Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
作者提供的说明(英文原文)
Private, expiring artifact hosting for AI agents. Upload via API or MCP; links die on their own.
这三项永远不会合并成一个分数:意见、测量和人气是不同的东西。
我们还没有为它写通俗的介绍。下面是我们从注册中心读取到的事实。
选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。
Authorization标为机密的值是你账户的钥匙。千万不要分享给别人,也不要粘贴到聊天里。
你需要
你用的是哪个应用?
在上方选择你的应用。我们会记住它,下次按钮会显示“安装到 …”。
这个地址需要在请求的 header 中放入密钥,而添加连接器的菜单无法设置。请改用 Claude Code、Cursor 或 VS Code。
在终端中运行这条命令
claude mcp add --transport http veilfile https://veilfile.com/mcp/ --header 'Authorization: your-value'运行前请先填写空着的值。
粘贴到项目中的 .cursor/mcp.json,或 ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
"mcpServers": {
"veilfile": {
"url": "https://veilfile.com/mcp/",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
粘贴到项目中的 .vscode/mcp.json
{
"servers": {
"veilfile": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://veilfile.com/mcp/",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "your-value"
}
}
}
}浏览器会先询问是否打开应用,然后应用会显示设置并请你确认。密钥的值会留空,由你自己填写。
这个地址需要在请求的 header 中放入密钥,而添加连接器的菜单无法设置。请改用 Claude Code、Cursor 或 VS Code。
你的选择通过 Cookie 保存在这台设备上,无需账户。
Authorization 机密 必填 HTTP header这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。
我们还没有读取这个服务器的工具列表;我们会轮流检查各个端点。
我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月6日
注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 veilfile 验证,该账户拥有此仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
我们还没有从 GitHub 读取这个仓库
尚未检查;我们会轮流检查各个端点
尚未检查;我们会轮流检查各个端点
尚未检查;我们会在检查端点时读取工具列表
与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。
它在 1 项适用的基础检查中通过了 1 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。
你需要填写:Authorization
它在作者的云端运行。通过互联网连接,无需安装,但你发送的内容会经过作者的服务器。
GitHub 仓库最后更新于–,最新版本(1.0.0)于10天前进入注册中心。
支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。它通过 URL 连接,所以接受远程 MCP 服务器的应用也可以使用,例如开启开发者模式的 ChatGPT。
同一分类中有:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, FOGA node
同一分类中其他作者的服务器,按星标数排序。
如何看卡片:★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
A Finch OG Agent cell as an MCP server: read the world, dry-run and take ERC-8414 tenders by policy.
按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。
When a coding agent in CI or a cloud session produces a screenshot, log bundle, or HAR file for review, it needs a private URL to put it at — not a public repo. Veilfile is the sanctioned place: upload via API key (or MCP), get back an unguessable, expiring URL. Uploads are scanned for secret shapes and flagged (blocked only when the caller passes on_secret=reject; file contents are never logged).
POST /api/v1/artifacts (multipart, Authorization: Bearer vlf_…) → {id, url, expires_at, size_bytes, secret_flags[]}. GET /a/ serves the file (the 256-bit token *is* the auth). List (bare JSON array) and revoke endpoints included.POST /mcp (JSON-RPC over HTTP; tools upload_artifact, create_upload_url, list_artifacts, revoke_artifact), authenticated with a vlf_ key or an OAuth token.veilfile on PyPI (cli/) and npm (npm/): login (device flow), logout, status, push, pull./app/, Django views on the same shell as the rest of the site: Overview (usage vs plan caps), Files (secret-flag notes/ (public). Agent docs: /llms.txt, docs/API.md, /docs/.See SPEC.md for the product spec.
| Plan | Price | Uploads/mo | Max TTL | Storage | API keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free | $0 | 100 | 7 days | 1 GB | 1 |
| Team | $4/mo | 2,000 | 90 days | 25 GB | 5 |
| Team Plus | $6/mo | 4,000 | 90 days | 40 GB | 10 |
| Scale | $12/mo | 10,000 | 365 days | 100 GB | unlimited |
| Team (yearly) | $40/yr | 2,000 | 90 days | 25 GB | 5 |
| Team Plus (yearly) | $60/yr | 4,000 | 90 days | 40 GB | 10 |
| Scale (yearly) | $120/yr | 10,000 | 365 days | 100 GB | unlimited |
Yearly billing costs ten months' price, so two months are free. A yearly plan has the same limits as the monthly one.
The source of truth is backend/drop_core/plans.py (PLANS, and ANNUAL_PRICE_USD for the yearly prices; Stripe prices live in Stripe and the STRIPE_PRICE_* variables). backend/drop_core/tests_fix_docs.py fails when a doc or template states a different price or cap.
# Backend
python3 -m venv venv && ./venv/bin/pip install -r backend/requirements.txt export DJANGO_DEBUG=True DJANGO_SECRET_KEY=dev-only-key ./venv/bin/python backend/manage.py migrate ./venv/bin/python backend/manage.py createsuperuser # dashboard login ./venv/bin/python backend/manage.py runserver # :8000
Sign up at http://localhost:8000/accounts/signup/ (or log in), open /app/, create an API key, then:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer vlf_..." \
-F "file=@screenshot.png" \ http://localhost:8000/api/v1/artifacts/
No secrets are committed to this repo. Copy the names below into a local .env (gitignored) or your host's env config. Billing is live in production (sk_live_..., live price IDs, Stripe Managed Payments); use a Stripe sandbox/test key only on a local or staging copy.
| Variable | Required | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
DJANGO_SECRET_KEY | prod | — | Required when DJANGO_DEBUG is false |
DJANGO_DEBUG | no | False | Set True for local dev and for tests |
DJANGO_ALLOWED_HOSTS | prod | — | Comma-separated, e.g. veilfile.com |
DJANGO_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS | no | derived from DJANGO_ALLOWED_HOSTS | Comma-separated origins |
DATABASE_URL | prod | sqlite (dev only) | Postgres URL. Production refuses to start without it, or with a sqlite:// URL, unless DJANGO_ALLOW_SQLITE=True. User, password and name are percent-decoded; ?sslmode=... is passed to the driver |
DJANGO_ALLOW_SQLITE | no | — | True lets production mode run on SQLite on purpose (local docker run, image build) |
DJANGO_CONN_MAX_AGE | no | 60 | Persistent DB connection lifetime (seconds) |
DROP_BASE_URL | prod | http://localhost:8000 | Public URL; artifact links are built from it |
DROP_STORAGE | no | local | local (dev) or s3 (prod) |
DROP_LOCAL_DIR | no | backend/media/artifacts | Local storage root |
AWS_S3_ENDPOINT_URL | prod (s3) | — | R2 endpoint, e.g. https:// .r2.cloudflarestorage.com |
AWS_S3_BUCKET | prod (s3) | — | R2 bucket name |
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID | prod (s3) | — | R2 API token (access key) |
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY | prod (s3) | — | R2 API token (secret) |
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY | billing | — | Live secret key (sk_live_…) in production |
STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET | billing | — | Signing secret (whsec_…) from the same Stripe account and mode as the secret key |
STRIPE_PRICE_TEAM | billing | — | Price ID for the $4/mo Team plan (tax-inclusive) |
STRIPE_PRICE_TEAMPLUS | billing | — | Price ID for the $6/mo Team Plus plan (tax-inclusive). The name has no underscore between TEAM and PLUS |
STRIPE_PRICE_SCALE | billing | — | Price ID for the $12/mo Scale plan (tax-inclusive) |
STRIPE_PRICE_TEAM_ANNUAL | billing | — | Price ID for yearly Team billing, $40/yr (tax-inclusive) |
STRIPE_PRICE_TEAMPLUS_ANNUAL | billing | — | Price ID for yearly Team Plus billing, $60/yr (tax-inclusive). No underscore between TEAM and PLUS, as in STRIPE_PRICE_TEAMPLUS |
STRIPE_PRICE_SCALE_ANNUAL | billing | — | Price ID for yearly Scale billing, $120/yr (tax-inclusive) |
EMAIL_BACKEND | prod | console | Set django.core.mail.backends.smtp.EmailBackend; without SMTP no new user can verify their email, mint keys or approve CLI logins (veilfile.W001) |
EMAIL_HOST, EMAIL_PORT, EMAIL_USE_TLS, EMAIL_HOST_USER, EMAIL_HOST_PASSWORD | prod | — | SMTP settings (the live service uses Gmail SMTP) |
DEFAULT_FROM_EMAIL | prod | — | From address, e.g. support@veilfile.com |
EMAIL_TIMEOUT | no | 10 | SMTP timeout (seconds) |
VEILFILE_SAFETY_MODE | no | off | off, log or enforce: SHA-256 blocklist screening of uploads. Unset is reported as veilfile.W002 |
VEILFILE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER | no | CF-Connecting-IP | Header carrying the visitor IP, set (and overwritten) by Cloudflare. Used for rate limits when it holds a valid IP and the request came from a Cloudflare edge address; otherwise the X-Forwarded-For hop logic below applies. Empty disables it |
VEILFILE_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS | no | 2 | Trusted public proxy hops in front of the app. The client IP used for rate limits is the X-Forwarded-For entry that many positions from the right, after trailing private-network hops are skipped, when the last of them is a Cloudflare edge address. A request without one did not come through Cloudflare, and the last entry (the one the platform's proxy appended) is used. Confirm against real traffic before changing |
DJANGO_SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS | no | 31536000 | HSTS max-age on HTTPS responses |
DJANGO_SECURE_HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS, DJANGO_SECURE_HSTS_PRELOAD | no | False | Turn on only after every subdomain serves HTTPS |
PORT | no | 8000 | Set by the host (Render); the entrypoint falls back to 8000 |
WEB_CONCURRENCY | no | 1 | gunicorn workers (gthread) |
GUNICORN_THREADS | no | 4 | Threads per worker. Each in-flight upload is held in memory; lower this on small instances |
GUNICORN_TIMEOUT, GUNICORN_GRACEFUL_TIMEOUT | no | 120, 30 | gunicorn timeouts (seconds) |
SKIP_MIGRATE | no | unset | 1 skips migrate at boot (use with a Render pre-deploy command) |
VEILFILE_FUNNEL_RETENTION_DAYS | no | 365 | How long prune_funnel_events keeps funnel rows |
VEILFILE_ALERT_DIR | no | unset | Directory where CRITICAL safety alerts are also written as files, for an external alert bus; they always go to the log |
DJANGO_TEST_ALLOW_REMOTE_DB | no | — | Lets manage.py test run against a non-local database server (CI with a service container) |
Without Stripe vars, checkout/switch/portal return 503 billing_not_configured and the dashboard shows a friendly note; everything else works.
Tests need DJANGO_DEBUG=True (the test runner refuses False) and a local database; it also forces local storage and strips STRIPE_*/AWS_*.
# Backend (the count changes; run it rather than trusting a number here)
cd backend && DJANGO_DEBUG=True DJANGO_SECRET_KEY=dev-only-key \ ../venv/bin/python manage.py test ../venv/bin/python manage.py makemigrations --check --dry-run # must report no changes
cd npm && node --test cd cli && ../venv/bin/python -m unittest discover -s tests -t .
CI (.github/workflows/ci.yml) runs all of the above plus manage.py check --deploy, a production-settings collectstatic, and the browser checks in site-tests/ (jobs site, site-cloth, site-ink, site-reading, site-phone, site-forms, site-catalog and site-dashboard; see AGENTS.md, "Site checks") on every pull request to main (the browser checks skip a pull request that changes no page), and the backend and CLI checks on every push to it. It runs on GitHub-hosted runners, one machine for each job, with the jobs side by side (AGENTS.md, "Where CI runs").
main after its CI checks pass, with a paid Postgres. render.yaml mirrors it. The container runs as a non-root user. Boot sequence (backend/entrypoint.sh): migrate --noinput (skipped when SKIP_MIGRATE=1), createcachetable, a background daily housekeeping loop, then gunicorn.GET /healthz returns 200 {"status":"ok"} after a SELECT 1, or 503. Set it as the Render Health Check Path.sweep_expired, clearsessions, cleartokens, prune_funnel_events, prune_email_ips (clears send-log IPs after 90 days) and purge_expired_cache once a day. No separate cron job is needed. Uploads also trigger a small lazy sweep.python backend/manage.py sweep_expired deletes expired artifacts (files + rows). Idempotent. Prints swept=N bytes=N failed=N and exits non-zero when any storage delete failed (those rows are kept for the next run); --limit N / --time-budget SECONDS bound a run.python backend/manage.py reconcile_storage lists stored objects with no artifact row; --delete removes them. Run it by hand, dry run first: --delete refuses when the database looks wrong (empty artifact table, more than 20% orphans, or R2 storage without PostgreSQL) unless you pass --force after checking the db= / storage= it prints.python backend/manage.py sync_stripe_billing (dry run; --apply to write) rebuilds workspace plans from Stripe. The Stripe setup steps are in the private ops repository.manage.py check --deploy reports veilfile.W001-W006 misconfigurations (also logged at ERROR by every worker at boot).docker run needs DATABASE_URL=sqlite:////tmp/db.sqlite3 together with DJANGO_ALLOW_SQLITE=True (production mode otherwise refuses SQLite); /app/backend is read-only to the non-root user.docs/REGISTRIES.md.backend/
config/ Django settings/URLs (env-driven) drop_core/ Workspace, APIKey (vlf_), Artifact, plans, storage, secret scan, agent API, key mgmt, device login, OAuth glue, sweeper drop_billing/ Stripe checkout/switch/portal/status/webhook (live,
只显示了开头部分;其余内容请在仓库中阅读