Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Scans MCP servers for prompt injection, data exfiltration, and privilege escalation.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"tooltrust-scanner": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"tooltrust-mcp"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add tooltrust-scanner -- npx -y tooltrust-mcp粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"tooltrust-scanner": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"tooltrust-mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"tooltrust-scanner": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"tooltrust-mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 AgentSafe-AI 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(1.0.9)于7个月前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, MCP Server Autocad Lisp Helper
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
High-precision static analysis and debug server for AutoCAD AutoLISP (.lsp) files.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
ToolTrust Scanner
Static security scanner for MCP tool definitions
Trust grades (A–F) before your agent calls a tool — run as an MCP server , CLI , or CI check.
Every MCP tool your agent calls is an attack surface — prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply-chain backdoors. ToolTrust scans tool definitions *before* your agent trusts them and assigns a trust grade (A–F) so you know the risk. ToolTrust is an MCP Server and a CLI/CI tool — not a host, gateway, or runtime proxy. Coverage is expanding beyond today’s MCP-focused workflows; skills and additional agent tool formats are on the roadmap.
Browse the live ToolTrust Directory — trust grades and scan-backed reports before you install.
MCP demo: run a full config scan from your agent.
Add ToolTrust as an MCP server and let your agent audit its own tools (stdio transport — no network listener; your host launches it as a subprocess):
{
"mcpServers": { "tooltrust": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "tooltrust-mcp"] } } }
Then ask your agent: *"Run tooltrust_scan_config"*
It reads your MCP config, connects to each server in parallel, scans every tool, and returns a risk report with grades and enforcement decisions — all in seconds.
Or use the CLI:
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/main/install.sh | bash
tooltrust-scanner scan --server "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp"
The public [ToolTrust Directory](https://www.tooltrust.dev/) holds current grades and aggregates as scanning scales. One published research pass illustrates the shape of the problem — 207 MCP servers, 3,235 tools — not an exhaustive count of everything we scan today:
| Metric | Count |
|---|---|
| MCP servers in cohort | 207 |
| Individual tools analyzed | 3,235 |
| Total security findings | 3,613 |
| Servers with at least one finding | 145 (70%) |
| Servers with a clean Grade A | 22 (10%) |
| Servers with arbitrary code execution | 16 |
Only 10% of servers in that cohort had a clean Grade A. See [tooltrust.dev](https://www.tooltrust.dev/) for up-to-date directory-wide results (and use this table only as a labeled snapshot).
ToolTrust runs 16 static tool-definition rules in this repo (AS-001–AS-011, AS-013–AS-017) plus 2 source-scan rules for embedded MCP implementations (AS-018, AS-019). AS-012 (tool drift) is evaluated in the [ToolTrust Directory](https://github.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-directory) when new scan results are compared to previous runs.
| ID | Severity | Detects |
|---|---|---|
| 🛡️ AS‑001 | Critical | Tool Poisoning — Adversarial prompts hidden in tool descriptions (ignore previous instructions, ) |
| 🔑 AS‑002 | High/Low | Permission Surface — exec, network, db, fs beyond stated purpose; over-broad input schema |
| 📐 AS‑003 | High | Scope Mismatch — Tool name contradicts its permissions (e.g. read_config with exec) |
| 📦 AS‑004 | High/Critical | Supply Chain CVEs — Known CVEs in bundled dependencies via OSV |
| 🔓 AS‑005 | High | Privilege Escalation — admin/:write OAuth scopes; sudo/impersonate in descriptions |
| ⚡ AS‑006 | Critical | Arbitrary Code Execution — evaluate_script, _evaluate suffix, execute javascript, page.evaluate() patterns |
| ℹ️ AS‑007 | Info | Insufficient Tool Data — Tool lacks a valid description or schema |
| 🚨 AS‑008 | Critical | Known Compromised Package — Offline embedded blacklist of confirmed supply-chain attacks (LiteLLM 1.82.7/1.82.8, Trivy v0.69.4-v0.69.6, Langflow <1.9.0, Axios 1.14.1/0.30.4). Zero-latency, no network required. |
| 🔤 AS‑009 | Medium | Typosquatting — Tool name within edit-distance 2 of a well-known MCP tool, suggesting impersonation |
| 🗝️ AS‑010 | Medium | Secret Handling — Input params accepting API keys/passwords; credentials logged insecurely |
| ⚡ AS‑011 | Low | DoS Resilience — No rate-limit, timeout, or retry config on network/exec tools |
| 🔄 AS‑012 | High | Rug-Pull — Tool set changed between scans of the same version without a version bump *(directory pipeline only)* |
| 👥 AS‑013 | High/Medium | Tool Shadowing — Duplicate or near-duplicate tool name hijacks calls intended for a trusted tool |
| ℹ️ AS‑014 | Info | Dependency Inventory Unavailable — MCP server exposed neither metadata.dependencies nor a repo_url, so supply-chain coverage is limited and must be treated as incomplete |
| ⚠️ AS‑015 | Medium/High | Suspicious NPM Lifecycle Script — npm dependency publishes preinstall / postinstall / similar install-time scripts; severity rises for remote-fetch or inline-execution patterns |
| 🚨 AS‑016 | Critical | Suspicious NPM IOC Dependency — published npm metadata or install-time scripts reference a known malicious IOC package, domain, URL, or reviewed script pattern such as plain-crypto-js, even if the top-level package name is new |
| ⚠️ AS‑017 | Medium | Suspicious Data Exfiltration Description — tool description explicitly suggests sending user data, content, or conversation history to external / remote endpoints, without classifying it as prompt injection |
| ℹ️ AS‑018 | Info | Embedded MCP Server Detected — source-level MCP SDK usage was found, but tools could not be enumerated from a manifest or live handshake, so manual review is still required |
| 🔓 AS‑019 | High | Unauthenticated MCP Route Exposure — embedded MCP HTTP routes expose the same handler without equivalent authentication middleware |
Full rule details: docs/RULES.md
ALLOW, REQUIRE_APPROVAL, or BLOCKPure static analysis. No LLM calls. No data leaves your machine (except optional CVE lookups). Runs in milliseconds. Deterministic and reproducible.
# One-line install (macOS / Linux)
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/main/install.sh | bash
go install github.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/cmd/tooltrust-scanner@latest
npx -y tooltrust-mcp
When running as an MCP server, ToolTrust exposes these tools to your agent:
| Tool | What it does | Data access |
|---|---|---|
tooltrust_scan_config | Scan all MCP servers in your .mcp.json or ~/.claude.json | Reads local config; spawns each server as subprocess |
tooltrust_scan_server | Launch and scan a specific MCP server by command | Runs user-supplied command as subprocess (stdio) |
tooltrust_scanner_scan | Scan a raw JSON blob of tool definitions | In-memory only; no subprocess or network |
tooltrust_lookup | Look up a server's trust grade from the ToolTrust Directory | Network request to ToolTrust Directory API |
tooltrust_list_rules | List all built-in security rules | Local catalog only |
Block risky MCP servers in your pipeline:
- name: Audit MCP Server
uses: AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner@main with: server: "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp" fail-on: "approval"
For deployment, use the install paths in Install or the workflow example in CI / GitHub Actions. For vulnerability reporting and disclosure policy, see docs/SECURITY.md.
Never add an untrusted MCP server to your config again:
# Scans the server, then auto-installs if Grade A/B, prompts on C/D, blocks on F
tooltrust-scanner gate @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory -- /tmp
claude mcp add with a scanned installalias mcp-add='tooltrust-scanner gate'
Full gate options and pre-commit hook setup: docs/USAGE.md
If your MCP server passes ToolTrust, let people know:
[](https://www.tooltrust.dev/)
Supply-chain alert: ToolTrust detects and blocks confirmed compromised packages including LiteLLM v1.82.7/8 (TeamPCP backdoor), Trivy v0.69.4–v0.69.6, and Langflow < 1.9.0. If you encounter a Grade F with rule AS-008, remove the package immediately and rotate all credentials.
Usage guide · Developer guide · Contributing · Deployment & security · Changelog · Security · License: MIT
If an OSV lookup fails (including rate limiting, service errors, malformed responses or timeouts), the scan fails with scan incomplete instead of issuing a success report or security grade. Partial lookup failure also fails the scan. CLI exits nonzero, MCP scan calls return tool errors, and gate does not install the server. This deliberately favors explicit incomplete results over availability; an OSV outage can prevent scans of tools with declared dependencies.
TOOLTRUST_OSV_URL optionally selects an OSV-compatible query endpoint (default: https://api.osv.dev/v1/query). Use only a trusted service: declared dependency names and versions are sent there. HTTPS is required, except numeric loopback HTTP for local integration fixtures; embedded credentials and fragments are rejected. There is no fallback to the public API when an override fails.
The project-local verification skill runs in GitHub Action
只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读