原型 · 预览版:收录官方注册中心里的全部服务器,每 30 分钟同步一次。评价和账户功能将在后续阶段推出。
PopNx MCP为使用 AI 的人准备的 MCP 服务器 · 用大白话讲清楚

MCP Security Guard

作者:petrovicistefan版本 0.9.1i★ –i在你的电脑上运行
注册名称io.github.petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard

安装

概览

作者提供的说明(英文原文)

Audit MCP servers for tool poisoning, rug pulls and supply-chain risk (OWASP MCP Top 10).

PopNx MCP 的三大支柱

这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。

它能帮你做什么

我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。

  • 连接方式: 在你的电脑上运行
  • 传输方式: stdio
  • 分类: 网络安全

安装

选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。

安装之前

  • 基础检查:1 项中通过 1 项
  • 在你的电脑上运行,拥有你的用户账户的权限(文件、网络、应用)。
  • 注册中心没有列出需要填写的密钥。

你需要

  • npm已安装 Node.js(用于 npx 命令)

你用的是哪个应用?

在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。

打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "security-guard": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "mcp-security-guard"
      ]
    }
  }
}

在终端中运行这条命令

claude mcp add security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guard

在 Cursor 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "security-guard": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "mcp-security-guard"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

在 VS Code 中打开

或者自己复制设置

粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json

{
  "servers": {
    "security-guard": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "mcp-security-guard"
      ]
    }
  }
}

浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。

这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。

你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。

这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。

它能做什么

它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。

基础检查i

我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月8日

  • ✓ 通过

    作者与仓库一致

    注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 petrovicistefan 验证,该账户拥有此仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    仍在维护

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • … 尚未检查

    有许可证

    我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库

  • – 不适用

    端点有响应

    它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点

  • – 不适用

    使用 OAuth 登录

    在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置

  • … 尚未检查

    工具描述中没有隐藏指令

    它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表

与“网络安全”中的其他服务器比较i

  • 星标数多于此分类中其他 996 个服务器的 0%
  • 发布到注册中心的时间比此分类中其他 996 个服务器的 67% 更新
  • 基础检查结果等于或优于此分类中其他 996 个服务器的 100%

与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。

常见问题

MCP Security Guard 安全吗?

它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。

它需要哪些密钥或代码?

注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。

它在我的电脑上运行还是在云端?

它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。

它还在维护吗?

GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.9.1)于19天前进入注册中心。

哪些应用可以使用它?

支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。

有什么可以替代它?

同一分类中有:Action1 MCP by usefulapi, QNSQY, EchelonGraph CVE & Exposure

替代选择

同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。

如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i

Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.

在云端运行今天更新
安装

QNSQY

作者:quantumsequrity

Linux only, local: post-quantum CBOM scan, encrypt to public keys, verify. Takes no secrets

在你的电脑上运行今天更新
安装

EchelonGraph CVE & Exposure

作者:echelongraph

CVE, KEV, EPSS, SBOM and advisory lookups; per-CVE exposure from Shodan data (© Shodan). Keyless.

电脑或云端今天更新
安装

作者的 README

打开 README

按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。

MCP Security Guard

Find out if the MCP servers you installed are lying to your AI.

Local audit for tool poisoning, rug pulls, tool shadowing, hidden Unicode and leaked secrets, mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10. Nothing leaves your machine unless you opt in.


🚀 Quick Install

Cursor

Click the button above, or use this deep link: cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=mcp-security-guard&config=eyJjb21tYW5kIjoibnB4IiwiYXJncyI6WyIteSIsIm1jcC1zZWN1cml0eS1ndWFyZCJdfQ==

Or manually add to .cursor/mcp.json:

{

"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }

Claude Code
Via Plugin (recommended)
/plugin marketplace add petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard

/plugin install mcp-security-guard@mcp-security-guard

Then run /mcp-audit or ask Claude *"are my MCP servers safe?"*

Via CLI
claude mcp add mcp-security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guard
Claude Desktop

Add to your Claude Desktop config (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows):

{

"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }

VS Code

Click the button above, or manually add to .vscode/mcp.json:

{

"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }

Command Line
npx -y mcp-security-guard audit --project-only

⭐ Star this repository to support the project and stay updated! → Give a star



📋 Table of Contents

  • Why MCP Security Guard?
  • Use Cases
  • What It Checks
  • OWASP MCP Top 10 Coverage
  • Quick Demo (1 Minute)
  • Tools
  • CI / GitHub Action
  • Interactive Dashboard
  • Runtime Hooks
  • Team Plan
  • Benchmark Results
  • Development
  • Contributing
  • Security & Privacy
  • About the Author

Why MCP Security Guard?

Your code is covered by other tools. This one checks the MCP servers that inject text into your AI's context.

MCP Security Guard audits every MCP server Claude (and other AI clients) can reach: servers you configured, servers that plugins bring, and servers from Claude Desktop and other clients on your machine.

How It Compares

*As of October 2026. Corrections welcome.*

FeatureMCP Security Guardsnyk/agent-scancisco-ai-defense/mcp-scannerriseandignite/mcp-shield
Claude Code native plugin✅❌❌❌
Runtime hooks (pre/post tool-use)✅❌❌❌
Rug-pull pinning (SHA-256)✅ Tools, skills, CLAUDE.mdLimited❌❌
OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping✅ Every finding❌❌❌
SARIF output✅ GitHub Action❌❌❌
CycloneDX BOM export✅ Agent inventory❌❌❌
Fully local (zero network)✅ DefaultVariesVariesVaries
Supply-chain checks✅ OSV, npm, PyPIVariesVariesVaries
Tool poisoning detection✅ 26/27 attacksVariesVariesVaries
LicenseMITApache 2.0MITMIT

Our differentiators:

  • Native Claude Code integration with a /mcp-audit slash command and runtime protection
  • Comprehensive rug-pull protection: pins and verifies tool definitions, skills, commands, subagents, and CLAUDE.md files
  • Every finding mapped to OWASP MCP Top 10 for compliance and remediation guidance
  • GitHub Action with SARIF for code scanning alerts on pull requests
  • Agent Bill of Materials (BOM) in CycloneDX 1.6 format for audits and compliance
  • Privacy-first: everything runs locally by default; network access is explicit opt-in

Use Cases

1. Individual Developers

Protect your local AI setup.

  • Audit MCP servers before and after installation
  • Get warned if a server's tool definitions change (rug pulls)
  • Runtime protection: block credentials from being sent, detect poisoned outputs
  • Pin trusted servers and skills for continuous verification
# Scan before installing a new server

npx mcp-security-guard scan server-config.json --confirm-launch

Pin your reviewed servers

npx mcp-security-guard pin

Check everything is still safe

npx mcp-security-guard audit

2. Pull Request CI Checks

Block risky MCP servers and poisoned skills in code review.

Fail PRs that add:

  • MCP servers with tool poisoning, unpinned packages, or privileged Docker images
  • Skills or CLAUDE.md files with instruction overrides or credential exfiltration
  • Vulnerable dependencies or typosquatted packages

Findings appear in GitHub's code scanning interface with OWASP MCP Top 10 references.

- uses: petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard@main

with: fail-on: high

3. Teams and Enterprises

Central security policy for your organization.

With the Team plan:

  • Admins publish one policy (allowed/blocked servers, plugins, pinned versions)
  • Everyone's plugin enforces it automatically, even offline
  • Approval flow: developers request, admins approve
  • Fleet inventory: see what MCP servers your team runs (opt-in with consent)
  • Compliance evidence: OWASP MCP Top 10 coverage report for audits

What It Checks

MCP Security Guard discovers servers from every place AI clients load them: user, local and project scope, servers shipped inside installed plugins, claude_desktop_config.json, Claude Desktop extensions, organization-managed managed-mcp.json, other clients on the machine (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf), and claude.ai connectors you've used.

It scans everything a server puts into the AI's context: tools, server instructions, prompts, resources and resource templates.

CheckWhat It Catches
Tool poisoningInstruction overrides, "don't tell the user", tags, directives to read secrets (~/.ssh, .env), conversation harvesting, exfiltration via URLs/parameters/Markdown images, HTML comments, encoded payloads
Full-schema poisoningSame checks on parameter names, descriptions, defaults, enums, required, plus non-schema text in type
Hidden textZero-width, bidi-control and Unicode-tag characters, ANSI terminal escapes, homoglyph tool names
Tool shadowingServer descriptions referencing another server's tools, tool-name collisions between servers
Rug pullsTool definitions or launch commands that changed after you pinned them (SHA-256 per tool). Skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hooks of a plugin that changed after pinning (plugins changing files under the same version are flagged high). Re-checked automatically at every session start
Capabilities & scorePer-tool classification (execute, delete, write, egress), unauthenticated remote write access, 0–100 score and A–F grade per server, recommended permission rules
Supply chainOSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions, typosquats, missing or brand-new packages, install scripts, publisher changes (opt-in network check)
RuntimeHooks on every MCP call: ask before credentials are sent, warn on injected instructions or credentials in outputs, content-free audit log
Policy.mcp-security.json approved/blocked servers and hosts, enforced in audits, CI and at session start
Toxic flowsServers holding all three legs of the "lethal trifecta" (untrusted input, private data, egress capability), on their own or together. A posture note (low or info), not a defect
Agent contextSkills and their scripts, slash commands, subagents, rules, CLAUDE.md and plugin hooks: instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", invisible text, HTML comments addressed to the model, directives to read credential files, commands that upload credentials, download-and-run, encoded execution, infostealer scripts, pre-approved unrestricted Bash
ConfigurationPlaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remotes, unpinned npx/uvx packages, privileged or unpinned Docker images, pipe-to-shell launches, duplicate names across scopes

Everything runs locally. Nothing is sent anywhere unless you opt in.


OWASP MCP Top 10 Coverage

Every finding is tagged with its OWASP MCP Top 10 id, in reports and in SARIF.

IDRiskCoverage
MCP01Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure✅ Plaintext secrets in env, headers, args and URLs. At runtime, asks before a credential is sent to an MCP server and warns when one comes back
MCP02Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep✅ Capability inventory (execute, delete, write, egress), ready-to-paste permissions.ask rules, privileged or broadly mounted containers
MCP03Tool Poisoning✅ 26/27 published techniques detected, including full-schema poisoning, shadowing and name collisions, plus rug-pull pinning
MCP04Supply Chain Attacks✅ Unpinned packages, images and git sources; OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions; typosquats; new packages; install scripts; publisher changes
MCP05Command Injection & Execution✅ Flags tools that can execute commands; adversarial_test finds injectable parameters in servers you own
MCP06Prompt Injection via Contextual Payloads✅ In tool metadata and, at runtime, in tool outputs (English patterns)
MCP07Insufficient AuthN/AuthZ✅ Plain-HTTP remotes; remote servers exposing write or exec tools without authentication; OAuth detection
MCP08Lack of Audit and Telemetry✅ Local, content-free audit log of every MCP call, with query_audit_log

| MCP09 | Shadow MCP Servers | ✅ Discovery across user, project, local, plugin and Claude Desktop configs; approved-server policy enforced in audits, CI and at session st

只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读

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