REA
Reverse engineer anything from your terminal or agent with one CLI and MCP server.
Claude Code skill for OWASP security best practices (2025-2026). Includes Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, Agentic AI security, and 20+ language-specific security quirks.
如果你是作者,可把这段代码贴到 README。徽章会链接回本页。
[](https://mcp.popnx.com/en/skills/agamm-claude-code-owasp)在同一工作中把 AI 连到服务的 MCP
Reverse engineer anything from your terminal or agent with one CLI and MCP server.
Codebase intelligence for TypeScript and JavaScript, exposed as structured MCP analysis tools.
MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
同类工作,排序与 Skill 列表相同
| 本项 claude-code-owasp | rea | graphify | MoneyPrinterTurbo | archify | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 作者 | agamm | morluto | Graphify-Labs | harry0703 | tt-a1i |
| Skill 数 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| GitHub 星标 | 450 | 463,254 | 148,775 | 143,788 | 97,049 |
| 最近代码更新 | 2026年11月4日 | 2026年11月16日 | 2026年11月16日 | 2026年11月13日 | 2026年11月15日 |
| 许可证 | MIT | MIT | Apache-2.0 | MIT | Apache-2.0 |
agamm 提供的 1 个 Skill(指令集),AI 读取后照做 · 不是 MCP server
MCP = 手
把 AI 连到外部服务或数据,例如读取 Notion 或开发票。需要有程序或服务器在运行。
Skill = 手册
教 AI 怎么做某项工作的文本文件,不连接任何服务。
有些会重叠:少数 Skill 带有调用工具的脚本,少数 MCP 只提供知识。请从你想完成的工作出发。
Claude Code
依据开发者 README 和 repo 中的文件夹
GitHub account agamm (person), 14 years old
★ 450 stars, few users so far · code last changed 2026年11月4日
No, plain text files the AI reads and follows
No scripts, so it does not go online by itself
No hooks or writes to machine settings found
Checked automatically from the repo files at commit 1ae29cb (read only, nothing was run). Not a safety guarantee: read it and decide for yourself
第一步:你用哪个 AI?
选择你用的应用,本页只显示该应用的安装方法
Uploading to claude.ai would fail: the description is over 200 characters (455). Use "Let the AI install it" instead
复制这句话,粘贴到 Claude Code 的对话中
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
重新打开 Claude Code,输入 /owasp-security,或直接提出相关任务,Claude 会自动选用
Checked against official docs 2026年11月12日 · Source: code.claude.com
Skill 是 AI 会照做的指令。安装前先阅读文件,只安装可信开发者的 Skill。
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
摘自开发者 README,会下载并运行开发者的代码
Mac:按 Command+空格输入 Terminal · Windows:下方命令在 PowerShell 中无法使用,请改用上方的“让 AI 帮你安装”
这条命令把 repo 下载到临时文件夹,只复制含 SKILL.md 的文件夹
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
ChatGPT 桌面应用内置 Codex,Codex 从 ~/.agents/skills 文件夹读取 Skill
在 ChatGPT 桌面应用中打开 Codex,把这句话粘贴到对话中
The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
把 owasp-security 文件夹放到 ~/.agents/skills/owasp-security
~ 是你的主文件夹($HOME)
Skill 是 AI 会照做的指令。安装前先阅读文件,只安装可信开发者的 Skill。
Mac:按 Command+空格输入 Terminal · Windows:下方命令在 PowerShell 中无法使用,请改用上方的“让 AI 帮你安装”
这条命令把 repo 下载到临时文件夹,只复制含 SKILL.md 的文件夹
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
Checked against official docs 2026年11月15日 · Source: learn.chatgpt.com
不能使用你自己安装的 Skill,只能使用目录中插件自带的 Skill
想在 ChatGPT 中使用这个 Skill,请按上面的方法使用 ChatGPT 桌面应用
Checked against official docs 2026年11月15日 · Source: learn.chatgpt.com
复制这句话,粘贴到 Codex 的对话中 · 适用于 ChatGPT 桌面应用中的 Codex、Codex CLI 和 IDE 扩展
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
Codex 会自动发现新安装的 Skill;如果没有出现,请重启 Codex · 使用方法:在 ChatGPT 中输入 @ 并选择 Skill · 在 Codex CLI 或 IDE 扩展中运行 /skills,或输入 $ 加 Skill 名称
Checked against official docs 2026年11月15日 · Source: learn.chatgpt.com
Skill 是 AI 会照做的指令。安装前先阅读文件,只安装可信开发者的 Skill。
Mac:按 Command+空格输入 Terminal · Windows:下方命令在 PowerShell 中无法使用,请改用上方的“让 AI 帮你安装”
这条命令把 repo 下载到临时文件夹,只复制含 SKILL.md 的文件夹
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
复制这句话,粘贴到 Cursor 的对话中
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
在 Cursor 的 Agent 聊天中输入 / 并选择 owasp-security
Checked against official docs 2026年11月12日 · Source: cursor.com
Skill 是 AI 会照做的指令。安装前先阅读文件,只安装可信开发者的 Skill。
Mac:按 Command+空格输入 Terminal · Windows:下方命令在 PowerShell 中无法使用,请改用上方的“让 AI 帮你安装”
这条命令把 repo 下载到临时文件夹,只复制含 SKILL.md 的文件夹
正在检查命令 · 通过后才会显示复制按钮
适用于其他能读取 Skill 的应用。这句话列出了 Claude Code、Codex 和 Cursor 的路径,AI 会按你的应用选择 · Copy this sentence into the app’s chat
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
Checked against official docs 2026年11月12日 · Source: code.claude.com, learn.chatgpt.com, cursor.com
其他支持 Agent Skills 的应用(如 Gemini CLI、GitHub Copilot)使用不同文件夹,请查看该应用的指南,再把含 SKILL.md 的文件夹复制过去。
已于 2026年11月11日 对照 Claude Code、Codex 和 Cursor 官方指南核实 skill 文件夹
以下文字来自开发者的 repo,不是 PopNx MCP 的指令
显示前 8,000 个字符 · 在 GitHub 打开完整文件
---
name: owasp-security
description: Reviews code for security vulnerabilities and guides secure implementation using OWASP Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2026), and the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026). Use when reviewing code or a diff for security issues, implementing authentication, authorization, sessions, or cryptography, handling untrusted input, files, or URLs, hardening config, dependencies, or CI, or building LLM and AI agent features.
when_to_use: Trigger phrases include "security review", "security check", "anything exploitable", "audit this", "is this secure", "is this safe to ship", "check for vulnerabilities", "find security bugs", "threat model", "OWASP", "ASVS", "CWE", "prompt injection", "MCP server security", "secrets in code", "supply chain", and "harden this Dockerfile or workflow".
---
# OWASP Security
Apply these standards when writing or reviewing code. For a review, follow the workflow below.
**Reference files** (read the one the task needs, and only the section you need):
- [`reference/review-checklist.md`](reference/review-checklist.md): coverage checklist for every Top 10 category, plus LLM and agent checks. Read during step 3 of a review.
- [`reference/languages.md`](reference/languages.md): per-language pitfalls with unsafe/safe examples for 20+ languages. Read the section for the language under review.
- [`reference/config-and-supply-chain.md`](reference/config-and-supply-chain.md): A02 and A03 in Dockerfiles, Kubernetes, Terraform, framework config, security headers, lockfiles, and CI/CD. Read when the change touches config, IaC, dependencies, or pipelines.
- [`reference/owasp-report.md`](reference/owasp-report.md): attack vectors, mitigations, and worked examples for every Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, LLM Top 10, and Agentic item. About 1100 lines: jump to the section you need.
## Security Review Workflow
Copy this checklist into your response and tick it off as you go:
```
Security Review Progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Map entry points and trust boundaries
- [ ] Step 2: Load the references this code needs
- [ ] Step 3: Sweep for candidate issues
- [ ] Step 4: Triage every candidate
- [ ] Step 5: Report findings
```
**Step 1: Map entry points and trust boundaries.** List where attacker-controlled data enters:
routes and handlers, headers and cookies, uploads, webhooks, queue consumers, CLI arguments,
third-party API responses, and anything an LLM reads or returns. Note where authentication and
authorization are enforced; it is often centralized in middleware rather than per route.
**Step 2: Load the references this code needs.** The language section of `languages.md`;
`config-and-supply-chain.md` if config, IaC, dependencies, or CI changed; the LLM and Agentic
sections of `owasp-report.md` if the code calls a model or runs an agent.
**Step 3: Sweep for candidate issues.** Walk `review-checklist.md` for the categories the code
touches. For each candidate, trace the path from an entry point in step 1 to the sink.
**Step 4: Triage every candidate** with the rubric in "Before Reporting a Finding" below. Drop
candidates that fail it, or downgrade them to defense-in-depth. If a candidate's reachability
is unclear, go back to step 1 for that input before deciding.
**Step 5: Report findings** in the format below, highest severity first.
## Before Reporting a Finding
A pattern match is not a vulnerability. The most common failure mode in automated security
review is reporting unreachable or already-mitigated code, which buries the real findings.
Confirm all four before reporting:
1. **Is the input actually attacker-controlled?** Trace it back to a real entry point: a
request parameter, header, cookie, uploaded file, webhook, queue message, or third-party
API response. A value that only ever comes from a constant, an enum, or trusted internal
config is not an injection source.
2. **Is the sink reachable with that input?** Check whether validation, an allowlist, an ORM,
or a framework-level control already sits between them. Look for auth middleware
(`middleware.ts`, `proxy.ts`, Express/Django/Rails middleware, a base controller,
decorators) before flagging a route as missing authorization. Enforcement is often
centralized rather than per-route.
3. **What is the blast radius?** Who can trigger it, what do they get, and does it cross a
trust boundary? An SSRF reaching cloud metadata differs from one reaching localhost only.
4. **Can the attacker perform every step?** Each step of the exploit must be possible from
the attacker's position. A symlink race needs a way to create symlinks on the server; a
header attack needs a client that can set that header. If a step needs a capability the
code doesn't show the attacker having, the finding is "Needs verification", not High.
Report severity by exploitability, not by pattern. State the concrete path (*this input
reaches this sink*) and say so explicitly when a finding is theoretical or defense-in-depth
rather than directly exploitable. If reachability can't be determined from the code available,
say that instead of asserting either way.
## Reporting Format
One block per finding, highest severity first:
```
[SEVERITY] Title (CWE-###, OWASP A##:2025, LLM## Risk Name, ASI## Risk Name)
Location: path/to/file.ext:LINE
Path: <entry point> -> <intermediate hops> -> <sink>
Impact: who can trigger it, what they get, which trust boundary it crosses
Fix: the concrete change, with a code snippet when it isn't obvious
Confidence: Confirmed | Likely | Needs verification (say what you couldn't see)
```
Write every LLM and ASI ID with its risk name, e.g. "LLM03 Excessive Agency". A bare LLM ID is
ambiguous: the 2025 and 2026 editions use the same numbers for different risks.
| Severity | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Critical | Unauthenticated remote code execution, auth bypass, or mass data exposure |
| High | Authenticated exploitation crossing a trust boundary (IDOR into other tenants, SQLi behind login) |
| Medium | Needs unusual preconditions, or impact is limited to the attacker's own data |
| Low | Defense-in-depth gap with no demonstrated exploit path |
| Info | Hardening suggestion; say plainly that it is not a vulnerability |
If the review finds nothing exploitable, say so directly. Do not pad the report with Info items
to look thorough; a long list is what makes real findings get ignored.
## OWASP Top 10:2025
Three categories were renamed from 2021 and two are new (A03, A10). Use these names and
numbers; much OWASP material online still cites the 2021 list.
| # | Category | Key Prevention |
|---|----------|----------------|
| A01 | Broken Access Control (now includes SSRF) | Deny by default, enforce server-side, verify ownership |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Harden configs, disable defaults, minimize features |
| A03 | Software Supply Chain Failures | Lock versions, verify integrity, audit dependencies |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS 1.2+, AES-256-GCM, Argon2/bcrypt for passwords |
| A05 | Injection | Parameterized queries, input validation, safe APIs |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Threat model, rate limit, design security controls |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | MFA, check breached passwords, secure sessions |
| A08 | Software or Data Integrity Failures | Sign packages, SRI for CDN, safe serialization |
| A09 | Security Logging and Alerting Failures | Log security events, structured format, alerting |
| A10 | Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | Fail-closed, hide internals, log with context |
## OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2026)
For applications that call LLMs (chatbots, RAG, copilots, agents). The 2026 edition renumbered
the list; translate 2025 IDs with the table in `owasp-report.md` and cite 2026 IDs only.
| # | Risk | Key Mitigation |
|---|------|----------------|
| LLM01 | Prompt Injection | No complete fix exists. Fence untrusted content (including images,提问、分享技巧或报告无法使用。按“有帮助”数量排序。