Shoon A2A Trust Services (pilot)

A2A Service System — Phase 0 Sandbox (local test only)

TEST SANDBOX. Everything free ($0.00), testnet semantics, binds to 127.0.0.1 only. No real crypto, no real payments, no external accounts, no money movement. Nothing here is public or commercial.

Run

cd ~/workspace/compound/a2a-economy/sandbox

pip3 install --user --break-system-packages -r requirements.txt

admin secret is REQUIRED — the server refuses to start without it

export A2A_SANDBOX_ADMIN="$(cat ~/.config/a2a-sandbox-admin)" python3 -m uvicorn app:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8741

Generate the secret once (stored with owner-only permissions, never in chat/logs):

mkdir -p ~/.config

python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))" > ~/.config/a2a-sandbox-admin chmod 600 ~/.config/a2a-sandbox-admin

Then in another terminal:

# machine-readable catalog (Tier A)

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8741/v1/catalog.json | head -c 600

public free-slot counter

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8741/v1/slots

synthetic buyer harness (full loop per service, green/red per stage)

python3 harness.py

human test page

open http://127.0.0.1:8741/test.html in a browser (test API key prefilled)

What is REAL vs STUBBED

Real (protocol fully implemented):

• POST /quote — free, zero-token, formula-based binding quote, 15-min expiry, input-cap + policy checks, ledger entry
• POST /execute — 402 without payment (x402-shaped response), mock commit-then-settle authorization verification (structure + quote match + validBefore expiry), 202 + task_id, async job queue, Ed25519-signed deliverables, settle event
• Quota enforcement: identity required, ≤10 tasks/day/wallet-or-API-key, ≤20/day/service with public slots counter, global daily token budget with auto-pause
• Kill switch as feature flag (POST /v1/admin/kill / /v1/admin/resume, token via A2A_SANDBOX_ADMIN env — the server refuses to start without it); no auto-resume
• SSRF protection: task-supplied URLs are resolved and every address must be public (loopback, private LAN, link-local and cloud-metadata ranges refused, including via redirects); non-http(s) schemes refused
• Append-only JSONL ledger + CSV/JSON tax-export stub (/v1/ledger/export)
• Per-task privacy (locked per buyer): every task gets a random 256-bit read_token at accept time (returned in the 202 response — keep it secret, treat it like a password). Task status, deliverable, signature check and that task's ledger entries all require it via the Authorization: Bearer header. Header-only by design: tokens in URLs would land in server access logs. No token → 401. The full ledger (all buyers) is admin-only (X-Admin-Token header). Task and quote IDs are 128-bit random; admin token comparisons are constant-time.
• Persistent quotas: usage counters and pause state live in SQLite (data/quotas.db) — a restart no longer resets daily caps or the kill-switch state.
• MCP (Model Context Protocol): POST /mcp speaks Streamable HTTP (stateless JSON-RPC 2.0): initialize, tools/list (the 5 services), tools/call (runs quote → accept → wait synchronously, returns the signed deliverable). Two auth flows: human one-step (X-API-KEY header + arguments.input), or machine two-step (POST /quote first, then tools/call with arguments.quote_id and the X-PAYMENT header authorizing that quote). Calls count as mcp origin traffic.
• Origin tracking: every accepted task is counted by channel — human, machine, mcp — visible at admin-only GET /v1/admin/stats alongside quota usage.
• Tier A machine-readable files: /v1/catalog.json, /.well-known/agent.json, /llms.txt, /v1/openapi.json, /robots.txt (AI crawlers allowed)
• Honest service logic: real HTTPS fetches of user-supplied URLs; results plainly labeled

Stubbed / simulated:

• The EIP-3009 authorization is a mock (base64 JSON in X-PAYMENT header) — verification checks shape, quote match and expiry, not an on-chain signature
• Settlement is a $0.00 ledger event under "testnet semantics" — no chain interaction, no faucet funds
• Token budget is simulated (estimated from input bytes), not real LLM tokens
• News tripwires check on demand; no background scheduler yet
• No facilitator, no escrow, no webhooks delivery (webhook_url accepted but not called), no Postgres/Inngest
• Human pilot API keys are fixed test keys, not issued per user

Honesty rules (enforced in code)

• Every deliverable carries "sandbox": true
• Claim verification: "supported" = quoted text found verbatim in the cited source, NOT "the claim is true". Uncheckable → "unverified"
• Citation audit: reports real HTTP status + verbatim text match
• Proof-of-work: evidence-resolution check only; never claims work was verified
• QA gate: fails any result missing the sandbox flag or required output keys

Files

• app.py — FastAPI gateway
• catalog.py — the 5 service definitions (schemas, caps, slots)
• services.py — honest minimal service logic + QA gate
• signing.py — Ed25519 key mgmt
• ledger.py — append-only JSONL ledger
• quotas.py — scarcity quotas, token budget, kill switch
• harness.py — synthetic buyer harness
• static/ — agent.json, llms.txt, robots.txt, test.html (human page)
• data/ — keys + ledger.jsonl (created at runtime, git-ignored by convention)