原型 · 预览版:收录官方注册中心里的全部服务器,每 30 分钟同步一次。评价和账户功能将在后续阶段推出。
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Prompt Injection Scanner

作者:GuardBee版本 1.2.0i★ –i在你的电脑上运行
注册名称io.github.GuardBee/prompt-injection-scanner

安装

概览

作者提供的说明(英文原文)

Scans RAG content/scraped pages for indirect prompt injection

PopNx MCP 的三大支柱

这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。

它能帮你做什么

我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。

  • 连接方式: 在你的电脑上运行
  • 传输方式: stdio
  • 分类: 搜索与 AI 记忆

安装

选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。

安装之前

  • 基础检查:1 项中通过 1 项
  • 在你的电脑上运行,拥有你的用户账户的权限(文件、网络、应用)。
  • 注册中心没有列出需要填写的密钥。

你需要

  • npm已安装 Node.js(用于 npx 命令)

你用的是哪个应用?

在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。

打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "prompt-injection-scanner": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
      ]
    }
  }
}

在终端中运行这条命令

claude mcp add prompt-injection-scanner -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner

在 Cursor 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "prompt-injection-scanner": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

在 VS Code 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json

{
  "servers": {
    "prompt-injection-scanner": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。

你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。

这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。

它能做什么

它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。

基础检查i

我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日

  • ✓ 通过

    作者与仓库一致

    注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 GuardBee 验证,该账户拥有此仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    仍在维护

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    有许可证

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • – 不适用

    端点有响应

    它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点

  • – 不适用

    使用 OAuth 登录

    在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置

  • … 尚未检查

    工具描述中没有隐藏指令

    它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表

与“搜索与 AI 记忆”中的其他服务器比较i

  • 星标数多于此分类中其他 7277 个服务器的 0%
  • 发布到注册中心的时间比此分类中其他 7277 个服务器的 86% 更新
  • 基础检查结果等于或优于此分类中其他 7277 个服务器的 100%

与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。

常见问题

Prompt Injection Scanner 安全吗?

它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。

它需要哪些密钥或代码?

注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。

它在我的电脑上运行还是在云端?

它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。

它还在维护吗?

GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(1.2.0)于6天前进入注册中心。

哪些应用可以使用它?

支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。

有什么可以替代它?

同一分类中有:Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa

替代选择

同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。

如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i

Context7

作者:upstash

Up-to-date docs for AI agents

电脑或云端★ 64,224MIT昨天更新
安装

Codebase Memory

作者:DeusData

Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.

在你的电脑上运行★ 48,148MIT21天前更新
安装

Exa

作者:exa-labs

Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.

在云端运行★ 5,213MIT上个月更新
安装

作者的 README

打开 README

按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。

@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner

🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文 | 🇯🇵 日本語 | 🇰🇷 한국어 | 🇧🇷 Português | 🇪🇸 Español | 🇩🇪 Deutsch

An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans content — a RAG chunk, a scraped web page, a document — for indirect prompt injection payloads.

ai-code-scanner and mcp-server-auditor scan code; this package scans data. In classic prompt injection, the attacker writes a malicious prompt themselves; in indirect prompt injection, the attacker never talks to the model at all — instead they embed instructions in a document, web page, or tool result the model will later read. The moment the model pulls this content into its context via a RAG retrieval or a web fetch, the embedded instruction appears to carry the same authority as the user's own instructions.

Telemetry is off by default. With GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1 it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields like content, token or password are replaced with a placeholder. See @guardbee/mcp-telemetry.

Web page/RAG document ──► prompt-injection-scanner ──► LLM context

│ ├─ Instruction override ("ignore all previous instructions", "önceki talimatları yok say") ├─ Role spoofing ("System:", <|im_start|>, [INST], ) ├─ Hidden text (zero-width, Unicode tag and bidi characters, display:none + instruction, HTML comment) ├─ Direct address ("Dear AI, ...") └─ Exfiltration (system prompt extraction request, data → URL instruction, templated img beacon)


Features

  • 17 patterns, 5 categories — instruction-override, role-spoofing, hidden-text, direct-address, exfiltration. English and Turkish phrasing
  • The rules live in @guardbee/guard-core, shared with @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy, so a phrase this scanner reports is the same phrase the proxy blocks at runtime
  • Every finding includes why it's risky and what to do about it (recommendation) — not just "found it"
  • SARIF 2.1.0 output — CI/CD integration (e.g. auto-scanning a knowledge-base repo on every PR)
  • Config file support via guardbee.yml
  • 45 unit tests — a positive and a negative (false-positive) scenario for every pattern; known false-positive sources like emoji ZWJ sequences and ordinary display:none modals are specifically tested

Quick Start

Claude Desktop / MCP Client
{

"mcpServers": { "guardbee-prompt-injection-scanner": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"] } } }

CLI (CI/CD — e.g. scan a RAG knowledge-base repo on every PR)
npx @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner scan ./knowledge-base --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarif

MCP Tools

ToolDescription
scan_textScans a given text/document snippet
scan_fileScans a single file
scan_directoryRecursively scans a directory (e.g. a RAG knowledge base) (node_modules, .git, dist skipped automatically)
list_patternsLists all supported patterns by category

Detected Patterns

CategoryPatternSeverityWhat it means
instruction-overrideinstruction_override_phrasehighA classic override phrase like "ignore/disregard/forget previous instructions"
instruction-overrideinstruction_override_trhighThe Turkish form: "önceki talimatları yok say / unut / görmezden gel"
instruction-overridedan_modehighAsks for the "DAN mode" jailbreak persona
instruction-overridebypass_safetyhighTells the model to bypass or disable its safety measures / guardrails
role-spoofingsystem_role_spoofmediumA fake "System:" role label at the start of a line in the content
role-spoofingchat_template_marker_injectionhighRaw chat-template control tokens (`<\im_start\>, [INST]`) in the content
role-spoofingsystem_taghighA tag that tries to pass data off as a system message
hidden-texthidden_zero_width_charsmediumZero-width space/word-joiner (U+200B/U+2060) — text hidden from a human reviewer
hidden-textunicode_tag_smugglingcriticalInvisible Unicode tag characters (U+E0000–E007F) carrying hidden text; flag emoji such as 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿 are excluded
hidden-textbidi_control_charsmediumBidi override/isolate characters that make text display in a different order than it is read
hidden-textcss_hidden_text_with_instructionhighA display:none/white-on-white element containing instruction-like language
hidden-texthtml_comment_instructionhighAn HTML comment containing instruction-like language
direct-addressdirect_address_to_aimediumThe content directly addresses "the AI"/"the assistant"
exfiltrationexfiltration_url_template_in_imagehighA markdown image URL with a {{...}}/${...} template — a data-exfil beacon
exfiltrationreveal_system_prompt_requesthighA sentence asking the model to reveal its system prompt
exfiltrationreveal_system_prompt_trhighThe Turkish form: "sistem istemini göster"
exfiltrationsend_data_to_url_instructioncriticalAn explicit instruction ordering the model to send data to an external URL

These are heuristic findings — a static text-pattern scan, not a semantic/intent analysis. Designed for a low false-positive rate (e.g. emoji ZWJ sequences and ordinary display:none modals are specifically excluded), but every finding should still be reviewed manually.


LLM judge (optional)

The patterns know attack phrases; a paraphrased, indirect or translated instruction slips past them. --judge also has a model read each file, in chunks, and reports instructions aimed at an agent as judge_semantic_injection (high). The finding carries judge: { model, version, confidence }, also in SARIF properties. The judge only adds findings.

GUARDBEE_JUDGE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1 GUARDBEE_JUDGE_MODEL=qwen2.5:7b \

npx @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner scan ./docs --judge

It is off unless configured. Since the content goes to the endpoint, a non-local one needs --judge-allow-remote and https. On GuardBee's judge benchmark (50 English and Turkish samples), the patterns catch 16% of the attacks and qwen2.5:7b all of them, with no false positives.

Configuration (guardbee.yml)

prompt-injection-scanner:

fail-on: high # any | critical | high | medium | low | none max-files: 5000 exclude:

  • ".test.ts"
  • "fixtures/"

Development

npm run build

npm test # 45 unit tests


License

MIT — GuardBee

Feedback

Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.

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