MCP YouTube Transcript
An MCP server retrieving transcripts of YouTube videos
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Agent-native X (Twitter) posting as one MCP server; every post clears a server-side guardrail.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
CAPX_CHOKEPOINT_URL, CAPX_EMAIL, CAPX_LANE, X_CLIENT_ID你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
打开 Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config,把下面的内容粘贴到 claude_desktop_config.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"capx-cafe": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"capx-cafe"
],
"env": {
"CAPX_CHOKEPOINT_URL": "your-value",
"CAPX_EMAIL": "your-value",
"CAPX_LANE": "your-value",
"X_CLIENT_ID": "your-value"
}
}
}
}在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add capx-cafe --env CAPX_CHOKEPOINT_URL=your-value --env CAPX_EMAIL=your-value --env CAPX_LANE=your-value --env X_CLIENT_ID=your-value -- npx -y capx-cafe运行前请先填写空着的值。
粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"capx-cafe": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"capx-cafe"
],
"env": {
"CAPX_CHOKEPOINT_URL": "your-value",
"CAPX_EMAIL": "your-value",
"CAPX_LANE": "your-value",
"X_CLIENT_ID": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"capx-cafe": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"capx-cafe"
],
"env": {
"CAPX_CHOKEPOINT_URL": "your-value",
"CAPX_EMAIL": "your-value",
"CAPX_LANE": "your-value",
"X_CLIENT_ID": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个服务器在你的电脑上运行,而 ChatGPT 只能连接互联网上的服务器。请选择其他应用。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
CAPX_LANE envX_CLIENT_ID env这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月7日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 vb-tyagi 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点
在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置
它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
你需要填写:CAPX_CHOKEPOINT_URL, CAPX_EMAIL
它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(0.1.3)于2个月前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Node.js。
同一分类中有:MCP YouTube Transcript, Google Analytics MCP, BibiGPT YouTube Video Summarizer
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
An MCP server retrieving transcripts of YouTube videos
GA4 MCP server for AI agents: schema discovery, server-side aggregation, analysis-ready defaults.
AI video summarizer: summarize and transcribe YouTube, Bilibili, TikTok and podcast videos.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
One MCP server. Your X token never touches the agent — and every post clears an enforced guardrail before it ships.
*The guardrail, live — every verdict above is produced by the real chokepoint code (pnpm demo replays it).*
capx café is an agent-native X poster that installs as one MCP server into any coding agent (Claude Code /
Cursor / Codex / Windsurf). A whitelisted user connects their X account once; after that they create /
schedule / post from inside their agent session. The whole product rests on one security thesis: the X
token, the guardrail (casserole), and the send are one inseparable server-side unit — the agent on
your laptop only ever holds a short-TTL session handle, never the token. That's why it structurally can't be
prompt-injected into tweeting a scam. "The AI writes; casserole decides what ships."
Every other "let your AI post" tool has the same flaw: to let an agent post, you paste your X token into a plaintext config right next to an autonomous agent that reads untrusted web pages, issues, and code. One prompt-injection and your account tweets a scam. capx café is the only one that structurally can't be.
→ Full threat model, architecture & the "what we can/can't see" table: [docs/SECURITY.md](docs/SECURITY.md)
flowchart LR
subgraph M["🖥️ your machine · untrusted"] A["agent model writes the draft"] S["capx skills"] C["capx MCP client holds a session handle · NO token"] end subgraph K["🔒 capx chokepoint · hosted · AGPL-3.0"] AD["admission allowlist · kill-switch"] CAS["casserole 6-layer guardrail"] V["vault the token lives here"] XA["x-adapter the only egress"] end X["🐦 X · /2/tweets"] A --> C S --> C C -->|"short-TTL handle crosses — never the token"| AD AD --> CAS CAS -->|PASS| V --> XA --> X CAS -.->|blocked / held| C
The token, the guardrail, and the send live together behind a trust boundary; your agent can only *ask*.
Six deterministic layers on every post. Worst result wins — pass / rewrite / hold / block — and a blocked post never even decrypts the token.
flowchart TD
D["draft"] --> AD{"admitted? allowlisted · not killed"} AD -->|no| R["rejected"] AD -->|yes| CAS["casserole L1 eligibility · L2 rate · L3 anti-slop L4 authenticity · L5 kill-switch · L6 audit"] CAS --> VER{"verdict"} VER -->|block| B["blocked — never sent 🔒 token never decrypted"] VER -->|hold| H["held for your review"] VER -->|rewrite| RW["ask the agent to fix"] VER -->|pass| SEND["vault → x-adapter → X ✅"]
npx -y capx-cafe # runs the MCP server — add it to your agent's MCP config
Then, inside your agent:
"connect my X account" → opens a browser once; the token stays on the server
"post: shipping the thing today" → clears casserole, or tells you exactly why not "turn my last week of commits into a build-in-public thread" → drafts + queues it
Set CAPX_EMAIL (your whitelisted email) and, for the BYO lane, X_CLIENT_ID (your own X app) in ~/.capx/config.json or your agent's MCP env. A guided setup page hands you the exact callback URL to paste.
| Agent | How |
|---|---|
| Claude Code | /plugin marketplace add vb-tyagi/capx-cafe → /plugin install capx-cafe (MCP + slash commands + skills) |
| Cursor | add to .cursor/mcp.json; skill rules in plugins/capx-cafe/adapters/cursor/ |
| Codex | add to your MCP config; prompt pack in plugins/capx-cafe/adapters/codex/ |
| Windsurf | add to MCP config; workflows in plugins/capx-cafe/adapters/windsurf/ |
| Any MCP agent | point it at npx -y capx-cafe |
| Docker Desktop | docker mcp catalog pull ghcr.io/vb-tyagi/capx-catalog:latest → MCP Toolkit → enable capx café |
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
connect_x | One-time browser OAuth — the token lands in the server vault, never on your machine |
post_now | Post now (clears casserole first). Supports reply-chains and media |
preview | Dry-run a draft through the guardrail without sending — pass / hold / block + why |
audit | The durable record of what capx posted or attempted on your behalf, and its state |
create_loop · list_loops · … | Scheduled posting — a queue you wrote, sent on a schedule, laptop-off |
upload_media | Stream a local image/video to X and attach it (media you made with your own tools) |
whoami | The connected account + its status |
capx lives inside a *coding* agent, so it has what no social scheduler does: your repo, commits, PRs, releases. Skills turn that into posts — automatically, and always through the guardrail.
flowchart LR
G["git commits"] --> BIP["build-in-public drafts a week of posts"] BIP --> Q["loop queue"] Q -->|"1/day · laptop-off"| POST["posted to X"] Q -.->|"runs low"| GAP["gap-alert"] GAP -.->|"top up from new commits"| BIP
The self-refilling content engine: you code → commits accrue → the loop drains as it posts → gap-alert tops it up from the *new* commits. Your normal work *is* the pipeline.
image-director, video-director, prompt-engine, model-guide: capx runs no models; it guides *your* image/video tools (higgsfield, fal, kling, …) and uploads the result. casserole guards your caption; you own the media.*One canonical SKILL.md per skill, generated for all four agents. capx never writes the content — it makes good content easy and stops bad content regardless of which skill produced it.*
Short $5 / Tall $15 / Grande $35 monthly tiers + top-up packs, quotas enforced server-side at the gate. Full sheet + the math: [docs/ECONOMICS.md](docs/ECONOMICS.md) · policy posture: docs/X-COMPLIANCE.md.The chokepoint is open source (AGPL-3.0). Run the identical image with your own X app, keys, database, and domain — CAPX_DEPLOY_MODE=self-host, zero telemetry to capx. See the self-host-guide skill and docs/HANDOFF.md.
MIT for the client and everything it bundles (apps/capx-mcp, core, config, platform-client) plus skills & docs. AGPL-3.0 for the server half (the chokepoint + casserole/captain/counter/canteen/ chef). Full map: [LICENSING.md](LICENSING.md).
Private alpha, whitelist-only. The first real post shipped 2026-07-19 — guardrail-cleared, token never on the machine. Not yet open for public signups.
Node ≥ 22.6 (TypeScript runs natively via --experimental-strip-types — no build step). pnpm run verify = unit tests across packages / services / apps + tsc. Contributions accepted under the project CLA.
capx café · security · architecture · license