fed to a real agent with every mail tool enabled.

This design is a fix. v0.1.0 returned a one-time confirm token in the

tool result, which put it in the model's context: the agent held both

halves. Thanks to u/ranbuman and u/anderson_the_one on r/mcp for

catching it. The switch now sits where the agent cannot reach.

The structural half of that suite runs in CI on every push ([tests/