PatchLabs

PatchLabs

Leak checks and tested fixes for AI-built apps: https://patchlabs.dev

Flow

1. Visitor enters a GitHub repo and email on patchlabs.dev → POST /checks.
2. They prove the repo is theirs by committing patchlabs-verify.txt with a one-time code → POST /checks/{id}/verify.
3. The worker claims the check (POST /worker/claim), rebuilds the database from the repo's migrations in a lab, finds personal data the wrong people can read, has the fix agent write a fix (Haiku first, escalating to Sonnet then Opus only if the lab proof fails), and posts the report (POST /worker/checks/{id}/result).
4. The check page shows the report, the proof table and the fix, and offers the fix as a download. An email goes out at each step once SMTP is configured.

API

Contract: SPEC.md. JSON everywhere; errors are {"detail": "..."}. Signed-in calls send Authorization: Bearer , CI calls send X-API-Key: pl_live_..., worker and admin calls send their bearer tokens.

Env: DATABASE_URL, WORKER_TOKEN, ADMIN_TOKEN, SITE_URL, CORS_ORIGINS, SMTP_*, RECEIPT_PRIVATE_KEY (required: base64 of a 32-byte Ed25519 seed, python3 -c "import os,base64;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(32)).decode())"; the API refuses to start without it unless PATCHLABS_DEV=1), optional GITHUB_TOKEN, FOUNDER_EMAIL. Test hooks: EMAIL_OUTBOX, GITHUB_API, RAW_GITHUB. Security rules (rate limits, verification, masking): see "Security rules" in SPEC.md.

Webhooks are signed: X-PatchLabs-Signature: v1= . "> with the workspace's whsec_ secret and X-PatchLabs-Timestamp; verification snippet at https://patchlabs.dev/docs/webhooks#security.

Verify a receipt (signed bytes are the receipt as JSON with sorted keys and (",", ":") separators):

import base64, json, urllib.request

from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey API, CHECK = "https://api.patchlabs.dev", " " r = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(f"{API}/receipts/{CHECK}")) k = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(f"{API}/.well-known/patchlabs-receipt-key")) assert r["key_id"] == k["key_id"], "signed with a different key" msg = json.dumps(r["receipt"], sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode() pub = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(base64.b64decode(k["public_key"])) pub.verify(base64.b64decode(r["signature"]), msg) # raises InvalidSignature if anything was changed print("receipt is genuine:", r"receipt", r"receipt")

Tests: tools/test-api.sh runs the whole suite in Docker (throwaway postgres:17 + python:3.13-slim) and cleans up after itself; extra arguments go to pytest, e.g. tools/test-api.sh -k webhook -x.

Deploy the API

TAG=$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M)

az acr build -r sponsorjobsregistry -t patchlabs-api:$TAG -f api/Dockerfile . az containerapp update -g ics-rg -n patchlabs-api --image sponsorjobsregistry.azurecr.io/patchlabs-api:$TAG

Before the first v2 deploy, set `RECEIPT_PRIVATE_KEY` as a secret on the container app: without it the new image won't start.