Makefile MCP

Name: Makefile MCP
Author: ai-ronin-systems

作者：ai-ronin-systems版本 0.3.0i★ –i在你的电脑上运行

注册名称io.github.ai-ronin-systems/makefile-mcp

安装

概览

作者提供的说明（英文原文）

Expose trusted GNU Make targets as governed MCP tools without a generic shell.

PopNx MCP 的三大支柱

这三项永远不会合并成一个分数：意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。

用户评价i暂无评价评价功能将在后续阶段与账户功能一起开放
我们的基础检查i1 项中通过 1 项依据公开信息检查；尚未扫描代码
使用情况i非常新↓ 90/周 · ★ –

它能帮你做什么

我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。

连接方式: 在你的电脑上运行
传输方式: stdio
分类: 开发者工具

安装

选择你使用的 AI 应用，然后复制设置。

安装之前

基础检查：1 项中通过 1 项
在你的电脑上运行，拥有你的用户账户的权限（文件、网络、应用）。
注册中心没有列出需要填写的密钥。

你需要

PyPI已安装 Python 的 uv（用于 uvx 命令）

你用的是哪个应用？

ClaudeClaude CodeCursorVS CodeChatGPT

在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它，下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。

打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config，把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "makefile": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "makefile-mcp",
        "serve"
      ]
    }
  }
}

在终端中运行这条命令

claude mcp add makefile -- uvx makefile-mcp serve

在 Cursor 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json，或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "makefile": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "makefile-mcp",
        "serve"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用，然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空，由你自己填写。

在 VS Code 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json

{
  "servers": {
    "makefile": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "makefile-mcp",
        "serve"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用，然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空，由你自己填写。

这个服务器在你的电脑上运行，而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。

你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上，无需账户。

这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同，请以 README 为准。

它能做什么

它在你的电脑上运行；安装后，工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。

基础检查i

我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息；我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月9日

✓ 通过
作者与仓库一致
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 ai-ronin-systems 验证，该账户拥有此仓库
… 尚未检查
仍在维护
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
… 尚未检查
有许可证
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
– 不适用
端点有响应
它在你的电脑上运行，没有互联网端点
– 不适用
使用 OAuth 登录
在你的电脑上运行，改用本地设置
… 尚未检查
工具描述中没有隐藏指令
它在你的电脑上运行；我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表

与“开发者工具”中的其他服务器比较i

星标数多于此分类中其他 5566 个服务器的 0%
发布到注册中心的时间比此分类中其他 5566 个服务器的 64% 更新
基础检查结果等于或优于此分类中其他 5566 个服务器的 100%

与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时，星标数才计入。

常见问题

Makefile MCP 安全吗？

它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前，请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限，并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。

它需要哪些密钥或代码？

注册中心没有列出必需的密钥，不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。

它在我的电脑上运行还是在云端？

它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它，数据不会经过作者的服务器（除非它自己调用在线服务）。

它还在维护吗？

GitHub 仓库最后更新于–，最新版本（0.3.0）于14天前进入注册中心。

哪些应用可以使用它？

支持 MCP 的应用，例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。

有什么可以替代它？

同一分类中有：GitHub, Desktop Commander, Cloudflare MCP

替代选择

同一分类中其他作者的服务器，按星标数排序。

如何看卡片：↓ 每周下载量i★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱：评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i

GitHub

Connect AI assistants to GitHub - manage repos, issues, PRs, and workflows through natural language.

作者：github广泛使用★ 3.4万5天前更新

电脑或云端

安装

Desktop Commander

MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management

作者：wonderwhy-er广泛使用↓ 71万/周★ 1万18天前更新

在你的电脑上运行

安装

Cloudflare MCP

Cloudflare MCP servers

作者：cloudflare广泛使用★ 444614个月前更新

在云端运行✓ mcp.cloudflare.com

安装

作者的 README

打开 README

按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。

Makefile MCP

Expose trusted GNU Make targets to AI agents — without exposing a generic shell or replacing Make with another workflow system.

Makefile MCP turns an existing Makefile into typed MCP tools. It is zero-config and run-safe by default, and deny-by-default when governed.

Makefile  →  Makefile MCP  →  Codex / Claude / LangChain / Cursor / VS Code / MCP client

Threat model

Design for a compromised agent: any text it reads can carry a prompt injection. Makefile MCP keeps the worst case short. A hijacked agent can run only the targets you listed, with values you typed, and a human approves the risky ones. Read the [threat model](https://github.com/ai-ronin-systems/makefile-mcp/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md) for the threats, controls, tests that prove them, and limits.

Protected	Not protected
Agents cannot run arbitrary shell commands, only exposed Make targets.	A malicious or buggy Makefile: recipes are trusted code, not sandboxed.
Without config, agents can only run `test`, `lint`, `check`, and `fmt`.	A target the operator chose to expose doing something destructive.
Governed mode runs only allow-listed `(context, target)` pairs with typed, validated inputs.	Host or container privileges granted outside Makefile MCP.
`dangerous` tasks need explicit human approval through the MCP client; no approval, no run.	An MCP client that auto-approves elicitation without a human.
Every governed run attempt, refused, approved, or cancelled, can be written to an audit log, with secret inputs masked.	Secrets a recipe prints in ways that differ from the input value.
The approval prompt shows the exact arguments; agent-supplied text cannot reshape it.	An agent that can edit unpinned Make code or scripts: editing a recipe is a shell.
With `pin`, any edit to the Makefile, its includes, or listed scripts stops the server until a human restarts it.	Prompt injection in output the agent does read; `agent_output: tail` or `none` narrows it.
Audit records are hash-chained; `doctor` reports edits. A CI test replays a hijacked agent.	A same-user process rewriting the whole log and its chain.

Details: threat model, SECURITY.md, and security model.

Quick start

pipx install makefile-mcp        # or: uv tool install makefile-mcp

makefile-mcp serve

Given:

test: ## Run tests

pytest -q

lint: ## Run lint ruff check .

Makefile MCP exposes make_test and make_lint as MCP tools. Other targets are listed but not runnable until you govern them.

makefile-mcp list

makefile-mcp doctor makefile-mcp run test makefile-mcp run test --preview # GNU Make --dry-run; not a sandbox

One-shot use: uvx makefile-mcp serve.

Why Makefile MCP

Makefile MCP is intentionally narrow: the repository's Makefile remains the executable source of truth, while Makefile MCP supplies a governed agent-facing capability boundary.

Principle	What it means
Make stays authoritative	No duplicate workflow DSL, plugin command language, scheduler, database, or second execution engine.
No generic shell capability	Agents invoke discovered or explicitly governed Make targets, not arbitrary host commands.
Trusted Makefile, untrusted invocation	Repository automation is trusted; caller-selected tasks and declared values are authorized, validated, and bounded. GNU Make's own variable/function semantics are treated as an interpreter boundary.
One execution path	CLI, direct MCP tools, generic MCP tools, preview, contexts, and capabilities share the same catalog, authorization, validation, and executor.
Conservative discovery	Makefile MCP statically exposes only Make syntax it can classify confidently; ambiguous constructs are omitted rather than guessed.
Bounded Unix runtime	Foreground execution has bounded input/output, timeout/cancellation cleanup, stdin isolation, process-group handling, and physical-context locking.

See Design rationale for the full capability/property map and the alternatives deliberately left out.

Architecture

                         Makefile

One catalog. One execution path. Thin CLI and MCP adapters.

See Architecture.

Governed mode

Without .makefile-mcp.yaml, Makefile MCP runs in auto mode: every conservatively discovered root target is listed, but only test, lint, check, and fmt can run, with no caller-controlled Make variables. --legacy-auto-run restores the old run-everything behavior (deprecated).

Add .makefile-mcp.yaml to switch to explicit governance:

schema_version: 1

contexts: backend: directory: backend

tasks: test: contexts: [root, backend] risk: safe

deploy: risk: dangerous variables: ENV: type: enum values: [staging, production] required: true

capabilities: verify: test

audit: path: .makefile-mcp/audit.jsonl

pin: paths: [scripts] # freeze Make code and scripts the agent must not change

Only enabled (context, target) pairs are callable. dangerous tasks additionally need human approval (defaults.require_approval), and audit writes one JSON line per call. See Governed mode, Configuration, and Contexts and capabilities.

MCP presentations

Makefile MCP supports three MCP presentations over the same callable catalog. Choose the presentation that best fits your requirements.

makefile-mcp serve --tools direct    # default: one typed tool per callable target

makefile-mcp serve --tools generic # list_tasks / describe_task / run_task makefile-mcp serve --tools both # both views, same execution core

See MCP presentations and client setup.

Security

Makefile MCP assumes the repository, Makefiles, included Make code, wrapper scripts, and provisioned tools are trusted operator-controlled code. The security boundary is the invocation: an MCP/CLI caller chooses an exposed task/context and, in governed mode, supplies declared values. Makefile MCP authorizes and validates that request; it does not sandbox hostile Makefiles.

Runtime bounds, cancellation/process-group cleanup, stdin isolation, and locking are primarily execution-correctness properties. They limit failure modes around trusted automation rather than turning Make into a sandbox. The built-in MCP server is stdio-only: no HTTP listener, remote-auth layer, TLS, tenancy, or network-service lifecycle is hidden inside the product.

See [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/ai-ronin-systems/makefile-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md) for the security policy, reporting process, trust boundary, and limitations. Detailed implementation notes are in docs/security.md.

Intentional scope limits

GNU Make on Linux/macOS; Windows is not currently supported.
Trusted repository assumption: Makefiles, includes, scripts, and provisioned tools are operator-controlled code.
Static discovery is deliberately conservative, not a complete GNU Make parser.
Preview is GNU Make dry-run, not sandboxing; Make evaluation can still have side effects.
Direct tool inventory is registered at startup; generic catalog calls can observe supported Makefile changes.
.makefile-mcp.yaml is startup policy; changes require restart and fail closed until then.
Foreground/bounded tasks only; deliberately detached daemons are outside Makefile MCP's process-group containment model.
No HTTP server, auth stack, scheduler, job queue, workflow persistence, plugin execution framework, or arbitrary shell tool.
Reload behavior:
.makefile-mcp.yaml is startup policy. Restart Makefile MCP after adding, removing, or editing it.
Makefile discovery refreshes when the conventional Makefile or tracked literal includes change.
Generic calls see the refreshed catalog immediately.
Direct tool inventory is a startup snapshot: adding or removing direct tools requires a restart. Existing direct tools still re-check the live catalog when invoked.

Requirements

Python 3.11+ · GNU Make · Linux or macOS

Documentation

Threat model — why agents should not get a shell, threats and controls, the policy and audit log, guarantees and limits. Start here.
Architecture — runtime flow, responsibilities, lifecycle, invariants, and dependency rules.
Design rationale — key tradeoffs, full product-property map, and deliberately rejected alternatives.
CLI reference — commands, options, result model, root detection, and exit codes.
Configuration — authoritative .makefile-mcp.yaml fields, defaults, approval, audit log, and precedence.
Static Make discovery — supported syntax, fail-closed behavior, includes, limitations, and cache semantics.
Governed mode — explicit exposure, typed inputs, risk metadata, human approval, and operating model.
MCP presentations — direct, generic, both, schemas, result/error semantics, naming, and lifecycle.
[Contexts and capabilities](https://github.com/ai-ronin-syste

只显示了开头部分；其余内容请在仓库中阅读

Makefile MCP

概览

PopNx MCP 的三大支柱

它能帮你做什么

安装

安装之前

它能做什么

基础检查i

作者与仓库一致

仍在维护

有许可证

端点有响应

使用 OAuth 登录

工具描述中没有隐藏指令

与“开发者工具”中的其他服务器比较i

常见问题

替代选择

GitHub

Desktop Commander

Cloudflare MCP

作者的 README

Makefile MCP

Threat model

Quick start

Why Makefile MCP

Architecture

Governed mode

MCP presentations

Security

Intentional scope limits

Requirements

Documentation