Context7
Up-to-date docs for AI agents
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Scans RAG content/scraped pages for indirect prompt injection
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"prompt-injection-scanner": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add prompt-injection-scanner -- npx -y @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"prompt-injection-scanner": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"prompt-injection-scanner": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 GuardBee 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(1.2.0)于6天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Up-to-date docs for AI agents
Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.
Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文 | 🇯🇵 日本語 | 🇰🇷 한국어 | 🇧🇷 Português | 🇪🇸 Español | 🇩🇪 Deutsch
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans content — a RAG chunk, a scraped web page, a document — for indirect prompt injection payloads.
ai-code-scanner and mcp-server-auditor scan code; this package scans data. In classic prompt injection, the attacker writes a malicious prompt themselves; in indirect prompt injection, the attacker never talks to the model at all — instead they embed instructions in a document, web page, or tool result the model will later read. The moment the model pulls this content into its context via a RAG retrieval or a web fetch, the embedded instruction appears to carry the same authority as the user's own instructions.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Web page/RAG document ──► prompt-injection-scanner ──► LLM context
│ ├─ Instruction override ("ignore all previous instructions", "önceki talimatları yok say") ├─ Role spoofing ("System:", <|im_start|>, [INST], ) ├─ Hidden text (zero-width, Unicode tag and bidi characters, display:none + instruction, HTML comment) ├─ Direct address ("Dear AI, ...") └─ Exfiltration (system prompt extraction request, data → URL instruction, templated img beacon)
@guardbee/guard-core, shared with @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy, so a phrase this scanner reports is the same phrase the proxy blocks at runtimerecommendation) — not just "found it"guardbee.ymldisplay:none modals are specifically tested{
"mcpServers": { "guardbee-prompt-injection-scanner": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner"] } } }
npx @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner scan ./knowledge-base --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarif
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
scan_text | Scans a given text/document snippet |
scan_file | Scans a single file |
scan_directory | Recursively scans a directory (e.g. a RAG knowledge base) (node_modules, .git, dist skipped automatically) |
list_patterns | Lists all supported patterns by category |
| Category | Pattern | Severity | What it means | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| instruction-override | instruction_override_phrase | high | A classic override phrase like "ignore/disregard/forget previous instructions" | ||
| instruction-override | instruction_override_tr | high | The Turkish form: "önceki talimatları yok say / unut / görmezden gel" | ||
| instruction-override | dan_mode | high | Asks for the "DAN mode" jailbreak persona | ||
| instruction-override | bypass_safety | high | Tells the model to bypass or disable its safety measures / guardrails | ||
| role-spoofing | system_role_spoof | medium | A fake "System:" role label at the start of a line in the content | ||
| role-spoofing | chat_template_marker_injection | high | Raw chat-template control tokens (`<\ | im_start\ | >, [INST]`) in the content |
| role-spoofing | system_tag | high | A tag that tries to pass data off as a system message | ||
| hidden-text | hidden_zero_width_chars | medium | Zero-width space/word-joiner (U+200B/U+2060) — text hidden from a human reviewer | ||
| hidden-text | unicode_tag_smuggling | critical | Invisible Unicode tag characters (U+E0000–E007F) carrying hidden text; flag emoji such as 🏴 are excluded | ||
| hidden-text | bidi_control_chars | medium | Bidi override/isolate characters that make text display in a different order than it is read | ||
| hidden-text | css_hidden_text_with_instruction | high | A display:none/white-on-white element containing instruction-like language | ||
| hidden-text | html_comment_instruction | high | An HTML comment containing instruction-like language | ||
| direct-address | direct_address_to_ai | medium | The content directly addresses "the AI"/"the assistant" | ||
| exfiltration | exfiltration_url_template_in_image | high | A markdown image URL with a {{...}}/${...} template — a data-exfil beacon | ||
| exfiltration | reveal_system_prompt_request | high | A sentence asking the model to reveal its system prompt | ||
| exfiltration | reveal_system_prompt_tr | high | The Turkish form: "sistem istemini göster" | ||
| exfiltration | send_data_to_url_instruction | critical | An explicit instruction ordering the model to send data to an external URL |
These are heuristic findings — a static text-pattern scan, not a semantic/intent analysis. Designed for a low false-positive rate (e.g. emoji ZWJ sequences and ordinary display:none modals are specifically excluded), but every finding should still be reviewed manually.
The patterns know attack phrases; a paraphrased, indirect or translated instruction slips past them. --judge also has a model read each file, in chunks, and reports instructions aimed at an agent as judge_semantic_injection (high). The finding carries judge: { model, version, confidence }, also in SARIF properties. The judge only adds findings.
GUARDBEE_JUDGE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1 GUARDBEE_JUDGE_MODEL=qwen2.5:7b \
npx @guardbee/mcp-prompt-injection-scanner scan ./docs --judge
It is off unless configured. Since the content goes to the endpoint, a non-local one needs --judge-allow-remote and https. On GuardBee's judge benchmark (50 English and Turkish samples), the patterns catch 16% of the attacks and qwen2.5:7b all of them, with no false positives.
guardbee.yml)prompt-injection-scanner:
fail-on: high # any | critical | high | medium | low | none max-files: 5000 exclude:
npm run build
npm test # 45 unit tests
MIT — GuardBee
Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.