Lucky x402
Pre-trade crypto checks for agents: token/memecoin verdict (EVM+Solana), wallet risk, CEX ops. x402.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Local crypto inventory for developers and AI agents; coverage and limits inside the CBOM.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"qrp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"qrp-mcp"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add qrp -- uvx qrp-mcp粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"qrp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"qrp-mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"qrp": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"qrp-mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月9日
发布者(quantumreadiness.eu)不是仓库所有者(StanimirTenev);可能是其他人代为上架的
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 0 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.44.0)于3天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。
同一分类中有:Lucky x402, Canli Capital, Canli Markets
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:↓ 每周下载量i★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Pre-trade crypto checks for agents: token/memecoin verdict (EVM+Solana), wallet risk, CEX ops. x402.
443 finance tools, 60 prompts: quant, SEC and EU filings, fact checks, rates, odds, DeFi, macro.
Finance from the sources: SEC and ESEF filings, fact checks, central-bank rates, odds, DeFi, macro.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
A local cryptographic inventory for developers and AI agents that carries verifiable coverage and its own limits inside the CBOM.
Every signature in your wallet, contract and validator rests on elliptic-curve cryptography, and a large quantum computer breaks it. Plenty of tools will tell you what they found. This one also tells you what it read, what it could not read, and which question it is not answering — in the document itself, where an auditor can check it rather than take your word.
An MCP server that scans a local directory for cryptography that Shor's algorithm defeats — secp256k1, Ed25519, BLS, Schnorr, RSA — plus weak primitives and CI signing commands, and classifies each one: broken by a quantum computer, post-quantum, or neither.
Everything runs on your machine. No network calls, no account, no API key, nothing uploaded. A tool that reads your keys' surroundings has no business phoning home, so this one makes zero outbound connections — enforced by a test, not promised in a paragraph. The only process it starts is a local git, to pin what it read, with the scanned repository's own hooks and filters disarmed.
flowchart TD
R["Your repository, on your machine, at a commit"] --> Q["qrp-mcp — offline, zero network calls"] Q --> F["Found file:line and family"] Q --> N["Not read each file with its reason"] F --> J["scan --out result.json"] N --> J J --> O["CBOM (CycloneDX 1.6) SARIF closure: what a change closed"]
Need a cryptographic inventory (a CBOM) for a post-quantum migration or an audit, without uploading your code? One command, no install step:
uvx qrp-mcp scan ~/code/my-project --out result.json
What comes back, run on this repository's own test fixtures -- the findings, and next to them what the scan did not read:
"verdict": "This scan read 24 of 27 files (88.89%); the remaining 3 (1 of 1, by extension
— .b64 — being 100.0% of them) are listed with a reason each." "summary": { "total_findings": 10, "quantum_vulnerable_count": 6, "pqc_ready_count": 1, "weak_count": 1, "pqc_readiness": "hybrid_partial", ... }
Bitcoin and Ethereum authenticate with ECDSA over secp256k1. Solana, Cardano and Polkadot use Ed25519. Ethereum's consensus layer aggregates with BLS12-381. Taproot adds Schnorr.
All four are public-key schemes whose security rests on discrete-log hardness — and all four fall to the same quantum algorithm. The practical consequence is specific: once a public key is exposed, the private key becomes derivable. Reused addresses, on-chain public keys, and long-lived validator keys are where that exposure already exists today.
None of this is a prediction about dates. It is an inventory question: *which of my code paths sign with what?* That question has an answer right now, and this tool gives it.
Add it to your MCP client — no installation step, uvx fetches and runs it:
{
"mcpServers": { "qrp": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["qrp-mcp"] } } }
Then ask your agent:
Scan ~/code/my-protocol for quantum-vulnerable cryptography.
The same server, packaged with a skill, so there is no config file to edit:
/plugin marketplace add StanimirTenev/qrp-mcp
/plugin install qrp@quantumreadiness
Then /qrp:pqc-scan in any project. Both routes need uv on your PATH, since uvx is what fetches and runs the server.
uvx qrp-mcp scan ~/code/my-protocol --out result.json
This produces the same result as the scan_repo tool, written to a file you can read before it goes anywhere. Nothing is sent. By default (from 0.40.0, as cbom since 0.16.0 and the tools) the quoted line is masked: everything in it but the algorithm name is starred out. --level full writes the line as it is, and --level trimmed removes the line altogether; all three keep each file and line number. The SHA-256 of the written bytes is printed, so anyone you send the file to can quote back exactly what they received.
That digest is the file's integrity, and the file holds its read times, so two runs over one commit print different ones. Beside it, findings sha256 is the fingerprint of the findings alone (findings_fingerprint in the JSON, in SARIF's run properties and in the CBOM as qrp:findings_fingerprint:sha256): the same on every run and at every --level that finds the same, different when a finding is added or removed. Its normalisation rules are written into the output beside it: each finding as family, raw value, classification and severity; each occurrence as category, path, line, family, role and key size; excerpts, confidence, owners, baseline state, mandate clauses, suppressed rows, coverage and the read window left out; both lists sorted, serialised as compact JSON with sorted keys, SHA-256 in hex. It says the result repeats; it says nothing about whether the result is complete.
uvx qrp-mcp cbom ~/code/my-protocol --out cbom.json
uvx qrp-mcp closure before.json after.json --out closure.json
cbom writes the same CycloneDX document as the export_cbom tool, masked by default because it is the document built to be sent. closure writes the prove_closure verdict for two saved scans, and names both inputs by their SHA-256, so the three files can be tied together by whoever receives them. Both print the SHA-256 of what they wrote.
uvx qrp-mcp control ~/code/my-protocol --seed 1 --out control.json
From 0.43.0. The tree is copied to a temporary directory, known cryptographic uses (9 styles) and lines that name an algorithm without using it (7 kinds) are planted into the copy, and the copy is scanned with the same instrument. The result says which planted lines were found, which were missed and which non-uses were reported as uses — robustness on known patterns, for this version. It is not a statement about what your tree contains, and it never makes the coverage claim stronger. scan --control-seed N carries the block in the result. The control.
uvx qrp-mcp scan ~/code/my-service --out scan.json # before building
uvx qrp-mcp build-gap scan.json ~/code/my-service/bin/publish --out gap.json
From 0.44.0. Of K public-key-bearing packages or modules in the build, the source scan named J; the K - J list; the families on one side only; and a Go binary's DefaultGODEBUG crypto settings as recorded. It reads only tables the toolchain wrote (*.deps.json, .NET metadata names, go version -m, go tool nm), never code, and never a key size from the build — robustness on known patterns, not recall or coverage of the build. Source against build.
Every file under the path is either read or named with the reason it was not. The full list of rules, file types and their limits is in What it looks at.
| Kind | Read as |
|---|---|
| Source code | C and C++, C#, Visual Basic and F#, Go, Rust, Java, Kotlin, Scala and Groovy, Python, JavaScript and TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Perl, Solidity, Move and Cairo |
| Scripts | .sh/.bash/.zsh/.ksh, .bat/.cmd, PowerShell .ps1/.psm1/.psd1 — algorithms, and signing commands as a pipeline's are |
| CI/CD pipelines | signing commands (gpg --sign, cosign sign, signtool, jarsigner, codesign, Secure Boot and kernel-module signing), with the key they name |
| Infrastructure as code | Terraform/HCL, Kubernetes manifests and Helm (.tpl, .gotmpl), Dockerfiles (including the crypto libraries a RUN installs) |
| TLS, SSH and VPN configuration | nginx, Apache, HAProxy, Caddy, Envoy, Istio, Traefik, Ingress-NGINX, Postfix, Dovecot, MySQL, PostgreSQL, Kafka, ZooKeeper, OpenVPN, WireGuard, strongSwan, OpenSSH, openssl.cnf, java.security, Vault, IBM MQ (.mqsc), AWS load-balancer policies, OPC UA |
| Device configuration | FortiOS backups, Cisco IOS and Junos — read in part, and named as read in part with what was and was not read |
| Windows | .reg exports (SCHANNEL), web.config/app.config/applicationHost.config, MSBuild .vcxproj/.props/.targets, WiX .wxs, certreq .inf, .snk strong-name keys |
| Certificates and keys | PEM and DER (.pem, .der, .crt, .cer, .key, .pub, …), PEM inside any text file or source string, .p12/.pfx, Java keystores, SSH keys, authorized_keys, known_hosts, OpenPGP keys and signatures, JWKS, BIND DNSSEC key and zone files, Apple .plist |
| Manifests and lockfiles | the dependencies that bring cryptography in, by ecosystem (npm, PyPI, Cargo, Go, Maven/Gradle, NuGet, RubyGems, CocoaPods, SwiftPM, deb/apk/rpm in a Dockerfile) |
| Not read, on purpose | documentation (.txt, .md, .rst, .pod), binaries and images — counted and named, never silently left out |
What coverage.scope says on three trees this project did not write, measured on 4 Nov 2026 with the code of this release (the repositories at OpenSSH 7fe3b24, certbot 56ee049, Vault 41e571b). coverage_pct is the share of the files present that were read; read_in_full_pct leaves out the files read only in part (a device configuration, a certificate block that did not parse).
| Repository | Files present | Read | coverage_pct | Read in part | read_in_full_pct | Findings | Weak |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OpenSSH | 873 | 741 | 84.88% | 5 | 84.31% | 70 | 54 |
| certbot | 1,250 | 850 | 68.00% | 0 | 68.00% | 39 | 28 |
| Vault | 9,281 | 5,434 | 58.55% | 9 | 58.45% | 74 | 62 |
These are reading figures, not detection figures. How well the rules find what is there is a different question; the measurements made of it, each with its date and version, are in How it is measured, and no recall or precision figure is cited here as current.
coverage_pct, read_in_part, read_in_full_pct, examined_partly, concentration--mandate, --min-coverage, .qrp.toml, qrp:ignore with until= and owner=qrp-mcp control, what it plants, the self_seeded_control block and its fieldsqrp-mcp build-gap, what it reads from a build, what it never reads, what K and J are只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读