Context7
Up-to-date docs for AI agents
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Threat intel and DFIR: IOCs, CVEs, actors, SBOMs, domain scans, cases, memory, Kubernetes, Proxmox.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
Authorization标为机密的值是你账户的钥匙。千万不要分享给别人,也不要粘贴到聊天里。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
这个地址需要在请求的 header 中放入密钥,而添加连接器的菜单无法设置。请改用 Claude Code、Cursor 或 VS Code。
在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add --transport http mlab https://mlab.sh/mcp --header 'Authorization: your-value'运行前请先填写空着的值。
粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"mlab": {
"url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"mlab": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个地址需要在请求的 header 中放入密钥,而添加连接器的菜单无法设置。请改用 Claude Code、Cursor 或 VS Code。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
Authorization 机密 HTTP header这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
服务器要求先登录,才会列出它的工具。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日
注册名称已通过域名 mlab.sh 验证(注册中心会核实域名所有权)
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
在 196 毫秒内响应(HTTP 401)
声明支持 OAuth 登录,你的 AI 应用可以带你去登录
尚未检查;我们会在检查端点时读取工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 3 项适用的基础检查中通过了 3 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
你需要填写:Authorization
它在作者的云端运行。通过互联网连接,无需安装,但你发送的内容会经过作者的服务器。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(1.2.0)于昨天进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。它通过 URL 连接,所以接受远程 MCP 服务器的应用也可以使用,例如开启开发者模式的 ChatGPT。
同一分类中有:Context7, Codebase Memory, Exa
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Up-to-date docs for AI agents
Codebase knowledge graph for AI agents — 162 languages, sub-ms queries, 99% fewer tokens.
Connect AI agents to Exa for web search, content fetching, and multi-step research.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
Public metadata and connection guide for the remote MCP server at https://mlab.sh/mcp, a threat intelligence server for SOC and DFIR work.
This repo is the registry listing and the documentation. It is not the server source: the server runs inside the mlab.sh backend and is closed source.
Endpoint: https://mlab.sh/mcp (Streamable HTTP via POST, SSE via GET).
Settings > Connectors > Add custom connector, then paste the URL. OAuth runs in the browser, no token to copy.
https://mlab.sh/mcp
claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mlab": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "mcp-remote", "https://mlab.sh/mcp", "--header", "Authorization: Bearer mcp_xxx" ] } } }
Drop the --header pair to use OAuth instead of a static token.
~/.cursor/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": { "mlab": { "url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp", "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer mcp_xxx" } } } }
.vscode/mcp.json:
{
"servers": { "mlab": { "type": "http", "url": "https://mlab.sh/mcp", "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer mcp_xxx" } } } }
curl -sS -X POST https://mlab.sh/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer mcp_xxx" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"curl","version":"1.0.0"}}}'
Ready to paste versions of these four configs live in examples/.
Officially supported clients are Claude.ai and Claude Desktop. Other MCP clients (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf and friends) work but are best effort.
48 tools. tools/list only shows a token the tools its role and plan can use, so a client never sees a tool that would refuse every call. Every tool carries MCP annotations (read only, destructive, idempotent, open world), so a host can tell what it may run unattended. No tool deletes anything.
Parameters marked ? are optional.
| Group | Plan | Role |
|---|---|---|
IOC lookups, domain scans, scan_bash, scan_sbom | Any | Owner, admin, member (viewers cannot spend quota) |
| CVEs, actors, account, bookmarks, history | Any | Any, viewer included |
Cases: reading (list_cases, get_case) | Team, Enterprise | Any, viewer included |
Cases: writing (create_case, add_case_indicators, add_case_comment) | Team, Enterprise | Owner, admin, member |
| Workspaces | Team (1 workspace), Enterprise (up to 20) | Any; members only see the workspaces they were added to, owners and admins see all |
Quotas are counted per organization over a rolling 24 hour window. get_scan_limits reads what is left.
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
detect_ioc | value | Detects the type of an indicator (IPv4, IPv6, CIDR, domain, URL, MD5/SHA1/SHA256/SHA512 hash, email, MAC) and returns the relevant intel. A domain is typed, not scanned: use start_domain_scan for that. An IP spends IP quota |
scan_ip | ip | For an address: geolocation, ISP, ASN, datacenter / proxy / VPN / mobile network, TOR consensus status, forward confirmed reverse DNS, RDAP record with the abuse contact. For a CIDR range: network, broadcast, host window, netmask, size, reserved blocks. Addresses spend IP quota (cached 7 days); ranges are free |
scan_url | url, resolve? | Static analysis without visiting: scheme, host with its Unicode and punycode forms, IP literal hosts, credentials in the URL, dangerous extensions, shorteners, embedded redirect targets, and what a past domain scan recorded about the host. resolve follows the link to its real destination, the only part that visits anything. No quota |
scan_hash | hash | MD5, SHA1 or SHA256 against CIRCL hashlookup (NIST NSRL): known good, known malicious or unknown, each feed's own answer, malware family, product and file name, CIRCL trust score, and mlab_sample when mlab analysed the file itself. unknown is not the same as safe. No quota |
scan_crypto | address, chain? | Labels, sanctions, risk score and address type across 18 chains (Bitcoin, Ethereum and 12 other EVM chains, Tron, Solana, TON, Dogecoin), with a checksum check. EVM addresses do not reveal their chain: pass chain when you know it. Spends crypto quota |
scan_email | email | Mailbox type (disposable, role, consumer, standard), SPF / DKIM / DMARC spoofability of its domain, MX presence, domain age when scanned, and a 0 to 100 score with its weighted reasons. No quota |
scan_phone | number | E.164 number: validity, country, line type, allocated operator, formatting and scam shaped findings. Offline, no quota |
scan_mac | mac | OUI vendor, unicast or multicast, universal or local administration, randomized or virtual interface, EUI-64 IPv6, other formats. Offline, no quota |
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
start_domain_scan | domain | Returns a recent completed scan right away, or launches a new one and returns {"status": "started"}. A new scan contacts the target and spends domain scan quota |
get_domain_scan_results | domain | Results of a domain scan: DNS records, subdomains, SSL certificates, security.txt, robots.txt. Call again while the status is pending or scanning |
scan_bash | content, filename? | Static analysis of an inline shell script: sha256, every IOC it holds, and well known suspicious constructs (download piped to a shell, base64 decoding, /dev/tcp reverse shells, persistence, anti forensics, destructive deletes). Nothing runs or is stored. No quota |
scan_sbom | content, format? | Known vulnerabilities in a lockfile or SBOM (npm, yarn, pnpm, Cargo, pip, Poetry, uv, PDM, Pipfile, Composer, Gem, Go, Maven, Gradle, NuGet, pub, Hex, mise, CycloneDX, SPDX), one finding per package and CVE, worst first, with the fixed version and what the scan could not cover. Matched server side on vuln.mlab.sh (OSV, NVD for CPE only components). 2 MB at most; format defaults to auto |
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
cve_search | query, severity?, date_start?, date_end?, limit?, page? | CVEs by keyword, product, vendor or ID, filtered by severity (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) and publication date, with CVSS, EPSS and KEV status |
cve_detail | cve_id | The full record: CVSS vector breakdown, affected products, references, CWEs, EPSS, CISA KEV status |
search_actors | query, origin?, motivation?, sector?, limit? | Threat actors by name or alias from the MISP Galaxy cluster (CC0), narrowed by origin, incident type or targeted sector. Returns the slug for get_actor |
get_actor | slug | MISP Galaxy profile (origin, suspected sponsor, synonyms, targeted countries and sectors, references) with the MITRE ATT&CK tools and techniques attributed to it. Keep the sources block when quoting: it carries MITRE's notice |
Team and Enterprise. Each call goes through the same checks as the case pages.
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
list_cases | none | The organization's cases, open ones first, with indicator and comment counts |
get_case | uuid | Title, summary, status, every indicator with a link to its analysis, and the comment thread |
create_case | title, summary? | Opens a case and returns the uuid the other case tools take |
add_case_indicators | uuid, indicators | Files a paste of indicators (one per line, or comma or space separated, mixed types), typed automatically; anything mlab cannot look up comes back in skipped with the reason |
add_case_comment | uuid, body, indicator_uuid? | A note on the case, or on one of its indicators |
Team and Enterprise, and only in a workspace whose admin turned on AI agents (MCP): a workspace keeps its data on the organization's own hosts, and an answer goes to the LLM provider of whoever asked. workspace_list says which workspaces are open. Every tool except workspace_list takes workspace (the uuid from workspace_list). Each call is written to the workspace's audit log.
The tools read, and can start an index or a YARA scan. Creating, deleting, enrolling, members, policies, pushing a cluster config and binary downloads stay in the app. Answers carry data sent by the hosts, which may contain text planted by an attacker: the server says so before every answer.
Agents and memory forensics (engram)
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
workspace_list | none | The workspaces you can open, whether AI agents may read them, agents online and the tools they run |
workspace_agents | workspace | The workspace's agents: live state, version, the tools each one reports |
workspace_memory_dumps | workspace | Memory dumps on the engram agents, and which ones are indexed. Asks every agent: allow a few seconds |
workspace_memory_index | workspace, agent, dump | Starts indexing a dump on its host, in the background. Follow it with workspace_memory_dumps |
workspace_memory_overview | workspace, agent, dump | A dump's index: system, process tree, findings (injected code and other anomalies), registry hives |
workspace_memory_process | workspace, agent, dump, pid | One process in full: command line, environment, modules, memory regions, handles, findings |
workspace_memory_read | workspace, agent, dump, address, len?, space?, pid? | Up to 4 KiB read live from the dump, as hex and text. space is virtual (needs pid, the default) or physical |
workspace_memory_registry | workspace, agent, dump, hive, path? | One registry key: values, subkeys, last write time |
workspace_memory_yara | workspace, agent, dump, rules, pids? | Runs YARA rules over the dump's processes on the host. Usually returns a job, a new one each call |
workspace_memory_yara_status | workspace, agent, job | Progress of a YARA scan, and its matches once done |
Kubernetes clusters (k3sec)
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
workspace_cluster_list | workspace | Clusters reporting to the workspace: nodes online, images, vulnerabilities in packages really loaded, recent detections |
workspace_cluster_images | workspace, cluster | Running images with their vulnerabilities, loaded ones first |
workspace_cluster_image | workspace, cluster, digest | One image: findings and packages, with which are loaded in memory |
workspace_cluster_events | workspace, cluster, source?, kind?, namespace?, min_severity?, q?, before?, limit? | Runtime events, newest first: Kubernetes events, eBPF activity, YARA detections, with cached reputation of destinations and binaries. 200 at most per call; before pages back |
workspace_cluster_config | workspace, cluster | What k3sec collects on each node, and the ceiling the nodes' local policies allow |
Proxmox VE (virtsec)
| Tool | Parameters | What it returns |
|---|---|---|
workspace_virt_list | workspace | Proxmox clusters: nodes online, LXC and VM guests, guests with weakened isolation, vulnerabilities in loaded packages, critical events of the last 24 h |
workspace_virt_guests | workspace, cluster | Guests and nodes: status, isolation risks from their config (privileged, host bind mounts, passthrough), vulnerabilities |
| workspace_virt_guest | workspace, cluster, key, agent? | One guest by vmid, or a node (key = node with its agent): i
只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读