MinerU
Transforms complex documents like PDFs and Office docs into LLM-ready markdown/JSON for your Agentic workflows.
Verify PDF signatures, detect tampering, and identify PDF/A and PAdES conformance levels.
教 AI 做这类工作的 Skill,可与本项一起使用
Transforms complex documents like PDFs and Office docs into LLM-ready markdown/JSON for your Agentic workflows.
Agent skills for Obsidian. Teach your agent to use Obsidian CLI and open formats including Markdown, Bases, JSON Canvas.
列表按使用分(满分 100)排序,由以下部分组成
| 热度 | 23/80 | GitHub 星标或每周下载量:较大的计 60,较小的计 20 |
|---|---|---|
| 新鲜度 | 12/12 | 30 天内有发布或代码更新得满分 |
| 仍在响应 | 0/8 | 上次检查时云端端点有响应 |
| 使用分 | 35/100 |
质量: 基础检查通过 3/3 项(仅展示,不用于排序) · 上升势头: 44 (只用于“上升中”标签)
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
用一句话让 AI 帮你安装
请帮我安装 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack)。按照 https://mcp.popnx.com/i/shuji-bonji-pdf-verify-mcp.md 操作,先把命令给我看,等我同意后再运行。粘贴到能在你电脑上工作的 AI(如 Claude Code、Cursor)。它会读取我们的步骤,先给你看命令,等你同意。无需密钥,无需注册。 · 查看 AI 会读取的全文
通过 3/3 项检查 · 在你的电脑上运行 · ✓ 命令已检查 2026年11月13日
第一步:你用哪个 AI?
选择你用的应用,步骤会显示在下方。
可连接 Claude,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次) · 仅限电脑上的 Claude 应用(Windows 或 Mac),网页和手机不可用
把这段话复制到 Claude 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 Claude 安装 MCP server PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "mcpServers": { "pdf-verify": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
SettingsDeveloperEdit Config
{
"mcpServers": {
"pdf-verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp"
]
}
}
}用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Claude 说正在使用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),或回答中出现 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
ChatGPT 暂时无法连接 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack)
PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 需要安装在你的电脑上,而 ChatGPT 只能连接在网上运行的服务器
可连接 Claude Code,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次)
把这段话复制到 Claude Code 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 Claude Code 安装 MCP server PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):claude mcp add --scope user pdf-verify -- npx -y @shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
Mac:按 Command+空格,输入 Terminal · Windows:打开 PowerShell
claude mcp add --scope user pdf-verify -- npx -y @shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp应能看到 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 在列表中并显示已连接
用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Claude Code 说正在使用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),或回答中出现 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
可连接 Cursor,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次)
把这段话复制到 Cursor 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 Cursor 安装 MCP server PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "mcpServers": { "pdf-verify": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 Cursor 说正在使用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),或回答中出现 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Cursor 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
可连接 VS Code,但需要先准备
需要先在电脑上安装 Node.js(只需一次)
把这段话复制到 VS Code 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。
请在这台电脑上为 VS Code 安装 MCP server PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),按顺序:1) 用 node -v 检查是否有 Node.js。没有的话,请让我从 https://nodejs.org/en/download 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "servers": { "pdf-verify": { "type": "stdio", "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具真的出现了。这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。
已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter
node -vMac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter
Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”
还没安装: 打开官方下载页,选择 LTS 版本和点选式安装程序:Mac 用 .pkg · Windows 用 .msi。双击后一路下一步即可,不需要 curl 命令
装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: node -v
安装一次,所有需要 Node.js 的工具都能用
用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看✓ 如果 VS Code 说正在使用 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack),或回答中出现 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) 的工具名称,就表示连接成功
菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 VS Code 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同
Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user pdf-verify -- npx -y @shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcpClaude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)
{
"mcpServers": {
"pdf-verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp"
]
}
}
}Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json)
{
"mcpServers": {
"pdf-verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp"
]
}
}
}VS Code (mcp.json)
{
"servers": {
"pdf-verify": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp"
]
}
}
}这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
依据这个服务器的连接方式和各应用自己的文档,检查于 2026年11月10日。
在你的电脑上运行,适用于
ClaudeGooseLM StudioMsty StudioCherry StudioCursorVS Code + GitHub CopilotVisual StudioWindsurf (Devin Desktop)ZedKiroClineContinueJetBrains AI AssistantClaude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLIOpenCodenodecodeWarpLibreChatRaycast
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月19日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 shuji-bonji 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
代码最后更新于13天前
使用 MIT
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
OSV.dev 中没有 @shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp@0.35.0 的记录
只检查这个版本的包本身,不包括所有依赖 · 检查于 2026年11月15日
如果你是作者,可把这段代码贴到 README。徽章会链接回本页。
[](https://mcp.popnx.com/en/servers/shuji-bonji-pdf-verify-mcp)提问、分享技巧或报告无法使用。按“有帮助”数量排序。
还没有评价
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 3 项适用的基础检查中通过了 3 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于13天前,最新版本(0.35.0)于13天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:Puter MCP, XcodeBuildMCP, Vexa, Atlassian Rovo MCP Server, Anki MCP Server
同一分类、其他作者、命令已通过检查。官方的排在前面,再按星标排序。
如何看卡片:↓ 每周下载量i★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
Puter MCP enables AI tools to interact with Puter: manage files, websites, workers, and more
XcodeBuildMCP provides tools for Xcode project management, simulator management, and app utilities.
Meeting bot and transcripts for Google Meet, Teams and Zoom. Live or after, speakers labelled.
Connect to Atlassian Jira, Confluence, Loom, and more to search, create, and manage your work.
MCP server for Anki flashcards: adaptive review, notes, media, and deck management via AnkiConnect.
| 本项 PDF Verify (PDF Agent Stack) | Puter MCP | XcodeBuildMCP | Vexa | Atlassian Rovo MCP Server | Anki MCP Server | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 运行位置 | 需要安装在电脑上 | 在云端运行,无需安装 | 需要安装在电脑上 | 在云端运行,无需安装 | 在云端运行,无需安装 | 需要安装在电脑上 |
| 需要密钥 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 是 | 否 | 否 |
| 可在 Claude 中按 + 添加 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 否 | 是 | 否 |
| 基础检查 | 3/3 | 4/4 | 3/3 | 2/4 | 4/4 | 3/3 |
| 许可证 | MIT | AGPL-3.0 | MIT | Apache-2.0 | Apache-2.0 | MIT |
| 价格 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 | 登记中未列出费用 |
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
MCP server for PDF authenticity and conformance verification — cryptographic digital signature verification, tamper detection, PAdES baseline level detection, and PDF/A (ISO 19005) / PDF/UA (ISO 14289) validation.
Part of the PDF family alongside pdf-reader-mcp (structure analysis) and pdf-spec-mcp (specification reference). Where pdf-reader-mcp tells you *what is in* a PDF, pdf-verify-mcp tells you *whether it is genuine*.
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
verify_signatures | Cryptographic verification, trust chain evaluation against trust anchors, revocation checking (embedded OCSP/CRL or online), RFC 3161 timestamp verification |
verify_integrity | Tamper detection: incremental updates, changes after signing, DocMDP certification violations assessed per P value (below), and an object-level diff of the revision chain (which objects each update added, rewrote or freed). Incremental updates are legal, so the diff says what to review — no verdict rests on it. Where those objects sit on the page is pdf-reader-mcp locate_objects |
detect_pades_level | PAdES baseline level (B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA) with content-validated LTV data |
identify_conformance | Declared PDF/A / PDF/UA conformance from XMP metadata |
validate_conformance | PDF/A (ISO 19005) and PDF/UA (ISO 14289) validation: veraPDF when installed, built-in rule subset otherwise |
validate_clauses | Constraints mapped from ISO 32000-1/-2 clauses — the specification body itself, which the PDF/A and PDF/UA profiles do not cover |
evaluate_policy | Deterministic 4-value trust verdict (trust_and_use / use_with_caution / human_review_required / reject) from a fixed rule table over the verification facts, with domain profiles (contract, financial, legal, medical, government). The judge is code; the narrative is the LLM |
| Verdict | Meaning |
|---|---|
valid | ByteRange digest matches and the CMS signature is cryptographically valid |
invalid | Digest mismatch or signature verification failure — possible tampering |
indeterminate | Unsupported format or verification could not complete |
A certification signature's P value states which kinds of change are allowed (ISO 32000-2 Table 257). verify_integrity classifies the changes made after signing at the object level and compares them against what that P permits.
| P | Permitted changes | Is adding an annotation a violation? |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | none (DSS / document-timestamp incremental updates are the §12.8.2.2 exception) | yes |
| 2 | filling in forms, instantiating page templates, signing | yes — annotations start at 3 |
| 3 | as for 2, plus annotation creation, deletion and modification | no |
Objects that a permitted change necessarily drags along — the page whose /Annots grew, the catalog, /Info, the XMP stream — are classified as housekeeping and are not counted as violations. Counting them would make *every* certified document violate, since a lawful P=3 annotation addition moves all four.
violationAssessment is three-valued| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
permitted | every change after signing is of a kind P allows |
violated | at least one change is outside it |
indeterminate | it could not be determined (the xref chain could not be walked, or a changed object's kind could not be read) |
⚠️ `indeterminate` is not a pass. This server disproves, and "could not be disproved" is a
different statement from "is fine" — the same discipline as
validate_clausesreturning
needs_external_factrather than defaulting a check into a pass.
violatedByLaterChanges(boolean) is kept for compatibility and **collapsesindeterminateto
false**. ReadviolationAssessmentwherever "could not tell" must not be mistaken for
"fine".
evaluate_policyraisesindeterminatetohuman_review_requiredas well.
A bare stream with no /Type is treated as *not determined* rather than as content: the same bytes could be a form field's appearance stream (which P=2 permits) or a page's content stream (which no P permits).
A JSON response is never cut by length. Lists are capped instead, and every cut is reported next to the list as { returned, total }: signatures / levels at 32 (verify_signatures does not verify the fields beyond the cap; evaluate_policy verifies all and caps only facts.signatures), revisions at 32, violations / results at 200 (counts such as compliant, failedRules, violations, notDecided cover all entries). A markdown response is cut at 50,000 characters with a visible marker.
evaluate_policy (v0.30.0)evaluate_policy also counts what the document carries that acts, or that is unfinished, and reports it under facts.content — the counts of ISO 32000-2 §12.8.7 Table 264 (legal content attestations): JavaScriptActions, LaunchActions, URIActions, GoToRemoteActions, HideAnnotationActions, MovieActions, SoundActions, plus SubmitFormActions, the URI hosts, whether /OpenAction or a document /AA is present, the annotation count, and the number of /Subtype /Redact annotations still in the file. Nested (direct) action dictionaries are walked, so an inline /A on a link counts. Two rules read it:
POL-CAUTION-REDACT-PENDING — a redaction annotation is still present (ISO 32000-2 §12.5.6.23). An applied redaction leaves no annotation behind, so the content it marks has not been removed from the file. use_with_caution.POL-CAUTION-ACTIVE-CONTENT — ECMAScript, Launch, remote go-to, or SubmitForm/ImportData actions are present; the reason says whether /OpenAction / /AA makes some of it run on open. use_with_caution. URI actions never change the verdict; their hosts go to an advisory.The inventory is an observation, not a verdict: null (could not be taken) is reported as "not counted", never as 0, and unreadable objects make the counts lower bounds. Keys of Table 264 that are not counted: AlternateImages, ExternalStreams, TrueTypeFonts, ExternalRefXobjects, ExternalOPIdicts, NonEmbeddedFonts, DevDepGS_*.
Pass trust_anchors (PEM/DER file paths) or set the PDF_VERIFY_TRUST_ANCHORS env var (a directory of certificates) to evaluate the signer's chain: results are trusted / untrusted / not_evaluated with the certificate path. The validation time is a verified signature timestamp, else the earliest document timestamp covering the signature, else the current time (v0.27.0); the CMS signingTime attribute is written by the signer and is not used. The chosen time is reported as validationTime.
check_revocation controls revocation checking: embedded (default — OCSP/CRL data in the DSS, CMS SignedData.crls, or the CMS signed attribute adbe-revocationInfoArchival; reported as revocation.origin), online (additionally query OCSP responders and CRL distribution points over HTTP), or none (revocation.status: not_checked). CRLs and OCSP responses whose signatures cannot be verified, whose nextUpdate is before the validation time, or whose thisUpdate is more than revocation_freshness seconds (default 86400) before it give unknown (v0.28.0). Pass trusted_ocsp_responders to trust an OCSP responder issued by another CA. Each intermediate CA's result is reported in trust.chainRevocation. A revoked signer certificate gives revoked_after_validation_time (verdict unchanged) when a timestamp proves the signature predates the revocation; otherwise revoked with verdict indeterminate. In online mode, missing issuer certificates are fetched via AIA caIssuers to complete the chain (v0.4). When anchors are provided, TSA certificate chains of RFC 3161 timestamps are evaluated too (tsaTrust).
| Step | What is checked | Network |
|---|---|---|
| Integrity | /ByteRange hash matches the CMS messageDigest | none |
| Signature value | Signature value verifies with the signer certificate's public key | none |
| Certificate chain | Chains up to a trust anchor | online only: issuer certificates fetched via AIA caIssuers |
| Revocation | OCSP / CRL for the signer certificate | none under embedded; under online, HTTP queries when embedded data gives no answer |
| Timestamp | RFC 3161 token and TSA signature | none |
verdict: valid means integrity and signature value passed (revoked turns it into indeterminate). online results reflect the CA's state at query time and can change later. See the site guide for each step and how to choose a mode.
Without trust anchors,
truststaysnot_evaluatedand avalidverdict asserts cryptographic integrity, not signer identity.
Encrypted PDFs are decrypted automatically when permission-encrypted (empty user password); pass password for reader-password PDFs. Supported: RC4 (R2–R4), AES-128, AES-256 (R6). Decryption recovers string metadata (field name, /M, /Reason, /Location) and XMP — a signature's /Contents is exempt from encryption, so verification never depends on it.
Supported SubFilters: ETSI.CAdES.detached (PAdES), adbe.pkcs7.detached, ETSI.RFC3161 (document timestamps). RFC 3161 signature timestamps are fully verified (imprint + TSA signature). Legacy MD5/SHA-1 signatures are verified via node:crypto and flagged as weak.
validate_conformance uses a hybrid engine. With veraPDF installed (PDF_VERIFY_VERAPDF env var or on PATH) validation is delegated for authoritative results. Otherwise a built-in subset of ~15 high-value ISO 19005 rules runs natively (encryption, trailer /ID, LZW, font embedding, JavaScript/prohibited actions, OutputIntent, transparency for A-1, XFA, and more), each reported with its clause reference.
Native results are honest about their limits: violations mean definitively non-compliant; all-passed means "no violations in the checked subset" — never certification.
PDF/A-4 (pdfa-4, pdfa-4e, pdfa-4f) is accepted. Note that PDF/A-4 has no conformance level — there is no pdfa-4b; e and f are variants. The native rules were written from ISO 19005-1/-2 and have not been checked against ISO 19005-4, so a PDF/A-4 report says outright that the native verdict ranks below veraPDF. Validate part 4 with veraPDF.
ISO 19005 accepts an XMP property only when its schema is predefined (XMP Specification, pdfaid) or described in the packet by pdfaExtension:schemas (19005-1 6.7.8, 19005-2/-3/-4 6.6.2.3). veraPDF reports a breach as "XMP property is either not predefined, or is not defined in any XMP extension schema" and names the namespace only in the check context. From v0.31.0 validate_conformance carries that name into the violation detail — e.g. http://www.w3.org/ns/tdmrep/ (tdm:reservation, tdm:policy) — W3C TDM Reservation Protocol (TDMRep): … — and says how the two coexist: PDF/A and TDMRep are compatible when the packet describes the TDMRep schema (reservation as Integer, policy as URL). identify_conformance lists every namespace the packet declares, marked predefined / described / known, and notes the undescribed ones when PDF/A is dec