GitHub
Connect AI assistants to GitHub - manage repos, issues, PRs, and workflows through natural language.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
IaC attack-path auditor: finds internet-to-crown-jewel chains in Terraform/CFN/K8s.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
适用于网页版、桌面版和手机版 Claude:
https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add --transport http cloud-pathfinder https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"cloud-pathfinder": {
"url": "https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp"
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"cloud-pathfinder": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp"
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器:
https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp菜单名称可能因套餐和版本不同而略有差异。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
我们还没有读取这个服务器的工具列表;我们会轮流检查各个端点。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 Baneado98 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
尚未检查;我们会轮流检查各个端点
尚未检查;我们会轮流检查各个端点
尚未检查;我们会在检查端点时读取工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在作者的云端运行。通过互联网连接,无需安装,但你发送的内容会经过作者的服务器。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.1.0)于5个月前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。它通过 URL 连接,所以接受远程 MCP 服务器的应用也可以使用,例如开启开发者模式的 ChatGPT。
同一分类中有:GitHub, Desktop Commander, Cloudflare MCP
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Connect AI assistants to GitHub - manage repos, issues, PRs, and workflows through natural language.
MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
Cloudflare MCP servers
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
Attack-path auditor for Infrastructure-as-Code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, CDK, Pulumi, Bicep/ARM. Not a linter. It parses your IaC into a resource graph, resolves cross-resource (and cross-file) relationships, and searches for the multi-hop chains from the public internet to your crown jewels (data stores, secrets, admin). It returns a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict and the concrete route an attacker would walk.
Example chain it finds:
open security group (SSH 0.0.0.0/0) → EC2 instance-profile role → iam:PassRole privilege escalation to admin → S3 exfiltration
Available as an MCP server (Claude, Cursor, any MCP agent) and a pay-per-call x402 API (autonomous AI agents with a wallet).
Sending your IaC to a third party is sensitive — so here is exactly what happens:
files map or source blob). Nothing is read from your machine, your cloud account, or your credentials — cloud-pathfinder never touches a live cloud (see "honest limits" below). There are no cloud keys to provide because it analyzes the *declared* templates only.deep: true, behind payment). Only then are the full chains, file:line evidence and remediation returned. You send the same IaC either way — nothing *extra* leaves your machine for the deep tier.Hosted service: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app — all analysis runs
server-side. This npm package is a thin MCP client: it sends the IaC text to
the hosted endpoint and renders the verdict. No analysis logic ships to your machine.
audit_iac_attack_paths { files: { "main.tf": "..." } }.https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app.INTERNET node to every data store / secret / admin sink, and resolves IAM privilege-escalation reachability along each hop — in memory.file:line evidence; the free tier returns the verdict, score and counts.The npm tarball contains only the HTTP caller — so nothing, free or deep, runs offline. Without the server it degrades to a clear network error.
A linter flags resources one at a time: "this SG is open", "this role is broad". cloud-pathfinder reasons about how those facts connect — work a per-file local tool structurally cannot do:
| Capability | Local linter | cloud-pathfinder |
|---|---|---|
| Flag one open SG / one broad role | ✅ | ✅ |
| Graph — which SG attaches to which instance, which role it assumes, what it reads | ❌ | ✅ |
| Reachability BFS internet → crown jewel, full multi-hop chain + file:line | ❌ | ✅ |
| IAM privilege-escalation KB (20+ primitives: PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion…) | ❌ | ✅ |
| Multi-cloud — AWS / GCP / Azure in one graph | ❌ | ✅ |
| Choke-point analysis (the one hop that, fixed, cuts the most paths) | ❌ | ✅ |
| Diff mode — what a PR INTRODUCES / ELIMINATES / AGGRAVATES | ❌ | ✅ |
| Kubernetes LB/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin SA → Secret | ❌ | ✅ |
| SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning (inline chains on the Security tab) | ❌ | ✅ |
INTERNET to every data store / secret / admin sink, returning the full multi-hop chain with per-hop file:line evidence.Formats are auto-detected per file and analyzed together — mix .tf, CloudFormation .yaml/.json and Kubernetes manifests in one call.
{
"mcpServers": { "cloud-pathfinder": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "cloud-pathfinder-mcp"] } } }
No key needed for the free tier. Restart your client and the
`audit_iac_attack_paths` + `diff_attack_paths` tools appear. (Remote server: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp.)
audit_iac_attack_paths{
"files": { "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" \"web\" { ingress { ... cidr_blocks = [\"0.0.0.0/0\"] } } ...", "k8s.yaml": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\n..." } // or: "source": " ", "filename": "main.tf" }
audit_iac_attack_paths { "files": { "main.tf": "<SG open to 0.0.0.0/0 on 22 +
EC2 with instance-profile role that can s3:* + iam:PassRole>" } }
→ FREE: verdict: BREACHABLE · risk 86/100 · 1 attack path · 1 crown jewel · 3 misconfigs
→ DEEP (deep:true): verdict: BREACHABLE PATH #1 (internet → admin): [1] INTERNET → aws_security_group.web (main.tf:4 — ingress 22 from 0.0.0.0/0) [2] → aws_instance.app (main.tf:19 — attaches sg web) [3] → aws_iam_role.app_role (main.tf:31 — instance profile) [4] → iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances (privesc → launch instance as admin role) [5] → s3:* on aws_s3_bucket.data (main.tf:52 — exfiltration sink) CHOKE POINT: tighten main.tf:4 ingress → cuts this entire path. FIX: restrict ingress CIDR; split the role; add a permissions boundary.
The free tier returns the verdict, risk score, and the counts (how many attack paths, crown jewels and misconfigurations). The deep tier returns every full chain with hops, file:line evidence, privilege-escalation reachability and remediation.
diff_attack_paths — the CI/CD gateGive it the IaC before and after a change (a PR's base and head trees) and it reports exactly what the change did to your attack surface: which internet→crown-jewel chains it INTRODUCES, which it ELIMINATES, and which it AGGRAVATES — with an INTRODUCES_BREACH / REDUCES_RISK / NEUTRAL / MIXED verdict.
{
"before": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 10.0.0.0/16..." } }, "after": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 0.0.0.0/0..." } } // deep: true → full introduced/eliminated chains + before→after exploitability + which choke points now matter }
A per-file linter or a single-state scan cannot answer this: it needs the full graph
HTTP: POST /diff (free, counts only) / POST /pro/diff (deep).
POST /audit
Content-Type: application/json
{ "files": { "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" ..." } }
Rate-limited to 30 requests/hour/IP. For unlimited/commercial/deep use, call /pro/audit.
Input formats: Terraform / OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Kustomize, Pulumi (TS/JS/Python), Bicep/ARM, and AWS CDK — both the synthesized cdk.out/*.template.json and the un-synthed CDK program (TypeScript + Python), so a CI gate runs on the PR diff before cdk synth.
Add ?format=sarif (or { "format": "sarif" }) to /audit, /pro/audit, /diff or /pro/diff to get SARIF 2.1.0 you can upload to GitHub code scanning — every attack chain shows up inline on the PR's Security tab.
result with a `codeFlow` (a step-through walk: internet → SG → instance role → privesc → S3), anchored to the IaC file:line, plus security-severity/CVSS so the badge colors correctly.note.# .github/workflows/cloud-pathfinder.yml (sketch)
/pro — two ways to pay (dual-pay)The deep /pro/audit returns the full attack chains, per-hop evidence, privilege-escalation analysis and remediation. Two payment lanes coexist:
| Lane | For | How |
|---|---|---|
| 💳 Card (Stripe) | Humans / teams | Buy a prepaid key at /pro/checkout, then send Authorization: Bearer (or set CLOUD_PATHFINDER_KEY). |
| 🪙 x402 (USDC) | AI agents with a wallet | Pay $0.30 per call automatically. Settles on Base. No signup, no key. |
POST /pro/audit # 402 (shows BOTH lanes) → pay → result
| Class | Detail |
|---|---|
| Public → role → data | Open SG on a sensitive port (SSH/RDP/DB) → instance role that can read S3/Dynamo/RDS/Secrets → exfiltration |
| IAM privilege escalation | iam:PassRole+ec2:RunInstances, iam:CreatePolicyVersion, iam:AttachRolePolicy, ssm:SendCommand, wildcard * on *, and ~15 more |
| Public data stores | publicly_accessible = true RDS, world-open buckets |
| Kubernetes | LoadBalancer/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin ServiceAccount → Secret |
| CloudFormation | !Ref/!GetAtt intrinsics resolved; ManagedPolicyArns/inline policies analyzed |
The premium engine and knowledge base never ship in the npm package — the published client is a thin renderer that calls the hosted analysis service. The free tier is genuinely useful (verdict + counts); the deep chains, evidence and privesc analysis are server-side behind payment.
Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC, not a live cloud assessment. It reasons over what the templates declare (no runtime SCP/permissions-boundary/condition evaluation). Treat findings as prioritized leads, not a guarantee.