Context7
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作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Non-custodial USDC wallet on Base with spending limits enforced in code, not in a prompt.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"stipend": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"stipend"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add stipend -- npx -y stipend粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"stipend": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"stipend"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"stipend": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"stipend"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日
发布者(Graphiker-Australia)不是仓库所有者(stipend-sh);可能是其他人代为上架的
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 0 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.45.4)于3个月前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
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按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
A non-custodial USDC wallet on Base that an AI agent installs by itself, with spending limits enforced below the instruction layer.
pip install eth-account && curl -sL stipend.sh/install | sh
This is the source of the package that installer fetches. It is published so that the claims made for it can be checked rather than believed.
It ships an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server — stipend mcp — exposing seven tools over stdio, so an agent can hold and spend money through the tool interface it already has. See MCP server below.
The failure that matters for an agent holding money is not a stolen key. It is a correctly signed transaction it was argued into.
Almost every defence against that lives in the instruction layer — a system prompt saying "do not send funds to unverified addresses." That is a suggestion to a model, sitting in the same context window as the text attacking it.
In here the limits are not advice. They are code that a transaction passes through on its way to being signed, and no wording in any context window reaches them.
Start at [`stipend/policy.py`](stipend/policy.py). It is about three hundred lines and it is the whole argument.
| control | what it does |
|---|---|
| per-transaction and daily caps | a ceiling that no instruction can raise |
| one-time approvals | authorise a single payment — bound to that recipient, that amount, expiring, single use — instead of raising a cap |
| new-destination confirmation | the first payment to any address you have never paid needs confirming, whatever the size |
The second is the one people get wrong. Raising a cap to afford one purchase weakens every future payment to everyone, which is precisely what an attacker asks for. Authorise the payment, not the capability.
The third is what stops a drain by many small payments that each sit under the threshold. An attacker's address is, by definition, one you have never paid.
And if you turn on an allowlist, it is absolute. Funds reach nothing else — not with a confirmation, not with an approval, not with any instruction from anywhere.
The wallet is also a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server, so an agent can use it through the tool interface it already has rather than by shelling out.
stipend mcp
It speaks JSON-RPC over stdin and stdout — the MCP stdio transport. Your MCP client spawns the process; nothing listens on a port and nothing is exposed to a network.
In a client's config that looks like:
{
"mcpServers": { "stipend": { "command": "stipend", "args": ["mcp"] } } }
| tool | what it does |
|---|---|
stipend_address | the wallet's address, so money can reach you whether or not you are running |
stipend_balance | USDC held, native currency held, spent today, and the daily limit |
stipend_check | would this payment be allowed? Answers without sending anything |
stipend_pay | send USDC, subject to every limit below |
stipend_earnings | read incoming payments off the network and record them |
stipend_report | earned against spent, by category, with runway in days |
stipend_recover | what is outstanding, and whose job each item is |
Every one of them goes through the same policy.check gate the command line uses, so the caps, the allowlist and the new-destination confirmation apply identically. There is no path here that moves money without them.
stipend_check exists so an agent can ask "would this be allowed?" before it offers to pay for something, turning a refusal into an answer rather than a failure.
No tool reads, exports or derives the private key. No tool changes a spending limit or the allowlist. No tool creates or overwrites a wallet.
An MCP tool is callable by a model that is reading untrusted text, and raising a cap is exactly what an attacker would ask for — so it is not on the menu at all. Configuration changes stay at the command line, where a human is present.
Every registry would prefer a URL, and we will not publish one. A hosted wallet server means the key lives on somebody else's machine — ours — and the whole claim of this package is that it does not. This runs beside the keystore, under the same user, and the key never moves.
No network, no funds, no wallet of yours touched:
python -m stipend selftest
219 checks covering address validation, amount arithmetic, every policy branch, the allowlist, the daily cap, destination trust and its expiry, keystore encryption, ERC-20 encoding, x402 requirement selection, EIP-3009 signing, the ledger, and exactly what telemetry would send.
Someone to break it.
If you can construct an injection that moves money past the checks in policy.py, open an issue. We would rather hear it from you than from someone who is not being polite about it.
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.
Built by the Stipend dev team. FelixTrade.ai Pty Ltd, Australia.