原型 · 预览版:收录官方注册中心里的全部服务器,每 30 分钟同步一次。评价和账户功能将在后续阶段推出。
PopNx MCP为使用 AI 的人准备的 MCP 服务器 · 用大白话讲清楚

valvur

作者:MaverickHQ版本 1.6.1i★ –i在你的电脑上运行
注册名称io.github.MaverickHQ/valvur

安装

概览

作者提供的说明(英文原文)

Offline security scanning for AI-generated code: seven open-source scanners in one MCP server.

PopNx MCP 的三大支柱

这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。

它能帮你做什么

我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。

  • 连接方式: 在你的电脑上运行
  • 传输方式: stdio
  • 分类: 网络安全

安装

选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。

安装之前

  • 基础检查:1 项中通过 1 项
  • 在你的电脑上运行,拥有你的用户账户的权限(文件、网络、应用)。
  • 注册中心没有列出需要填写的密钥。

你需要

  • PyPI已安装 Python 的 uv(用于 uvx 命令)

你用的是哪个应用?

在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。

打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "valvur": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "valvur",
        "mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

在终端中运行这条命令

claude mcp add valvur -- uvx valvur mcp

在 Cursor 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "valvur": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "valvur",
        "mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

在 VS Code 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json

{
  "servers": {
    "valvur": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "valvur",
        "mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。

你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。

这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。

它能做什么

它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。

基础检查i

我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月8日

  • ✓ 通过

    作者与仓库一致

    注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 MaverickHQ 验证,该账户拥有此仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    仍在维护

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    有许可证

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • – 不适用

    端点有响应

    它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点

  • – 不适用

    使用 OAuth 登录

    在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置

  • … 尚未检查

    工具描述中没有隐藏指令

    它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表

与“网络安全”中的其他服务器比较i

  • 星标数多于此分类中其他 996 个服务器的 0%
  • 发布到注册中心的时间比此分类中其他 996 个服务器的 84% 更新
  • 基础检查结果等于或优于此分类中其他 996 个服务器的 100%

与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。

常见问题

valvur 安全吗?

它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。

它需要哪些密钥或代码?

注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。

它在我的电脑上运行还是在云端?

它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。

它还在维护吗?

GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(1.6.1)于7天前进入注册中心。

哪些应用可以使用它?

支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。

有什么可以替代它?

同一分类中有:Action1 MCP by usefulapi, ipdata MCP by usefulapi, MaxMind minFraud MCP by usefulapi

替代选择

同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。

如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i

Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.

在云端运行今天更新
安装

Look up location, network, company and threat data for IP addresses and ASNs in ipdata.

在云端运行今天更新
安装

作者的 README

打开 README

按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。

Offline security scanning for AI-generated code.

Seven open-source scanners and AI-specific checks, in one command and one ranked report.

Scorecard's Code-Review, Branch-Protection and Contributors checks need a second maintainer; valvur has one (MAINTAINERS.md).

Status: `1.6.1`, the version this tree declares; the PyPI badge above shows what pip install valvur serves, and the CHANGELOG what each version changed.

In Claude Code: /plugin marketplace add MaverickHQ/valvur, then /plugin install valvur@valvur, and ask it to scan the project.

From a terminal, with Docker or Podman running: uvx valvur scan.

Why valvur

  • Seven scanners, one report. Gitleaks, Trivy, OSV-Scanner, Opengrep, Checkov, zizmor and Syft, pinned, installed and run for you in one container, beside valvur's own checks for AI-written code. A vulnerability two of them report is one finding, not two, and everything is ranked together.
  • Nothing leaves your machine, provably. No account, no API key, no telemetry. The Scanners run in one container with no network interface, and your source is copied in, never mounted. Every fetch of public data is recorded in run.json, beside what left the machine: nothing. One command checks it.
  • Built for how AI-generated code breaks. Models invent package names that attackers then register; agent instruction files carry injected directives and hidden Unicode; agent settings leak tokens. valvur checks for each, offline, beside the classic secrets, vulnerable dependencies and misconfigurations.
  • Ten findings that matter, not four hundred. Findings are ranked by whether attackers are exploiting them, from CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS rather than CVSS alone, grouped by rule and directory, with development-only dependencies demoted.
  • You stay in charge. valvur proposes fixes and never applies them. An agent told to reach zero findings can delete code or write suppressions instead, and *the finding disappeared* is not *the vulnerability is fixed*.

What it finds

areawhat valvur reportsfound by
Hallucinated packagesdependencies that do not exist, or sit one edit from a popular name, checked offline against every name on PyPI, npm, RubyGems, Packagist and crates.iovalvur's dependency-reality Check
Malicious packagesdependencies published as malicious, from OpenSSF's malicious-packagesOSV-Scanner, and the same Check
Agent configurationinjected directives, hidden Unicode, unpinned MCP servers, blanket approval, hooks that run a command, settings that would leakvalvur's ai-artifact Check
Vulnerable dependenciesknown CVEs from lockfiles, ranked by exploitation, with the direct package to bumpTrivy, OSV-Scanner
Secretscredentials in the files and in git historyGitleaks
Codeinjection, path traversal, SSRF, open redirects, XXE and insecure cookies, and model output reaching eval, a shell, a query or the DOMOpengrep, with valvur's rules
InfrastructureTerraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes and Dockerfile misconfigurationCheckov
CI workflowsunpinned actions, write permissions, template injectionzizmor
Licences and SBOMa missing or contradictory project licence; a CycloneDX SBOM when asked forvalvur's licence-file Check, Syft

What it checks, rule by rule, and what it cannot see: how valvur works.

How it works

  1. A small host shim decides what a scan reads (the files git would publish, plus .env* files and agent configuration), fetches the public data it needs, and records each fetch.
  2. One Scan Container, with no network interface, runs every Scanner over a copy of those files fed on stdin. Nothing in it can change your source.
  3. One findings model normalises and ranks what they report, and the shim writes the Results Folder into your project:
.security-scan/          ← ignores itself in git, so it is never committed

├── SUMMARY.md ← start here: the verdict, anything that failed, the top groups ├── REMEDIATION.md ← a ranked proposal: you choose what to apply ├── findings.json ← every finding, normalised, secrets redacted ├── results.sarif ← SARIF 2.1.0, for code scanning and IDEs └── run.json ← what ran, what was fetched, and what left the machine: nothing

A scan ends findings, clean or inconclusive. It never says clean when stale data, an uninspected ecosystem or a Scanner that did not finish cannot support it, and it says why.

Measured, not claimed

How much of what valvur claims it finds is measured as the Score: nine tracks scored by the OWASP Benchmark's formula, with a ratchet that no change may fall more than two points under. It is 74.1 out of 100, the same on Linux and on macOS.

trackwhat it holdsscore
sast-pythonthe OWASP Benchmark for Python40.9
sast-jsvalvur's JavaScript twins: ten weaknesses, vulnerable and fixed55.0
secretsten formats, in files and in history100.0
dependencieslockfiles pinned to vulnerable versions; known-malicious packages100.0
package-realitynonexistent, near-miss and malicious names100.0
agent-configurationplanted directives and hidden Unicode, against real files94.3
infrastructureTerraform, Kubernetes, Dockerfile and Actions faults95.0
real-code-precision48 maintained projects, every finding labelled by hand2.3
llm-outputmodel output reaching code, a shell, a query or the DOM: generated twins and five published advisories79.0

Track 8 is precision on maintained code, where almost nothing is a vulnerability: 3 of its 171 findings are real. Track 9 measures the rules for model output reaching a sink: they catch 30 of 34 generated flows with no false alarm, and none of five published advisories in LangChain, LlamaIndex and Vanna, whose flows each cross a function. Each rule's precision is in docs/RULES.md, and the method, the gates and what valvur does not claim are in docs/EVALUATING.md. Read that one sceptically.

Use it

In an AI coding agent

The Claude Code plugin brings the MCP server, a skill that runs the workflow, and a hook that asks you before the agent installs a package valvur flags. Kiro takes it as a power. Any MCP client runs the server with uvx --from valvur valvur-mcp. The agents' guide has the configuration for eleven clients, the seven tools, and the permissions a *don't ask* mode needs.

From the command line

The Scanners run in a container, so the machine needs Docker or Podman; valvur doctor says what is missing.

pip install valvur          # or: uv tool install valvur

valvur scan # offline by default; --profile full adds the registries' answers valvur check npm left-pad # before an install: real, a near-miss, or malicious? valvur gate . --fail-on high --no-inconclusive

The command-line guide has every command, what a first scan fetches, the Results Folder, and the settings files.

In CI
- uses: MaverickHQ/valvur-action@16b19e275f843419887873ed536a71f872607e24 # v0.2

with: { fail-on: high, no-inconclusive: "true" }

The action scans, uploads results.sarif to code scanning and gates the job. The CI guide covers the gate, the image as a step of its own, and GitLab.

Built on open-source scanners

valvur builds no detection engine. Seven open-source Scanners do that and deserve the credit; valvur adds one File Set, one findings model, exploit-aware ranking, and three Checks of its own. All of them run in one container, fed a copy of the files. run.json records the version of each that ran, and raw/ keeps what each said.

ScannerLicenceReadsRuns
GitleaksMITSecrets in the files scanned and in git history, the newest 5,000 commits or 200 MBalways
TrivyApache-2.0Known vulnerabilities in dependencies, from lockfiles, against its database in the host cachealways
OSV-ScannerApache-2.0Lockfiles against OSV's data, which carries the known-malicious MAL- packages nothing else here reports. On offline, OSV's offline database for each ecosystem present, fetched into the host cache; on full, OSV.dev's API, which receives lockfile names and versionsalways
OpengrepLGPL-2.1Static analysis: pinning rules, a sink inventory at INFO, taint rules from a model call to a sink, and taint rules from request dataalways
CheckovApache-2.0Infrastructure misconfiguration: Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Dockerfiles, other CI systemswhere there is infrastructure other than GitHub workflows
zizmorMITGitHub Actions workflows: unpinned actions, write permissions, template injectionwhere there are workflows
SyftApache-2.0The SBOM, and the dependency licences read from itwhen asked for: scan --sbom, or sbom = true under [scan]
CheckReads
ai-artifactAgent configuration: injected directives, hidden Unicode, unpinned MCP servers, blanket approval, hooks that run a command, and local settings that would leak
dependency-realityEvery declared dependency against the Name Index: does it exist, and on full, how old and how adopted is it. Every declared or locked one against the known-malicious list, built daily from OpenSSF's malicious-packages
licence-fileThe project's own licence: missing, or contradicting what the manifest declares

Exploit intelligence comes from CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS: public primary sources, auditable and mirrorable. No proprietary database, and nothing to lock you in.

What it does not do

  • No reachability analysis. We do not prove a vulnerable function is called.
  • No autonomous fixing. You choose the fixes.
  • No penetration testing. No DAST, no exploitation, no scanning of deployed systems.
  • No code-quality analysis. Security only.
  • We will not out-detect commercial SAST. We win on trust, breadth in one artifact, and prioritisation, not on engine depth.

Platforms

platformsupport
Linux, Docker and PodmanSupported. Every commit runs the e2e suite against Docker and Podman on amd64, and against Docker on arm64, and a scan with the published image on both; the acceptance set runs nightly on GitHub's Linux runner

| macOS, Docker Desktop or Podman | Supported, and tested by hand on

只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读

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