VMware Log Insight

VMware Log Insight

For a read-only check of this skill with your model and agent host, use the shared model-fit self-test in the marketplace root.

Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project, **not affiliated with,

endorsed by, or sponsored by VMware, Inc. or Broadcom Inc.** "VMware", "vSphere",

and "Aria" are trademarks of Broadcom. Source is publicly auditable under the MIT license.

Read-only log search and aggregation for VMware Aria Operations for Logs (formerly vRealize Log Insight) — the appliance that collects syslog from ESXi hosts, vCenter, and VMs. The centralized-log data source for the VMware skill family. Strictly non-destructive: it queries, it never writes.

Upgrading to 2.0

2.0 renames all 7 MCP tools so every name starts with a verb (e.g. alert_get → get_log_alert, alert_history → get_log_alert_history, alert_list → list_log_alerts). The full old → new table is in RELEASE_NOTES.md. Nothing else changes: same tools, parameters, safety gates and CLI commands. If an agent prompt, script or ~/.vmware/rules.yaml names a tool, update it — though deny rules written with the old names keep working with vmware-policy ≥ 1.18 (vmware-audit policy lists any rule the renames widened), and vmware-pilot ≥ 1.13 translates old names in saved workflows. If an install older than 2.0 shares that rules.yaml, give it vmware-policy ≥ 1.18.2 too: it matches each rule against both the old and the new name, so one file serves both.

Companion Skills

Install

uv tool install vmware-log-insight

mkdir -p ~/.vmware-log-insight cp config.example.yaml ~/.vmware-log-insight/config.yaml # edit host/username/provider echo 'VMWARE_LOG_INSIGHT_PROD_PASSWORD=...' > ~/.vmware-log-insight/.env chmod 600 ~/.vmware-log-insight/.env vmware-log-insight doctor

Offline / Air-Gapped Install (from source)

This project uses the modern PEP 517 build system (hatchling), so there is no `setup.py` by design — that is expected, not a missing file. If you cloned the source and hit ERROR: File "setup.py" or "setup.cfg" not found ... editable mode currently requires a setuptools-based build, your pip is older than 21.3 and cannot do an *editable* (-e) install with a non-setuptools backend. Editable mode is a developer convenience, not needed to run the tool — do one of:

# From the source tree — a normal (non-editable) install builds a wheel:

pip install . # NOT pip install -e .

...or upgrade pip first, and editable works too:

pip install --upgrade pip && pip install -e .

For a truly air-gapped host, build the wheels on a connected machine and copy them over — the target then needs no network:

# On a connected machine, collect this package + its dependencies as wheels:

pip wheel . -w dist # → dist/*.whl (or: uv build, for just this package)

Copy dist/ to the air-gapped host, then install offline:

pip install --no-index --find-links dist vmware-log-insight

MCP Tools (7 — all read-only)

Workflows

• Find errors fast — vmware-log-insight search -q error -l 1h.
• Where did logs burst? — vmware-log-insight aggregate -q error -l 6h --bin-ms 300000, read spikes[], then search the spike window.
• Root cause — pass search_logs results (plus vCenter events from vmware-monitor and metrics from vmware-aria) to vmware-debug build_incident_timeline.

Troubleshooting

• 401 on /sessions → check username/password/provider and the VMWARE_LOG_INSIGHT_ _PASSWORD env var.
• 503 everywhere → appliance starting up; doctor reports it as a status, not a crash.
• Empty results → widen --last; text matches whole words, not substrings (try word*); default API port is 9543 (set port if different).
• UCOUNT needs a field → pass --field (names from fields); COUNT and SAMPLE take none.

Security

Read-only by construction. Credentials in ~/.vmware-log-insight/.env (chmod 600); plaintext passwords auto-obfuscated to grep-safe b64: (obfuscation, not encryption — inject from a secret manager for real secrecy). TLS on by default. See SECURITY.md.

Remote access (HTTPS) and limiting tools

By default vmware-log-insight mcp speaks stdio to one local client and offers every tool. Two options change that (vmware-policy ≥ 1.21.0).

Serve over HTTPS so clients on other machines can connect. Every caller needs a bearer token:

vmware-audit token create alice          # prints the token once; give it to alice

vmware-audit token list # names only vmware-audit token revoke alice # refused from its next request, no restart vmware-log-insight mcp --transport https --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8443 \ --cert /etc/vmware-mcp/server.pem --key /etc/vmware-mcp/server-key.pem \ --public-name mcp.example.com

Connect a client (Claude Code shown; any MCP client that supports streamable HTTP and custom headers works):

claude mcp add --transport http vmware-log-insight https://mcp.example.com:8443/mcp \

--header "Authorization: Bearer $VMWARE_MCP_TOKEN"

{

"mcpServers": { "vmware-log-insight": { "type": "http", "url": "https://mcp.example.com:8443/mcp", "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer ${VMWARE_MCP_TOKEN}" } } } }

• The server will not start without a token, refuses Host/Origin values outside --public-name, and checks before it binds that unauthenticated requests get 401. Use a certificate your clients trust for those names.
• Behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy on the same machine use --transport http --host 127.0.0.1 --public-name mcp.example.com and pass the Authorization header through.
• Behind a load balancer or gateway on another machine, keep --transport https (a self-signed certificate is fine), list in --public-name the host name the balancer sends as Host, and have it forward Authorization. Its health probe can use GET /healthz, which needs no token and returns only {"status": "ok"} (vmware-policy ≥ 1.23.0).
• Send traceparent or X-Request-ID with each request to have it stored on the audit row; vmware-audit log --correlation-id ID then finds the calls behind one platform request.
• The audit log records each caller as token: . Calls run side by side, with or without a target: each target keeps up to VMWARE_MCP_POOL_SIZE sessions (default 2), and each session is a login on the target. A call that finds them all busy waits at most 300 s for one.
• Everyone who can reach the endpoint acts with this server's account. Tokens identify callers; they grant nothing on the platform. Run one endpoint per privilege level.
• Several people or roles on one endpoint: run vmware-audit roles enable once, then give each token a role (vmware-audit token create NAME --role reader, or a role in roles.yaml naming tools and targets; vmware-policy ≥ 1.24.0). A role limits what the token may call on this endpoint; it cannot grant more than the account has. See vmware-policy's README, "Roles for network callers".

Limiting tools: every tool of this server is read-only, so --expose read changes nothing here; it exists for the write-capable skills. Least privilege comes from the account the server uses.

Details: skills/vmware-log-insight/references/setup-guide.md ("Serving MCP over HTTPS", "Limiting which tools are offered").

License

MIT.