World Monitor
Real-time global intelligence on conflict, markets, energy, trade, shipping and cyber. 100 tools.
Let your AI agent set up API keys without ever seeing them.
作者提供的原文
列表按使用分(满分 100)排序,由以下部分组成
| 热度 | 12/80 | GitHub 星标或每周下载量:较大的计 60,较小的计 20 |
|---|---|---|
| 新鲜度 | 12/12 | 30 天内有发布或代码更新得满分 |
| 仍在响应 | 0/8 | 上次检查时云端端点有响应 |
| 使用分 | 24/100 |
质量: 基础检查通过 3/3 项(仅展示,不用于排序) · 上升势头: 6 (只用于“上升中”标签)
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
用一句话让 AI 帮你安装
请帮我安装 Lockbox。按照 https://mcp.popnx.com/i/rosostolato-lockbox-mcp.md 操作,先把命令给我看,等我同意后再运行。粘贴到能在你电脑上工作的 AI(如 Claude Code、Cursor)。它会读取我们的步骤,先给你看命令,等你同意。无需密钥,无需注册。 · 查看 AI 会读取的全文
通过 3/3 项检查 · 在你的电脑上运行 · ✓ 命令已检查 2026年11月14日
第一步:你用哪个 AI?
选择你用的应用,步骤会显示在下方。
可连接 Claude,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次) · 仅限电脑上的 Claude 应用(Windows 或 Mac),网页和手机不可用
把这段话复制到 Claude 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 Claude 安装 MCP server Lockbox,按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "mcpServers": { "lockbox": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "lockbox-mcp", "serve" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 Lockbox 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
SettingsDeveloperEdit Config
{
"mcpServers": {
"lockbox": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"lockbox-mcp",
"serve"
]
}
}
}用 Lockbox 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Claude 说正在使用 Lockbox,或回答中出现 Lockbox 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。
LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS 文件目标可以写入其中的文件夹。默认为当前目录。 说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
ChatGPT 暂时无法连接 Lockbox
Lockbox 需要安装在你的电脑上,而 ChatGPT 只能连接在网上运行的服务器
A · 使用能连接 Lockbox 的应用
B · 其他 类中能连接 ChatGPT 的其他服务器
从同类中使用较多的里挑选,仅限用地址即可连接、无需密钥的
可连接 Claude Code,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次)
把这段话复制到 Claude Code 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 Claude Code 安装 MCP server Lockbox,按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):claude mcp add --scope user lockbox -- npx -y lockbox-mcp serve 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 Lockbox 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
Mac:按 Command+空格,输入 Terminal · Windows:打开 PowerShell
claude mcp add --scope user lockbox -- npx -y lockbox-mcp serve应能看到 Lockbox 在列表中并显示已连接
用 Lockbox 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Claude Code 说正在使用 Lockbox,或回答中出现 Lockbox 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。
LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS 文件目标可以写入其中的文件夹。默认为当前目录。 说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
可连接 Cursor,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次)
把这段话复制到 Cursor 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 Cursor 安装 MCP server Lockbox,按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "mcpServers": { "lockbox": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "lockbox-mcp", "serve" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 Lockbox 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
用 Lockbox 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Cursor 说正在使用 Lockbox,或回答中出现 Lockbox 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。
LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS 文件目标可以写入其中的文件夹。默认为当前目录。 说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Cursor 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
可连接 VS Code,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次)
把这段话复制到 VS Code 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 VS Code 安装 MCP server Lockbox,按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "servers": { "lockbox": { "type": "stdio", "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "lockbox-mcp", "serve" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 Lockbox 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
用 Lockbox 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 VS Code 说正在使用 Lockbox,或回答中出现 Lockbox 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。
LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS 文件目标可以写入其中的文件夹。默认为当前目录。 说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 VS Code 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user lockbox -- npx -y lockbox-mcp serveClaude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)
{
"mcpServers": {
"lockbox": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"lockbox-mcp",
"serve"
]
}
}
}Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json)
{
"mcpServers": {
"lockbox": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"lockbox-mcp",
"serve"
]
}
}
}VS Code (mcp.json)
{
"servers": {
"lockbox": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"lockbox-mcp",
"serve"
]
}
}
}LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS env说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。
这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
依据这个服务器的连接方式和各应用自己的文档,检查于 2026年11月10日。
在你的电脑上运行,适用于
ClaudeGooseLM StudioMsty StudioCherry StudioCursorVS Code + GitHub CopilotVisual StudioWindsurf (Devin Desktop)ZedKiroClineContinueJetBrains AI AssistantClaude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLIOpenCodenodecodeWarpLibreChatRaycast
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月21日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 rosostolato 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
代码最后更新于7天前
使用 Apache-2.0
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
OSV.dev 中没有 lockbox-mcp@0.1.1 的记录
只检查这个版本的包本身,不包括所有依赖 · 检查于 2026年11月15日
如果你是作者,可把这段代码贴到 README。徽章会链接回本页。
[](https://mcp.popnx.com/en/servers/rosostolato-lockbox-mcp)提问、分享技巧或报告无法使用。按“有帮助”数量排序。
还没有评价
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 3 项适用的基础检查中通过了 3 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于7天前,最新版本(0.1.1)于7天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:World Monitor, openstatus, Oh My Posh Validator, Strata, Jitsu
同一分类、其他作者、命令已通过检查。官方的排在前面,再按星标排序。
如何看卡片:↓ 每周下载量i★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Real-time global intelligence on conflict, markets, energy, trade, shipping and cyber. 100 tools.
Manage monitors, status pages, incidents and maintenances in your openstatus workspace.
Validate oh-my-posh configurations and segment snippets against the official schema.
MCP server for progressive tool usage at any scale (see https://klavis.ai)
Manage Jitsu data pipelines: destinations, streams, connections, functions, live events.
| 本项 Lockbox | World Monitor | openstatus | Oh My Posh Validator | Strata | Jitsu | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 运行位置 | 需要安装在电脑上 | 在云端运行,无需安装 | 在云端运行,无需安装 | 在云端运行,无需安装 | 在云端运行,无需安装 | 在云端运行,无需安装 |
| 需要密钥 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 否 |
| 可在 Claude 中按 + 添加 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 否 |
| 基础检查 | 3/3 | 4/4 | 4/4 | 4/4 | 1/4 | 4/4 |
| 许可证 | Apache-2.0 | AGPL-3.0 | AGPL-3.0 | MIT | Apache-2.0 | MIT |
| 价格 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 |
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
Let your AI agent set up API keys without ever seeing them.
You ask Claude, Cursor or any MCP client to *"put the Stripe key in our .env"* — or in Secret Manager, Vercel, your own API. The agent describes where it goes. You read that in Lockbox's own window and paste the value there. The key goes straight to the destination and never enters the chat, the prompt or the logs.
gcloud, or an HTTPS request, with {{secret}} where the value goes. The tool has no field that could carry a value.STORED and a reference. It never sees the key.claude mcp add lockbox -e LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS="$PWD" -- npx -y lockbox-mcp serve
Then ask your agent: *"store my Stripe test key in .env"*.
Lockbox is a stdio MCP server, so you do not run it yourself — your MCP client starts it, the same way it starts any other npm-published server. Requires Node 20+.
cd ~/some/project
claude mcp add lockbox -e LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS="$PWD" -- npx -y lockbox-mcp serve
Add -s project to record it in the repository's .mcp.json instead of your own config.
Drop this into the client's MCP configuration — the mcpServers block is the same shape everywhere:
{
"mcpServers": { "lockbox": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "lockbox-mcp", "serve"], "env": { "LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS": "/absolute/path/to/your/project" } } } }
Prefer a pinned install to an ephemeral one:
npm install -g lockbox-mcp
lockbox-mcp serve as the command, with no npx
The package is published to npm, unscoped, as lockbox-mcp.
Set `LOCKBOX_ENV_ALLOWED_ROOTS`. File destinations refuse to write outside those directories, and they default only to the server's working directory. Everything else is optional — see Configuration.
Destinations behind a login (Google Secret Manager, Vercel, GitHub) are reached through their own CLI, which uses the login you already have — gcloud, vercel, gh. See Destinations.
Ask your agent for something like *"store my Stripe test key in .env"*. Lockbox opens its window on your machine; the agent does not receive that link. The band at the top tells you the environment at a glance, and the field tells you whether the key looks right before you send it.
Catches the wrong key. A test key headed for production gets flagged in the window. The check runs locally and never shows the value.
Confirms before sending. Nothing is sent until you type where it goes: the host, the program or the file.
Tells the agent only "stored". Lockbox wipes the value and hands back a reference such as the file and variable.
Enter continues and Esc cancels. The link works once: if anything opened it before your browser did, Lockbox shows an alarm and a Cancel button instead of the request. Lockbox's stderr carries structured audit JSON; nothing else is expected of you in the terminal.
It removes an entire class of failures caused by the agent knowing the secret. With Lockbox in the loop, a credential does not pass through:
Lockbox does not make an AI agent trustworthy, and it is not "safe AI". It does not guarantee that the agent picked the right destination, that it understood you, that it is free of prompt injection, that the destination is itself secure, that your machine is uncompromised, or that a credential cannot be misused later by software that legitimately receives it.
There are two separate problems here:
| Question | Lockbox's answer |
|---|---|
| Should the agent know the secret? | No. |
| Should the agent decide alone where the secret goes? | Not without human authorization. |
Lockbox answers those two. It does not claim to answer the rest.
Trusted with the credential value:
The human at the keyboard Lockbox's secure input UI (loopback only, in your control) Lockbox's secure input broker (this process) The destination you approved (a file, a program, an HTTPS endpoint)
NOT trusted with the credential value:
The LLM The agent / MCP client The conversation The prompt and any repository content it read Generated code Logs, telemetry, crash reports
Lockbox's runtime dependency list is one package (zod, for input validation). The MCP protocol is implemented in-tree rather than through the official SDK, which would add ~90 packages — including HTTP servers and an OAuth stack — to a process that holds plaintext credentials.
This diagram does not claim the trusted components are invulnerable. It says where the credential is *allowed* to exist. Lockbox is security-sensitive software: if Lockbox itself is malicious or compromised, the boundary is gone. Its source, dependencies and releases deserve the scrutiny you would give any credential-handling tool.
The secret flow — the human's path, which the model cannot observe:
Human ─▶ Lockbox secure UI (127.0.0.1) ─▶ Broker ─▶ approved definition ─▶ Destination
The agent flow — everything the model sees:
LLM ─▶ MCP client ─▶ Lockbox MCP server ─▶ non-sensitive result metadata
The MCP tool schema has no property capable of carrying a credential. That is structural, not a prompt instruction: there is no value, secret_value, password, token, content or raw_secret field to abuse, closed schemas reject unknown properties, and arguments are screened for credential-shaped values before they are parsed.
{
"destination": "custom", "name": "STRIPE_SECRET_KEY", "target": { "definition": { "kind": "command", "label": "Google Secret Manager", "executable": "/opt/homebrew/bin/gcloud", "args": ["secrets", "versions", "add", "stripe-secret-key", "--project", "acme-prod", "--data-file=-"], "stdin": "{{secret}}" } }, "environment": "production", "description": "Stripe production API key" }
Lockbox replies with a request_id, a risk classification and the normalized destination — and opens its own authorization window on your machine. The agent polls secret_status. destination: "saved: " reuses a destination the human saved earlier.
The agent does not get the authorization link. That link is a capability: anything holding it can complete the human's half of the flow, and an agent with a shell or an HTTP tool is precisely the threat model. Lockbox hands it straight to your browser. Set LOCKBOX_DISCLOSE_AUTHORIZATION_URL=true if your setup needs the agent to relay the link (for example, a remote or headless session) — and understand that this lets a compromised agent authorize its own request.
The link works once. Opening it trades it for an HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax session cookie scoped to that request and redirects to an address with no token in it; every later page and form needs the cookie. A second opening of the same link gets an alarm page ("This link was already opened") with a Cancel button, never the request. So a copy left in browser history, a process list or a log is dead once you open it, and one used by someone else first is visible to you.
Logs never hold the identity phrase, and hold the link only as a last resort. MCP hosts save server stderr to files any process running as you can read (Claude Desktop under ~/Library/Logs/Claude/, Claude Code under its cache directory), so the audit record carries a short fingerprint of the link instead. The full link is logged only when no browser could be opened (LOCKBOX_OPEN_BROWSER=false, too many windows, or the opener failed), because the operator then has no other way in.
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
secret_store | Create a credential request. Returns non-sensitive metadata and a request id. |
secret_status | Poll a request. Never returns credential material. |
secret_cancel | Cancel a pending request; any entered value is destroyed. |
secret_revise | Invalidate an authorization and start a new one. Nothing is edited in place. |
secret_destinations | The definition contract, worked examples, and the user's saved destinations. |
Stage A shows the credential name and one destination line — the definition's label and its host, program or file — plus a line for anything worth a second look: a host never used before, a host spelled with non-ASCII characters, an IP address instead of a name, a program outside the system folders, a saved destination that changed. The full request (the URL, every header and the body; or the program, each argument and stdin; or the file and its content) sits behind "See exactly what will be sent", closed by default, with the canonical JSON and its hash. Every custom destination needs a second confirmation in Stage B, after entry and before anything is sent: the human types the host, the program name or the file (.env:API_TOKEN for a variable), and the server checks it. This is an attention check, not authentication: the expected text is on the page. What keeps a second party out of Stage B is the session cookie. The value is never displayed back.
POSTs are refused unless they come from Lockbox's own page (Origin and Sec-Fetch-Site), and every response sets Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy and `Cross-Origin-Reso