原型 · 预览版:收录官方注册中心里的全部服务器,每 30 分钟同步一次。评价和账户功能将在后续阶段推出。
PopNx MCP为使用 AI 的人准备的 MCP 服务器 · 用大白话讲清楚

MinIO AIops

作者:AIops-tools版本 0.15.0i★ –i在你的电脑上运行
注册名称io.github.AIops-tools/minio-aiops

安装

概览

作者提供的说明(英文原文)

Governed MinIO ops: capacity RCA, exposure audit, ILM, WORM retention, IAM, healing, 48 tools.

PopNx MCP 的三大支柱

这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。

它能帮你做什么

我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。

  • 连接方式: 在你的电脑上运行
  • 传输方式: stdio
  • 分类: 其他

安装

选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。

安装之前

  • 基础检查:1 项中通过 1 项
  • 在你的电脑上运行,拥有你的用户账户的权限(文件、网络、应用)。
  • 注册中心没有列出需要填写的密钥。

你需要

  • PyPI已安装 Python 的 uv(用于 uvx 命令)

你用的是哪个应用?

在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。

打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "minio-aiops": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "minio-aiops"
      ]
    }
  }
}

在终端中运行这条命令

claude mcp add minio-aiops -- uvx minio-aiops

在 Cursor 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "minio-aiops": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "minio-aiops"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

在 VS Code 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json

{
  "servers": {
    "minio-aiops": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "minio-aiops"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。

你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。

这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。

它能做什么

它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。

基础检查i

我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日

  • ✓ 通过

    作者与仓库一致

    注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 AIops-tools 验证,该账户拥有此仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    仍在维护

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    有许可证

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • – 不适用

    端点有响应

    它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点

  • – 不适用

    使用 OAuth 登录

    在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置

  • … 尚未检查

    工具描述中没有隐藏指令

    它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表

与“其他”中的其他服务器比较i

  • 星标数多于此分类中其他 32712 个服务器的 0%
  • 发布到注册中心的时间比此分类中其他 32712 个服务器的 80% 更新
  • 基础检查结果等于或优于此分类中其他 32712 个服务器的 100%

与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。

常见问题

MinIO AIops 安全吗?

它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。

它需要哪些密钥或代码?

注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。

它在我的电脑上运行还是在云端?

它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。

它还在维护吗?

GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.15.0)于8天前进入注册中心。

哪些应用可以使用它?

支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。

有什么可以替代它?

同一分类中有:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, Aiterm MCP

替代选择

同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。

如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i

Spec Driven Development

作者:formulahendry

MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.

在你的电脑上运行★ 440MIT14个月前更新
安装

Remote Desktop Commander

作者:desktop-commander

Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.

在云端运行★ 211前天更新
安装

Aiterm MCP

作者:kitepon

Persistent terminals and one launcher for Claude, Codex, Grok, Cursor, and Antigravity harnesses.

在你的电脑上运行今天更新
安装

作者的 README

打开 README

按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。

MinIO AIops

Audit availability: Real writes require a committed pending audit row and stop before contacting the platform if storage is unavailable. Reads and previews may continue with a warning; new audit rows store outcome summaries rather than full responses.

Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by MinIO, Inc. or any storage vendor. Product and trademark names belong to their owners. MIT licensed.

Governed AI-ops for MinIO object storage — for the homelab and small/medium self-hosted deployments where MinIO actually lives. Talks to the S3 API (official minio SDK, SigV4), the admin API (bucket quota, server info), the unauthenticated health endpoints (/minio/health/live|ready|cluster), and the cluster metrics endpoint (/minio/v2/metrics/cluster, bearer-token or public auth) — with a built-in governance harness: a unified audit log, a token/runaway budget guard, undo-token recording, and a descriptive risk tier on every audit row. Self-contained: no external skill-family dependency.

What it does

Four flagship analyses, plus the guarded reads and writes around them:

  • `capacity_rca` — capacity vs used, offline drives/nodes, per-drive hotspots and imbalance → each finding as cause + suggested action (nearfull/full thresholds are named constants, not magic).
  • `bucket_exposure_audit` — every bucket scored and ranked for anonymous/public policy statements (read and, far worse, write), missing default encryption, versioning off, no lifecycle.
  • `lifecycle_gap_analysis` — the storage ILM should be reclaiming but isn't: versioned buckets with no noncurrent expiry (old bytes accrue forever), incomplete multipart uploads with no abort rule (invisible space), large buckets with no lifecycle — with a clearly-labelled reclaimable estimate.
  • `healing_health` — heal backlog and per-erasure-set write-quorum risk: how many more drive failures each set can tolerate, which sets are healing, where heal errors are piling up.
  • Governed writes. Bucket policy / versioning / lifecycle / quota changes capture the real prior state and record an undo descriptor; bucket_delete is refused unless the bucket is verifiably empty (including versions and delete markers) and remove_incomplete_uploads only touches uploads older than a safety window.

What works

  • CLI (minio-aiops ...): init, overview, doctor, health check/status, capacity rca/usage, heal status/drives/nodes, bucket ls/info/objects/audit/ilm-gap/uploads plus guarded writes (bucket versioning-set/policy-set/lifecycle-set/quota-set/purge-uploads/delete), secret set/list/rm/migrate/rotate-password, mcp. Destructive commands take --dry-run and double-confirm.
  • MCP server (minio-aiops mcp or minio-aiops-mcp): the full 48 tools (29 read, 19 write), every one wrapped with the bundled @governed_tool harness. The CLI is a convenience subset; the MCP surface is the whole tool. CLI writes delegate to the same governed functions, so they are audited identically.
  • Encrypted credentials: the secret key lives in an encrypted store ~/.minio-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet + scrypt) — never plaintext on disk. Unlock with a master password from MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD (MCP/CI) or an interactive prompt (CLI).
  • Metrics auth, both modes: servers running MINIO_PROMETHEUS_AUTH_TYPE=public are scraped directly; for the default (jwt) mode the bearer token is derived from the stored credentials — no extra secret to manage.
  • Reversibility: reversible writes capture prior state and record an inverse undo descriptor (prior policy JSON, prior lifecycle XML, prior versioning state, prior quota).

Capability matrix (48 MCP tools)

GroupToolsCountR/W
Healthhealth_live, health_ready, health_cluster, cluster_status, fleet_overview5read
Capacitycapacity_rca (flagship), usage_by_bucket2read
Healinghealing_health (flagship), drive_status, node_status3read
Exposure / ILMbucket_exposure_audit (flagship), lifecycle_gap_analysis (flagship)2read
Bucketsbucket_ls, bucket_info, bucket_policy_get, bucket_lifecycle_get, bucket_versioning_get, bucket_quota_get, object_ls, incomplete_uploads_ls, server_info9read
Writesset_bucket_policy (med, undo), delete_bucket_policy (med, undo), set_versioning (med, undo), set_lifecycle (med, undo), delete_lifecycle (med, undo), set_bucket_quota (med, undo)6write
bucket_delete (high, dry-run, empty-only, irreversible), remove_incomplete_uploads (med, dry-run, priorState only)2write
Object lock (WORM)bucket_lock_config, object_lock_status, diagnose_retention_gaps (flagship)3read
bucket_create (med, undo — the only way to enable object lock), set_default_retention (high, undo), clear_default_retention (med, undo), set_legal_hold (med, undo)4write
set_object_retention (critical, dry-run, extend-only, no undo exists)1write
IAMiam_users, iam_groups, iam_policies, diagnose_iam_exposure (flagship)4read
create_user (med, undo, secret redacted + never returned), set_user_status (med, undo), attach_user_policy (med, undo), detach_user_policy (med, undo) — all refused for this tool's own credential4write
remove_user (high, dry-run, no undo: MinIO keeps no recoverable secret)1write
Undoundo_list, undo_apply2read + replay

Totals: 48 tools — 29 read (incl. `undo_list`), 19 write (incl. `undo_apply`).

What this tool does, and does not, decide

It delivers MinIO object-storage operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently, and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the access key you connect it with: give the key a read-only IAM policy and the writes fail at the server — the place that actually owns the permission.

So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure. The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.minio-aiops/audit.db, and reversible writes still capture their real prior state and record an inverse undo descriptor.

Each tool declares a risk_level, kept in agreement with its [READ]/[WRITE]

documentation tag by a test, and carried into the audit row as a descriptive

tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was a high-risk delete. It

is a label, not a gate.

Running a smaller / local model? See agent-guardrails.md — it lists the guardrails this tool enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.

Quick start

As a Claude Code plugin

One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:

/plugin marketplace add AIops-tools/marketplace

/plugin install minio-aiops@aiops-tools

The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with minio-aiops init — see below.

As an OpenClaw plugin

The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:

openclaw plugins install clawhub:@zw008/minio-aiops

openclaw skills info minio-aiops # expect: Visible to model: yes

Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.

As a CLI or standalone MCP server
uv tool install minio-aiops         # or: pipx install minio-aiops

minio-aiops init # wizard: endpoint + access key; secret key stored encrypted minio-aiops doctor # live/ready + S3 auth + metrics reachability minio-aiops overview # health + capacity headline + exposure headline minio-aiops capacity rca # why is storage filling up, and what to do minio-aiops bucket audit # ranked bucket-exposure findings

Run as an MCP server (stdio):

export MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD=...   # unlock secrets non-interactively

minio-aiops-mcp

Where that password then lives: an exported variable is readable by

every process this shell starts and is recorded by shell history. On a

shared or long-lived host, prefer the interactive prompt, or inject it from

a secret manager for the life of the one command that needs it.

MCP client config
{

"mcpServers": { "minio-aiops": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["--from", "minio-aiops", "minio-aiops-mcp"], "env": { "MINIO_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD": "your-master-password" } } } }

Env-block caveat: MCP clients launch the server **without a TTY and

without your shell profile**, so the master password cannot be prompted for

and an export in ~/.zshrc is not seen — it must be passed in the client's

env block (or the client process's environment) as above. Everything else

(targets, TLS, region, metrics mode) comes from ~/.minio-aiops/config.yaml

written by minio-aiops init.

Configuration

~/.minio-aiops/config.yaml (non-secret connection details only):

targets:
  • name: lab1 host: 192.0.2.10 port: 9000 access_key: minio-ops # identifies the account; NOT the secret secure: true # https (false for plain-http labs) verify_ssl: true # false for self-signed lab certs region: "" # optional metrics_public: false # true when MINIO_PROMETHEUS_AUTH_TYPE=public

The secret key is stored with minio-aiops secret set lab1 (encrypted; a legacy MINIO_LAB1_SECRET_KEY env var is honoured as a fallback with a migration warning).

Governance

Every MCP tool passes through the bundled @governed_tool harness:

  • Audit — every call (params, outcome summary, status, duration, risk tier, and any MINIO_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY / MINIO_AUDIT_RATIONALE annotations) is logged to ~/.minio-aiops/audit.db (relocatable via MINIO_AIOPS_HOME).
  • Budget / runaway guard — token and call budgets trip a circuit breaker. A safety backstop, not authorization.
  • Risk-tier labelling — each tool's declared risk_level is recorded on the audit row as a descriptive tier (bucket_delete is high). It is a label for the reviewer, not a gate: there is no read-only switch, policy file, or approval gate, and MINIO_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY / MINIO_AUDIT_RATIONALE are optional annotations recorded when set, never required.
  • Undo recording — reversible writes record an inverse descriptor built from the captured prior state.

Supported scope & limitations

  • Deployments: any reasonably current MinIO server (single-node or distributed/erasure-coded) reachable over its S3 port. Admin features (quota, server_info) need admin-capable keys. Generic S3 services are not a target: the health/metrics/admin surfaces used here are MinIO-specific.
  • Metrics: the capacity/healing RCAs read the v2 cluster metrics endpoint; both public and bearer-t

只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读

问 PopNx