TacticalRMM

TacticalRMM MCP server

Lets an AI assistant read everything in your TacticalRMM install, and — when you explicitly switch it on — run commands on your managed machines.

Ask "which machines are offline and why", "what's eating memory on the front desk PC", "show me every failed check this week", and get answers from live fleet data. Turn on elevate mode and the assistant can also fix things, but only after you approve each action yourself.

Why I built it

I manage machines for a number of clients, and TacticalRMM already collects far more about each one than anyone has time to sit and read. I wanted to actually use that data: run deeper diagnostics than the dashboard puts in front of you, produce per-client reports covering every device, and find the things worth fixing before someone rings up to report them.

It does grow billable work, and I think that is fine as long as the work is real. A disk throwing early SMART errors, a server quietly filling up, patches that stopped applying three months ago and nobody noticed — catching those is worth paying for. Billing for busywork is not. The test I hold this to is whether every item on a report is something the client can see the sense in fixing once it has been explained to them.

What you get

28 tools. 20 read-only ones covering agents, checks, alerts, services, processes, event logs, software inventory, patches, scripts and audit history; 8 execution tools for running commands and scripts, rebooting, controlling services, killing processes, and waking machines.

A full audit trail of everything. Every inbound request, every tool call with its arguments, every result, every TRMM API call, every approval decision and every refusal is written to a structured JSONL log with credential redaction and rotation. For a bridge that can run commands as SYSTEM across a fleet, knowing exactly who asked for what and when is not optional — so it is on by default and cannot be silently skipped. Details in Audit logging.

An approval gate the model cannot reach. In elevate mode an execution is refused until you approve that exact call in a browser (password + TOTP) or from a shell on the server. Approvals are bound to a fingerprint of the arguments, are single-use, and expire. No tool exists that grants elevation.

Read-only that actually holds. Three independent layers: the execution tools are never registered, the HTTP client refuses non-read requests, and the API key itself is bound to a TRMM role with no execution permissions.

Built for real fleets. TRMM has no pagination and returns whole tables — one agent detail call measured 192 KB here. Responses are projected, capped and truncated with an explicit notice, so a single call cannot swallow the model's context.

HTTPS with bearer auth, a self-signed certificate carrying an IP SAN, and a hardened systemd unit. Clients trust that one certificate rather than skipping verification.

Works with Claude Code, Claude Desktop and LM Studio on macOS, Windows and Linux. Built and verified against TRMM 1.5.1. The TRMM API itself is documented independently in docs/trmm-api.md.

Three modes

elevate is the one to use for interactive work: Claude can look at anything, but the moment it wants to *do* something it stops and waits for you.

Security

The short version:

• The approval gate is out of band. In elevate mode an execution is refused until you approve that exact call in a browser (password + TOTP) or from a shell on the server. Approvals are bound to a fingerprint of the arguments, are single-use, and expire. No tool exists that grants elevation, so the model has no route to its own approval.
• Read-only holds at three independent layers. The execution tools are never registered, the HTTP client refuses non-read requests, and the API key itself is bound to a TRMM role with no execution permissions.
• Destructive patterns are refused client-side in command mode — rm -rf /, mkfs, dd of=/dev/*, format c: and the rest — with an optional agent allowlist to hard-scope what can be touched at all.
• HTTPS with bearer auth, a self-signed certificate carrying an IP SAN, and a hardened systemd unit. Clients trust that one certificate rather than skipping verification.

There is one honest caveat about the third read-only layer, because TRMM has no view-only permission for services, processes or Windows updates. That, the approval page's own password + TOTP gate, and why MCP elicitation is not used as the approval channel, are all written up in docs/security.md.

Setup

Already done on this box:

• venv at venv/ with mcp 2.0 and httpx
• TRMM roles MCP Read Only and MCP Command, users mcp-readonly and mcp-command (both blocked from UI login, unusable passwords)
• API keys written to .env (mode 600)

To re-provision or rotate keys:

/rmm/api/env/bin/python /opt/trmm-mcp/provision_trmm_accounts.py --rotate

Running the server

To reach it from other machines, first tell it which address to serve on. These go in .env, not in the unit file — the unit is in git, and an address baked in there would follow every copy of it onto the wrong machine:

cat >> /opt/trmm-mcp/.env <<'EOF'

TRMM_MCP_HTTP_HOST=10.0.0.5 TRMM_MCP_PUBLIC_URL=https://10.0.0.5:8770 EOF

Substitute your own address. TRMM_MCP_PUBLIC_URL is what the assistant tells you to open when something needs approving, so it has to be a URL your browser can actually reach. Skip this step and the server binds 127.0.0.1, which is fine if the client runs on the same box.

Then install the unit and start it:

sudo cp /opt/trmm-mcp/trmm-mcp.service /etc/systemd/system/ && sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now trmm-mcp

Check what it came up on — the startup line names the address, the mode and whether TLS is on:

journalctl -u trmm-mcp -n 5 --no-pager | grep listening

It serves HTTPS on port 8770 by default and requires the bearer token from .env. To run it in the foreground instead, for a quick test:

/opt/trmm-mcp/run.sh readonly http

The listener runs stateless (TRMM_MCP_STATELESS_HTTP=true, the default). This matters: with stateful streamable HTTP the server hands out a session id that dies with the process, so restarting the service leaves any connected client replaying a session the server has forgotten. Through mcp-remote that shows up as tool calls hanging for minutes and then failing, while tools/list still answers, with Rejected request with unknown or expired session ID in logs/server.log. Stateless removes the failure mode; we use no server-initiated requests, so it costs nothing. restart_test.py proves both behaviours.

The bearer token is the only authentication on that port, so anything that can reach it inherits this server's TRMM permissions. Keep it on the LAN or behind a tunnel rather than binding a public interface.

Connecting a client

You need two things from the server: the bearer token from .env, and a copy of `certs/cert.pem` so the client can verify the TLS certificate.

Claude Code speaks HTTP directly and needs no bridge:

claude mcp add --transport http trmm https://192.0.2.10:8770/mcp \

--header "Authorization: Bearer " --scope user

On the server itself you can skip the network entirely and run it over stdio:

claude mcp add trmm -- /opt/trmm-mcp/run.sh readonly

Swap readonly for elevate to get the approval gate, or command for unattended execution.

Claude Desktop needs the mcp-remote bridge, LM Studio speaks remote HTTP natively, and either can instead be run across SSH with nothing listening on the network at all. Working configs for all three on macOS, Windows and Linux — plus installing the certificate into the system trust store — are in docs/clients.md.

Tools

28 tools: 20 read-only, 8 execution. Anywhere a tool takes an agent you can pass the hostname or the agent_id — hostnames are resolved automatically, and an ambiguous one is rejected rather than guessed.

• Start here — trmm_fleet_overview: counts, plus the offline, needs-reboot, failing-check and pending-patch lists.
• Fleet — agents with status and filters, clients and sites, alerts, pending actions, server info and the active mode.
• Diagnostics — services, processes, event log, configured checks, installed software, patch status, automated tasks, and past command and script runs *with their output*.
• Audit and scripts — the TRMM audit log, the server debug log, the script library and full script source.
• Escape hatch — trmm_api_get: a raw GET against any API path.
• Execution (elevate and command only) — run a command, run a saved script, reboot, start/stop/restart a service, kill a process, wake-on-LAN, force checks to run, run an automated task.

Bulk fleet-wide execution, server-side scripts and all config mutation are deliberately not exposed. The full 28-row table, the reasoning behind the omissions, the MCP safety annotations and the context-size handling are in docs/tools.md.

Documentation

Changelog

See CHANGELOG.md.

License

AGPL-3.0-or-later (LICENSE), with per-file SPDX headers. The copyleft terms mean anyone who runs a modified copy as a network service must publish their changes — deliberate, to keep execution-capable forks open.

Buy me a coffee

buymeacoffee.com/sethwalker234 if you want to.