Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Self-hosted MCP gateway. Turn any REST API into MCP tools via YAML (DADL). Authz, audit, policies.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
适用于网页版、桌面版和手机版 Claude:
https://{host}:8123/mcp地址中有只有你知道的 {…} 部分(例如你的账户),请复制后自行填写。
在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add --transport http toolmesh 'https://{host}:8123/mcp'地址中有只有你知道的 {…} 部分(例如你的账户),请复制后自行填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"toolmesh": {
"url": "https://{host}:8123/mcp"
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
地址中有只有你知道的 {…} 部分(例如你的账户),请复制后自行填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"toolmesh": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://{host}:8123/mcp"
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器:
https://{host}:8123/mcp地址中有只有你知道的 {…} 部分(例如你的账户),请复制后自行填写。
菜单名称可能因套餐和版本不同而略有差异。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
我们还没有读取这个服务器的工具列表;我们会轮流检查各个端点。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月6日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 DunkelCloud 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
这个地址需要填入你自己的账户信息,所以我们无法替你检查
这个地址需要填入你自己的账户信息,所以我们无法替你检查
尚未检查;我们会在检查端点时读取工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在作者的云端运行。通过互联网连接,无需安装,但你发送的内容会经过作者的服务器。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.5.0)于14天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。它通过 URL 连接,所以接受远程 MCP 服务器的应用也可以使用,例如开启开发者模式的 ChatGPT。
同一分类中有:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, yontu
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
Türkçe yazı denetimi: TDK kuralları, yapay zekâ izleri, metin türüne göre üslup.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
The missing control layer between AI agents and enterprise systems. ToolMesh turns uncontrolled AI tool calls into a governed, auditable process — and connects any REST API or MCP server in minutes, not months.
In practice, MCP servers only expose a fraction of the REST API they wrap — and you'll hit the gaps fast. ToolMesh lets you replace the wrapper layer with .dadl files — a declarative YAML format that describes any REST API as MCP tools. No wrapper server to build, deploy, or maintain.
Current: Claude → ToolMesh → MCP Server → REST API
With DADL: Claude → ToolMesh → REST API (via .dadl file)
You don't write the YAML by hand. You ask an LLM. Claude, GPT, Gemini — any model that knows the DADL spec generates a working .dadl file in seconds. Describe what you need, drop the file into config/dadl/, done.
"Create a DADL for the GitHub API — list repos, open issues, and create pull requests."
10 seconds. Works with any LLM that knows the format.
And unlike MCP gateways that just pass tool calls through, ToolMesh adds what production deployments actually need:
| Pillar | What it does | Backed by |
|---|---|---|
| Any Backend | 30 lines of DADL replace a whole MCP server. Also proxies existing MCP servers. | Go MCP SDK + DADL (.dadl files) |
| Code Mode | 15 MCP servers at once? Without ToolMesh, impossible. Code Mode cuts 50,000+ tokens to ~1,000. | AST-parsed tool calls |
| Credential Store | Secrets injected at execution time — never in prompts, never in LLM client configs | Per-request injection via Executor pipeline |
| OpenFGA | Fine-grained authorization, on by default with nothing to install (user → plan → tool). Example: free users get read-only, pro gets everything. | OpenFGA, embedded or external |
| Gate | Block confidential data before execution, redact PII in responses | goja |
| Audit | Every tool call recorded and queryable — answer "what did that agent do?" with SQL | slog / SQLite |
Want to try ToolMesh before installing? Connect to our public demo instance — no Docker, no config, no API keys:
[demo.toolmesh.io](https://www.toolmesh.io/en/demo/) — Hacker News APIs via ToolMesh. Works with Claude Desktop, Claude Code, and ChatGPT. Login: dadl / toolmesh.
# Clone
git clone https://github.com/DunkelCloud/ToolMesh.git cd ToolMesh
cp .env.example .env
docker compose up -d
curl http://localhost:8123/health
ToolMesh itself serves plain HTTP. Most MCP clients — including Claude Desktop — require HTTPS and will reject http:// URLs. You need a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front of ToolMesh:
| Option | When to use |
|---|---|
| Caddy | Self-hosted with a public domain — automatic Let's Encrypt certs |
| Cloudflare Tunnel | No open ports needed, zero-config TLS |
| nginx / Traefik | Already in your stack |
For local development only, you can bypass TLS by editing claude_desktop_config.json by hand (the GUI enforces https://).
Add to your Claude Desktop MCP config:
{
"mcpServers": { "toolmesh": { "url": "https://toolmesh.example.com/mcp" } } }
For local development without TLS proxy:
{
"mcpServers": { "toolmesh": { "url": "http://localhost:8123/mcp" } } }
ToolMesh supports OAuth 2.1 with PKCE S256 for remote access. Configure users in config/users.yaml and use the public HTTPS URL as the MCP endpoint.
ToolMesh supports two authentication methods that can be used independently or together. All OAuth state (tokens, auth codes, clients) is persisted in Redis and survives server restarts.
Define users in config/users.yaml with bcrypt-hashed passwords:
users:
Generate password hashes with any bcrypt-capable utility:
htpasswd -nbBC 10 "" "my-password" | cut -d: -f2
For single-user setups, TOOLMESH_AUTH_PASSWORD still works as a fallback. Configure the identity with TOOLMESH_AUTH_USER, TOOLMESH_AUTH_PLAN, and TOOLMESH_AUTH_ROLES (defaults: owner, pro, admin).
Define API keys in config/apikeys.yaml. Each entry names its key by the SHA-256 of the key:
keys:
Generate a key and its key_sha256:
KEY="tm_$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
printf '%s' "$KEY" | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1
Each key maps to a distinct user identity with its own plan and roles, which flow through to authorization.
Entries with a bcrypt key_hash, as files written for earlier versions have them, keep working without any change. Until its key has been used once after startup, such an entry costs a bcrypt comparison for every bearer credential that nothing else recognizes; key_sha256 is looked up directly and is meant for randomly generated keys. See docs/configuration.md for the details and for how the two forms differ.
For single-key setups, TOOLMESH_API_KEY still works as a fallback. The same TOOLMESH_AUTH_USER, TOOLMESH_AUTH_PLAN, and TOOLMESH_AUTH_ROLES variables control the identity.
A request to /mcp without a valid credential is answered 401 with a WWW-Authenticate: Bearer challenge that carries resource_metadata, as the MCP authorization specification asks. MCP clients start the OAuth flow, or refresh an expired token, on that status. Such requests are logged at INFO and counted in toolmesh_logins_total{method="anonymous"}. See docs/configuration.md.
Dynamic Client Registration is rate-limited to 5 registrations per hour per IP to prevent abuse (with Redis; a Redis outage lets registrations through and is logged). A registered client that never obtains a token is forgotten after a day, and one that does after 90 days without a new token (TOOLMESH_DCR_CLIENT_TTL, TOOLMESH_DCR_CLIENT_IDLE_TTL). See docs/configuration.md.
The file broker (upload_file, POST /files/upload, download URLs under /blobs/) can be switched off with TOOLMESH_FILE_BROKER_ENABLED=false and bounded with a quota in bytes, in total and per user (TOOLMESH_FILE_BROKER_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES, TOOLMESH_FILE_BROKER_MAX_BYTES_PER_USER). It is on and unbounded by default. See docs/configuration.md.
Failed password logins are limited per account and per client address: by default 5 failures for one account from one address, 20 for one account from all addresses together, and 50 from one address across all accounts, each within 15 minutes. Beyond that the login answers 429 until the window has passed. Every failed login is logged at WARN and counted in toolmesh_logins_total{result="failure"}. Already issued tokens and API keys are not affected by a lockout. See docs/configuration.md for the variables and the reverse-proxy requirement of the per-address limits.
The number of bcrypt comparisons that run at the same time is bounded for the whole process (TOOLMESH_BCRYPT_MAX_CONCURRENT, default: half of the available CPUs), so that password logins cannot take the CPU away from everything else. See docs/configuration.md.
Every tool call is checked, and tool listings show each caller only the tools it may call. Nothing has to be set up: ToolMesh runs OpenFGA inside its own process and keeps its data in data/authz.db.
TOOLMESH_AUTHZ_MODE selects the engine:
| Mode | Behavior |
|---|---|
embedded (default) | Checks run inside ToolMesh. Grants come from a preset or from config/authz.yaml. |
external | Checks go to an OpenFGA server you operate (OPENFGA_API_URL, OPENFGA_STORE_ID). ToolMesh never writes to it. |
disabled | No checks. Reported at every start and recorded in the audit trail. |
Grants refer to the users, roles, plans and companies from users.yaml, apikeys.yaml or the single password/API key. Without a grants file a preset applies:
| Preset | Who may call what |
|---|---|
single-user | the owner (TOOLMESH_AUTH_USER) and role admin: every tool. Default without users.yaml/apikeys.yaml. |
team | as single-user, plus plan pro: every tool, plan free: every read tool. Default with users.yaml or apikeys.yaml. |
open | every authenticated caller: every tool |
For finer control, copy config/authz.yaml.example to config/authz.yaml; grants can name all tools, backends, single tools or DADL access classes (read, write, ...), denies block any of these and win over every grant, and changes take effect within seconds:
grants:
denies:
An installation upgraded from a version without authorization keeps every tool open to every authenticated caller (preset open) and says so at every start, until you pick a preset or write grants. OPENFGA_MODE is deprecated: restrict maps to external, bypass to embedded. See docs/configuration.md.
ToolMesh is secure-by-default: it ships with no individual default that relaxes a control silently. At boot it logs a single security-posture summary that lists every control still in a relaxed state (missing auth credential, authorization disabled or open to everyone, open CORS, debug tools, login limits switched off) together with how to harden it. In the default production posture these are log
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