Action1 MCP by usefulapi
Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Offline security scanning for AI-generated code: seven open-source scanners in one MCP server.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"valvur": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valvur",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add valvur -- uvx valvur mcp粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"valvur": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valvur",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"valvur": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"valvur",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月8日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 MaverickHQ 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(1.6.1)于7天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。
同一分类中有:Action1 MCP by usefulapi, ipdata MCP by usefulapi, MaxMind minFraud MCP by usefulapi
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.
Look up location, network, company and threat data for IP addresses and ASNs in ipdata.
MCP server for MaxMind minFraud — score transactions for fraud risk from your AI assistant.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
Offline security scanning for AI-generated code.
Seven open-source scanners and AI-specific checks, in one command and one ranked report.
Scorecard's Code-Review, Branch-Protection and Contributors checks need a second maintainer; valvur has one (MAINTAINERS.md).
Status: `1.6.1`, the version this tree declares; the PyPI badge above shows what
pip install valvurserves, and the CHANGELOG what each version changed.
In Claude Code: /plugin marketplace add MaverickHQ/valvur, then /plugin install valvur@valvur, and ask it to scan the project.
From a terminal, with Docker or Podman running: uvx valvur scan.
run.json, beside what left the machine: nothing. One command checks it.| area | what valvur reports | found by |
|---|---|---|
| Hallucinated packages | dependencies that do not exist, or sit one edit from a popular name, checked offline against every name on PyPI, npm, RubyGems, Packagist and crates.io | valvur's dependency-reality Check |
| Malicious packages | dependencies published as malicious, from OpenSSF's malicious-packages | OSV-Scanner, and the same Check |
| Agent configuration | injected directives, hidden Unicode, unpinned MCP servers, blanket approval, hooks that run a command, settings that would leak | valvur's ai-artifact Check |
| Vulnerable dependencies | known CVEs from lockfiles, ranked by exploitation, with the direct package to bump | Trivy, OSV-Scanner |
| Secrets | credentials in the files and in git history | Gitleaks |
| Code | injection, path traversal, SSRF, open redirects, XXE and insecure cookies, and model output reaching eval, a shell, a query or the DOM | Opengrep, with valvur's rules |
| Infrastructure | Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes and Dockerfile misconfiguration | Checkov |
| CI workflows | unpinned actions, write permissions, template injection | zizmor |
| Licences and SBOM | a missing or contradictory project licence; a CycloneDX SBOM when asked for | valvur's licence-file Check, Syft |
What it checks, rule by rule, and what it cannot see: how valvur works.
.env* files and agent configuration), fetches the public data it needs, and records each fetch..security-scan/ ← ignores itself in git, so it is never committed
├── SUMMARY.md ← start here: the verdict, anything that failed, the top groups ├── REMEDIATION.md ← a ranked proposal: you choose what to apply ├── findings.json ← every finding, normalised, secrets redacted ├── results.sarif ← SARIF 2.1.0, for code scanning and IDEs └── run.json ← what ran, what was fetched, and what left the machine: nothing
A scan ends findings, clean or inconclusive. It never says clean when stale data, an uninspected ecosystem or a Scanner that did not finish cannot support it, and it says why.
How much of what valvur claims it finds is measured as the Score: nine tracks scored by the OWASP Benchmark's formula, with a ratchet that no change may fall more than two points under. It is 74.1 out of 100, the same on Linux and on macOS.
| track | what it holds | score |
|---|---|---|
| sast-python | the OWASP Benchmark for Python | 40.9 |
| sast-js | valvur's JavaScript twins: ten weaknesses, vulnerable and fixed | 55.0 |
| secrets | ten formats, in files and in history | 100.0 |
| dependencies | lockfiles pinned to vulnerable versions; known-malicious packages | 100.0 |
| package-reality | nonexistent, near-miss and malicious names | 100.0 |
| agent-configuration | planted directives and hidden Unicode, against real files | 94.3 |
| infrastructure | Terraform, Kubernetes, Dockerfile and Actions faults | 95.0 |
| real-code-precision | 48 maintained projects, every finding labelled by hand | 2.3 |
| llm-output | model output reaching code, a shell, a query or the DOM: generated twins and five published advisories | 79.0 |
Track 8 is precision on maintained code, where almost nothing is a vulnerability: 3 of its 171 findings are real. Track 9 measures the rules for model output reaching a sink: they catch 30 of 34 generated flows with no false alarm, and none of five published advisories in LangChain, LlamaIndex and Vanna, whose flows each cross a function. Each rule's precision is in docs/RULES.md, and the method, the gates and what valvur does not claim are in docs/EVALUATING.md. Read that one sceptically.
The Claude Code plugin brings the MCP server, a skill that runs the workflow, and a hook that asks you before the agent installs a package valvur flags. Kiro takes it as a power. Any MCP client runs the server with uvx --from valvur valvur-mcp. The agents' guide has the configuration for eleven clients, the seven tools, and the permissions a *don't ask* mode needs.
The Scanners run in a container, so the machine needs Docker or Podman; valvur doctor says what is missing.
pip install valvur # or: uv tool install valvur
valvur scan # offline by default; --profile full adds the registries' answers valvur check npm left-pad # before an install: real, a near-miss, or malicious? valvur gate . --fail-on high --no-inconclusive
The command-line guide has every command, what a first scan fetches, the Results Folder, and the settings files.
- uses: MaverickHQ/valvur-action@16b19e275f843419887873ed536a71f872607e24 # v0.2
with: { fail-on: high, no-inconclusive: "true" }
The action scans, uploads results.sarif to code scanning and gates the job. The CI guide covers the gate, the image as a step of its own, and GitLab.
valvur builds no detection engine. Seven open-source Scanners do that and deserve the credit; valvur adds one File Set, one findings model, exploit-aware ranking, and three Checks of its own. All of them run in one container, fed a copy of the files. run.json records the version of each that ran, and raw/ keeps what each said.
| Scanner | Licence | Reads | Runs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gitleaks | MIT | Secrets in the files scanned and in git history, the newest 5,000 commits or 200 MB | always |
| Trivy | Apache-2.0 | Known vulnerabilities in dependencies, from lockfiles, against its database in the host cache | always |
| OSV-Scanner | Apache-2.0 | Lockfiles against OSV's data, which carries the known-malicious MAL- packages nothing else here reports. On offline, OSV's offline database for each ecosystem present, fetched into the host cache; on full, OSV.dev's API, which receives lockfile names and versions | always |
| Opengrep | LGPL-2.1 | Static analysis: pinning rules, a sink inventory at INFO, taint rules from a model call to a sink, and taint rules from request data | always |
| Checkov | Apache-2.0 | Infrastructure misconfiguration: Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Dockerfiles, other CI systems | where there is infrastructure other than GitHub workflows |
| zizmor | MIT | GitHub Actions workflows: unpinned actions, write permissions, template injection | where there are workflows |
| Syft | Apache-2.0 | The SBOM, and the dependency licences read from it | when asked for: scan --sbom, or sbom = true under [scan] |
| Check | Reads |
|---|---|
ai-artifact | Agent configuration: injected directives, hidden Unicode, unpinned MCP servers, blanket approval, hooks that run a command, and local settings that would leak |
dependency-reality | Every declared dependency against the Name Index: does it exist, and on full, how old and how adopted is it. Every declared or locked one against the known-malicious list, built daily from OpenSSF's malicious-packages |
licence-file | The project's own licence: missing, or contradicting what the manifest declares |
Exploit intelligence comes from CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS: public primary sources, auditable and mirrorable. No proprietary database, and nothing to lock you in.
| platform | support |
|---|---|
| Linux, Docker and Podman | Supported. Every commit runs the e2e suite against Docker and Podman on amd64, and against Docker on arm64, and a scan with the published image on both; the acceptance set runs nightly on GitHub's Linux runner |
| macOS, Docker Desktop or Podman | Supported, and tested by hand on
只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读