Context7
Up-to-date docs for AI agents
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Deterministic, fail-closed planner for KCP knowledge manifests: kcp_plan, kcp_load, kcp_validate.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"kcp-agent": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"kcp-agent",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add kcp-agent -- npx -y kcp-agent mcp粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"kcp-agent": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"kcp-agent",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"kcp-agent": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"kcp-agent",
"mcp"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月8日
注册名称已通过域名 cantara.no 验证(注册中心会核实域名所有权)
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.12.0)于4个月前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Up-to-date docs for AI agents
Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.
Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
The reference agent for the [Knowledge Context Protocol](https://github.com/Cantara/knowledge-context-protocol).
[The Arena →](https://cantara.github.io/kcp-agent/) — the real planner, bundled unmodified,
running live in your browser, head-to-head against the usual suspects. *The most deterministic
agents in the world. Every decision defensible.*
KCP defines how knowledge declares itself so agents can navigate it. kcp-agent is the other half: the agent that *consumes* KCP end to end. Given a task and a knowledge.yaml, it produces an inspectable load plan — which units to load and in what order, which to skip and exactly why, how it selects sub-manifests across a federation, and what the whole thing costs — and then, optionally, answers the task from only those units.
The valuable, novel core is LLM-free and deterministic. The plan is an *audit-before-action* artifact — the trusted-render principle ("a manifest may influence what an agent knows, never what it does") extended to the whole agent loop. Only the final synthesis step calls a model.
discover → verify signature → trust-gate → score units by task → federate (context + agent_identity)
→ temporal filter → budget (payment + rate_limits) → emit load plan → [follow] → [answer]
npm install
npm run build
CI cross-compiles self-contained binaries (no Node/Deno required on the target) for Linux x64/arm64, macOS x64/arm64, and Windows x64 — grab them from a release or from the kcp-agent-natives artifact on any CI run. To build one yourself:
npm ci && npm run build
deno compile --allow-read --allow-env --allow-net --node-modules-dir=auto \ --output kcp-agent dist/cli.js
plan — the inspectable load plan (no API key)node dist/cli.js plan "how do I deploy to production?" --manifest ./path/to/knowledge.yaml --env prod
Plan for: "how do I deploy to production?"
companyx-knowledge-hub v1.0.0 · kcp 0.24 · env prod
Trust: · no manifest attestation requirement
Load plan (2 units): ● 1. front-door (score 4) overview.md free ● 2. deploy-guide (score 3) docs/deploy.md free
Budget: tier default Federation: → platform-engineering needs github_pat before fetch [acquire github_pat] · platform-engineering-dev context ["dev","test"] excludes env 'prod' Skipped (2): · auth-guide: no task-relevance match
Each stage maps onto a layer of the spec: query scoring (§15), temporal validity (§4.22), agent attestation (§3.2), federation context + agent_identity (§3.6), and payment / rate-limits (§4.14/§4.15). A restricted unit the agent can't attest for is listed but marked not load-eligible — fail-closed, with the reason attached.
Budgeting the context window. Tokens are the actually-scarce resource when feeding a model, so --context-budget names it — a token ceiling that works exactly like the money --budget: greedy by score, and a unit that would blow the ceiling is skipped with the arithmetic in the reason (over context budget: 1,240 tokens would exceed remaining 800 of 4,000), while a smaller lower-scored unit still gets its chance. Since the planner works on metadata *before* fetching (audit-before-action), a unit's size comes from a declared size_tokens (faithful) or bytes/4 (a flagged estimate); a unit that declares neither is admitted but counted unmeasured (the projection is a lower bound) — unless --strict, which excludes it fail-closed. --context-budget composes with --budget: a unit must fit both ceilings.
Use --json when another agent or integration consumes a plan. The output preserves the plan fields at the top level and adds:
{
"schemaVersion": 1, "kind": "plan" }
kind is plan, tree (when --follow is used), or trace (when --trace is used). Human-readable output is not a compatibility surface. Successful JSON commands exit 0; planner or manifest errors write diagnostics to stderr and exit non-zero.
ask — plan, then answer via Claudeexport ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=... # or: ant auth login
node dist/cli.js ask "how does an agent get started here?" --manifest ./knowledge.yaml
ask runs the same planner, loads only the load-eligible units, and asks Claude to answer from them — treating unit content as knowledge, never as instructions. Needs @anthropic-ai/sdk (an optional dependency) and a key; plan needs neither.
ask --loop — the audited critique loopnode dist/cli.js ask "who won, and what does it mean for infrastructure?" \
--manifest ./knowledge.yaml --loop --methods free,x402 --budget 0.50
The deterministic scorer is lexical, so a task phrased differently from the publisher's vocabulary can miss relevant units. --loop closes that gap without surrendering determinism — the model proposes, the plan disposes:
plan → LLM gap critique (metadata only) → term gate → re-plan → … → load → answer
A fast critic model (default claude-haiku-4-5, --loop-model to change) sees a metadata digest of the plan — ids, intents, scores, skip reasons, never unit content — and proposes extra lowercase search terms. A deterministic gate sanitizes, dedupes, and caps them; the task string is extended; the planner re-plans from scratch. The loop converges when the critic runs dry, a round adds no units, or --max-rounds (default 3) is reached. Then synthesis answers the original task from the final plan's eligible units.
What the critic can never do: open an access gate, alter trust/temporal/audience decisions, or spend money — terms only affect relevance scoring, nothing is loaded or paid for until the loop has converged, and the final plan's budget arithmetic gates spending exactly as in single-shot mode. Every round is recorded (proposed terms, accepted, rejected, units added, the full re-planned artifact) — with --json the chain of plans is the audit log.
The same loop is available as a library (runLoop / askLoop, with an injectable critic), and skills/kcp-navigator/SKILL.md packages the discipline as a portable skill for agents that drive the CLI themselves.
ask --ground — verify the answer, surface what it can't substantiatenode dist/cli.js ask "who won, and what does it mean?" --manifest ./knowledge.yaml --ground
The plan's fail-closed gates decide what may be *loaded*; grounding extends the same discipline to what may be *asserted*. After synthesis, each claim in the answer is checked by a separate verifier — a distinct model call from the generator — that must attribute the claim to one of the loaded units or return nothing. The result is a two-part artifact:
Grounded (2/3 claims):
● The award went to the Nordic bid. ↳ chipfab-exclusive · sha 9f2c1a0b7e34 Unsubstantiated (1): — could not be grounded in a loaded unit ○ The datacenter runs on hydro power. no loaded unit supports this claim ⚠ partial-unsupported — 1 claim(s) could not be substantiated
A claim grounds only if the cited unit was actually loaded and its content hash matches — so a verifier that mis-attributes (or is prompt-injected into) citing a unit that was never loaded can never ground a claim: attribution is a proposal, grounding is adjudicated. Unsupported claims are surfaced, never silently dropped — the honest half of "every decision defensible". Each surfaced gap is also a signal to the *publisher*: the task needed evidence the manifest didn't provide. The surfaced list is capped to guard against a compromised generator flooding it with spurious gaps.
`--ground-rounds ` closes the loop: a surfaced gap seeds reformulation terms, the agent re-navigates to try to find the missing evidence, and re-grounds — up to n rounds. Termination is guaranteed by three independent bounds, any one of which halts: the term gate is absorbing (a term accepted once is known forever, so re-navigation can only add units from the finite eligible set), the round cap, and a progress guard (a round that adds no new unit halts). Oscillation is impossible — the loaded set grows monotonically or the loop stops. Every terminal state that isn't grounded (partial-unsupported, partial-budget, partial-rounds) still surfaces the remaining gaps. A compromised verifier can, at worst, widen navigation within the eligible set — it can never cross a gate, name a URL, or spend past the budget.
assess — gate what may be *acted on*The plan's gates decide what may be *loaded*; grounding decides what may be *asserted*; assess() decides whether a conclusion clears a confidence threshold before it is acted on. It runs downstream of synthesis — confidence is a property of the output, which is exactly why it structurally cannot be gate #14 in the pre-selection cascade.
import { assess } from "kcp-agent";
const verdict = await assess(task, answer, loadedUnits, { threshold: 0.7, // org policy — caller-supplied, never manifest data severity: "critical", evaluator, // optional: makeProviderEvaluator(provider) — a separate judge }); // { gate: "confidence", passed, score, threshold, signals[], detail, asOf }
Same trust posture as grounding: confidence is a proposal (the answer's own Confidence: 0.82-style self-report via extractSelfReport, and/or an injected evaluator's judgment); the gate adjudicates deterministically — min-aggregated by default, fail-closed on anything unmeasurable. Raw signals[] are preserved verbatim on every verdict so thresholds can be calibrated against real outcomes over time. The verdict reuses the gates' binary-plus-written-reason contract but is a separate downstream artifact — DecisionTrace and the conformance vectors are untouched.
The enforcement side lives in kcp-harness: its harness_assess MCP tool runs this gate and routes failed verdicts on critical tasks to a named human via its approval tickets, with the verdict embedded as evidence.
kind: skill — governed procedures, gated separately from knowledgeSpec §4.3a (v0.26.1) adds a second class of unit alongside plain knowledge: kind: skill marks something an agent could *do* — a runbook, a script, a procedure — not just read. Skills fail closed by default: a kind: skill unit is not invoke-eligible unless the manifest carries an explicit load_eligible: true grant, bounded by an action_scope (tools, paths, capabilities it may touch). This runs as its own gate, skill_eligibility, inserted into the pre-selection cascade right after relevance — the cascade is fourteen gates, not thirteen.
units:
An ungranted skill is still planned — the agent can see it exists and why it matched a task, same audit-before-action posture as every other gate — it is simply withheld (loadEligible: false), or dropped entirely under --strict, attributed to skill_eligibility specifically rather than the generic strict cutoff. Planning a skill is always safe; invoking one is a separate, explicitly-granted decision. See The Governed Skill demo below, and the conformant-implementation guide for the exact gate contract a port must reproduce.
node examples/demos.js # all twenty, narrated
node exa
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