GitHub
Connect AI assistants to GitHub - manage repos, issues, PRs, and workflows through natural language.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
SSH & Kubernetes access broker for AI agents; the model never touches a credential.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"infrabroker": {
"command": "docker",
"args": [
"run",
"-i",
"--rm",
"ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3",
"-config",
"your-value"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add infrabroker -- docker run -i --rm ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3 -config your-value这个服务器需要在启动命令中填入值,请复制设置后自行填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"infrabroker": {
"command": "docker",
"args": [
"run",
"-i",
"--rm",
"ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3",
"-config",
"your-value"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器需要在启动命令中填入值,请复制设置后自行填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"infrabroker": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docker",
"args": [
"run",
"-i",
"--rm",
"ghcr.io/luisgf/infrabroker:3.1.3",
"-config",
"your-value"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 luisgf 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(3.1.3)于2个月前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Docker。
同一分类中有:GitHub, Desktop Commander, Cloudflare MCP
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Connect AI assistants to GitHub - manage repos, issues, PRs, and workflows through natural language.
MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
Cloudflare MCP servers
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
Infrastructure access broker for AI agents — SSH & Kubernetes. The model never touches a credential. *(formerly ssh-broker)*
The agent requests an *action* — run a command on a host, query or change a cluster. infrabroker checks it against policy, executes it with a credential minted for that single operation — an ephemeral, scope-limited SSH certificate from its own CA, or a short-lived bound ServiceAccount token — and returns only the output. Keys, certificates and tokens live in the broker's memory and are discarded after the call: nothing enters the model's context, so a prompt-injected agent has nothing to exfiltrate.
One binary — infrabroker — exposes the same engine (internal/broker) and tool surface (internal/mcpserver) over three transports, chosen by subcommand. (The legacy per-transport binaries broker / mcp-broker / mcp-broker-http remain as thin deprecated wrappers over these subcommands, so existing configs keep working.)
infrabroker serve-mcp. Tools: ssh_execute, ssh_session_open / ssh_session_exec / ssh_session_close, ssh_list_servers, ssh_put_file / ssh_get_file; with clusters configured, also k8s_get / k8s_list / k8s_logs / k8s_apply / k8s_delete / k8s_list_clusters. No transport auth — isolation comes from the process being launched by the user (as the MCP spec recommends for stdio).infrabroker serve-mcp-http, Streamable HTTP. Same tools, but each client authenticates with an OIDC bearer token validated locally against the issuer's JWKS; the user identity (and groups, for per-user RBAC) is propagated to the signer.infrabroker serve-http, POST /v1/ssh_run (one-shot), for network agents authenticated with a client certificate.This README is a landing page. The detail lives in focused, single-source docs:
| Document | Contents |
|---|---|
| QUICKSTART.md | First ssh_execute in under 10 minutes — single-binary local mode, no signer/PKI |
| ARCHITECTURE.md | Diagram, request flow, design decisions, sudo elevation, sessions, multi-CA |
| THREAT_MODEL.md | Actors, trust boundaries, security controls, and explicit non-goals/gaps |
| OPERATIONS.md | Runbook: startup, adding hosts, hot-reload, broker-ctl, PKI rotation, configs |
| MESH.md | Running infrabroker over a NetBird / Tailscale mesh — the session layer on top of the overlay path |
| SANDBOX.md | infrabroker with a sandboxed agent (ASP): the agent's code in a microVM, the credential and the action behind the broker — what each layer enforces, the OIDC recipe, the honest limits |
| HA.md | Why it is single-instance today: state inventory, the blockers, and what degrades under replication |
| API.md | HTTP endpoint reference for all services |
| USAGE.md | Guide to the MCP tools (SSH + Kubernetes), dry-run, and audit review (for the model / operator) |
| SECURITY.md | Vulnerability disclosure policy |
| CONTRIBUTING.md · CODING_STYLE.md | Workflow, versioning, Go style |
source-address (broker or bastion IP), and — for one-shot — a force-command. Useless outside its host/time/IP.allow_sudo / allowed_sudo_users live in the signer; a compromised broker cannot escalate where policy forbids it.ca_keys), each key optionally in Azure Key Vault or ssh-agent (YubiKey PIV / SoftHSM / TPM) — the private key never leaves the HSM.serial across signer, broker, and sshd.The full threat model — including what the system deliberately does not defend — is in THREAT_MODEL.md.
AI model ──tool call──> broker ──mTLS──> [control-plane] ──mTLS──> signer
(no credential) (ephemeral key (approval + (CA key + in RAM, never guardrails, policy + RBAC, on disk) no CA key) signs the cert) │ └── SSH with the ephemeral cert ──> bastion ──> target host └─ stdout/stderr/exit_code ─> model
The broker sends an *intent* ({host, role, purpose, command?, sudo?, pty?, pubkey, …}); the signer derives every certificate constraint from policy and returns the signed cert. The ephemeral private key is generated in the broker and never leaves it. See ARCHITECTURE.md for the request flow, the design decisions, and the per-hop ProxyJump certificate diagrams.
| Capability | One-liner | More |
|---|---|---|
| Ephemeral certificates | Ed25519 pair in RAM per operation; minutes-long, scoped cert. No reusable secret. | ARCHITECTURE |
| External signer | A separate cmd/signer holds the CA key and policy; the broker never does. | ARCHITECTURE |
| Multi-CA + HSM | One CA key per host group via ca_keys; local PEM, Azure Key Vault, or ssh-agent/HSM. | ARCHITECTURE |
| AI-action firewall | Per-host or composable-by-group command policy (allow/deny/require_approval), POSIX-sh AST parsing, dry-run. Authoritative for one-shot. | ARCHITECTURE · USAGE |
| Human-in-the-loop approval | Optional control plane gates require_approval commands behind out-of-band approval; the signer enforces it. | ARCHITECTURE · API |
| Action budgets (behaviour guardrails) | Budget *how much* an agent can do: per-CN sign-rate cap plus per-subject rate limit and novelty escalation (a subsequent new host / novel command → approval); observe or enforce. Network tools budget what an agent can *reach* or *spend*; this budgets the actions themselves. | OPERATIONS · ARCHITECTURE |
| Kill switch | Freeze a subject (caller CN, end user, session id or certificate serial): no new certificates, grants revoked, and live sessions are force-closed within revocation_poll_seconds. | OPERATIONS |
| Sealed exec | Opt-in per host (sealed_exec): every session command carries a signer-signed envelope that infrabroker-shim verifies on the target, so per-command authorization survives a compromised broker. | THREAT_MODEL gap 1 · deploy |
| Approval bridge | approval-bridge posts pending approvals to Slack (Socket Mode) with Allow / Deny buttons; outbound-only, so nothing with approval authority becomes internet-facing. | OPERATIONS |
| Secret redaction | On by default: credentials inline in commands are masked in audit logs, session recordings and approval notifications (best-effort pattern matching, not DLP). | THREAT_MODEL gap 8 |
| RBAC | Broker-CN groups (mTLS) + per-end-user OIDC groups; fail-closed. | ARCHITECTURE |
| sudo / PTY | Policy-gated elevation (sudo -n) and PTY allocation, per host. | ARCHITECTURE |
| Kubernetes broker | k8s_* tools with per-operation bound SA tokens, default-deny verb/resource/namespace policy, dry-run. | USAGE §10 |
| Session recording | shell/pty sessions to ASCIIcast v2 (.cast), indexed by session_id. | USAGE §8 |
| Chained audit | Append-only, Ed25519-signed, SHA-256-chained; correlated by serial. | USAGE §7 · API |
| Hot reload | signer.json re-read (and validated) without restart, via POST /v1/reload or SIGHUP. | OPERATIONS §3 |
Several tools address SSH access control or AI-agent credential security, but none cover the full combination that infrabroker targets in a lightweight, self-hosted package.
| Feature | infrabroker | Teleport | Vault + SSH engine | StrongDM | ssh-mcp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ephemeral cert in memory (no disk) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Separate broker / signing service | ✅ | ✅ | Partial | ❌ | ❌ |
| MCP-native (AI agents) | ✅ | ✅ (2025) | ✅ (2025) | ❌ | ✅ |
| OAuth2/OIDC on MCP transport | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Per-command policy + dry-run (AI-action firewall) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Human-in-the-loop approval for AI commands | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Per-agent behavioral guardrails (anomaly/rate) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Session recording (ASCIIcast v2, stdin+stdout+stderr) | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | Partial | ❌ |
| Cryptographically chained audit log | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | Partial | ❌ |
| Single-binary / simple self-hosted | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| HSM/KMS for CA key | ✅ (AKV, ssh-agent/HSM) | ✅ | ✅ | — | — |
[Teleport](https://goteleport.com/) is the closest commercial equivalent — short-lived SSH certs, RBAC, and since 2025 *Secure MCP*; its Jan-2026 *Agentic Identity Framework* targets the same threat model. The difference is operational weight: Teleport needs a dedicated control-plane cluster, recording proxy, and web UI — orders of magnitude heavier than a Go binary + signer.
[HashiCorp Vault SSH secrets engine](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/secrets/ssh) is an SSH CA with full HSM/KMS support and (2025) its own MCP server, but it provides only the *signing* piece — you still build the execution layer (engine.go, session.go, the MCP tools) yourself.
[StrongDM](https://www.strongdm.com/) hides credentials but stores long-lived secrets rather than generating ephemeral certs in memory, making it weaker against exfiltration. [Smallstep SSH CA](https://smallstep.com/) is a lightweight OIDC-integrated SSH CA (close to cmd/signer) with no execution broker or MCP layer. **[ssh-mcp](https://
只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读