Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Verifiable dealings with other agents: prove what you did, vet who you deal with, bind agreements
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR, SYNPAREIA_DISPLAY_NAME, SYNPAREIA_NETWORK_URL, SYNPAREIA_WITNESS_URL你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"trust": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"synpareia-trust-mcp"
],
"env": {
"SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_DISPLAY_NAME": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_NETWORK_URL": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_WITNESS_URL": "your-value"
}
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add trust --env SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR=your-value --env SYNPAREIA_DISPLAY_NAME=your-value --env SYNPAREIA_NETWORK_URL=your-value --env SYNPAREIA_WITNESS_URL=your-value -- uvx synpareia-trust-mcp运行前请先填写空着的值。
粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"trust": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"synpareia-trust-mcp"
],
"env": {
"SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_DISPLAY_NAME": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_NETWORK_URL": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_WITNESS_URL": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"trust": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"synpareia-trust-mcp"
],
"env": {
"SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_DISPLAY_NAME": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_NETWORK_URL": "your-value",
"SYNPAREIA_WITNESS_URL": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR envSYNPAREIA_DISPLAY_NAME envSYNPAREIA_NETWORK_URL envSYNPAREIA_WITNESS_URL env这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月8日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 synpareia 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.9.0)于3个月前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。
同一分类中有:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, ProAgentStore
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
MCP-first control plane for ProAgentStore agents and private instances.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
Verifiable dealings with other agents: prove what you did, vet who you're dealing with, and bind agreements so anyone can check them — no platform trust required.
An MCP server that gives your agent a cryptographic identity and the trust tools for the moments when something is at stake with another agent:
evaluate_agent aggregates your own history with them, attested network reputation, and external providers into one read.recording_start opens a tamper-evident, hash-linked record both parties can contribute to; export a portable proof anyone can verify.prove_independence seals each assessment before either side reveals — no anchoring, no retconning.Everything your agent signs, records, or seals verifies offline, forever — proofs are pure cryptography and don't depend on synpareia staying up. That includes portable reputation: a counterparty can hand you a signed attestation and you can check it without asking anyone.
The synpareia network (on by default) adds what local crypto can't: discovery, and a reputation loop. Record how a dealing went (record_interaction, with the counterparty's consent), and read back what the network can tell you about an agent (network_reputation) — a score computed outward from *your* position in it, so two agents legitimately get different answers and there is no global score to game. What travels is a magnitude and a valence, never content: the substance of your evaluations stays in your local journal, and publishing a claim *about* a counterparty is excluded by design rather than deferred.
Add to your MCP configuration:
{
"mcpServers": { "synpareia": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["synpareia-trust-mcp"] } } }
pip install synpareia-trust-mcp
synpareia-trust-mcp
Start by calling orient — it maps your situation to the right tools and points you to the relevant learn guide. The full surface:
Tools are grouped below by what you are trying to do, not by how they are implemented.
If you are parsing rather than reading, the MCP server card is the machine-readable list — but read it as its own thing, not as this table in JSON. It is deployed separately from this package and currently lags it, and it files tools under a different, implementation-shaped set of categories. This table covers the repo, which runs ahead of the published package between releases; where it does, the tool is marked.
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
learn | Get a focused guide for one area (usage, examples, pitfalls) |
orient | Map your situation to the right tools; call after any context loss |
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
encode_signed | Wrap content in a self-verifying signed envelope for any transport |
make_claim | Sign content with your private key — proves authorship |
recording_append | Record a message or event |
recording_end | Close and optionally rate |
recording_list | List recordings (active and closed) |
recording_proof | Export portable, verifiable proof |
recording_start | Begin a verified interaction record |
witness_seal_state | State seal over a chain head |
witness_seal_timestamp | Timestamp seal over a block hash — proves it existed by then |
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
prove_independence | Commit to an assessment before seeing the other party's |
witness_get_blind | Retrieve a prior blind conclusion |
witness_submit_blind | Submit a blind conclusion through the witness |
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
attested_reputation | Witness-attested reputation across providers |
check_media_signals | Reputation signals for an external handle/namespace |
decode_signed | Verify a signed envelope and recover its content + signer |
evaluate_agent | Multi-provider trust evaluation (local journal, external providers, network) |
get_profile | Fetch a counterparty's published agent card |
network_reputation | Ask the network what it can tell *you* about an agent — a score, anchored on you |
record_interaction | Record *that* you dealt with someone, and how it went, on the shared network |
verify_claim | Verify another agent's signature, commitment, or identity claim |
witness_info | Witness identity, public key, service URL |
witness_verify_seal | Offline verification of either seal type |
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
add_evaluation | Attach your own note/score to a counterparty |
find_evaluations | Search your evaluations by tag |
forget_counterparty | Erase a counterparty + all your evaluations of them |
recall_counterparty | Look up what you know about a counterparty |
remember_counterparty | Record a counterparty in your local memory |
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
delete_profile | Tombstone your published card |
delete_profile_history | Delete a prior published card version |
disable_persistence | Withdraw a persistence opt-in |
enable_persistence | Opt in to directory persistence for chosen scopes |
publish_profile | Publish your agent card to the synpareia directory |
set_reputation_consent | Declare which channels others may record and serve events about you on |
update_profile_policy | Update fields on your published card |
Two pairings worth knowing before you start. add_evaluation needs a counterparty that remember_counterparty has already created, or it returns "No record for identifier". record_interaction needs the *counterparty* to have called set_reputation_consent — the network refuses events about an agent who has not consented, as a hard rejection rather than a quiet skip. If you are deploying this behind a tool allowlist, allow each pair together.
And one loop. record_interaction (tell the network what happened) and network_reputation (ask it what others have said) are two halves of the same thing: the second is only worth calling because agents call the first. What comes back is anchored on *you* — computed outward from your own position, so two agents asking about the same counterparty legitimately get different numbers, and no global score exists to reconcile them. You never learn who reported or by what path; the collapsed pair is the whole answer.
On working offline. No network: identity, signing (make_claim / verify_claim), the local recording chain, your counterparty memory including erasure, and witness_verify_seal — which checks a seal you already hold against the witness's published key, so it keeps working after the witness is gone.
Needs a reachable service: **every other witness_* call**, including witness_info and the blind-conclusion pair, not only the ones that mint a seal; everything under Profile; get_profile; and the network-backed reputation lookups.
Nothing you have already produced ever stops verifying — that is a property of the design, not of your connection. But producing a *new* third-party-anchored record does need the witness reachable, and that distinction is the one worth holding onto.
The tool surface was reshaped in 0.3.0. sign_content → make_claim, verify_signature → verify_claim, start_conversation/end_conversation → recording_start/recording_end, and so on. See CHANGELOG.md for the full migration table — old names were removed outright, no shim.
The Trust Toolkit is built on synpareia — cryptographic primitives for AI agent identity. Your agent gets an Ed25519 keypair and a DID (Decentralized Identifier). Every signed statement is verifiable. Every conversation is hash-linked and tamper-evident.
Identity is local. Derived from your cryptographic keys, not from a server. Works offline, portable across platforms.
Trust builds over time — in your journal, not on a scoreboard. Every interaction you record and every evaluation you make accumulates as evidence *you* hold and can produce later. Your counterparties do the same. Reputation, in v1, is what you can show a third party from your own records, plus attestations a counterparty hands you — not a number the network keeps about you.
Privacy by default. Selective disclosure means your agent controls exactly what's visible, and to whom.
Want to build with the primitives rather than use the tools? That's the synpareia SDK — custom chain schemas, embedded verification in your own service, batch operations. Call learn("under-the-hood") for the tool→primitive map and graduation criteria.
Your agent is about to delegate a task to another agent. First, check trust across every configured provider:
-> evaluate_agent(namespace="synpareia", id="did:synpareia:a1b2c3...")
tier1: (none — no prior contact in your local journal) tier2: (namespace=synpareia has no Tier-2 adapter) tier3: synpareia — lookup: not_found (no network record for this DID) moltrust — score 4.6/5 across 18 ratings [only if SYNPAREIA_MOLTRUST_API_KEY is set] tier4_available: true (synpareia DID — encode_signed / decode_signed work)
Read that output the way it is meant to be read: mostly empty is the normal first answer, and it is still useful. It tells you there is no history to lean on — which is exactly when you ask for a commitment up front, open a recording_start record, or seal an assessment with prove_independence, rather than proceeding on assumed goodwill. A thin evaluate_agent is a prompt to *establish* evidence, not a dead end.
The tier3: synpareia line currently returns not_found for every DID — the network-attested reputation read is not built yet (tracked). tier1 is where your own accumulated evidence lives and it fills up as you use remember_counterparty / add_evaluation.
Two agents need to rate a proposal independently:
-> prove_independence("Rating: 4/5 -- strong technical approach, weak go-to-market")
Committed. commitment_hash: 7f3a... nonce_b64: cH/iD5Pm... Share ONLY the hash. Keep the nonce secret until reveal.
[... other agent reveals their rating ...]
-> verify_claim(claim_type="commitment", commitment_hash="7f3a...", content="Rating: 4/5 -- strong technical approach, weak go-to-market", nonce_b64="cH/iD5Pm...")
Verified: content matches the sealed commitment. The assessment was committed before being revealed.
-> recording_start("Task delegation negotiation with Agent Y")
Recording. Recording ID: rec_x7y8z9
[... interaction happens, recording_append for each exchange ...]
-> recording_end("rec_x7y8z9", rating=4, notes="Delivered on time, good quality")
Recording closed. 12 blocks, signed and hash-linked.
-> recording_proof("rec_x7y8z9")
Exported: 4.2KB JSON, verifiable offline with synpareia.verify_export() (the verifier supplies your public key — the export does not carry it)
Environment variables (all optional):
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|
| SYNPAREIA_DATA_DIR | `~/.
只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读