Action1 MCP by usefulapi
Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Audit MCP servers for tool poisoning, rug pulls and supply-chain risk (OWASP MCP Top 10).
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"security-guard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-security-guard"
]
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guard粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"security-guard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-security-guard"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"security-guard": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"mcp-security-guard"
]
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月8日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 petrovicistefan 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.9.1)于19天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:Action1 MCP by usefulapi, QNSQY, EchelonGraph CVE & Exposure
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Read endpoints, missing updates, CVE vulnerabilities, installed software and reports in Action1.
Linux only, local: post-quantum CBOM scan, encrypt to public keys, verify. Takes no secrets
CVE, KEV, EPSS, SBOM and advisory lookups; per-CVE exposure from Shodan data (© Shodan). Keyless.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
Find out if the MCP servers you installed are lying to your AI.
Local audit for tool poisoning, rug pulls, tool shadowing, hidden Unicode and leaked secrets, mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10. Nothing leaves your machine unless you opt in.
Click the button above, or use this deep link: cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=mcp-security-guard&config=eyJjb21tYW5kIjoibnB4IiwiYXJncyI6WyIteSIsIm1jcC1zZWN1cml0eS1ndWFyZCJdfQ==
Or manually add to .cursor/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }
/plugin marketplace add petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard
/plugin install mcp-security-guard@mcp-security-guard
Then run /mcp-audit or ask Claude *"are my MCP servers safe?"*
claude mcp add mcp-security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guard
Add to your Claude Desktop config (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows):
{
"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }
Click the button above, or manually add to .vscode/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mcp-security-guard": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"] } } }
npx -y mcp-security-guard audit --project-only
⭐ Star this repository to support the project and stay updated! → Give a star
Your code is covered by other tools. This one checks the MCP servers that inject text into your AI's context.
MCP Security Guard audits every MCP server Claude (and other AI clients) can reach: servers you configured, servers that plugins bring, and servers from Claude Desktop and other clients on your machine.
*As of October 2026. Corrections welcome.*
| Feature | MCP Security Guard | snyk/agent-scan | cisco-ai-defense/mcp-scanner | riseandignite/mcp-shield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Code native plugin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Runtime hooks (pre/post tool-use) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Rug-pull pinning (SHA-256) | ✅ Tools, skills, CLAUDE.md | Limited | ❌ | ❌ |
| OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping | ✅ Every finding | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| SARIF output | ✅ GitHub Action | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| CycloneDX BOM export | ✅ Agent inventory | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Fully local (zero network) | ✅ Default | Varies | Varies | Varies |
| Supply-chain checks | ✅ OSV, npm, PyPI | Varies | Varies | Varies |
| Tool poisoning detection | ✅ 26/27 attacks | Varies | Varies | Varies |
| License | MIT | Apache 2.0 | MIT | MIT |
Our differentiators:
/mcp-audit slash command and runtime protectionProtect your local AI setup.
# Scan before installing a new server
npx mcp-security-guard scan server-config.json --confirm-launch
npx mcp-security-guard pin
npx mcp-security-guard audit
Block risky MCP servers and poisoned skills in code review.
Fail PRs that add:
Findings appear in GitHub's code scanning interface with OWASP MCP Top 10 references.
- uses: petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard@main
with: fail-on: high
Central security policy for your organization.
With the Team plan:
MCP Security Guard discovers servers from every place AI clients load them: user, local and project scope, servers shipped inside installed plugins, claude_desktop_config.json, Claude Desktop extensions, organization-managed managed-mcp.json, other clients on the machine (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf), and claude.ai connectors you've used.
It scans everything a server puts into the AI's context: tools, server instructions, prompts, resources and resource templates.
| Check | What It Catches |
|---|---|
| Tool poisoning | Instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", tags, directives to read secrets (~/.ssh, .env), conversation harvesting, exfiltration via URLs/parameters/Markdown images, HTML comments, encoded payloads |
| Full-schema poisoning | Same checks on parameter names, descriptions, defaults, enums, required, plus non-schema text in type |
| Hidden text | Zero-width, bidi-control and Unicode-tag characters, ANSI terminal escapes, homoglyph tool names |
| Tool shadowing | Server descriptions referencing another server's tools, tool-name collisions between servers |
| Rug pulls | Tool definitions or launch commands that changed after you pinned them (SHA-256 per tool). Skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hooks of a plugin that changed after pinning (plugins changing files under the same version are flagged high). Re-checked automatically at every session start |
| Capabilities & score | Per-tool classification (execute, delete, write, egress), unauthenticated remote write access, 0–100 score and A–F grade per server, recommended permission rules |
| Supply chain | OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions, typosquats, missing or brand-new packages, install scripts, publisher changes (opt-in network check) |
| Runtime | Hooks on every MCP call: ask before credentials are sent, warn on injected instructions or credentials in outputs, content-free audit log |
| Policy | .mcp-security.json approved/blocked servers and hosts, enforced in audits, CI and at session start |
| Toxic flows | Servers holding all three legs of the "lethal trifecta" (untrusted input, private data, egress capability), on their own or together. A posture note (low or info), not a defect |
| Agent context | Skills and their scripts, slash commands, subagents, rules, CLAUDE.md and plugin hooks: instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", invisible text, HTML comments addressed to the model, directives to read credential files, commands that upload credentials, download-and-run, encoded execution, infostealer scripts, pre-approved unrestricted Bash |
| Configuration | Plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remotes, unpinned npx/uvx packages, privileged or unpinned Docker images, pipe-to-shell launches, duplicate names across scopes |
Everything runs locally. Nothing is sent anywhere unless you opt in.
Every finding is tagged with its OWASP MCP Top 10 id, in reports and in SARIF.
| ID | Risk | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| MCP01 | Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure | ✅ Plaintext secrets in env, headers, args and URLs. At runtime, asks before a credential is sent to an MCP server and warns when one comes back |
| MCP02 | Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep | ✅ Capability inventory (execute, delete, write, egress), ready-to-paste permissions.ask rules, privileged or broadly mounted containers |
| MCP03 | Tool Poisoning | ✅ 26/27 published techniques detected, including full-schema poisoning, shadowing and name collisions, plus rug-pull pinning |
| MCP04 | Supply Chain Attacks | ✅ Unpinned packages, images and git sources; OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions; typosquats; new packages; install scripts; publisher changes |
| MCP05 | Command Injection & Execution | ✅ Flags tools that can execute commands; adversarial_test finds injectable parameters in servers you own |
| MCP06 | Prompt Injection via Contextual Payloads | ✅ In tool metadata and, at runtime, in tool outputs (English patterns) |
| MCP07 | Insufficient AuthN/AuthZ | ✅ Plain-HTTP remotes; remote servers exposing write or exec tools without authentication; OAuth detection |
| MCP08 | Lack of Audit and Telemetry | ✅ Local, content-free audit log of every MCP call, with query_audit_log |
| MCP09 | Shadow MCP Servers | ✅ Discovery across user, project, local, plugin and Claude Desktop configs; approved-server policy enforced in audits, CI and at session st
只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读