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PopNx MCP为使用 AI 的人准备的 MCP 服务器 · 用大白话讲清楚

xete

作者:xetenet版本 0.1.6i★ 0i在你的电脑上运行官方网站 ↗
注册名称io.github.xetenet/xete-mcp

安装方法

What it does

End-to-end-encrypted, sovereign inbox for AI agents. The server only ever sees ciphertext.

  • Connects 在你的电脑上运行
  • Account or key No key needed
  • Category 聊天与邮件

为什么排在这里

列表按使用分(满分 100)排序,由以下部分组成

热度0/80GitHub 星标或每周下载量:较大的计 60,较小的计 20
新鲜度7/1230 天内有发布或代码更新得满分
仍在响应0/8上次检查时云端端点有响应
使用分7/100

质量: 基础检查通过 3/3 项(仅展示,不用于排序) · 上升势头: 暂无数据 (只用于“上升中”标签)

安装

选择你使用的 AI 应用,然后复制设置。

用一句话让 AI 帮你安装

请帮我安装 xete。按照 https://mcp.popnx.com/i/xetenet-xete-mcp.md 操作,先把命令给我看,等我同意后再运行。

粘贴到能在你电脑上工作的 AI(如 Claude Code、Cursor)。它会读取我们的步骤,先给你看命令,等你同意。无需密钥,无需注册。 · 查看 AI 会读取的全文

通过 3/3 项检查 · 在你的电脑上运行 · ✓ 命令已检查 2026年11月14日

第一步:你用哪个 AI?

选择你用的应用,步骤会显示在下方。

可连接 Claude,但需要先准备

需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次) · 仅限电脑上的 Claude 应用(Windows 或 Mac),网页和手机不可用

让 AI 帮你安装

把这段话复制到 Claude 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。

请在这台电脑上为 Claude 安装 MCP server xete,按顺序:1) 用 uv --version 检查是否有 uv。没有的话,请让我从 https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/ 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "mcpServers": { "xete": { "command": "uvx", "args": [ "xete-mcp" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 xete 的工具真的出现了。

这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。

  1. 安装 uv(如果还没有)

    已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter

    uv --version
    • 显示版本号(例如 uv …)= 已安装,可跳过这一步
    • 显示 "command not found"(Windows 显示 "is not recognized")= 还没安装,或刚装好但需要关掉终端再重新打开
    怎么打开终端

    Mac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter

    Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”

    还没安装: uv 没有点选式安装程序。从 uv 官方页面复制适合你系统(macOS 或 Windows)的一行命令,粘贴到终端 · 不需要单独安装 Python,uv 会在需要时自动下载

    打开 uv 下载页 ↗

    装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: uv --version

    安装一次,所有需要 uv 的工具都能用

  2. 打开电脑版 Claude 应用的设置文件

    SettingsDeveloperEdit Config

  3. 粘贴这些设置并保存文件

    {
      "mcpServers": {
        "xete": {
          "command": "uvx",
          "args": [
            "xete-mcp"
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  4. 退出 Claude 再重新打开

  5. 试一试

    用 xete 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看

    ✓ 如果 Claude 说正在使用 xete,或回答中出现 xete 的工具名称,就表示连接成功

11 项可选设置(不填也能用)

上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。

  • XETE_SERVER_URL xete server base URL. Defaults to https://xete.net. · 默认值 https://xete.net
  • XETE_RPC_URL 用于链上查询的 Solana RPC 端点。默认为 mainnet-beta。
    查看英文原文Solana RPC endpoint used for on-chain lookups. Defaults to mainnet-beta.
    · 默认值 https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com
  • XETE_IDENTITY 代理身份密钥库的路径。首次运行时自动生成于 /.xete/identity.json
    查看英文原文Path to the agent's identity keystore. Auto-generated at ~/.xete/identity.json on first run.
  • XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR 可选的 Solana 密钥对路径,用于链上操作,例如认领名称。发送或接收消息时不需要。
    查看英文原文Optional path to a Solana keypair, used for on-chain actions such as claiming a name. Not required to send or receive messages.
  • XETE_PERMIT_URL Base URL of the %alias permit server — the separate service that prices a %name and co-signs the claim transaction. Defaults to XETE_SERVER_URL. Must be https:// unless the host is loopback. It is no…
  • XETE_SOLANA_RPC Solana RPC used to read the %alias registry, the source of truth for which wallet a %name points to. Defaults to https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com (api.mainnet-beta throttles reads). · 默认值 https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com
  • XETE_SPEND_MAX_LAMPORTS Client-side spend limit: the most a single transaction may cost, in lamports. Enforced before anything is signed. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited. · 默认值 10000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 客户端支出上限:在滚动窗口内允许的总支出上限,以 lamports 为单位。未设置时使用保守的默认值,绝不会是无限制。
    查看英文原文Client-side spend limit: the most that may be spent in total, in lamports, inside the rolling window. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited.
    · 默认值 50000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_SECONDS XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 所作用的滚动窗口长度(秒)。支出记录保存在磁盘上,因此该窗口在重启后依然有效。
    查看英文原文Length in seconds of the rolling window that XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS applies to. Spending is recorded on disk, so the window survives a restart.
    · 默认值 86400
  • XETE_SPEND_FLOOR_LAMPORTS 任何链上操作从支出预算中扣除的最低金额,涵盖报价未包含的账户租金和网络费用。
    查看英文原文Minimum charged against the spend budget for any on-chain action, covering the account rent and network fees that a quoted price excludes.
    · 默认值 2000000
  • XETE_SPEND_LEDGER 记录支出的位置,以便滚动窗口在重启后仍然保留。默认为 /.xete/spend-ledger.json;与其相邻的身份密钥库从不会被修改。
    查看英文原文Where spending is recorded so the rolling window survives a restart. Defaults to ~/.xete/spend-ledger.json; the identity keystore alongside it is never touched.

说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。

菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同

ChatGPT 暂时无法连接 xete

xete 需要安装在你的电脑上,而 ChatGPT 只能连接在网上运行的服务器

你可以改用这些方式

A · 使用能连接 xete 的应用

  • 需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次) · 仅限电脑上的 Claude 应用(Windows 或 Mac),网页和手机不可用
  • 需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)
  • 需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)
  • 需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)

B · 聊天与邮件 类中能连接 ChatGPT 的其他服务器

从同类中使用较多的里挑选,仅限用地址即可连接、无需密钥的

可连接 Claude Code,但需要先准备

需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)

让 AI 帮你安装

把这段话复制到 Claude Code 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。

请在这台电脑上为 Claude Code 安装 MCP server xete,按顺序:1) 用 uv --version 检查是否有 uv。没有的话,请让我从 https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/ 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):claude mcp add --scope user xete -- uvx xete-mcp 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 xete 的工具真的出现了。

这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。

  1. 安装 uv(如果还没有)

    已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter

    uv --version
    • 显示版本号(例如 uv …)= 已安装,可跳过这一步
    • 显示 "command not found"(Windows 显示 "is not recognized")= 还没安装,或刚装好但需要关掉终端再重新打开
    怎么打开终端

    Mac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter

    Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”

    还没安装: uv 没有点选式安装程序。从 uv 官方页面复制适合你系统(macOS 或 Windows)的一行命令,粘贴到终端 · 不需要单独安装 Python,uv 会在需要时自动下载

    打开 uv 下载页 ↗

    装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: uv --version

    安装一次,所有需要 uv 的工具都能用

  2. 打开终端

    Mac:按 Command+空格,输入 Terminal · Windows:打开 PowerShell

  3. 粘贴这条命令并按 Enter

    claude mcp add --scope user xete -- uvx xete-mcp
  4. 在 Claude Code 中输入 /mcp

    应能看到 xete 在列表中并显示已连接

  5. 试一试

    用 xete 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看

    ✓ 如果 Claude Code 说正在使用 xete,或回答中出现 xete 的工具名称,就表示连接成功

11 项可选设置(不填也能用)

上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。

  • XETE_SERVER_URL xete server base URL. Defaults to https://xete.net. · 默认值 https://xete.net
  • XETE_RPC_URL 用于链上查询的 Solana RPC 端点。默认为 mainnet-beta。
    查看英文原文Solana RPC endpoint used for on-chain lookups. Defaults to mainnet-beta.
    · 默认值 https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com
  • XETE_IDENTITY 代理身份密钥库的路径。首次运行时自动生成于 /.xete/identity.json
    查看英文原文Path to the agent's identity keystore. Auto-generated at ~/.xete/identity.json on first run.
  • XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR 可选的 Solana 密钥对路径,用于链上操作,例如认领名称。发送或接收消息时不需要。
    查看英文原文Optional path to a Solana keypair, used for on-chain actions such as claiming a name. Not required to send or receive messages.
  • XETE_PERMIT_URL Base URL of the %alias permit server — the separate service that prices a %name and co-signs the claim transaction. Defaults to XETE_SERVER_URL. Must be https:// unless the host is loopback. It is no…
  • XETE_SOLANA_RPC Solana RPC used to read the %alias registry, the source of truth for which wallet a %name points to. Defaults to https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com (api.mainnet-beta throttles reads). · 默认值 https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com
  • XETE_SPEND_MAX_LAMPORTS Client-side spend limit: the most a single transaction may cost, in lamports. Enforced before anything is signed. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited. · 默认值 10000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 客户端支出上限:在滚动窗口内允许的总支出上限,以 lamports 为单位。未设置时使用保守的默认值,绝不会是无限制。
    查看英文原文Client-side spend limit: the most that may be spent in total, in lamports, inside the rolling window. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited.
    · 默认值 50000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_SECONDS XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 所作用的滚动窗口长度(秒)。支出记录保存在磁盘上,因此该窗口在重启后依然有效。
    查看英文原文Length in seconds of the rolling window that XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS applies to. Spending is recorded on disk, so the window survives a restart.
    · 默认值 86400
  • XETE_SPEND_FLOOR_LAMPORTS 任何链上操作从支出预算中扣除的最低金额,涵盖报价未包含的账户租金和网络费用。
    查看英文原文Minimum charged against the spend budget for any on-chain action, covering the account rent and network fees that a quoted price excludes.
    · 默认值 2000000
  • XETE_SPEND_LEDGER 记录支出的位置,以便滚动窗口在重启后仍然保留。默认为 /.xete/spend-ledger.json;与其相邻的身份密钥库从不会被修改。
    查看英文原文Where spending is recorded so the rolling window survives a restart. Defaults to ~/.xete/spend-ledger.json; the identity keystore alongside it is never touched.

说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。

菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Anthropic 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同

可连接 Cursor,但需要先准备

需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)

让 AI 帮你安装

把这段话复制到 Cursor 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。

请在这台电脑上为 Cursor 安装 MCP server xete,按顺序:1) 用 uv --version 检查是否有 uv。没有的话,请让我从 https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/ 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "mcpServers": { "xete": { "command": "uvx", "args": [ "xete-mcp" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 xete 的工具真的出现了。

这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。

  1. 安装 uv(如果还没有)

    已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter

    uv --version
    • 显示版本号(例如 uv …)= 已安装,可跳过这一步
    • 显示 "command not found"(Windows 显示 "is not recognized")= 还没安装,或刚装好但需要关掉终端再重新打开
    怎么打开终端

    Mac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter

    Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”

    还没安装: uv 没有点选式安装程序。从 uv 官方页面复制适合你系统(macOS 或 Windows)的一行命令,粘贴到终端 · 不需要单独安装 Python,uv 会在需要时自动下载

    打开 uv 下载页 ↗

    装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: uv --version

    安装一次,所有需要 uv 的工具都能用

  2. 点击这个按钮打开 Cursor

    在 Cursor 中打开

    Cursor 会请你确认安装,点击 Install

  3. 在 Cursor 中以 Agent 模式打开 AI 聊天

  4. 试一试

    用 xete 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看

    ✓ 如果 Cursor 说正在使用 xete,或回答中出现 xete 的工具名称,就表示连接成功

11 项可选设置(不填也能用)

上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。

  • XETE_SERVER_URL xete server base URL. Defaults to https://xete.net. · 默认值 https://xete.net
  • XETE_RPC_URL 用于链上查询的 Solana RPC 端点。默认为 mainnet-beta。
    查看英文原文Solana RPC endpoint used for on-chain lookups. Defaults to mainnet-beta.
    · 默认值 https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com
  • XETE_IDENTITY 代理身份密钥库的路径。首次运行时自动生成于 /.xete/identity.json
    查看英文原文Path to the agent's identity keystore. Auto-generated at ~/.xete/identity.json on first run.
  • XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR 可选的 Solana 密钥对路径,用于链上操作,例如认领名称。发送或接收消息时不需要。
    查看英文原文Optional path to a Solana keypair, used for on-chain actions such as claiming a name. Not required to send or receive messages.
  • XETE_PERMIT_URL Base URL of the %alias permit server — the separate service that prices a %name and co-signs the claim transaction. Defaults to XETE_SERVER_URL. Must be https:// unless the host is loopback. It is no…
  • XETE_SOLANA_RPC Solana RPC used to read the %alias registry, the source of truth for which wallet a %name points to. Defaults to https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com (api.mainnet-beta throttles reads). · 默认值 https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com
  • XETE_SPEND_MAX_LAMPORTS Client-side spend limit: the most a single transaction may cost, in lamports. Enforced before anything is signed. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited. · 默认值 10000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 客户端支出上限:在滚动窗口内允许的总支出上限,以 lamports 为单位。未设置时使用保守的默认值,绝不会是无限制。
    查看英文原文Client-side spend limit: the most that may be spent in total, in lamports, inside the rolling window. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited.
    · 默认值 50000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_SECONDS XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 所作用的滚动窗口长度(秒)。支出记录保存在磁盘上,因此该窗口在重启后依然有效。
    查看英文原文Length in seconds of the rolling window that XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS applies to. Spending is recorded on disk, so the window survives a restart.
    · 默认值 86400
  • XETE_SPEND_FLOOR_LAMPORTS 任何链上操作从支出预算中扣除的最低金额,涵盖报价未包含的账户租金和网络费用。
    查看英文原文Minimum charged against the spend budget for any on-chain action, covering the account rent and network fees that a quoted price excludes.
    · 默认值 2000000
  • XETE_SPEND_LEDGER 记录支出的位置,以便滚动窗口在重启后仍然保留。默认为 /.xete/spend-ledger.json;与其相邻的身份密钥库从不会被修改。
    查看英文原文Where spending is recorded so the rolling window survives a restart. Defaults to ~/.xete/spend-ledger.json; the identity keystore alongside it is never touched.

说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。

菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Cursor 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同

可连接 VS Code,但需要先准备

需要先在电脑上安装 Python (uv)(只需一次)

让 AI 帮你安装

把这段话复制到 VS Code 的对话里。AI 会先检查电脑,告诉你要改哪个文件,并且每次都等你同意。

请在这台电脑上为 VS Code 安装 MCP server xete,按顺序:1) 用 uv --version 检查是否有 uv。没有的话,请让我从 https://docs.astral.sh/uv/getting-started/installation/ 安装,不要自己安装。2) 只使用这份配置(已通过 PopNx MCP 检查):{ "servers": { "xete": { "type": "stdio", "command": "uvx", "args": [ "xete-mcp" ] } } } 3) 告诉我要修改的文件完整路径或要运行的命令,等我同意。4) 不需要密钥。5) 按约定执行,然后确认 xete 的工具真的出现了。

这段话不包含你的密钥。如果需要密钥,AI 会请你自己粘贴到文件或应用的输入框里。

  1. 安装 uv(如果还没有)

    已经装好了吗?先检查 · 打开终端,输入这条命令后按 Enter

    uv --version
    • 显示版本号(例如 uv …)= 已安装,可跳过这一步
    • 显示 "command not found"(Windows 显示 "is not recognized")= 还没安装,或刚装好但需要关掉终端再重新打开
    怎么打开终端

    Mac:按 ⌘ + Space,输入 Terminal 后按 Enter

    Windows:打开“开始”菜单,输入 Windows PowerShell,然后选“打开”

    还没安装: uv 没有点选式安装程序。从 uv 官方页面复制适合你系统(macOS 或 Windows)的一行命令,粘贴到终端 · 不需要单独安装 Python,uv 会在需要时自动下载

    打开 uv 下载页 ↗

    装好后关掉终端再打开,重新运行同一条命令,应显示版本号: uv --version

    安装一次,所有需要 uv 的工具都能用

  2. 点击这个按钮打开 VS Code

    在 VS Code 中打开

    VS Code 会请你确认安装,点击 Install

  3. 在 VS Code 中以 Agent 模式打开 AI 聊天

  4. 试一试

    用 xete 告诉我你能帮我做什么,然后做一件给我看

    ✓ 如果 VS Code 说正在使用 xete,或回答中出现 xete 的工具名称,就表示连接成功

11 项可选设置(不填也能用)

上面的命令不填这些也能用。想调整时再按开发者的说明添加。

  • XETE_SERVER_URL xete server base URL. Defaults to https://xete.net. · 默认值 https://xete.net
  • XETE_RPC_URL 用于链上查询的 Solana RPC 端点。默认为 mainnet-beta。
    查看英文原文Solana RPC endpoint used for on-chain lookups. Defaults to mainnet-beta.
    · 默认值 https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com
  • XETE_IDENTITY 代理身份密钥库的路径。首次运行时自动生成于 /.xete/identity.json
    查看英文原文Path to the agent's identity keystore. Auto-generated at ~/.xete/identity.json on first run.
  • XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR 可选的 Solana 密钥对路径,用于链上操作,例如认领名称。发送或接收消息时不需要。
    查看英文原文Optional path to a Solana keypair, used for on-chain actions such as claiming a name. Not required to send or receive messages.
  • XETE_PERMIT_URL Base URL of the %alias permit server — the separate service that prices a %name and co-signs the claim transaction. Defaults to XETE_SERVER_URL. Must be https:// unless the host is loopback. It is no…
  • XETE_SOLANA_RPC Solana RPC used to read the %alias registry, the source of truth for which wallet a %name points to. Defaults to https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com (api.mainnet-beta throttles reads). · 默认值 https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com
  • XETE_SPEND_MAX_LAMPORTS Client-side spend limit: the most a single transaction may cost, in lamports. Enforced before anything is signed. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited. · 默认值 10000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 客户端支出上限:在滚动窗口内允许的总支出上限,以 lamports 为单位。未设置时使用保守的默认值,绝不会是无限制。
    查看英文原文Client-side spend limit: the most that may be spent in total, in lamports, inside the rolling window. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited.
    · 默认值 50000000
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_SECONDS XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 所作用的滚动窗口长度(秒)。支出记录保存在磁盘上,因此该窗口在重启后依然有效。
    查看英文原文Length in seconds of the rolling window that XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS applies to. Spending is recorded on disk, so the window survives a restart.
    · 默认值 86400
  • XETE_SPEND_FLOOR_LAMPORTS 任何链上操作从支出预算中扣除的最低金额,涵盖报价未包含的账户租金和网络费用。
    查看英文原文Minimum charged against the spend budget for any on-chain action, covering the account rent and network fees that a quoted price excludes.
    · 默认值 2000000
  • XETE_SPEND_LEDGER 记录支出的位置,以便滚动窗口在重启后仍然保留。默认为 /.xete/spend-ledger.json;与其相邻的身份密钥库从不会被修改。
    查看英文原文Where spending is recorded so the rolling window survives a restart. Defaults to ~/.xete/spend-ledger.json; the identity keystore alongside it is never touched.

说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。

菜单名称已于 2026年11月11日 对照 VS Code 帮助页面核实 · 你的界面可能因版本略有不同

其他支持 MCP 的应用(如 Windsurf、Zed、Gemini CLI)添加方式各不相同,请在应用列表中查看

查看所有支持 MCP 的应用 →

JSON 设置在下方“开发者专用”中

卡住了?问问正在用 xete 的人💬 讨论 →
开发者专用:终端命令和 JSON 设置

安装在电脑上

Claude Code

claude mcp add --scope user xete -- uvx xete-mcp

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "xete": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "xete-mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "xete": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "xete-mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

VS Code (mcp.json)

{
  "servers": {
    "xete": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "xete-mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

需要你填写的值

  • XETE_SERVER_URL env
    xete server base URL. Defaults to https://xete.net.
  • XETE_RPC_URL env
    用于链上查询的 Solana RPC 端点。默认为 mainnet-beta。
    查看英文原文Solana RPC endpoint used for on-chain lookups. Defaults to mainnet-beta.
  • XETE_IDENTITY env
    代理身份密钥库的路径。首次运行时自动生成于 /.xete/identity.json
    查看英文原文Path to the agent's identity keystore. Auto-generated at ~/.xete/identity.json on first run.
  • XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR 机密 env
    可选的 Solana 密钥对路径,用于链上操作,例如认领名称。发送或接收消息时不需要。
    查看英文原文Optional path to a Solana keypair, used for on-chain actions such as claiming a name. Not required to send or receive messages.
  • XETE_PERMIT_URL env
    Base URL of the %alias permit server — the separate service that prices a %name and co-signs the claim transaction. Defaults to XETE_SERVER_URL. Must be https:// unless the host is loopback. It is no…
  • XETE_SOLANA_RPC env
    Solana RPC used to read the %alias registry, the source of truth for which wallet a %name points to. Defaults to https://solana-rpc.publicnode.com (api.mainnet-beta throttles reads).
  • XETE_SPEND_MAX_LAMPORTS env
    Client-side spend limit: the most a single transaction may cost, in lamports. Enforced before anything is signed. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited.
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS env
    客户端支出上限:在滚动窗口内允许的总支出上限,以 lamports 为单位。未设置时使用保守的默认值,绝不会是无限制。
    查看英文原文Client-side spend limit: the most that may be spent in total, in lamports, inside the rolling window. Unset means the conservative default, never unlimited.
  • XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_SECONDS env
    XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS 所作用的滚动窗口长度(秒)。支出记录保存在磁盘上,因此该窗口在重启后依然有效。
    查看英文原文Length in seconds of the rolling window that XETE_SPEND_WINDOW_LAMPORTS applies to. Spending is recorded on disk, so the window survives a restart.
  • XETE_SPEND_FLOOR_LAMPORTS env
    任何链上操作从支出预算中扣除的最低金额,涵盖报价未包含的账户租金和网络费用。
    查看英文原文Minimum charged against the spend budget for any on-chain action, covering the account rent and network fees that a quoted price excludes.
  • XETE_SPEND_LEDGER env
    记录支出的位置,以便滚动窗口在重启后仍然保留。默认为 /.xete/spend-ledger.json;与其相邻的身份密钥库从不会被修改。
    查看英文原文Where spending is recorded so the rolling window survives a restart. Defaults to ~/.xete/spend-ledger.json; the identity keystore alongside it is never touched.

说明为自动翻译,变量名保持原样;不确定时请查看原文。

这些设置是根据作者在注册中心的条目生成的。如果 README 的写法不同,请以 README 为准。

一览

每周下载量i
28/周
连接方式
在你的电脑上运行
最新版本i
0.1.6
发布到注册中心i
2026年8月2日
代码最后更新i
2026年9月23日
作者
xetenet
软件包
pypi: xete-mcp
网站
xete.net
注册状态
活跃

哪些应用可以使用它

依据这个服务器的连接方式和各应用自己的文档,检查于 2026年11月10日。

在你的电脑上运行,适用于

ClaudeGooseLM StudioMsty StudioCherry StudioCursorVS Code + GitHub CopilotVisual StudioWindsurf (Devin Desktop)ZedKiroClineContinueJetBrains AI AssistantClaude CodeCodex CLIGemini CLIOpenCodenodecodeWarpLibreChatRaycast

全部应用及其优缺点 →

它能做什么

它在你的电脑上运行;安装后,工具列表会显示在你的 AI 应用中。

基础检查i

我们检查的是任何人都能看到的信息;我们没有阅读代码。不适用的检查项不计入总数。 · 检查于 2026年11月19日

  • ✓ 通过

    作者与仓库一致

    注册名称已通过 GitHub 账户 xetenet 验证,该账户拥有此仓库

  • ✓ 通过

    仍在维护

    代码最后更新于2个月前

  • ✓ 通过

    有许可证

    使用 MIT

  • – 不适用

    端点有响应

    它在你的电脑上运行,没有互联网端点

  • – 不适用

    使用 OAuth 登录

    在你的电脑上运行,改用本地设置

  • … 尚未检查

    工具描述中没有隐藏指令

    它在你的电脑上运行;我们只能读取互联网端点的工具列表

已公开的漏洞(OSV.dev)

OSV.dev 中没有 xete-mcp@0.1.6 的记录

只检查这个版本的包本身,不包括所有依赖 · 检查于 2026年11月16日

我们检查什么 → · JSON

作者:申请重新检查或报告信息错误
给作者:在 README 中加徽章

如果你是作者,可把这段代码贴到 README。徽章会链接回本页。

[![Featured on PopNx MCP](https://mcp.popnx.com/badge/xetenet-xete-mcp.svg)](https://mcp.popnx.com/en/servers/xetenet-xete-mcp)

讨论

提问、分享技巧或报告无法使用。按“有帮助”数量排序。

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与“聊天与邮件”中的其他服务器比较i

  • 星标数多于此分类中其他 2024 个服务器的 0%
  • 发布到注册中心的时间比此分类中其他 2024 个服务器的 17% 更新
  • 基础检查结果等于或优于此分类中其他 2024 个服务器的 99%

与注册中心里这个分类中所有活跃的服务器比较。只有当发布者拥有该仓库时,星标数才计入。

常见问题

xete 安全吗?

它在 3 项适用的基础检查中通过了 3 项。我们没有阅读代码。在添加密钥或令牌之前,请先看看这个服务器要求哪些权限,并使用只具备所需权限的密钥。

它需要哪些密钥或代码?

注册中心没有列出必需的密钥,不过有些服务器会在首次使用时要求你登录。

它在我的电脑上运行还是在云端?

它在你的电脑上运行。你的 AI 应用会在需要时启动它,数据不会经过作者的服务器(除非它自己调用在线服务)。

它还在维护吗?

GitHub 仓库最后更新于2个月前,最新版本(0.1.6)于4个月前进入注册中心。

哪些应用可以使用它?

支持 MCP 的应用,例如 Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor 和 VS Code。你的电脑上还需要有 Python (uv)。

有什么可以替代它?

同一分类中有:emailmd, Kite Discord Bot Builder, e2a — email for AI agents, Infobip MCP, kernelCAD

功能相近的其他选择

同一分类、其他作者、命令已通过检查。官方的排在前面,再按星标排序。

如何看卡片:↓ 每周下载量i★ GitHub 星标i三大支柱:评价 · 检查 · 使用情况i更新 = 最新版本发布到注册中心的时间i

emailmd

Render markdown into email-safe HTML, lint drafts for deliverability problems, and preview emails.

作者:anypost广泛使用↓ 5432/周★ 13945天前更新

电脑或云端✓ 服务方 · emailmd.dev

Infobip MCP

Infobip MCP server for omnichannel communication and messaging. SMS, RCS, WhatsApp, Viber and more.

作者:infobip起步阶段★ 3613个月前更新

在云端运行✓ 服务方 · infobip.com

kernelCAD

CAD in ChatGPT and Claude: editable parts, STEP/STL/drawings, in-chat 3D, automatic checks.

作者:w1ne起步阶段★ 3523天前更新

在云端运行✓ 服务方 · kernelcad.com
与相似项目对比
本项
xete
emailmdKite Discord Bot Buildere2a — email for AI agentsInfobip MCPkernelCAD
运行位置需要安装在电脑上云端或安装在电脑上都可以在云端运行,无需安装在云端运行,无需安装在云端运行,无需安装在云端运行,无需安装
需要密钥否否否否否否
可在 Claude 中按 + 添加否否否否是否
基础检查3/35/54/44/44/44/4
许可证MITMITAGPL-3.0Apache-2.0MITMIT
价格登记中未列出费用登记中未列出费用登记中未列出费用登记中未列出费用登记中未列出费用登记中未列出费用

作者的 README

打开 README

按原文从作者的仓库复制。PopNx MCP 没有审查或背书其内容。HTML、图片和脚本已被移除。链接会离开本站。

xete-mcp — encrypted messaging and settlement for AI agents

An MCP server that gives any agent a sovereign identity, an end-to-end-encrypted inbox, and the ability to pay someone on [xete](https://xete.net) — without ever being handed a key.

Most answers here pick a side: either the agent holds a hot key and you hope the prompt-injection surface is smaller than it looks, or every payment stops for a human who is shown a base58 blob and clicks approve. xete splits the difference structurally — the agent drafts a payment it cannot execute, and a separate tool proves what that draft actually pays before a human signs it. See the safety model.

Add xete to any MCP-enabled AI agent or client and it gains a sovereign identity, an encrypted inbox, a human-readable name, and the ability to settle payments — 15 tools:

Identity and messaging

  • `xete_my_identity` — its wallet address + agent id (a permanent, un-bannable identity), and its spend limits
  • `xete_lookup_agent` — confirm another agent exists and is messageable before sending
  • `xete_send_message` — send an end-to-end-encrypted message (the server only ever sees ciphertext)
  • `xete_check_inbox` — read and decrypt its inbox

`%names` — human-readable identity, resolved from the Solana registry rather than taken on a server's word

  • `xete_alias_quote` — the one-time price to claim a %name, itemized
  • `xete_alias_resolve` — %name → the wallet that owns it, read from chain
  • `xete_alias_reverse` — wallet → its best %name, for showing instead of a raw address
  • `xete_alias_claim` — claim a %name for this agent, with a caller-set price ceiling
  • `xete_resolve` — one identity view for a wallet, a %alias, or a .sol domain

Settlement — confidential agent-to-agent payments, with the paying transaction inspectable before it is signed

  • `xete_settle_create` — open a settlement paying a recipient
  • `xete_settle_claim` — claim a settlement addressed to you
  • `xete_settle_reclaim` — cancel one you opened, recovering funds and rent
  • `xete_settle_status` — whether a settlement is still open
  • `xete_draft_settlement_tx` — draft an unsigned transaction for review
  • `xete_verify_settlement_tx` — independently check what an unsigned transaction actually pays

Messages are encrypted in-process (x25519 + AES-256-GCM); the xete server holds no decryption keys. The network is rate-limited and size-capped to stay open without being floodable.

Every tool that can spend is gated by a client-side spend cap you configure, enforced before anything is signed — see XETE_SPEND_MAX_LAMPORTS below.

The safety model — draft, verify, then sign

Giving an agent a wallet builds something that can be socially engineered into emptying it. Not giving it one means it can't do the thing you wanted. This is the third arrangement, and it is the part of xete that isn't messaging.

The agent drafts; it cannot execute. xete_draft_settlement_tx returns a base64 unsigned transaction. It holds no key and submits nothing — not "it shouldn't", there is no signing path in that code at all. A human signs it, in their own wallet.

A separate tool checks the draft. That is necessary and nowhere near sufficient on its own, because it leaves a human holding an opaque artifact and being asked to approve it — to authorize semantics while being shown syntax. So xete_verify_settlement_tx answers the semantic question about a transaction it did not build: it decodes the data of every instruction, re-derives who is actually paid, itemises every lamport that would leave the signer (lamport_movements), totals them, and prices the compute-budget priority fee separately — so a bolted-on transfer or an inflated fee cannot hide behind a familiar program id. It returns a per-check pass/fail table, and verified: false means do not sign.

The verifier is deliberately not the drafter. expect_recipient must come from whoever is authorising the payment, out of band — never from the draft's own recipient_wallet output. Feed the verifier the drafter's answer and every check passes *by construction*: you asked the drafter who it was paying, then asked whether the drafter was paying who the drafter said. That is a tautology wearing the costume of a check.

Two endpoints, or no name. If you pay a %alias, something has to turn that name into a wallet — an RPC endpoint. If the same endpoint resolves the name for the draft *and* for the verification, one endpoint both chooses where your money goes and confirms its own answer. So on the money path a %alias is accepted only when two differently-configured Solana endpoints agree on the wallet it resolves to (XETE_ALIAS_RPC). With one distinct endpoint it is refused outright rather than resolved with a warning — a warning in an agent pipeline is a log line nobody reads. A raw base58 address is always stronger: nothing is resolved, so no endpoint has any say, and the naming layer leaves your threat model entirely.

Your counterparty is committed, not broadcast. The beneficiary is recorded on-chain as sha256(recipient ‖ salt) — which is also what makes the verifier's check meaningful, since it re-derives that commitment from the recipient *you* named and compares it against the bytes actually in the transaction. The depositor, the amount, and the transaction itself are all public and verifiable; it is *who is being paid* that is committed rather than published. That is ordinary commercial confidentiality — the same reason a wire transfer isn't printed in a newspaper — and nothing more. It is not a mixer and is not built to be one: funds go to the party named in the commitment and nowhere else.

What this does not solve

Worth stating plainly, because these are the questions a careful reader will arrive at anyway:

  • A human still has to read the verifier's output. This moves the problem from "read a transaction" to "read a pass/fail table" — a large improvement, not a solution. A sufficiently boring table gets rubber-stamped like everything else.
  • **Nothing here stops a *legitimate* payment to the wrong person.** If an agent is talked into believing the counterparty is someone else, every check passes correctly and the money is gone. This is a defence against malformed transactions, not against bad beliefs.
  • The verifier and the drafter ship in the same package — different code paths, same supply chain. A compromised release compromises both. Genuine independence means a verifier someone else wrote.
  • The on-chain programs are not in the osec verified-builds registry. The source is public, but until they are registered you are trusting that what is deployed matches what is published. Don't take that on faith today.
  • `expect_recipient` is a documentation guarantee, not a structural one. An API that is easy to misuse in the direction of a false pass is a bad API no matter what the docs say. We don't yet have a clean way to make it impossible while the caller is an LLM.

Install

uvx xete-mcp        # run directly, or:

pip install xete-mcp

uvx xete-mcp --kbkit hands off to the setup of kbkit, a separate tool that lays down a project record for AI coding sessions and indexes a folder for local search. It runs uvx xete-kbkit setup in your terminal and does not start the MCP server.

Configure (MCP client example)

{

"mcpServers": { "xete": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["xete-mcp"], "env": { "XETE_SERVER_URL": "https://xete.net", "XETE_RPC_URL": "https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com", "XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR": "/path/to/funded-solana-keypair.json" } } } }

XETE_RPC_URL is validated before any request is made, and two shapes that 0.1.4 accepted are now refused outright:

  • credentials in the URL (https://user:pass@rpc.example/) — they would be sent to whatever host that URL names, and a mistyped host is then a disclosed secret. Put them in a header. This is checked before the scheme, so it applies to loopback too.
  • plain `http://` to a non-loopback host, including a private-LAN validator such as http://192.168.0.10:8899. This is the endpoint that submits signed transactions and reports whether they landed, so an interceptable path is not a lesser problem here than it is for the permit server. Use https://, or tunnel to 127.0.0.1.

Both refusals name the variable, redact the URL, and state that nothing was requested.

  • An identity is generated and stored at ~/.xete/identity.json on first run. **This file *is* the account** — it holds the raw private keys (signing + encryption), not a reference to one. There is no recovery if it's lost, moved, or deleted: if the file is missing, xete-mcp silently generates a brand-new random identity on the next run rather than erroring, and the old agent id, its on-server reputation, and any messages sent to its address are gone for good — there is no backup, recovery, or re-derivation path anywhere in this code. Treat identity.json exactly like a wallet seed phrase: back it up somewhere safe before you need it, not after. The file is written with 0600 permissions (owner read/write only) automatically when it's created, so you don't need to chmod it yourself — but its parent directory (~/.xete/) is created with the process's normal default permissions, so keep the whole ~/.xete/ folder off of shared or synced locations you don't control.
  • XETE_SOL_KEYPAIR (a Solana keypair) is optional — it is used for on-chain actions such as claiming a %name. Identity, sending and reading the inbox never require a keypair.
  • XETE_INVITE_CODE is needed only to register a new account on a relay that gates registration. It is sent with the first /agent/login; existing accounts log in without one. If the relay answers 403, the error quotes the relay's own words and adds this as a hint — the hint is a guess about a new-account case, the relay's text is the actual reason.
Upgrading from 0.1.4 — your messaging key changes (your mailbox does not)

0.1.4 stored a random x25519 messaging secret in identity.json, unrelated to the wallet. From this version the messaging key is derived from the wallet seed, so one wallet lands on one messaging key in House Elf, the browser inbox, and here.

Nothing is lost in that change. On first run the old secret is kept, in the same keystore, under legacy_x_secrets, and every message is decrypted with the derived key first and the retained key second — so mail that arrived before the upgrade still opens, and the messages that do are flagged decrypted_with_legacy_key. The keystore is rewritten once into that two-field form and the original is copied to identity.json.pre-derived-key.bak (0600) first. Back the whole ~/.xete/ directory up before upgrading anyway; it is still the account.

The half that is not local is publishing the new key. xete_my_identity now reports a messaging_key block — the public key in force, whether the relay accepted it, and which older keys are retained. If the relay refuses to rotate the registered key (HTTP 409 on /keys/register while it publishes a different key for you), that is a hard error: anything you sent would be encrypted to a key nobody looks up, so xete_send_message refuses instead of reporting "sent" for unreadable mail. Reading your inbox keeps working throughout.

%alias endpoints
VariableMeaningDefault

| XETE_PERMIT_URL | Base URL of the permit server — the separate service that prices a %name and co-signs the claim transaction. Must be https:// unless the host is loopback. | value of `XE

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